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A HISTORY OP STRAITS SETTLEMENTS FOREIGN TRADE,
1870-1915
By CHIANG HAI DING
The aim of this thesis is to study the growth and 
changes in the regional distribution and commodity 
composition of Straits Settlements trade in the period 1870- 
1915. It endeavours also to analyse the character of this 
trade and to examine the influences that affected it. The 
thesis can be divided into five sections:
Section 1 (Chapter I) The causes for the founding of Penang 
and Singapore were to serve as bases in the China trade 
and as emporia in Southeast Asia. The factors responsible 
for their success were the freedom of the ports, the freedom 
of trade and their geographical' location. By 1869 the 
European powers had gained firm footholds in Southeast 
while the Chinese came in large numbers.
Section 2 (Chapters II, III, and IV) The trade of the 
Straits Settlements is usually described as entrepot 
while its commercial policy is free trade. But the entre­
pot trade is only one, although the most important,
component of the total trade of the colony. According to
✓contemporary mercantile opinion the large and persistent 
import surplus as shown in the published trade returns
was proof of their inaccuracy, for it was argued that 
the colony could not possibly continue to import more than 
it exported. But by drawing attention to the other 
components and by distinguishing between the balance of 
trade accounts, to which merchants were in fact referring, 
and the balance of payments accounts, which were the 
pertinent values to be considered, an attempt is made to 
account for the import surplus.
There were five major reasons for trade to be attracted 
to the Straits Settlements. Firstly, they were free ports, 
and taxes that were imposed fell on consumption in the 
colony and not on the entrepot trade. Secondly, there 
were no restrictions on trade. Thirdly, the geographical 
advantage, in particular of Singapore, was not impaired 
by the development of steamship navigation because it was 
a logical and an excellent coaling station in addition to 
being the natural site for a Southeast Asian emporium. 
Fourthly, the colony, in particular Singapore, provided 
special and valuable services to trade, of which the 
establishment of smelting works and a rubber market are 
excellent examples. Lastly, the colony was a centre of 
credit for Asian traders. In addition, the Singapore 
Chamber of Commerce was an active promoter of trading 
interests and objectives while the colonial government 
was aware of the special position of these ports and gave 
a very sympathetic hearing to mercantile representations.
3There were three major reasons for Singapore to lose 
trade. They were: the increasing number of direct steamship 
services between Europe and the ports of Southeast Asia 
which reduced their dependence on Singapore; the compe­
tition of these ports as they developed and participated 
in the trade; and tariff restriction as imposed by the 
French in Indochina.
The trade of the Straits Settlements was handled 
almost entirely by European and Chinese merchants. This 
trade can be divided into East-West and intra-Asian sectors; 
the first was shared between the two - the Europeans 
importing Western manufactures and exporting Asian produce 
and the Chinese doing the reverse. The intra-Asian trade 
was the monopoly of the Chinese. The Chinese and European 
merchants therefore were complementary and not competitive, 
and they were linked by credit granted by the Europeans 
to the Chinese. Although occasional frauds sometimes 
imposed stresses on this relationship it was usually 
harmonious.
Section 3 (Chapters V, VI and VII) The growth of Straits 
Settlements trade in the period 1870-1915 reflected the 
economic phenomena of the time. These included the rapid 
industrialization of Europe and the United States, the 
brief period of free trade which was followed by a return 
to protectionism, and great advances in transport and
4communication. The influence of Western price movements 
on the values of Straits Settlements trade is discernible 
but it was more than balanced by the effects of currency 
depreciation in the colony which insulated it from the 
Great Depression of 1873-1896. The expansion of the 
European powers in Southeast Asia introduced law and order. 
Under the new conditions, and stimulated by Western demands 
for foodstuffs and raw materials, the regions of Southeast 
Asia made rapid gains in output, which was reflected in 
the expansion of the colony's trade. The introduction and 
the development of the para rubber industry at the end 
of the nineteenth century helped to swell even further 
the values of imports and exports in the twentieth.
The analysis of distribution of Straits Settlements 
trade shows that the flow of trade from East-to-West was
more valuable than the reverse flow of West-to-East while
/
the intra-Asian flow also exceeded that of the West-to- 
East. Malaya became the most important region trading 
with the Straits Settlements by the end of this period 
while Indonesia retained its strong commercial ties. The 
colony's trade with Indochina was severely affected by 
the imposition of restrictive tariffs but the trade with 
Siam, Burma, British Borneo and the rest of Southeast 
Asia did not show any significant changes. Its trade with 
South and East Asia was, however, on the decline. Exports 
to Britain, Europe and the United States increased much
- 5■ -  mm
more rapidly than imports from these regions, but its trade 
with the last two regions grew faster than its trade with 
Britain. The analysis of commodities in the colony's trade 
bears out these observations in the regional distribution: 
the value of commodities in the East-to-West flow increased 
more rapidly than that of commodities in the reverse flow.
The importance of tin in the nineteenth century and that 
of rubber by the twentieth can be clearly seen, while cotton 
piece goods declined proportionately in terms of total 
trade. In the intra-Asian flow the outstanding change was 
the decline of the trade in opium. The origin and destination 
of commodities did not change appreciably except in such 
commodities as coal and petroleum, in which the Western 
sources were replaced by Asian ones. The growing importance 
of Malaya to the Straits Settlements, both as a source of 
supplies and as a market, is, also evident.
Section 4 (Chapters VIII and IX) The merchants of the 
day argued vehemently about the effects on trade of the 
Straits Homeward Conference and the depreciation of the 
colony's currency. The alleged detrimental effects of 
these factors are not supported by the statistical evidence.
It is in fact very possible that these factors made positive 
contributions to trade: the conference made possible an 
excellent shipping service which complemented the harbour 
facilities of Singapore while the depreciating currency 
prevented the transmission to the colony of the price fall
6in the West.
Section 5 (Chapter X) This study brings out the dominating 
importance of external factors in the trade of the Straits 
Settlements, which in many ways can be regarded as a 
barometer recording changes in its environs and in places 
as far removed as Europe and the United States. This was 
due primarily to the entrepot character of the greatest 
part of its trade. Secondly, the development of close 
economic ties with its hinterland greatly strengthened the 
position of the colony. Thirdly, it was the political 
stability of the colony which enabled it to profit from 
the economic developments that took place in this period.
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PREFACE
The aim of this thesis is to study the* growth of 
Straits Settlements foreign trade in the period 1870 to 
1915, to examine the changes in its regional distribution 
and commodity composition and to analyse the factors 
that influenced trade.
The trade of the Straits Settlements is commonly 
described as entrepot in character while free trade was, 
and is still, held as its primary attraction. Yet very 
little study has been made of its nature, causes and 
structure. This thesis begins therefore with such an 
analysis which, it is believed, is basic in a study of 
the colony’s trade. Then follows a statistical exposition 
and analysis of the trade, covering both growth and change 
in these 45 years. Two chapters are then devoted to 
examining the effect of two factors which contemporary 
mercantile opinion held to have seriously affected trade.
A brief summing-up of the salient features that emerge 
from this study concludes the thesis.
Statistical appendices with explanatory notes 
supplement the tables used in the text while three 
historical appendices enlarge on subjects which could 
not be accommodated in the text but which were neverthe­
less important to the study.
This thesis was undertaken when I was holding a 
research scholarship in the Department of Pacific History
in the Australian National University, Most of the primary 
materials were collected during a year’s field trip back to 
Singapore including a brief visit to Penang,
I am indebted to many people for advice and assistance 
during the planning of the thesis, the collection of 
materials and the actual writing, in particular to my 
supervisors, Professor J.W, Davidson and Mr E,K, Fisk, 
who gave me generously of their time and experience, I 
was fortunate also to receive the guidance of Professor 
N.G. Butlin in the early stages of my work and of 
Dr W.M, Corden in the final stages. I wish to thank also 
Mr P, Suntharalingam, Dr Wong Lin Ken and Mr Christopher 
Wake for their friendly counsel and help.
The research student invariably ends up being heavily 
indebted to many people who helped to trace and make 
available books and other sources of information, I am 
very grateful to Mrs N. Galloway and Mr T. Ellis of the 
ANU Library in Canberra, to Mrs Hedwig Annuar, Mrs V. 
Perumbulavil, Mrs Y.L, 7/icks and. Mr Ng Cheng Onn of the 
National Library of Singapore, to Mr,Peter Tan of the 
Statistics Department, Singapore, and to Professor K.G, 
Tregonning of the History Department, University of 
Singapore, for allowing me to consult the unpublished 
thesis in the possession of the Department.
It was my intention to make a close study of the 
role of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce in the trade of
the colony hut the inadequacy of materials rendered this
impossible at the moment so that only an outline history
of the Chamber is appended while its known activities are
the
referred to in relevent places in/text. The Chambers of 
Commerce of Singapore, Penang, Hongkong, London, Manchester 
Liverpool and Glasgow responded to my queries and sent me 
several interesting pieces of information. I wish to 
thank these organizations for their kindness, and also 
Dr Ian Nish of Sydney University for information on the 
subject of merchant organizations in the India-China trade.
Finally, it is my pleasure to record my thanks to 
Mrs A. Guenot and the typists in the Typing Pool of the ANU 
and to Miss Jenny Choong of the History Department of the 
University of Singapore.
CHD
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ITHE HISTORY OP STRAITS SETTLEMENTS TRADE TO 1869
The British settlements in the Straits of Malacca were
established to serve the cause of trade. So successfully was 
this cause served that it can truly he said that the history 
of the Straits Settlements 'is written mainly in statistics1 2
Penang and subsequently Singapore were founded to 
protect the China trade, which consisted largely of the 
exchange of tea from Canton with the opium of Bengal. This 
trade was of primary importance to the English East India 
Company, for it was the huge profits made from it that 
saved the Company from being bankrupted by the expenses of 
governing its possessions in India. The two main routes 
for the trade between Europe, India, Southeast Asia and 
China were the Straits of Malacca in the north and the 
Straits of Sunda in the south. The southern route was 
under Dutch control. Penang, situated at the northern 
entrance of the Straits of Malacca, was founded in 1786 by 
a trader, Francis Light, to serve as a base for the 
victualling, watering and refitting of vessels engaged in 
the China trade.2 With the founding of Singapore in 1819
1. Sir Richard Winstedt, Malaya and Its History, London 
1948, p. 60. Winstedt referred in particular to 
Singapore, but the remark is applicable to all the 
Straits Settlements.
2. K.G. Tregonning, 'The Founding and Development of 
Penang, 1786-1826', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Malaya (Singapore) 1958, p. 69. Dr Tregonning 
advances the view that the several expeditions under­
taken by the East India Company at the close of the 
eighteenth century were 'commercial in intent and 
designed to assist the trade v/ith China'.
1
"by Stamford Raffles, "both entrances to the Straits of 
Malacca came under British control and the China trade 
was thus fully protected.'*
The second consideration in the founding of these two 
settlements was to prevent the Dutch from monopolizing the 
trade of the Archipelago. The establishment of Penang was a 
step against further Dutch expansion and it gave the British 
a base in the Malay Peninsula. This step was followed up by 
Raffles who felt that the very least his Singapore should do 
was to secure for the British fa fair participation in the 
general trade of the Eastern Archipelago’.1 2 3 The Dutch, 
re-established in Java in 1811 after the wars in Europe, 
were actively pursuing a policy intended to gain exclusive 
control of trade of the Archipelago. Raffles’ response was 
’we must set up shop next to the Dutch’.3
Singapore prospered. Its establishment embarrassed the 
negotiations between the Dutch and British governments which
2
1. The instructions that Lord Hastings, the Governor-General 
of Bengal, gave to Raffles regarding the founding of 
Singapore were: to leave to the Dutch the control of the 
Straits of Sunda, but to secure the Straits of Malacca 
for the protection of the China trade; this was to be 
done by ’the establishment of a station beyond Malacca, 
such as may command the southern entrance of those 
Straits’. See C.E. Wurtzburg, Raffles of the Eastern 
Isles. London 1954, pp.4^1-4*
2. Quoted in Lin Ken Wong, ’A Study of the Trade of 
Singapore, 1819-1869’, unpublished M.A. thesis, University 
of Malaya (Singapore) 1955» p«38*
3. W. Makepeace, G.E. Brooke, R. St.J. Braddell, 100 Years 
of Singapore, vol. II, London 1921, p.23.
3"began in 1818, "but the instant success of Singapore led to 
considerable support in Britain for its retention. When 
negotiations were later resumed and concluded in the Anglo- 
Dutch Treaty of March 1824, the Dutch recognized the British 
occupation of Singapore. The treaty secured a division of 
spheres of influence, with the British north of the Straits 
of Malacca hut not south of Singapore while the Dutch were to 
keep to the south of the Straits of Malacca, This division 
was symbolized by the exchange of British Bencoolen in 
Sumatra for Dutch Malacca in Malaya. In effect the British 
now had undisputed control of the Straits of Malacca for the 
protection of the China trade; the price was the denial of 
possible extension in Sumatra. The Dutch, however, 
relinquished their claim to the Malay Peninsula in favour of 
the British. Both parties undertook to promote a more 
liberal trade policy.1
The support for the retention of Singapore came from 
British private traders who saw its value as a base for thi 
protection and development of British trade in the 
Archipelago. They had secured in 1813 the opening of the 
trade to India, which hitherto had been the monopoly of the 
East India Company.2 Since Singapore (and Penang)
1. Wong, 1 2Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869*, pp. 19-29«
2. See Arthur Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, 
1794-1858, Manchester 1934, PP* 111-18. The opposition to 
the EIC monopoly seemed to be headed by the Manchester and 
Liverpool Chambers of Commerce, but co-operation came from 
Chambers in Glasgow, Blackburn and other textile centres.
4comprised part of the Company’s Indian possessions, private 
traders were able to participate in the trade with China by 
using Singapore as a transshipment base: they took Chinese
silks from Singapore and left English cottons there to be 
forwarded to China in Chinese junks. In 1833 the trade to 
China was finally thrown open to private traders as the 
result of further agitation, Singapore’s role as a mere 
transshipment port came to an end. In the meantime the East 
India Company came under close scrutiny and severe criticism 
in Britain and, after the Indian Mutiny, it was abolished in 
1858. These settlements had frequently found their Indian 
connexion irksome, and in 1858 began a movement to bring 
about their transfer from Indian control to the Colonial 
Office. This was successful and in April 1867 the Crown 
Colony of the Straits Settlements was established.
As the importance of the Straits Settlements as a base 
in the China trade declined, that as an emporium in Southeast 
Asia grew. Singapore’s trade with Southeast Asia increased 
from about a quarter of total imports and exports of the 
port in 1833 to almost half in i860, while the trade with 
China fell from almost a quarter to less, than a fifth. 
Penang’s trade was even more dependent on Southeast Asia.-*
1 . C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya. The Origins 
of British Political Control. London 1961. p. 21.
5TABLE I
T rad e  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  1833-63*^
( $ 0 0 0 )
1 S in g a p o re Penang M alacca S t r a i t s
S e t t l e m e n t s
Im- Ex- Im- Ex- Im- Ex- Im- Ex-
p o r t s p o r t s p o r t s p o r t s p o r t s p o r t s p o r t s  p o r t s
1833 9,071 7 ,5 7 0 1 ,896 1 ,9 5 4 462 258 11 ,429 9,781
1843 13,111 11 ,5 2 2 2 ,1 0 0 2 ,4 3 8 422 275 1 5 ,6 3 3  14 ,235
[1853 , 1 5 ,4 8 7 1 3 ,4 4 0 3 ,2 1 9 4,271 1 ,328 968 2 0 ,0 3 3  18 ,679
h 863i 28,691 2 4 ,6 6 4 7 ,4 7 7 1 0 ,6 2 0 2,011 1,598 3 8 ,1 8 0  36 ,8 8 3
(S o u rc e :  Jo h n  Cameron, Our T r o p ic a l  P o s s e s s io n s  i n  M alayan
I n d i a , 1 8 6 5 , p ,  1 7 9 . )
The t o t a l  t r a d e  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  i n c r e a s e d  
a b o u t  t h r e e  and  a h a l f  t im e s  i n  th e  30 y e a r s  b e tw een  1833 and 
1863 , w i th  S in g a p o re  c la im in g  th e  m a jo r  s h a re  o f  b o th  im p o r ts  
and e x p o r t s .  Prom 1822 S in g a p o r e ’ s t r a d e  had  a l r e a d y  
exceed ed  t h a t  o f  P enang1 2 and i t  form ed th e  p r e p o n d e r a n t  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  t r a d e .
1 .  The t a b l e  i n  Cameron’ s book was g iv e n  in  £ s t e r l i n g ,  which 
p re su m ab ly  was c o n v e r t e d  from  r u p e e s ,  i n  which t h e  
S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  r e c o r d s  were k e p t .  The t a b l e  h a s  
b e e n  r e c o n v e r t e d  t o  d o l l a r s  a t  th e  r a t e  o f  $1 = 4 s .  6 d . , 
w hich was th e  r a t e  o f  exchange  u n t i l  th e  1 8 7 0 s . A check  
h a s  b e e n  made a g a i n s t  th e  v a lu e  o f  im p o r ts  and e x p o r t s  
o f  S in g a p o re  i n  th e  c o r r e s p o n d in g  y e a r s  w i th  L in  Ken 
Wong’ s ’T rad e  o f  S in g a p o re ,  181 9 -1 8 6 9 ’ (v a lu e  c o n v e r te d  
i n t o  d o l l a r s  from  r u p e e s )  and t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  was 
n e g l i g i b l e .
2 C*D. Cowan, E ar l y  Penang  and  t h e  P i s e  o f  S in g a p o r e . 
1 8 0 5 -1 8 3 2 . JMBRAS. v o l .  XXIII P a r t  2 , 1950 , p .  11 .
6F a c t o r s  i n  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s
T h ree  m a jo r  f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  r a p i d  e x p a n s io n  
o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  t r a d e  -  t h e  f reedom  o f  t h e  p o r t s ,  t h e  
f reed o m  o f  t r a d e  and t h e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s e t t l e ­
m e n t s .
The f reedom  o f  t h e  p o r t s  meant t h a t  t h e y  were exempted 
from t h e  payment o f  im p o r t  and e x p o r t  d u t i e s ,  t o n n a g e  and 
p o r t  d u e s ,  w h a r fag e  and a n ch o rag e  dues  and  p o r t  c l e a r a n c e  
f e e s  an d  stamp d u t i e s .  T h is  was i n  d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  w i th  t h e  
o t h e r  p o r t s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  which were ’ l o a d e d  w i t h  
m o n o p o l i e s ,  e x o r b i t a n t  d u e s ,  and  v a r i o u s  r e s t r i c t i o n s ' 1 , ’ 
P enang  was fo u n d ed  i n  1786 a s  a  f r e e  p o r t  and  r e m a in e d  so 
u n t i l  180 1 ,  when i t  became a customs p o r t  a t  which t a x e s  were 
l e v i e d  on i m p o r t s  and  e x p o r t s .  S in g a p o re  was a l s o  founded  
a s  a f r e e  p o r t  and i t  h a s  r e m a in e d .o n e  e v e r  s i n c e .  I n  1826 
Penang and  M alacca  were d e c l a r e d  f r e e  p o r t s  and  p l a c e d  on t h e  
same b a s i s  a s  S i n g a p o r e ,  T h is  f reedom was a g r e a t  a t t r a c t i o n  
t o  t h e  t r a d e r s  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  and  C h in a .  I t  a t t r a c t e d  t h e  
B u g is  t r a d e r s  who h a d  a v o id e d  Malacca  w h i l e  i t  was u n d e r  
Dutch  c o n t r o l  b e c a u s e  h i g h  d u t i e s  were l e v i e d  t h e r e .  The 
B u g i s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  known a s  t h e  Waju, were t h e  most 
i m p o r t a n t  c a r r i e r s  o f  t r a d e  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  a t  t h a t  t im e .  
From t h e i r  homes i n  t h e  so u th w e s t  arm o f  t h e  C e le b es  t h e y
1 .  Wong, ’ T rad e  o f  S in g a p o r e ,  1 8 1 9 - 1 8 6 9 , ’ p .  283»
7made their way in their prahus (native boats), collecting and 
"bringing the produce of the eastern half of the Archipelago to 
Singapore; they took away in exchange European and Indian 
textiles and other manufactures. The Bugis trade, however, 
declined after Macassar was made a free port in 1847, but the 
trade between Singapore and Macassar increased rapidly.
At this time it was the practice for Chinese junks to call at 
Batavia, which was then the only port in Indonesia where 
Chinese junks could trade. At Batavia, however, high duties 
were charged: an import duty ranging from 2,000 to 6,000
florins was levied if only Chinese merchandise was carried, 
and a higher duty if European goods were included. There 
were also export duties on local produce.2 With the rise of 
an alternative port which imposed no taxes the trade shifted 
and a large Chinese population quickly collected at Singapore.3 
The Straits Settlements were not only free ports, but the 
first free ports in an area abounding in restrictions. They 
therefore attracted trade immediately. Later free ports, 
such as Hongkong (1842), Labuan (1846), and Macassar (1847) 
had, however, to contend with already flourishing free ports.
1. Wong, 1 23Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869’, p. 136.
2. Ibid., p. 148.
3. According to Raffles there were 120 Malays and 30 Chinese inhabitants when he landed, but within four months -there 
were 5,000, most of whom were Chinese. Victor Purcell in 
The Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 198-9 rather doubts the 
latter figure, and prefers Braddell’s estimate that in 
1821 there were 4,727 inhabitants of which 1 ,159 were 
Chinese, and that in 1823 there were 10,683 of which less 
than a third, 3,317, were Chinese.
8The second major factor in the rapid grov/th of the 
Straits Settlements was the complete freedom of trade. Not 
only were there no imposts on trade hut there were also no 
restrictions on trading. Traders of all nations were allowed 
to come to these ports to trade without let or hindrance.
This was once again in contrast with Dutch practices.
Although Macassar, for example, was made a free port in 1847 
and admitted commodities tax-free, private traders were not 
permitted to enter the market until the national company, the 
Nederlandse Handelmaatschappij (NHM) had satisfied all its 
requirements; the result was that these traders quite 
frequently were unahle to obtain a return cargo. 1 There were
no such discriminatory practices in the Straits Settlements.
Thirdly, these settlements were well located for trade 
v/ith Southeast Asia, China, India, Britain and Europe. This 
was particularly true of Singapore. Penang, situated on the 
north-western fringe of the Archipelago was not in a position 
to attract much trade beyond that of its proximate neighbours 
- Burma, Siam, the west coast of Malaya and north Sumatra. 
Singapore, however, was close and easily accessible to the 
small boats from Siam, Indochina, Indonesia and British 
Borneo. It lay on the natural routes for both sailing and 
steam vessels. It was the most convenient port of call for 
a sailing vessel setting out from Britain or India and bound 
for Siam, Indochina, China or the Philippines; it was also
1# Wong, ’Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869’, p. 136.
on the route of vessels plying "between India and China which 
used the Straits of Macassar and Mindoro,
Prom the time of its foundation Singapore attracted the 
Chinese traders in Southeast Asia who were looking for 
precisely the kind of port that Singapore was. Chinese trade 
in Southeast Asia (the Nanyang or Southern Ocean) could be 
divided, hy drawing an imaginary north-to-south line through 
the middle of Borneo, into two sections - that with the 
Eastern Nanyang which was Based at Luzon in the Philippines, 
and that with the Western Nanyang, for which there was no 
satisfactory "base. The V/estern Nanyang was the richer of the 
two sections, hut from the decline of Palembang in the 
fifteenth century and the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese 
in 1511» the Chinese moved around Siam, Johore and Java 
looking for a base. In the last years of the eighteenth and 
in the beginning of the nineteenth century the Chinese had 
established settlements in Sambas in West Borneo, in Bangka, 
Billiton, the Biau-Lingga Archipelago and on both sides of 
the Straits of Malacca, For the trade in the area bounded 
by these settlements both Penang and Batavia were compara­
tively remote. Baffles found and established the base for 
which the Chinese were looking in the Western Nanyang.^
From Singapore the Chinese pressed forward into the 
hinterland and out into the surrounding islands.
9
1. Gungwu Wang, A Short History of the Nanyang Chinese. 
Singapore 1959, p. 19»
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With t h e  a d v e n t  o f  s t e a m s h i p s  S i n g a p o r e ’ s g e o g r a p h i c a l  
p o s i t i o n  o p e r a t e d  t o  i t s  a d v a n t a g e .  The e a r l y  s t e a m s h i p s  
consumed t o o  much c o a l  t o  make i t  e c o n o m ic a l ly  w o r th w h i l e  f o r  
them t o  t r a v e r s e  g r e a t  d i s t a n c e s  such  a s  t h e  Cape o f  Good Hope 
t o  Sunda S t r a i t s ,  To r e l i e v e  them o f  c a r r y i n g  c o a l  which 
t o o k  up c a r g o  s p a c e ,  a s e r i e s  o f  c o a l i n g  d e p o t s  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
d o t t i n g  t h e  c o a s t s  from A r a b i a  t o  I n d i a ,  down t h e  S t r a i t s  o f  
M alacca  and t h e n c e  onward t o  C h in a ,  S in g a p o re  became a 
c o a l i n g  d e p o t  an d  a p o r t  o f  c a l l  f o r  s team  v e s s e l s  p l y i n g  t h i s  
r o u t e ,  M a lac ca ,  c a u g h t  b e tw ee n  two f r e e  p o r t s ,  a t t r a c t e d  
v i r t u a l l y  no t r a d e  and  s e r v e d  o n ly  a s  a m inor  f e e d e r - p o r t  t o  
S i n g a p o r e ,  a r o l e  a l s o  p l a y e d  by  Penang ,  1 
European  i n f l u e n c e  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia
Both t h e  B r i t i s h  and t h e  Dutch  were p r i m a r i l y  i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e i r  t r a d i n g  i n t e r e s t s .  The Dutch aimed 
a t  s e c u r i n g  a monopoly o f  t r a d e  w h e rev e r  t h i s  was p o s s i b l e ,  
w h i l e  t h e  B r i t i s h  a imed a t  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  f r e e  p o r t s  t o  
p rom ote  t h e  g row th  o f  t r a d e .  They came i n t o  c o n f l i c t .  The 
A ng lo -D u tch  a g re e m e n t  o f  1824 was an a t t e m p t  t o  s e t t l e  t h i s  
c o n f l i c t .  The Malay P e n i n s u l a  was c o n s i d e r e d  t o  f a l l  i n t o  
t h e  B r i t i s h  s p h e r e  o f  i n f l u e n c e .  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  g e n e r a l l y  
eschewed t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  t e r r i t o r y ,  p r e f e r r i n g  t h e  
e x e r c i s e  o f  an  i n f o r m a l  pa ram o u n tcy  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f
1 .  Wong, ’T rad e  o f  S in g a p o r e ,  I 8 l 9 - l 8 6 9 f , p .  114* I n  1862-3 
o n e - t h i r d  o f  P e n a n g ’ s t o t a l  t r a d e  ( i m p o r t s  and  e x p o r t s )  
was w i t h  S i n g a p o r e .
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formal control. The Burney Treaty, negotiated with Siam in 
1826, did seal off the northern part of the Malay Peninsula 
from Siamese influence, "but this was not followed by measures 
to extend British influence. The merchants who worked for the 
transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office in 
1867 hoped that it would lead to a closer relationship 
"between the colony and the Malay Peninsula. They had to wait 
for seven years "before it took place.
British policy towards Burma was based on the need to 
secure the Indian frontiers "by controlling contiguous 
territories although the promotion of trade was an important 
factor. In 1824 the first invasion of Burma took place and 
the British acquired Arakan and Tenasserim. Anglo-Burmese 
relations deteriorated and a second invasion followed in 
1850-51 as a result of which Pegu was annexed. In 1852 
Rangoon and Prome were captured; three years later the 
entire Burmese coast came under British control. By 1867 
Britain had also acquired most favoured nation treatment, 
extra-territorial rights, and secured the guarantee of 
freedom to trade and to promote trade in Burma.
French activity in Indochina was responsible for British 
action in Burma. It was feared that French expansion west­
wards would result in a common frontier between the two 
powers, which could lead to conflict. French interest dated 
back to the late eighteenth century and was actively revived 
in the middle of the nineteenth. The French captured Saigon
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i n  1859 and annexed t h e  t h r e e  e a s t e r n  p r o v i n c e s  o f  C och in -  
China i n  1862.  F iv e  y e a r s  l a t e r  t h e  o t h e r  p r o v i n c e s  were t a k e n  
and t h e  Colony o f  F r e n c h  C och in -C h ina  was e s t a b l i s h e d .  I n  t h e  
same y e a r  t h e  F re n c h  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  a p r o t e c t o r a t e  o v e r  
Cambodia was r e c o g n i s e d  by  Siam, t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s u z e r a i n ,
Siam was t h e  f o c a l  p o i n t  o f  A n g lo -F re n c h  r i v a l r y .
D e l i m i t e d  i n  t h e  s o u t h  by t h e  Burney T r e a t y  o f  1826 and r e d u c e d  
i n  t h e  e a s t  by t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  F r e n c h  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  Cambodia, 
t h e  Kingdom o f  Siam n e v e r t h e l e s s  r e t a i n e d  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
i n d e p e n d e n c e . Much c r e d i t  f o r  t h i s  must go t o  t h e  wisdom o f  
Siam’ s g r e a t  m onarch ,  Mongkut ( 1 8 5 1 - 6 8 ) ,  who m o d e rn ize d  h i s  
s t a t e  and k e p t  p e a c e f u l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  b o t h  W este rn  po w ers .
But a m a jo r  cau se  o f  Siamese in d ep e n d en c e  was B r i t i s h  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  a v o i d  a common b o r d e r  w i t h  t h e  F r e n c h ,  and 
Siam was t h e r e f o r e  k e p t  s t r o n g  and i n d e p e n d e n t  t o  s e r v e  a s  
a b u f f e r  s t a t e .
I n  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  m a jo r  i n n o v a t i o n  o f  t h e  Dutch  was t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  i n  1830 o f  t h e  ’ c u l t u r e  s y s t e m ’ which o p e r a t e d  
u n t i l  1870 when most o f  i t  was a b o l i s h e d .  The c u l t u r e  sy s te m  
i n v o l v e d  com pulsory  l a b o u r  a n d  t h e  d i r e c t e d  c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  
c o f f e e ,  s u g a r ,  i n d i g o  and o t h e r  c r o p s ,  i n  e f f e c t  t u r n i n g  J a v a  
i n t o  a s t a t e  p l a n t a t i o n .  I n  so d o in g  t h e  Dutch  became t h e  
f i r s t  E u ro p e a n s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  t o  t u r n  f rom  t r a d e  to  a c t u a l  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  c r o p s .  B a t a v i a ,  t h e  
l e a d i n g  Dutch  exchange  m arke t  i n  i s l a n d  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  was 
e c l i p s e d  by S i n g a p o r e ,  b u t  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n a t i o n a l  Dutch 
company, t h e  N e d e r l a n d s e  H a n d e lm a a t s c h a p p i j  (MM) i n  1824 l e d
t o  a marked i n c r e a s e  i n  Dutch  s h i p p i n g  and s t i m u l a t e d  Dutch  
im p o r t s  i n t o  J a v a .
I n  Borneo James Brooke e s t a b l i s h e d  h i m s e l f  i n  Sarawak 
i n  1 841 and t h e  B r i t i s h  a c q u i r e d  Labuan a s  a c o a l i n g  d e p o t  i n  
1846 ,  d e s p i t e  Dutch  p r o t e s t s  t h a t  t h e  1824 t r e a t y  was b e i n g  
v i o l a t e d .  The D u tch ,  however ,  made c a u t i o u s  a d v an c es  i n  
Sumatra  -  a p r o t e c t o r a t e  was e s t a b l i s h e d  ove r  S iak  and a 
t r e a t y  o f  f r i e n d s h i p  made w i th  Acheh i n  1858 .
L e s s  a c t i v e  i n  t e m p o r a l  m a t t e r s  were t h e  S p an ish  i n  t h e  
P h i l i p p i n e s .  The s o l e  comm erc ia l  v e n t u r e  o f  t h e  S p a n ish  was 
t h e  a n n u a l  * Mani la  g a l l e o n ’ t o  S p a in .  The t r i a n g u l a r  t r a d e  
b e tw e e n  M a n i la ,  China and  S p an ish  America  f e l l  i n t o  C h in ese  
h a n d s .
The E u ro p e a n s  h ad  b e e n  a t t r a c t e d  to  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  f o r  
commerc ia l  r e a s o n s  a n d  u n t i l  1 8 6 9  t r a d e  r e m a in e d  t h e i r  m ajo r  
i n t e r e s t .  As a r u l e  t h e y  l o o k e d  s e a - w a r d s  f o r  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  
and  B r i t i s h  b a s e s  fo u n d ed  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d  -  P en an g ,  S in g a p o r e ,  
Hongkong and  Labuan -  were a l l  o f f - s h o r e  i s l a n d s .  But some 
headway had  b een  made by 1 8 7 0  to w a rd s  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  
t e r r i t o r y  and t h e  c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  d e s i r e d  c r o p s .
The C h inese  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia
One o f  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  e f f e c t s  o f  E u ropean  r u l e  i n  
S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  was t h e  i n f l u x  o f  C h inese  m i g r a n t s  i n t o  t h e  
r e g i o n ,  Chinese  t r a v e l l e r s  and  t r a d e r s  had  b e e n  coming t o  
t h e  Hanyang from rem o te  t i m e s ,  b u t  i t  was n o t  u n t i l  t h e  
E u ro p ea n s  -  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e ,  t h e  Dutch and t h e  E n g l i s h  -  had  
e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e i r  s e t t l e m e n t s  and i n t r o d u c e d  c o n d i t i o n s  o f
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security that the Chinese came in large numbers. The majority 
of Chinese who came to Southeast Asia were natives of the 
southeastern coastal provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, Kwangsi 
and the island of Hainan, These provinces were contiguous 
with Southeast Asia, They suffered from population pressure 
and the shortage of land; in addition they were beset by 
political troubles which resulted from the change-over from 
Ming to Manchu rule and the instability which accompanied the 
decline of Manchu authority in the nineteenth century. The 
contacts of these coastal areas with Europeans, which dated 
back to the arrival in 1517 of a Portuguese trade mission 
from Malacca, gave them an added incentive to emigrate. The 
principal ports for European trade were Canton in Kwangtung 
and Amoy in Fukien. It was the establishment of the British 
port of Hongkong in 1842 which gave rise to greater Chinese 
migration: here was an important exit to Southeast Asia.
More important, it was a port of re-entry into China.
Emigration was discouraged in China. Ancestor worship 
demanded that the living attend to the spirits of the dead 
forbears, and neglect to do so (as a result of being overseas) 
was considered to be unfilial conduct. The Chinese Emperors 
took a more practical view. The Mings were of the opinion 
that emigration amounted to the loss of their subjects which 
was not compensated by any advantages to be gained from 
trade. The Manchus feared that emigrants from the disaffected 
south would plot the overthrow of the dynasty from overseas,1
1, This fear was not without foundation because the overseas 
Chinese played an important role in the eventual overthrow 
of the Manchus.
and all emigrants were liable to execution if they returned 
to China or were apprehended.
The right of Chinese to leave the homeland to go abroad 
was recognized by the government after the two China Wars of 
1839-42 and 1858-60. This concession by the government was 
first incorporated in a treaty signed with the United States 
of America in 1870 (and in similar treaties signed later with 
Britain and France). The Chinese Emperor, according to the 
treaty, ’cordially recognized the inherent and inalienable 
right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the 
mutual advantage of the free migration of aliens and subjects 
respectively from one country to another for the purpose of 
curiosity, of trade or as permanent residence’.1
Only the British gave the Chinese an unqualified welcome 
in Southeast Asia. The Spanish and the Butch (except 
initially) were quite hostile and on occasions persecuted the 
Chinese in their colonies: in 1740 took place the infamous
massacre of Chinese by the Butch in Java, The coming of 
British influence to the Straits of Malacca was a landmark 
in the history of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Francis 
Light in 1794 referred to the Chinese community in Penang as 
’the most valuable part of our inhabitants’, a view also held 
by Raffles with regard to the Chinese who flocked to his 
colony when it was founded.
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1. Quoted in Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 
Oxford 1951, p. 37-
The most welcome of the Chinese in the early decades of 
the Straits Settlements were the merchants, because they were 
the necessary intermediary in the commercial intercourse 
between Europeans and the native peoples of Southeast Asia*
The Europeans lacked the knowledge of native and Chinese ways 
whereas the Chinese, who learnt those of natives and Europeans 
made themselves the indispensable go-between in the East-West 
trade.
The most numerous of the Chinese emigrants were the 
labourers. The expansion of trade and the economic develop­
ment which it stimulated led to a demand for labour in the 
mines and estates in Southeast Asia. Chinese labourers were 
most in demand and they were ’recruited1 (that is, persuaded, 
beguiled or forced) at Macao and Amoy to board boats headed 
for the Straits Settlements. These new arrivals or sinkhehs 
(literally ’new guests’) were ’bought’ by Chinese employers. 
They worked for their employers at low wages until the cost 
of the passage was paid off and then became free labourers. 
There were many abuses in this system and the upshot was the 
establishment of the Chinese Protectorate in the Straits 
Settlements in 1877* which aimed at removing these abuses and 
improving the conditions of Chinese immigrants.^ Some 
immigrants were able to save small fortunes with which to 
retire to China; some of those who returned to China came
1. See Siew Yoong Ng, ’The Chinese Protectorate in Singapore, 
1877-1900’, in JSEAH, vol. 2, No. 1, March 1961, pp. 76-99
17
"back to Singapore and were known as laukhehs (or ’old guests’). 
The more fortunate and enterprising made enough to go into 
"business as merchants, miners or planters, not infrequently 
settling permanently in Southeast Asia,
4
The Chinese followed Dutch advances in Sumatra, Borneo 
and Celebes and the French in Indochina. They followed the 
British into Burma and Sarawak as they had flocked to their 
settlements in the Straits of Malacca. Only in the Malay 
Peninsula did Chinese economic penetration precede the 
establishment of British authority. The activities of the 
Chinese there helped to give cause to the Governor of the 
Straits Settlements to extend British rule to Malaya.
IX
THE NATURE OP STRA ITS SETTLEMENTS TRADE, 1870-1915
I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  o f  t h e  
S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  from i t s  i n t e r - s e t t l e m e n t  t r a d e ,  t h e  v a lu e  
o f  which h a s  "been o m i t t e d  from t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y .  1 The i n t e r ­
s e t t l e m e n t  o r  i n t e r n a l  t r a d e  i s  t h a t  t r a d e  b e tw ee n  S i n g a p o r e ,  
Penang and  M a la c c a .  The f o r e i g n  o r  e x t e r n a l  t r a d e  i s  t h e  
t r a d e  o f  t h e s e  p o r t s  w i th  t h e  o u t s i d e  w o r ld ,  and t h i s  i s  by 
f a r  t h e  l a r g e r  and  more i m p o r t a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  c o l o n y ’ s 
t r a d e .  The c o l o n y ’ s t r a d e  w i t h  Malaya ,  which  i n c l u d e s  t h e  
F e d e r a t e d  and t h e  U n f e d e r a te d  Malay S t a t e s ,  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  
u n d e r  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  f o r e i g n  t r a d e .
The f o r e i g n  t r a d e  can  be  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e r e  was t h e  u s u a l  form o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  -  t h e  
im por t  o f  com m odi t ies  f o r  l o c a l  c onsum pt ion  and t h e  e x p o r t  o f  
d o m es t ic  p r o d u c e .  R ic e  and c o t t o n  p i e c e  goods were 
com m odi t ies  which  were  consumed i n  t h e  c o lo n y ,  w h i l e  some 
gambier  a n d  s u g a r  were  d o m e s t i c a l l y  grown and e x p o r t e d .  The 
c o l o n y ’ s c o n su m p t io n  o f  im p o r t s  was a v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  t o t a l  i m p o r t s  by  v a l u e .  I n  1913 a b o u t  57 
p e r  c e n t  o f  S i n g a p o r e ’ s im p o r t s  o f  c o t t o n  p i e c e  goods,  and  
61 p e r  c e n t  o f  P e n a n g ’ s ,  were consumed*1 2 T h is  commodity
1 .  I t  c a n ,  how ever ,  be fo u n d  i n  S t a t i s t i c a l  Appendix  I I .
2 .  R a lp h  M. O d e l l ,  C o t to n  Goods i n  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s . 
D epar tm en t  o f  Commerce. Bureau  o f  F o r e i g n  and Dom est ic  
Commerce. S p e c i a l  A gen ts  S e r i e s .  No. 1 1 5 . W ash in g to n  
Government  P r i n t i n g  P r e s s  1916 , p .  14»
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v/as t h e  m ost  i m p o r t a n t  "by v a l u e  o f  t h e  c o l o n y ’ s im p o r t s  o f  
m a n u f a c t u r e d  goods .  L o c a l  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  e x p o r t  was,  on t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  o f  n e g l i g i b l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  I n  1870 S in g a p o re  
p r o d u c e d  l o c a l l y  a b o u t  o n e - h a l f  o f  i t s  e x p o r t s  o f  gambier  b u t  
b y  1892 v i r t u a l l y  a l l  i t s  e x p o r t s  o f  t h a t  commodity had  f i r s t  
b e e n  i m p o r t e d .  ^
Second ,  t h e r e  was t h e  t r a n s s h i p m e n t ,  o r  more a c c u r a t e l y  
t h e  t r a n s i t ,  t r a d e  o f  t h e  c o lo n y  which c o m p r i se d  t h a t  p o r t i o n  
o f  goods w h ich  h a d  b e en  sh ip p e d  from p o r t s  o u t s i d e ,  and 
c o n s ig n e d  f o r  d e s t i n a t i o n s  o t h e r  t h a n ,  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  
a t  which p o r t s  t h e y  on ly  s to p p e d  t e m p o r a r i l y ,  b e f o r e  b e i n g  
t r a n s s h i p p e d  ( t h a t  i s ,  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  o t h e r  s h i p s  t o  c o n t i n u e  
t h e i r  o t h e r w i s e  u n i n t e r r u p t e d  j o u r n e y ) .  These goods were n o t  
s e n t  f o r  s a l e  i n  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  and t h e i r  v a l u e  was 
n o t  e n t e r e d  i n t o  t h e  r e t u r n s  o f  im p o r t s  and e x p o r t s  o f  t h e  
colony.2 i n  1 8 9 5 , f o r  exam ple ,  1650 c h e s t s  o f  opium f o r  
S a ig o n ,  650 f o r  J a v a ,  250 f o r  M an i la  and two for Sarawak were 
t r a n s s h i p p e d  a t  S i n g a p o r e . 3 The t r a d e  r e t u r n s  f o r  S in g a p o re
1 .  W. Makepeace ,  G-.E. Brooke and  R. S t ,  John  B r a d d e l l ,  One 
Hundred  Y ea rs  o f  S i n g a p o r e , (tv/o vo lum es)  v o l . I I .
London 1921,  p .  80 .
2 .  SSLCP 1 9 0 2 , App. 40 ’R e p o r t  o f  t h e  Commission on t h e  
E a s t e r n  S h ip p in g  o r  S t r a i t s  Homeward C onference  a s  a f f e c t i n g  
t h e  T ra d e  o f  t h e  C o lony’ , E v id en ce  by  A le x an d e r  S t u a r t ,  
R e g i s t r a r  o f  I m p o r t s  and E x p o r t s  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s
p p . 3 6 4 - 9 .
3 .  SSAB 1 8 9 5 . p .  5 0 0 .
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in 1895 showed no exports of opium to Indochina, 1 In the same 
year 435,000 cases of petroleum entered into the trade of 
Singapore while 136,000 cases were transshipped; in 1896
376,000 cases entered while 693,000 cases were transshipped.2 
Thus the proportion of petroleum entering into the colony’s 
trade had decreased while that transshipped had grown. Rubber 
exported from Malaya to overseas via Straits ports, although 
recorded in the Federated Malay States trade returns as exports 
to the Straits Settlements and in the British trade returns 
as imports from the Straits Settlements, were not recorded 
in those of the colony. Only the rubber that actually 
entered into the Singapore rubber market was recorded in the 
colony’s trade returns,-
Exports of opium from Singapore 1895
To : chests value
Indonesia 2,549 1,906Indochina - -
Malaya 1,598 1,193Hongkong 1,425 1,096Siam 1 ,127 835British Borneo 90 67China 84 64Others 208 155Total 7,081 5,317(Source: Straits Settlements Blue Book ■
($000)
2. Of the 693>000 eases of petroleum transshipped, 290,000 
cases went to Java, 130,000 to Hongkong and China,
124.000 to Siam, 78,000 to Indochina, 36,000 to Sumatra,
24.000 to Japan and 11,000 to Dutch Borneo. (SSAR 1896, 
P. 193).
3« Selangor CCAR 1913-4. App. 0, ’Report of the Committee appointed by His Excellency the Governor to enquire into 
the System of Registration of Imports and Exports in the 
Colony and the Federated Malay States and the desirability 
of amending it’, p. 67.
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The words ’ t r a n s s h i p m e n t  t r a d e ’ c o u ld  h e  c o n fu s e d  w i th  
t h e  ’e n t r e p o t  t r a d e ’ .1 I n  so f a r  a s  goods a r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  
from one s h i p  t o  a n o t h e r ,  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o l o n y ’ s 
t r a d e  i s  ’ t r a n s s h i p m e n t ’ . But t h e  t r a n s s h i p m e n t  t r a d e  i n  t h e  
p e r i o d  1870-1915* and in d e e d  t o - d a y  a s  r e c o r d e d  i n  t h e  Malayan 
s t a t i s t i c s ,  i s  t h a t  p o r t i o n  o f  t r a d e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  
p a ra g ra p h .2 To a v o id  t h e  p o s s i b l e  c o n f u s i o n  be tw een  ’ t r a n s ­
s h i p m e n t ’ and e n t r e p o t  t r a d e ,  b o t h  o f  which  e n t a i l  t h e  
p h y s i c a l  t r a n s f e r e n c e  from s h i p  t o  s h i p ,  i t  i s  p r e f e r a b l e , f o r  
p u r p o s e s  o f  c l a r i t y ,  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  f o r m e r  a s  t r a n s i t  t r a d e .
The t h i r d  c a t e g o r y  o f  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  o f  t h e  c o lo n y  was 
e n t r e p o t  t r a d e .  T h is  c o m p r i s e s  o n ly  t h a t  p o r t i o n  of  im p o r t s  
which e n t e r e d  i n t o  t h e  m arke t  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  and  
was s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e - e x p o r t e d .  I t  does  n o t  i n c l u d e  t h e  im p o r t s  
f o r  consum pt ion  i n  t h e  co lony  n o r  t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  d o m es t ic  
p r o d u c e .  E n t r e p o t  e x p o r t s  c o m p r ise  im p o r t s  s u b s e q u e n t l y  
r e - e x p o r t e d  and  v a l u e  added  i n  t h e  form o f  p r o c e s s i n g ,
1 . As i n  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  Commission a p p o i n t e d  b.y H is  
E x c e l l e n c y  t h e  Governor  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  t o  
e n q u i r e  i n t o  a n d  r e p o r t  on t h e  T rade  o f  t h e  C o lo n y ,
1 9 3 5 - 4 . ( f o u r  v o lu m e s ) ,  v o l ,  I  p a r a g r a p h s  4-46  d e a l  
w i th  t h e  ’ e n t r e p o t  t r a d e ’ b u t  t h e  map appended  d e p i c t s  
S in g a p o re  a s  ’The T ra n s s h ip m e n t  C e n t r e  o f  t h e  O r i e n t ’ .
2. See f o r  example  Malayan S t a t i s t i c s ,  D i g e s t  o f  Economic
and  S o c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s . ( S t a t e  o f  S in g a p o re  and F e d e r a t i o n  
o f  Malaya) No. 11 ,  1 9 6 1 , S i n g a p o r e ,  p .  45« Two columns 
a r e  g i v e n ,  one f o r  ’ D i r e c t ’ t r a d e  which  i n c l u d e s  ’ n o r m a l ’ 
and e n t r e p o t  t r a d e ,  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  ’T r a n s s h i p m e n t ’ , f o r  
which o n ly  q u a n t i t i e s  (and  n o t  v a l u e )  a r e  g iv e n .
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grading, packaging, other services, and profit mark-up. That 
portion of imported cotton piece goods and rice not consumed 
in the colony "but re-exported constituted the colony’s 
entrepot trade in these commodities. Tin and gutta percha were 
the typical ’all-entrepot’ commodities. Quantities imported 
and exported (or more correctly, re-exported) varied very 
little (the difference being due to small errors in recording 
and changes in stocks), hut the export values were always 
greater than import values due to the value added at the 
entrepot ports of the Straits Settlements,
It is the ’value added’ which is the true exports of the 
entrepot ports, in addition to the services performed in 
shipping and insurance. These exports go towards paying for 
imports consumed in the colony.
It is possible to consider the colony’s trade with Malaya 
as internal trade. This is based on the concept that the 
colony and the hinterland comprise ohe economic unit - Pan- 
Malaya. In 1913-14 a local committee that examined the 
compilation of the trade returns of the Straits Settlements 
and the Federated Malay States recommended that they ought 
to be treated together.1 It was not until 1922 that this 
recommendation was in fact carried out. In 1928 the trade 
returns for the Straits Settlements alone were abolished and 
only the combined SS-FMS returns were published. It is
1 Selangor CCAF 1913-14. App, 0, p. 57
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preferable, however, to treat the Straits Settlements and the 
Federated as well as the Unfederated Malay States as one 
economic unit because the greatest part of the trade of these 
Malay States was done through the Straits ports which were 
geographically and logically the ports of Malaya. Malaya (more 
so the FMS than the un-FMS) and the Straits Settlements were 
politically and administratively united under British rule, 
which was symbolised by the person of the Governor of the 
Straits Settlements who was also the High Commissioner of the 
Federated Malay States. Their unity of economic interests is 
well exemplified in the action taken to keep the handling of 
tin-ore within Pan-Malaya by the passing of legislation in 
the FMS which was intended to allow export of ores to only 
Singapore and Penang.1 The economic development that took
place in Malaya was assisted by its proximity to the colony, 
which was used as a base and a stepping stone for Chinese 
traders, miners and entrepreneurs who ventured into the 
hinterland from even before and more so after British inter­
vention in 1874« It is possible to view the colony’s imports 
from the Malay States as returns to capital invested there - 
the tin was mined by Chinese entrepreneurs with connexions in 
the Straits Settlements and the export of Western commodities 
and foodstuffs to these states and the collection of jungle 
produce was financed by European merchants. An example of 
each of Straits Settlements Chinese and European economic
1 . See p.182
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links with the hinterland are the Pepper and Gambier Society 
or the Kongkek  ^ and the Straits Trading Company.2
Straits Settlements exports to Malaya should he added 
to Straits Settlements consumption to give Pan-Malayan 
consumption. The colony1 2s imports from Malaya and its own 
production for export would then he Pan-Malayan exports hut 
since Straits Settlements production is of negligible value, 
Pan-Malayan exports are in effect almost synonymous with 
Straits Settlements imports from Malaya. The surplus of 
Malaya1s direct trade (that is, not with the Straits Settle­
ments) should also he added to the colony’s imports or 
exports as the case may he. In the present study, however, 
unless it is specifically mentioned, the foreign trade of 
the Straits Settlements includes the colony’s trade with 
Malaya.
The import surplus in Straits Settlements’ trade
The import surplus in Straits Settlements’ trade arises 
because the value of imports domestically consumed (including 
retention for stocks) exceeds the sum of value added to re­
exports and the value of domestically-produced exports 
(including changes in stocks). If all of Straits Settlements 
trade were entrepot then the value of exports will exceed 
that of imports because of value added to re-exports, while
1. See p.91.
2. See p.180.
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the quantity of imports and exports will he equal. But some
imports are consumed in the colony and a small portion of thecomprises
colony’s total exports / exports of domestic produce. The 
commodities in the colony’s trade can he seen to fall into 
two categories - those in which the value of imports exceeds 
that of exports, and vice-versa. The value of imports 
exceeds that of exports when the sum of value added to re­
exports and the value of domestically-produced exports 
(including changes in stocks) is less than the value of imports 
domestically consumed (including retention for stocks). The 
value of exports exceeds that of imports when the reverse is 
true. It should he possible, if quantity data for imports 
and exports are available, to find out the value of re-exports 
at their original cost of importation, the value of exports 
of domestic produce (including changes in stocks) and the 
value of consumption in the colony (including retention for 
stocks). In practice this is not easy because, unlike those 
of Britain, the trade returns of the Straits Settlements did 
not distinguish between re-exports and exports of domestic 
produce, because the latter was relatively unimportant.
It is possible, however, to make a rough estimate of 
the colony’s actual consumption of imports by value and the 
value added to re-exports, for a limited number of commodities. 
It ought to be possible to do this for all commodities in 
which quantity data is available, but there are a number of 
complications which render such an exercise unrewarding.
Two assumptions have to be made. First, it is assumed that
2 6
all imports are either consumed in the colony or exported 
out of it, and that there were no exports of domestic 
produce. Second, it is assumed that all the commodities 
selected are homogeneous in character and no cognizance is 
taken of quality differences or changes.
A total of nine commodities which accounted for over 50 
per cent of the colony’s merchandise imports and exports in 
the period 1870-1910 and 45$ in 1915 (see Table XXVII 
Chapter VII) is taken. It is noticed that for the year 
1900 the value of exports of the nine commodities exceeds 
that of imports; while this is not true of total imports 
and exports it does not matter very much. The value of re­
exports prior to value added (that is, at the original cost 
of importation) is computed by multiplying current quantities 
with current average import prices, which is calculated by 
dividing current import values by current quantities. The 
value of actual consumption of the colony is the difference 
between imports and the value of exports at import prices.
The value added to re-exports is the difference between 
exports and the value of exports at import prices (see 
G-raph One).
Certain problems are encountered as the result of the 
assumptions made. It is noticed in the case of some 
commodities that average import price exceeds export price 
implying that purchasing price was higher than selling price, 
which is an absurd situation. The explanation lies in 
quality differences. Taking an example of a commodity with
Importsx
Import
surplus
»Exports*
Value
added
Exports at J 
import prices
Actual
consumption
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G-raph One : The im p o r t  s u r p l u s ,  v a l u e  added  and  a c t u a l
consum ption  i n  t h e  t r a d e  i n  n in e  com m odities
1870-1  9 1 5 .
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only two qualities, one high and very expensive and the
other low and cheap, it can he seen that the average prices
computed hy combining the two qualities could show an
apparent loss in trading, which in reality was not the case.
Imports Exports
Quantity Price Value Quantity Price Value
Good quality 100 12 1200 20 15 300
Inferior quality 40 5 200 30 7 210
Total average price (l40) 10 (l400) (50) 5.1 (510)
There are a number of such cases in Straits Settlements, 
sugar and tobacco among others, hence the decision to limit 
this exercise to only nine commodities. Of these, cotton 
piece goods in 1905» 1910 and 1915 showed higher average 
import prices than export prices and the practice adopted 
was to give the actual export values instead of exports at 
import prices which would have indicated a loss in trading.
The result is that for these years there is no value added 
at all to cotton piece goods re-exports and actual 
consumption is understated. In the case of gutta percha 
and gutta inferior - a distinction first made in 1899 - it 
was seen that if these two items were considered separately 
the total of exports at import prices exceeded that of 
exports, once again implying a loss. The sums of the 
quantities imported and exported were, however, approximately 
equal, and it was found that if an average import price for 
gutta percha and gutta inferior together was taken and 
multiplied with combined quantity of exports there was 
value added. This was done for 1900-1915 and an example
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is given on page 29. What could have happened was that hy 
careful sorting and grading, some of the gutta inferior 
imported was 1 changed’ into (that is, found to he) gutta 
percha.
The percentage value added to re-exports at import values 
and the percentage of imports actually consumed in the colony 
can he seen in Table II. It is noticed that value added in 
the three classes of goods chosen was about the same hut while 
there was no consumption of Southeast Asian produce destined 
for exports to the West, the consumption of imports of cotton 
piece goods averaged more than a third of all imports hy value 
while that of intra-Asian goods was about one quarter. The 
net average consumption of imports of all nine commodities 
was more than 10 per cent while the average value added was 
almost six per cent.
It can he seen therefore (illustrated in Graph One) that 
the import surplus was the result of the colony consuming 
more of its imports hy value than it added to the re-expofts.
Taking the year 1900 as an example (see Graph Three) 
recorded imports and exports were $280m and $240m respectively, 
so that the import surplus was $40m. The colony’s consumption 
of imports of Western manufactures was $17.5m while the cons­
umption of imports from Asia was $39.30m, making a total of 
$56.80m. The value added to re-exports to the West was $8.05m 
and value added to re-exports to Asia was $8.75m making a total 
of $l6.80m, so that the net import surplus of the colony was 
$40m.
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TABLE IT
S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  co n su m p tio n  of im p o rts  and 
v a lu e  added  to  r e - e x p o r t s ,  1870-1915  ( 000$)
Im p o rts
o f  t i n ,  
r a t t a n s
E x p o rts
g u t t a ,  p e p p e r 
and garni) i  e r
E x p o r ts  a t  
im p o rt p r i c e s  
( i . e .  r e - e x p o r t s )
V alue 
added  to  
r e - e x p o r t s
P e r  c e n t  
v a lu e  
added  to  
r e - e x p o r t s
1870 9 ,7 0 8 11 ,341 1 1 ,3 3 1 510 4 .5 0
1375 1 1 ,6 0 6 14 ,557 13 ,3 8 8 1 ,1 6 9 8 .7 3
1880 1 2 ,2 6 4 15 ,960 1 3 ,5 8 4 2 ,376 1 7 .4 9
1885 2 2 ,3 0 4 25 ,489 2 2 ,9 6 4 2 ,525 1 1 .0 0
1890 3 5 ,2 0 4 40,035 3 7 ,4 5 7 2 ,577 6 .8 8
1895 4 7 ,9 6 4 51 ,435 4 9 ,7 2 6 1 ,7 0 9 3 .4 4
1900 8 4 ,8 2 9 9 8 ,9 8 4 9 4 ,7 0 9 4 ,2 7 6 4 .5 1
1905 1 0 5 ,1 2 6 105 ,904 1 0 2 ,3 5 8 3 ,5 4 7 3 -4 7
1910 8 9 ,0 6 3 103 ,092 10 2 ,3 0 0 792 0 .7 7
1915 1 0 3 ,1 7 6 109 ,325 102 ,951 6 ,3 7 4 6 .1 9
A verage  p e r  c e n t  v a lu e  added ( e x c lu d in g  1910) i s  7*35
Im p o rts  E x p o r ts
o f  c o t to n  p ie c e  
goods
E x p o rts
a t
im port 
p r i c e s  
( i . e .  re 
- e x p o r ts )
V alue
added
to
r e ­
exports
P e r  c e n t  
v a lu e  
added 
to  r e ­
e x p o r ts
V alue
o f
im p o r ts
a c t u a l l y
consum ed
P e r  c e n t  
a c tu a l  
consum ption  
o f
im p o rts
1870 8 ,4 8 6 6 ,1 6 0 5 ,8 9 4 265 4 .5 0 2 ,5 9 2 3 0 .5 4
1875 6 ,7 4 7 5 ,7 9 0 5 ,581 209 3 , 7 4 1 ,1 6 6 1 7 .2 8
1880 8 ,6 0 2 6 ,2 9 8 5 ,826 472 8 .1 0 2 ,7 7 6 3 2 .2 7
1885 9 ,7 5 4 5 ,7 7 7 5 ,738 39 0 .6 8 4 ,0 1 6 41 .1 7
1890 1 1 ,2 1 8 6 ,2 7 6 5 ,303 973 1 8 .3 5 5 ,9 1 5 5 2 .7 3
1895 9 ,4 5 7 7 ,2 1 2 6,566 646 9 . 8 4 2 ,8 9 0 3 0 .5 6
1900 1 4 ,7 8 9 1 0 ,0 9 9 9 ,5 °2 596 6 .2 7 5., 287 2 5 . 7 5 _
1905 1 6 ,9 0 6 9 ,9 5 5 2 9 ,9 5  V - - £ 6 , 9 5 1 / / 4 I . I I /
1910 1 4 ,9 9 0 8 ,5 3 9 Z8,5324 - - Z S , 4 5 l 2 A j . o l j /
! 19151 .. 1 3 ,9 4 2 1 1 ,0 2 4 / 1 1 , 0 2 s 7...:_.J * 2 2 , 9 1 2 / Z20-9V
A verage  p e r  c e n t  v a lu e  added ( e x c lu d in g  1885, 1 9 0 5 -1 0 -1 5 ) i s  8 ,4 6  
A verage  p e r  c e n t  a c tu a l  consum ption  o f  im p o rts  i s  34*54»
A verage  p e r  c e n t  v a lu e  added to  e x p o r t s  ( e x c lu d in g  1885 , 1905“ 
1 0 -1 5 )  i s  7*62.
32
TABLE II - continued
Imports Exports
of rice, opium 
and fish
Exports 
at import 
prices 
(i.e. re­
exports)
Value 
added 
to re­
exports
Per cent 
value 
added 
to re­
exports
Value of 
imports 
actually 
consumed
Per cent 
actual 
consump­
tion of 
imports
1 8 7 0 6 , 8 6 3 4,814 4 , 3 4 1 4 7 3 1 0 . 9 0 2,592 37.77
1875 1 1 , 2 9 6 8,732 7,707 1,025 13.30 3,589 31.77
1 8 8 0 1 5 , 2 2 0 12,369 12,233 1 3 6 0 . 1 1 2,987 1 9 . 6 3
1 8 8 5 1 7 , 6 5 7 13,461 12,992 469 3 . 6 1 4,665 2 6 . 4 2
1 8 9 0 2 8 , 1 5 6 20,514 18,854 1 , 6 6 0 8 . 8 0 9,302 3 3 . 0 4
1895 3 3 , 8 8 7 28,960 28,077 883 3.14 5,809 1 7 . 1 41900 4 7 , 9 2 0 41,532 39,577 1,955 4.94 8,343 1 7 . 4 1
1905 53,735 45,769 44,313 1 , 4 5 6 3.29 9,422 17.531910 6 7 , 3 5 2 54,792 51,209 3,583 7.00 16,143 23.97
1915 7 2 , 1 1 2 58,677 55,897 2,780 4-97 16,216 22.49
Average per cent value added (excluding l88o) is 6.66.
Average per cent actual consumption of imports is 24*72.
/""Average per cent value added to exports (excluding 1880) is 6.15_7.
• Imports Exports
of all nine 
commodities
Exports 
at import 
prices 
(i.e. re­
exports)
Value 
added 
to re­
exports
Per cent 
value 
added 
to re­
exports
Value of 
imports 
actually 
consumed
Per cent 
actual 
consump­
tion of 
imports
1870 2 5 , 0 5 8 22,815 2 1 , 5 6 7 1 , 2 4 9 5.79 3 , 4 9 1 13.93
1875 29,648 29,078 2 6 , 6 7 6 2 , 4 0 3 9.00 2,972 10.021880 36,085 34,627 3 1 , 6 4 3 2,984 9 , 4 3 4,442 1 2 . 3 1
1885 49,715 44,727 4 1 , 6 9 4 3 , 0 3 3 7.27 8 , 0 2 1 1 6 . 1 3
1890 74,578 66,825 6l , 6 1 4 5,210 8,46 1 2 , 9 6 4 1 8 . 3 8
1895 91,308 87,608 84,370 3,238 3.84 6 , 9 3 8 7 . 6 01900 147,538 150,615 143,788 6,827 4.61 3 , 7 4 9 2 . 5 4
1905 175,768 161,628 1 5 6 , 6 2 5 5,003 3.19 1 9 , 1 4 2 10.89
1 9 1 0 171,405 1 6 6 , 4 2 4 162,049 4,375 2.70 9,357 5 . 4 6
1915
l
189,231 179,025 169,871 9,154 5,39 1 9 , 3 6 0 10.23
Average per cent value added is 5.97.
Average per cent actual consumption of imports is 10.75* 
/""Average per cent value added to exports is 5.60__7 .
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I n  t h e  t r a d e  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  t h e r e  was an 
im p o r t  s u r p l u s  f o r  e v e r y  s i n g l e  y e a r  b e tw ee n  1870 a n d  1915> 
t h a t  i s ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  im p o r t s  a s  r e c o r d e d  i n  t h e  t r a d e  r e t u r n s  
e x c e e d e d  t h e  v a l u e  o f  e x p o r t s ,  w h e th e r  o f  m erc h an d ise  a l o n e ,  
o r  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  t r e a s u r e  t r a d e  a s  w e l l . ^  To t h e  m erc h an ts  
o f  t h e  day  a c o n t i n u o u s  im p o r t  s u r p l u s  was an i m p o s s i b l e  
s i t u a t i o n ,
I  do n o t  s e e  how t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  can 
go on, y e a r  a f t e r  y e a r ,  t a k i n g  i n  §4 0 , 0 0 0 ,0 0 0  
w o r th  more t h a n  th e y  can  g iv e  o u t .
They were d i s p o s e d  t o  condemn t h e  T rade  R e t u r n s  a s  i n a c c u r a t e
p
a n d  u n r e l i a b l e .
The p rob lem  h e r e  p o se d  was a g e n u in e  one : how was t h i s  
im por t  s u r p l u s  f i n a n c e d ?  T h ere  a r e  i n  f a c t  t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  
e x p l a n a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  im p o r t  s u r p l u s .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  s t a t i s t i c s  were i n a c c u r a t e ,  and  t e n d e d  t o  
o v e r v a l u e  i m p o r t s  o r  t o  u n d e r v a l u e  e x p o r t s .  The common 
p r a c t i c e  o f  v a l u i n g  im p o r t s  c . i . f . ( c o s t ,  i n s u r a n c e ,  f r e i g h t )  
an d  e x p o r t s  f . o . b .  ( f r e e  on b o a r d )  was a d o p te d  i n  t h e  S t r a i t s  
S e t t l e m e n t s ,  b u t  t h i s  a l o n e  does  n o t  e x p l a i n  t h e  s u r p l u s .
W hile  g r e a t  a c c u r a c y  i s  n o t  c l a im e d  f o r  t h e  t r a d e  r e t u r n s ,
1 .  The im p o r t  s u r p l u s  s t i l l  o c c u r s  i n  t h e  t r a d e  o f  S in g a p o re  
t o d a y ,  s e e  c u r r e n t  volumes o f  Colony o f  S in g a p o re  Annual 
R e p o r t s . Government P r i n t i n g  P r e s s ,  S i n g a p o r e .  Between 
lS 2 2 ~ a n d  1869 S i n g a p o r e 1 2s t r a d e  a l s o  showed a n  im por t  
s u r p l u s ,  see  Wong, ’T rade  o f  S i n g a p o r e ,  1819-1869’.
2 .  Such a t y p i c a l  v iew was e x p r e s s e d  by t h r e e  w i t n e s s e s ,  a l l  
e x - S t r a i t s  m e rc h a n t s  and  b a n k e r s  who gave e v id e n c e  b e f o r e  
t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  C u r ren cy  Committee .  M inu tes  o f  
E v id e n ce  and  A p p e n d i c e s . May 1903, Cd. 1585> p . 1 9 .
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no evidence can be found of bias in one direction or another, 
and the statistics were, to quote a committee which examined 
them in 1913-1914> ’in the main accurate’
Secondly, it is possible that the trade returns were 
incomplete, that there were exports which went unrecorded.
The most important omission was coal ’exports’. Much of the 
coal imported into the Straits Settlements was sold as bunker 
fuel to passing ships and was not, as it would appear from 
the trade returns, consumed in the colony itself. Such sales 
ought properly to be considered exports of coal. It is not 
known how much exactly of the coal imports was sold as bunker 
fuel and how much was consumed in the colony — - the workshops 
of the Tanjong Pagar Pock Company utilized steam power derived 
from burning coal until 1886 when electricity was used^ and 
there were a small number of small factories that used steam 
power at the end of the nineteenth century.- But even if the 
assumption is made that all the coal imported into the colony 
was sold as bunker fuel and a sum equal to the value of coal 
imports is taken as the value of coal ’exports’ (no account 
being taken of value added), the colony’s trade still shows 
an import surplus. There v/ere other items of unrecorded trade,
1. Selangor CCAR 1913-1914. App 0, p.57. See also Historical 
Appendix A for a discussion of the reliability of the 
colony’s trade returns.
2. George Bogaars, The Taniong Pagar Pock Company. 1864-19Q5» 
and C.A. Gibson-Hill, Singapore Old Strait and New Harbour, 
1300-1870. Memoirs of the Raffles Museum No.3 Pecember 
1956, p.129.
3. Trade and Shipping in South East Asia, Cd.324 1901, p.60.
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such as the value of smuggled opium from the Straits Settle­
ments to Johore and to Indonesia,^* to evade the tax imposed 
hy the ’ opium farmers’* There was also some hand carrying 
trade hy passengers in ships which called at the Straits 
Settlements ports, neither the magnitude nor the direction 
of this trade is known,1 2 3hut it is unlikely to he so large 
in value as to account for the colony’s import surplus.
The third possible explanation therefore is the most
likely --- the Straits Settlements had other sources of finance
to pay for the import surplus. The merchants of the period 
were erronous in concluding that a persistent import surplus 
as shown in the Returns of Imports and Exports was impossible.
It was not at all unusual. Britain had an actual import 
surplus in merchandise trade and treasure between 1815 and 1915-^ 
The merchants were not very clear as to the difference between 
the balance of visible trade, and the balance of payments.
The balance of payments accounts of the Straits Settlements.
There are no known balance of payments accounts for the 
Straits Settlements. An attempt is made in Table III to list
1. U V/en Cheng, ’Opium in the Straits Settlements, 1867-1910,’ 
JSEAH, vol.2. No.l March 1961, pp.53-4»
2. Selangor CCAF. 1913-1914. App.O. pp.6l-4 Evidence of A. 
Stuart, Registrar of Imports & Exports, SS.
3. Albert Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica. 
Studies in British Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth 
Century. Harvard 1955« Table 4» pp.20-5.
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TABLE III
Items in Straits Settlements' Balance of Payments Accounts
DEBITS CREDITS
Visible Items
A Imports of merchandise A Exports of merchandise
B Imports of treasure B Exports of treasure
C Unrecorded items (i) Bunker coal
(ii) Smuggled opium
(iii) Hand-carrying trade of ships’ passengers
(iv) Private trade of ships’ captains
(v) Purchase/sale of ships
Invisible Items
D Income from the ports
(i) Docks and machine shops
(ii) Wharfage, storage, 
stevedorage
(iii) Pilotage
(iv) Sale of water to ships
(v) Sale of ballast to
ships
E Income from River
(i) Sale of water
(ii) Other services
F Insurance, brokerage,
commission
G SS loans, etc. from abroad 
H Capital investment in SS
I Military contribution of SS 
J Payments of leave salaries 
and pensions and others 
K (i) Shipping Freights 
’homeward*
(ii) Freights elsewhere 
L Repatriation of profits, etc.
M Trade with Malaya
(i) SS import surplus 
from Malaya
(ii) Malaya*s balance of direct foreign trad
37
Total:
(iii) SS transhipment tax 
from Malaya
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TABLE IV
Straits Settlements "balance of payments 1900 ($000)
DEBITS CREDITS
Visible Items
279,933
A Imports of 
merchandise 
B Imports of
treasure 34,157
C Unrecorded items
239,720
22,897
Z 7,871V
n.a.
A Exports of 
merchandise 
B Exports of 
treasure
(i) Bunker 
coal
(ii) Smuggled 
opium
(iii) Hand-carrying trade of ships1 passengers n.a.
(iv) Private trade of ships1 captains n.a.
(v) Purchase/sale of ships n.a.
Invisihle Items
D Income from New Harbour
Singapore
(i) Docks and machine 
shops V  5,000J
(ii) Wharfage, storage and 
stevedorage Z~2,000V
(iii) Pilotage n.a.
(iv) Sale of v/ater
to ships Z 45J
(v) Sale of ballast
to ships n.a.
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E Income from River, Singapore
(i) Sale of water n.a.
(ii) Other services n.a.
n.a
F Insurance, brokerage,
commissions n.a
0 SS loans etc. from abroad -
Straits light dues 
collected in India $24
H Capital investment in
SS n.a
I Military contri­
butions to SS 957 
J Payments of leave salaries 
and pensions
- Remittances incl.
exchange differences for 
leave salaries payable in 
England 60
- Widows1 and Orphans1 Fund
Difference in exchange on 
balances in
4
Engl an d 21
- Payments to Crown
Agent s 3
- Contribution towards
Indian Famine
Fund 20
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K S h ip p in g  F r e ig h t s
( i )  homeward Z~3>125_7
( i i )  e ls e w h e re  n .a *
L R e p a t r i a t io n  o f p r o f i t s
o f  T an jong  P a g a r  Dock 
Company 444
O th e r p r o f i t s  r e p a t r i a t e d  n . a .
M T rad e  w ith  M alaya
( i )  SS im p o rt s u r p lu s  from  
M alaya 3 0 ,5 6 8
( i i )  M alaya’s im p o rt s u r p lu s
in  d i r e c t  t r a d e  4>098
( i i i )  SS t r a n s s h ip m e n t  t r a d e  
from  M alaya
T o ta l  i d e n t i f i e d  3 2 2 ,8 2 2  308 .145
ite m s
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the items wtlieh would have been significant in value in such 
accounts even though it has not been possible to make actual 
balance of payments estimates for the period 1870-1915• The 
values of some of these items, either known or estimated, 
are given in Table IV for the year 1900, for which year the 
most information is available. It is a convenient year to 
introduce the concept of Pan-Malayan trade because para rubber 
had not appeared in the trade nor had Port Swettenham been 
created so that the problems of transshipment are avoided.
The note that follows on the balance of payments comments on 
the various items and on hov; estimates were arrived at for 
those items which are bracketed.
The visible items
A&B. Merchandise and treasure
The balance of trade as recorded in the Blue Books of the 
Straits Settlements, which includes the trade with Malaya, 
shows a continuous import surplus for the colony, and the 
year 1900 is no exception.
C. Unrecorded items
(i) Bunker coal. It is assumed that all coal apparently 
consumed in the colony is sold as bunker fuel, hence the 
difference in value of coal imported and that exported for 
1900 has been added to the credit side of the colony’s balance 
of payments accounts.^
(ii) , (iii), (iv) Smuggled opium, hand-carrying trade of
1. See also ante p.34
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ships’ passengers and private trade of ships’ captains. Little 
can he added to what was stated earlier,^ and no figures are 
available.
(v) Purchase/sale of ships. It is known that there were 
steamers belonging to Chinese and other steamship companies 
operating from the Straits Settlements. The Straits Steamship 
Company, a Sino-European venture, was founded in 1890 with 
five ships already in operation and it ’added others to its 
trade’ before the end of the century. It also ordered ships
pspecially designed for the coasting trade. Presumably these 
ships were imported from abroad. But there was some ship­
building in the colony, such as that undertaken by the Tanjong 
Pagar Lock Company^ but is not known whether such ships were 
sold locally (consumed) or sold outside the colony (exported). 
Thus neither the balance nor the magnitude of this item can 
be discovered.
The invisible items
L&E. Income from services to ocean-going and to coasting 
steamers and native boats
As ports serving trans-ocean steamships as well as to coasting 
steamers and native prahus. the earnings of the Straits 
Settlements from these items were probably quite considerable. 
In Singapore there were three dock companies although only 
the Tanjong Pagar and the New Harbour Lock Companies were 
significant. In Penang there was a small dock company which
1. See ante p.35*
2. G-.C, Allen and Audrey G. Lonnithorne, Western Enterprise 
in Indonesia and Malaya. London 1957, pp.216-7.
3. Bogaars, Tan .long Pagar. p.130.
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was eventually absorbed by the Tanjong Pagar. The trade 
between the colony and the islands was very largely concen­
trated at Singapore and centred at the mouth of the Singapore 
River. As no information is readily available on the port 
earnings of Penang and Malacca and on the earnings of the 
New Harbour Dock Company, the figures actual and estimated 
for 1900 refer only to the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company in 
Singapore
D. (i) Docks and machine shops. The docks and machine shops 
of the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company were extremely well-equipped 
and capable of undertaking even major repairs to ships. They 
were fully utilized and earned good profits. In 1900 the 
profit earned was about film. If profits were in the region 
of 20 jper cent of gross takings then gross income to Singapore 
would be $5m*
D. (ii) Wharfage, storage and stevedorage. A charge was made 
for the hire of machinery used in landing cargo. Goods were 
stored free for seven days, after which store rent and fire 
insurance had to be paid. The major earnings came from 
stevedorage. In I869 the charge was 25 cents per ton on cargo 
landed or shipped over the wharf, two and a half per cent ad 
Valoren on treasure, 10 cents per chest of opium and 25 cents 
per head on horses and cattle. In 1894, as the result of the 
decline of the sterling value of the dollar, these rates w^ ere 
raised to reimburse the English share-holders. In 1905 these 
charges wrere once again raised from J O cents to $1.25 per ton
1. Based on Bogaars, Tanjong Pagar.
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on European and American cargo, and from 60 cents to $1.15 
on Asian goods. The charge for handling coal was 12 J cents 
per ton for discharging and 25 cents for loading it on hoard. 
The cost of greater speed was 50 cents in the day and 75 cents 
at night. The gross earnings from wharfage, warehouse storage 
and stevedorage in 1902 and 1003 were $2,395,585 and $2,757,526 
respectively. It seems reasonable that there would he around 
$2m in 1900.
D. (iii) Pilotage. In 1890 the charge for piloting a ship 
from the Roads to Tanjong Pagar was 50 cents per foot of 
draught for steamers and 75 cents for ships in tow. Within 
the harbour the charge was also 50 cents and 75 cents respec­
tively. In 1894 these rates were raised to 75 cents and $1, 
and in 1903 they were doubled, No information is, however, 
available on income from this source.
D. (iv)&(v) Sale of water and, ballast to ships. In 1880 the 
Tanjong Pagar Company was selling water to ships in the har­
bour at 50 cents a ton, and 90,000 tons were sold in 1900, so 
that an estimated $45>000 has been attributed to this item. 
Ballast was delivered at 35 cents per ton and up to 300 tons 
could be delivered by the company in one day, but no estimates 
of income from this source are available.
E. (i)&(ii) Sale of water and food to native boats at Sing­
apore Piver and Other services
Very little is known about the services provided at the 
Singapore River and their cost. In 1879 over 200 boats were 
selling at the river.^ It is very likely that other services
1. Ibid., p.152.
to traders were also provided, "but no estimates of values 
are available.
F. Insurance, brokerage and commissions
Insurance agencies were easily the most numerous of all those 
held by the European firms in the Straits Settlements.'1* There 
were European as well as Chinese insurance companies with 
agents in the colony. Many of the European merchant firms 
held other agencies as well, such as shipping or imports of 
manufactured or consumer goods. But neither the rate charged 
for brokerage and commission nor the magnitude of income from 
this source of European or Chinese firms is known.
G. Straits Settlements loans, etc. from abroad.
No loans seem to have been floated abroad for the Straits 
Settlements, but from 1893 the colony was liquidating its 
assets held in Indian securities to meet an increased military 
contribution. In 1900 the colony received $24,000 in the form 
of light dues collected in India.
H. Capital investment in Straits Settlements
Very little is known about overseas investment in the Straits 
Settlements in this period. There was a certain amount of 
British and other European investment in tin mining in this 
period. In 1900 there were four companies floated in Britain 
to raise a nominal total of £136,000 for mining enterprises 
in the Malay States, but it is not known hov/ much came to
45
1. See p .83
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them, o r  i n  what form.-1-
I .  M i l i t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n
From th e  t im e  o f  t h e  T r a n s f e r  f rom t h e  I n d i a n  t o  t h e  
C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  i n  1 8 6 7 , th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  p a i d  an 
a n n u a l  m i l i t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o w a rd s  t h e  upkeep o f  i t s  
d e f e n c e .  U n t i l  1889  t h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  amounted t o  a b o u t  
£ 5 0 ,0 0 0  p e r  y e a r  b u t  f rom 1890 i t  was r a i s e d  to  £ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  a t  
t h e  c u r r e n t  and  n o t  o f f i c i a l  r a t e  o f  exchange  o f  t h e  d o l l a r  
(w h ich  was h i g h e r ) .  A f t e r  immense p r o t e s t s  by t h e  c o lo n y  i t s  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  was c a l c u l a t e d  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  of  i t s  r e v e n u e ,  
v/hich was f i x e d  o r i g i n a l l y  a t  17 i  p e r  c e n t  b u t  l a t e r  r a i s e d  
t o  20 p e r  c e n t . “ I n  1900  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p a i d  was $9 5 7 *0 0 0 .
J .  Payments  o f  l e a v e  s a l a r i e s  and  p e n s i o n s  and o t h e r s  
When s e n i o r  government  o f f i c i a l s  went on l e a v e ,  u s u a l l y  to  
B r i t a i n ,  o r  r e t i r e d ,  t h e i r  s a l a r i e s  o r  p e n s i o n s  were p a i d  t o  
them o v e r s e a s .  From 1894  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  g o l d  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  s i l v e r  d o l l a r ,  a p a r t  o f  s u c h  payments  was p a i d  
a t  a f i x e d  r a t e  o f  e x ch an g e .  Payments  ou t  o f  t h e  Widows and 
O rp h a n s1 2 Fund a l s o  come u n d e r  t h i s  c a teg o ry . - "  I n  1900  the  
paym ents  o f  t h e s e  two i t e m s  came t o  $6 0 ,0 0 0  and $4*000 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  a l s o  p a i d  $21 ,000
1 .  Wong, ’ W e s te rn  E n t e r p r i s e  and  t h e  Development o f  t h e
Malayan T in  I n d u s t r y  to  1914:  A Study on Economic
C o m p e t i t i o n  a n d ,  th e  Impact  o f  W este rn  I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  
in  M a lay a ’ 1 9 6 1 . p .3 0  P a p e r  r e a d  a t  London U n i v e r s i t y ,  
u n p u b l i s h e d .
2 .  SSLCP 1 8 9 0 . A p p . l ,  p . C l .  Sec.  o f  S t a t e  t o  Gov. SS,
(SS411) 13 December 1889,  See a l s o  100 y e a r s  o f  S i n g a p o r e , 
v o l . l ,  p p . 3 9 9 -4 0 2 ,  and Hai  Ding Chiang ’Ma1aya i n  
P a r l i a m e n t ,  1857-1895* B.A. Honours  academic e x e r c i s e ,  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Malaya ( S i n g a p o r e )  1959, p p . 58-75«
3* See c h a p t e r  IX, p .2 6 0 .
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being the difference in exchange on balance in England. It 
also paid a total of $3,200 to the Crown Agents in England 
and contributed $20,000 to the Indian famine Fund.
K. Shipping freights
The Straits Settlements earned considerable income as a ship­
ping centre, but not much information is available on rates 
of freight and how payments are made, especially in the case 
of trade with Southeast Asia carried in Chinese-owned ships.
In the case of exports to Britain and Europe freights were 
paid in by the consignees in the liest.“ The exports carried 
in vessels of the Straits Homeward Conference in 1900 came to
pabout 250,000 tons. Since the Straits Homeward Conference 
aimed at keeping freights at a minimum average of 25s. per 
ton^ the value of freights earned would have been at least 
£312,500 or converted to dollars at the current rate of exchange 
of 2s. to the dollar, $3jI25>000.
L. Repatriation of profits etc.
Once again, very little information is available although there 
were undoubtedly profits made and repatriated overseas. The 
Tanjong Pagar Dock Company in 1900 paid a dividend of $444*000^ 
most of which went to shareholders in Britain.
1. Report of the Royal Commission on Shippings; with Minutes
of Evidence and Appendices (five volumes) 1909, vol.IV, p.182 
Evidence by R.D, Holt.
2. See chapter VIII, Table XLII p.231. This is an estimate 
based on. it.
3. See chapter VIII, p.205.
3> (4. Bogaars, Tan.iong Pagar, App.l p.243•
Pan-Malayan  
Import surplus 
$24-8m  
(1900)
SS import surplus $20-7m  
from  o th tr  countries
$ 4 1m FM S import surplus 
in direct trade
SS import surplus 
from  Malaya —
K— $ 30 *6 m - i-^ -
SS total import surplus $51*3m
1
SS
FMS
urvFMS
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M . Straits Settlements trade with Malaya.
If Straits Settlements trade with Malaya is considered 
as internal trade (utilizing the concept of Pan-Malayan trade), 
then the colony's import surplus from Malaya becomes Pan- 
Malayan exports. The Pan-Malayan import surplus is then the 
result of subtracting from Straits Settlements import surplus 
the value of the colony’s import surplus from Malaya. But to 
this resultant Pan-Malayan import surplus must be added 
Malaya’s import or export surplus in direct trade to arrive at 
net Pan-Malayan import surplus.
In 1900 the colony’s import surplus in trade with Malaya, 
comprising the Federated and Unfederated Malay States, was 
$30*6m, while the import surplus of Malaya in direct trade 
was $4«lm,'i' so that the net Pan-Malayan import surplus was 
U24«8m compared with the Straits Settlements import surplus 
of $51.3m. This is illustrated in Graph Two where only import 
surpluses are shown. The net Pan-Malayan import surplus is 
the sum of Straits Settlements and Malayan import surplus in 
direct trade and excludes the import surplus arising out of 
trade with each other. (In 1910 when para rubber had entered 
the trade Malaya had an export surplus in direct trade).
1. It is assumed that there is no direct trade in the case 
of the Unfederated Malay States. The value of $4*lm 
refers specifically to the PMS: Straits Settlements 
imports from the FMS were $51*7m and exports $25*6m, 
while FMS total imports and exports were §38»4m and 
|60.4m. Assuming that both these sets of statistics 
are correct, the FMS imported directly $12.8m and 
exported directly $8.7m, leading to an import surplus 
of $4*lm in direct trade. There was of course an export 
surplus in total trade.
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From 1905 Malaya1 s exports of para rubber was trans­
hipped at Singapore and although the colony did not record 
these as imports from Malaya the Malay States recorded them 
as exports to the colony. The values of this transhipment 
trade are exports of Pan-Malaya. In 1900, however, this 
problem had not arisen and no value is assigned to this 
transhipment trade.
Considered thus, the balance of the identified items 
in the Straits Settlements balance of accounts shows that 
there is an import surplus of over $14m in 1900. This is, 
however, considerably smaller than the colony1s import 
surplus of over $51m in merchandise and treasure.
THE CAUSES OP ENTREPOT TRADE
The largest and most valuable portion of the Straits 
Settlements foreign trade was the entrepot trade. Why were 
goods sent to the Straits Settlements to be subsequently re­
exported; vhy were they not sent directly from the producers 
to the consumers? In short, what were the advantages of an 
entrepot which induced producers and consumers to come thither 
to effect the exchange of goods rather than to trade directly?
Why did they rely on the 'middleman1?
The entrepot makes a positive and valuable contribution 
to trade. It provides a market-place for the exchange of 
goods, thereby producing services in the transformation of 
goods in space and in time, which are services no less import­
ant than the actual physical creation of the goods themselves."
In the case of Singapore it provided a centrally situated, easily 
accessible and cheap (tax free) place for goods --  both West­
ern and Asian — - to be collected and exchanged. In Singapore 
there v/as available a great variety and a wide selection of 
goods which were stored until required. The multifarious 
small items of the trade in Southeast Asian produce were 
collected, sorted, graded, processed if necessary, and bulked 
for re-export to Western countries, while the large consign­
ments of Western manufactures such as cotton piece goods .were
1. See Edward Szczepanik, ’The Gains of Entrepot Trade', Far 
Eastern Economic Review. vol.XVII, 16 December 1954» No.25, 
pp.771-5» See also The Economic Development of Halaya.Report of a Mission organized by the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, Singapore 1955, P»94»
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"broken up into smaller and more convenient parcels for re­
export to the various consuming regions in Southeast Asia.
In performing these services Singapore, and the Straits 
Settlements as a whole, offered considerable advantages to 
trade which it attracted to itself and discouraged from 
taking a direct route.
Five major advantages that Singapore in particular offered 
as an entrepot port will be discussed. In addition to the
three advantages briefly described in chapter 1 --  the
freedom of the ports, the freedom of trade and the geograph­
ical location --  may be added the provision of special
services to trade and the provision of credit facilities.
The operation of these factors in the period 1870-1915 is 
considered below.
The freedom of the ports and of trade
These were the first and immediate advantages that 
Singapore offered to trade. The importance of the freedom 
of the port was recognized by its founder who told the gather­
ing of European merchants who came to farewell him in June 
1823 that:
It has happily been consistent with the policy 
of Great Britain and accordant with the principles 
of the East India Company, that Singapore should 
be established as a Free Port; that no sinister, 
no sordid view, no consideration either of 
political importance or pecuniary advantage, should 
interfere with the broad and liberal principles, 
on which the British interests have been established. 
Monopoly and exclusive privileges, against which 
public opinion has long raised its voice, are here 
unknown, and while the free Port of Singapore is 
allowed to continue and prosper, as it hitherto 
lias done, the policy and liberality of the East
India Company toy whom the settlement was founded, 
and under whose protection and control it is still 
administered, can never toe disputed.1
This subsequently became the creed for Straits merchants.
The Singapore Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1837. regarded 
this freedom as the most important of Singapore1 2s commercial 
interests. One of the principal objects of the Straits 
Settlements Association, formed in London in 1868 following 
the transfer of the settlements to the Colonial Office and 
comprising former residents, was to 1 guard against any leg­
islation that might prejudicially affect the interests of 
the Straits Settlements and, in particular, that might toe 
calculated to check or interfere with their commercial
pprosperity as free ports of trade ...’
The vigilance of the Straits merchants and the zeal 
that animated their organizations ensured that the ports 
of the Straits Settlements remained generally free of impo­
sitions. This is not to say that there were no taxes at 
all. The revenues of the colony for 1870, 1890, 1900 and 
1910 show that more than half was derived from imposts on 
trade (see Table V).
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1. Lady Raffles, Memoir of the Life and Public Service of 
Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles. F.R.S.etc vol.II, London
1830, pp.5 45-8•
2. See Swee Lee Ooi, ’The First Colonial Governor, Sir 
Harry Ord, 1867-1873; B.A. Honours academic exercise, 
University of Malaya (Singapore) 1958, App.A. ’Minutes 
of Proceedings at a meeting held to form the Straits 
Settlements Association’ pp.i-ii.
54
TABLE V
Revenues from Trade in the Straits Settlements in
1870, 1890, 1900, 1910 ($000)
Revenues from 
commodities
1870 I890 1900 1910
Opium
Spirits )
Toddy and bhang )* 
Petroleum
700
14
2,228
695
2,318
812
3,357
1,400
204
Port and harbour dues
Straits light dues 
Government wharves/
24 89 141 32H H
Total revenues from 
trade 739 3,011 3,271 5,106
TOTAL SS Revenue 1,379 4 , 3 7 5 5,387 9,336
Percentage Total to 
TOTAL (53%) (68%) (60%) (54$)
(Source: Straits Settlements Annual Reports)
* These were locally distilled spirits.
/ Ho revenues were received hy the Government until 1905 
when it expropriated the previously private Tanjong Pagar 
Dock Company.
The revenues from commodities were raised from taxes on the 
consumption of opium, alcholic drinks and petroleum in the 
colony. These revenues were obtained hy selling to the 
highest bidder or group of bidders the right to collect taxes 
on the commodities concerned. The government was assured of 
a fixed income while the revenue farmers were allowed to 
make a profit from their collection of taxes. This practice 
was common in the European colonies in Asia and in the case 
of Singapore dated from the early days of its foundation.
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The Excise Ordinance (No.IV) of 1870, consolidated and 
amended the lav/s relating to the opium and alcohol farms.
This Ordinance, with minor changes, operated until 1910.
There were three farms --  the opium, spirits and toddy.
The opium farmer received the exclusive right to sell opium 
in quantities less than one chest, as well as the right to 
cook, prepare and retail chandu. The spirits farmer received 
a tax of 75 cents for every gallon of spirits imported for 
consumption in the colony, while the toddy farmer charged 
a fee to all producers of that drink. Opium and spirits not 
consumed in the colony hut re-exported were not taxed, hut 
that portion consumed or used in the colony was subject to 
a mark-up collected hy the farmers. There was evasion and 
smuggling and the farmers’ agents, who were called revenue 
officers, were given certain powers of search. The government 
imposed heavy fines on offenders. The opium farm was the 
biggest source of government revenue, accounting for over 
50% of total revenue in 1870 and 1890, 43% in 1900 and 28% 
in 1910.1
In 1910 the Government Monopolies Department was created 
to replace the system of farming which was in consequence 
abolished, and the government itself undertook the task of 
raising revenue from these commodities. This department was 
responsible for the importation, preparation and distribution 
of opium. To ensure that the entrepot trade in this commodity 
was not affected, all opium landed in the colony was stored
1. See also Cheng, ’Opium in the Straits Settlements, 
1867-1910’, pp.52-75.
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in bonded warehouses from which they could he removed only 
with a government permit. The chests of opium which were re­
exported went tax-free, hut none were consumed in the colony 
without being handled by the Monopolies Department, A pre­
ventive service which had three launches to patrol the harbours 
of Singapore and Penang was headed by a former police officer. 
Smuggling by passengers was controlled by requiring all 
persons entering the ports to do so at certain determined 
landing places. Imports of alcohol for consumption were 
taxed according to its ’strength*, and similar precautions 
were taken to avoid inconveniencing the entrepot trade and 
to prevent smuggling. The right to prepare toddy was, how­
ever, still farmed out.1
The consumption of petroleum in the colony was not 
subject to any tax until 1909 when the Petroleum Revenue 
Ordinance (No.XIX) of 1909 was passed. The decline in the 
revenue from the opium farms in the beginning of the twentieth 
century led to a search for alternative means of raising 
revenue, as well as government assumption of the farms them­
selves. The tax on petroleum amounted to five cents on every 
gallon imported and consumed in the colony. The government 
argued that it ‘cannot be said to interfere with the freedom 
of the port* because the trade in petroleum was already under 
government control for reasons of fire prevention. All the 
petroleum on arrival at Singapore, except petroleum for
1, SSAR 1910, Report on Government Monopolies Department, 
p.94. The rents in the three settlements were $1,556 
(Singapore), #5,850 (Penang) and #25 (Malacca).
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transshipment, was immediately taken to a store. Any petro­
leum subsequently re-exported could he removed without tax,
'but any that was taken out for local consumption was subject 
to the five cents* duty. The law was accepted in the 
Legislative Council without protests from the unofficial s 
who represented mercantile interests.'*'
The port and harbour dues were extremely light, comprising 
only a small levy on European vessels to defray the cost of 
lighthouses. Even this was removed in 1912. The rest of the 
colony’s revenue came from such items as land rents, sales of 
government land, stamp duties, post and telegraph charges, 
fines, forfeitures and fees of court, and interest on invest­
ments and profit on silver and copper coins. The trade of 
the colony was therefore not totally free, but taxes were 
levided on consumption rather than on re-export, so that 
the colony’s entrepot trade was free.
The merchants, however, frequently tended to interpret 
the ’freedom of the port’ rather liberally, and attempted to 
use it to reject almost every type of legislation that they 
found objectionable. This caused some of the members of the 
Commission to Enquire into and Report on the Trade of the 
Colony in 1933-34 to comment that
The appeal to the ’freedom of the port’ is 
traditional, and the expression has, we think, 
become somewhat of a fetish, though the Singapore
1. SSLCP 1909, 26 November, pp. B197-201
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Chamber of Commerce no longer maintains, as it 
solemnly did in 1906, that registration of 
partnerships* would be inconsistent with the 
freedom of the port.l
One of the most peculiar calls for the preservation of the 
freedom of the ports was made when the colony appeared to 
be threatened with an income tax.
An income tax was suggested by Sir Harry Ord, the first 
Colonial Governor of the Straits settlements (1867-1873)•
At the end of his first year as Governor of the newly- 
established Crown Colony, he referred to the possible nece­
ssity of raising more revenue in the future. He said that 
contrary to popular opinion he did not believe that the 
imposition of import and export duties would be disastrous 
to the trade of the colony. He went on to say that there 
was no need to consider such taxes so long as there was 
1 another and equally legitimate but less objectable mode of 
raising revenue remaining open to us by the imposition of 
direct taxation* 1 2. Ord could not have been totally ignorant 
of the temper of mercantile feeling. In i860 the government 
of India, which then administered the settlements, attempted 
to extend Indian income tax legislation to them. The 
merchants, however, met together and drew up a petition to 
be presented to the legislative Council of India and to the 
British Parliament. It was argued that the proposed income
# • See Chapter IV, pp. 96-101.
1. SS Trade Commission Report 1955-4. vol.i, Reservation 
No.5, by two out of the eight members, p.21+8.
2. SSL CP 1867, 18 December, pp.40-41*
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tax was ’inquisitorial, vexations, impolitic, and unnecessary’;
"besides, it was further argued:
Immunity from direct taxation has "been one of 
the great causes of the commercial prosperity 
of these entrepots, and an impost such as that 
proposed would, in all probability, tend to 
drive from our ports the industrious classes cf 
the inhabitants, to the evident and great 
detriment of the trade of the revenues.^*
The pet it ion requested that the question be left to the ’future
government of the settlements’  ^ to decide.
I
Grd was taken to task by the newly established Straits 
Settlements Association in 1868 and 1869. A memorandum to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies accused the Governor 
of trying to ’ignore the whole past history of the Colony, 
and the dependence of its very existence on the free trade 
policy inaugurated by its founder, Sir Stamford Raffle s’^ .,
Ord*s defence was a masterly analysis of the mercantile 
conception of freedom of the ports. In Ord’s opinion^ it 
was ’nothing more than that the European community enjoyed 
all the facilities of trade which the administration of 
Singapore conferred without contributing anything towards 
its maintenance.’ Ord demonstrated that in 1868 eight-tenths 
of the colony’s revenue was paid by the Asian population and
1. SPP 2 August i860.
2. The movement for the transfer from the Indian Office to 
the Colonial Office began in 1858, see ante, p. 4*
3. Quoted in Wong, ’Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869', p.270.
4. Ibid., p.271.
60
that in 1869 the major part was paid by the Chinese while 
the Europeans contributed less than one-tenth. Not one of 
the principal partners or managers of the twelve largest 
European firms, whose business ran into hundreds of thousands 
of dollars, paid more than §84 tax per year, while among the 
Chinese merchants the richest paid the least tax. / This was 
because the revenue came principally from the opium farms, 
and only the poorer classes of Chinese consumed the drug._7 
Ord pointed out that European community, who contributed so 
little, felt that they should not be called upon to contribute 
more, but were content to suggest such means of raising 
revenue as a gambling tax and a tax upon the Chinese. Governor 
Ord was never forgiven his crime of advocating direct taxation 
in the colony and when he left he was neither farewelled 
nor missed.1
If it was a crime for a Colonial Governor to hint at 
a tax, it was sheer heresy for a member of the mercantile 
community (who should have known better) to propose it. This 
was what A.P. Adams did in the Legislative Council in October
91908. Referring to the declining revenues from opium^ he 
declared that new sources of revenue had to be found; in the 
past the consumers of opium and alcohol paid 60 per cent of 
entire revenue of the colony, which he felt was unjust. He
1. Oat, P.52.
2. In 1905 the Colony’s revenue from opium v/as §5,346,000, 
or 45*6 per cent of total revenue; in 1910 it fell to 
§3,357,971, or 28.0 per cent. See Cheng, p.52.
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proposed, an income tax."** In 1910 an income tax bill came 
before the council. In introducing it the Acting Colonial 
Secretary said that he did not expect any 1 outburst of public 
enthusiasm’ but asked for the ’grudging approval of this Coun­
cil’.^  The tax proposed was very small, only one cent tax per 
dollar on all kinds of income. Only public bodies like the 
Municipal Boards were to be exempted, as well as persons 
earning less than $100 a month.
The Bill met with an outburst of public protests. One 
of the first mercantile reactions came from the Singapore 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce. At its public meeting of 7 
January 1911 it rejected the income tax bill. Instead it 
proposed increased taxation on opium and alcohol, and if the 
revenue was still insufficient, a tax on tobacco, cigars and 
cigarettes^. On 16 January the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
met to vent its opposition to the Bill which was denounced 
as premature, oppressive and inquisitorial. It was argued 
that it would lead to evasion and dishonesty on the part 
of the Chinese I and the principle that the ’absolute freedom 
of this port for its imports and exports must be kept inviolate’ 
was brought forward.^- There was undoubtedly a confusion here: 
what obviously meant was that incomes of merchants were to be
1. SSLCP 1908, 28 October, p. B14«
2. 3SLCP 1910, 18 November, p . B143•
3. SFP 12 January 1911
4. SOGAR 1911, PP .8-18.
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kept inviolate. The Singapore "branch of the Straits Settle­
ments Association called a public meeting to discuss the Bill. 
The temper of the colony could "be gauged "by the editorial 
comment "by the local newspaper that the meeting was called 
Because the Straits Settlements administration was ’a govern­
ment that is running financially amok’^ . The public meeting 
of protest was claimed to he the largest meeting ever seen in 
the colony or in the Federated Malay States. Three resolutions
were unanimously passed. The first declared that an income not
tax was/necessary; the second rejected any kind of tax, direct 
or indirect, until the question of the military contribution
-- a problem of some years’ standing --  was finally resolved.1 2 3
The third resolution proposed to abolish the collection of 
revenue:
That this Association is of opinion that all 
permanent public works should, in future, be 
paid for, if necessary out of loans, and not 
from revenue, and that the saving thus effected 
would obviate the necessity for further taxation.3
Faced with the obdurate opposition of virtually every single
1. 3FP 23 January 1911.
2. At the time of the transfer in I867, the colony’s military 
contribution for the upkeep of the defences of the colony 
was £39,300. In practice, between 1868 and 1889 it paid 
just over £50,000 p.a. In 1889 the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies demanded that the colony pay £100,000 in 
sterling. This meant that not only was the burden doubled 
but that the colony also suffered the losses incurred on 
exchange - the silver dollar having depreciated considerably 
from its official rate of L|.s.6d. at which the contribution 
was hitherto paid. Several compromises were arrived at, 
mainly on the basis of a fixed percentage of total revenue, 
but the dissatisfaction continued. See ante, p.46.
3. SFP 26 January 1911.
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merchant in Singapore, the colonial government abandoned 
its iDroposal to introduce an income tax.-*-
This controversay revealed three important features 
of the trade of the Straits Settlements. First, it showed 
that the principle of the freedom of the ports could he 
stretched by the merchants to serve their own interests.
There was no precise definition of what this freedom involved. 
Thus the peculiar situation arose where merchants, in the 
name of freedom of the ports, rejected income tax but proposed 
taxes on tobacco, matches, and even a poll-tax (on Chinese). 
Second, it revealed mercantile unity and aggressiveness and 
readiness to contest any issue in which they felt their 
interests were threatened. Third, it revealed very clearly 
the influence that the merchants in the Straits Settlements 
wielded with the government of the colony,, an influence 
which was undoubtedly to the benefit of the colony’s trade 
and traders.
The freedom of trade, which went together with the 
colony’s freedom of the ports, proved to be an ’extra’ or 
’bonus’ attraction of Singapore when other ports in Southeast 
Asia became free ports. The case of Macassar was mentioned 
earlier.1 2 The only instance of action against specific firms
1. SSLCP 1912. 27 January, p.B3. The revenues in 1912 
were adequate, which was not expected, so that the 
government case that the tax was necessary was weakened.
2. See ante. p.8.
64
took place in 1915, when the First World War "began. German 
firms were struck off the membership of the Singapore Chamber 
of Commerce. In so doing the Chamber followed the practice 
of the London Chamber which had suspended the privileges of 
’enemy1 23 members and disallowed naturalized ones from attending 
meetings. "•
The freedom of trade in the entrepot port gave rise to 
something very close to a perfect market with perfect compet-
pition. It provided an inducement to trade and was also a
factor contributing to grov/th. An economist studying the
entrepot trade of Hongkong came to the conclusion that:
Its main advantage / of private enterprise in an 
entrepot economy_y in comparison with e.g. state 
capitalism or socialism, consists in the possibility 
of the cancellation of errors of optimism or 
pessimism committed by individual private businesses. 
Losses suffered by some traders may be compensated 
by the gains in the savings of some other, more 
lucky, merchants. This type of safety valve does 
not exist in the alternative economic systems.
The risky nature of an entrepot economy requires 
a system which fully allows for rev/ards and 
penalties connected with risk-taking.3
The Straits Settlements also possessed this safety valve.
1. SCCAR 1915 * pp.20-21, The seven German firms struck off 
were Behn, Meyer & Co.Ltd; Deutsche Asiatic Bank, R.Forwerg, 
Franzen & Co., Kümpers & Co., Rautenberg, Schmidt & Co., 
and Siemens Bros., Dynamo Works Ltd.
2. See Edwrard Szczepanik, ’Economic System of Hong Kong’ , 
in Far Eastern Economics Reviews vol.XVII, 28 October 
1954, No.18, pp.545-8. Imperfections are admitted by 
Szczepanik. There were also imperfections inthe Straits 
Settlements.
3. Szczepanik, ’’The Gains of Entrepot Trade’, p.774»
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Singapore’s geographical advantages
Singapore’s favourable location with regard to the trade
between East and West and between countries in Southeast Asia
is an unalterable advantage. The pattern of East-West trade
also tended to accentuate Singapore’s geos^raphical advantage.
In 1900 the Dutch tried to develop Pulo Way as a coaling
station to challenge Singapore. It lay at the northern.
entrance to the Straits of Malacca, only 30 miles from Acheh,
and appeared well situated. The Dutch navy also undertook
to coal there and two iron wharves, adequate to accommodate
any vessel that traversed the Suez Canal, were built. But
the British were not worried at all:
If steamers, outwards and homewards, for China and 
Japan ports were not in the habit of carrying Straits 
cargo, they might save a little time in coaling at 
Pulo Y/ay instead of at Singapore or Colombo; but 
generally speaking, all these vessels carry Straits 
cargo and have thus an object in calling at the 
ports apart from the question of fuel supply. So 
long as such conditions prevail, there would not 
appear to be much chance of Pulo Way attracting any 
appreciable portion of the Singapore or Penang 
traffic, for the positions of these two ports as 
trade entrepots must give them a constant advantage 
over a port not similarly situated.1
Singapore also had other natural advantages such as the
magnificent natural harbour, deep and safe, and excellent
sheltered anchorage.
The Provision of services
Singapore attracted trade because it was the centre
1. Trade and Shipping in Southeast Asia 1901. p.lll.
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of shipping and communication and provided the services nece­
ssary to trade. In addition it provided special services for 
the trade in tin, and later rubber.
The mouth of the Singapore River was Singapore’s first 
and natural commercial centre. To it came the small nrahus 
and coastal steamers that collected the produce of Southeast 
Asia and took away in exchange manufactured goods and textiles. 
On the left bank of the river were located the shops and 
godcwns of the Chinese merchants who assembled and disposed 
of the desired produce to their European counterparts. In 
the period prior to 1870-1915» the square-rigged vessels of 
Britain, Europe, India and USA and the junks of China and 
Siam also called at the river mouth. The coming of steam­
ships threatened to increase the congestion of traffic on 
the river and eventually to choke it, but before this happened 
the development of New Harbour siphoned off the ocean-going 
trade. The Singapore River has remained, even to this day, 
the home of the trade in the produce of Southeast Asia. Prom 
the 1870s the silting up of the channel caused anxiety and 
the first of several committees to study and report on the 
river and its requirements was set up in 1878. But up to 
World Tar 1 no improvements had been made beyond the dredging 
of the middle of the channel. The river was not developed 
and it was useless for 12 hours out of 24»^
1. 100 Years of Singapore. vol.II, p*39*
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I t  was t h e  d eve lopm en t  o f  New H arb o u r  t h a t  1 r a i s e d  t h e  
p o r t  to  a v e r y  h i g h  p o s i t i o n  among t h e  p o r t s  of  t h e  w o r l d 1. 1 
To New Harbour came t h e  l a r g e  v e s s e l s ,  sq u a r e  r i g g e r s  and  
s t e a m e r s ,  which c a r r i e d  t h e  o c e a n i c  t r a d e  o f  t h e  c o lony :  t h e y  
b r o u g h t  ’T e s t e r n  m a n u f a c t u r e s  and to o k  away t h e  p ro d u c e  o f  th e  
A r c h i p e l a g o .  The "b u i ld in g  o f  w harves  and docks i n  New Harbour  
beg an  i n  e a r n e s t  i n  t h e  1860s a s  t h r e e  companies  competed 
a g a i n s t  each  o t h e r .  The two i m p o r t a n t  o n e s ,  the  Tanjong  
P a g a r  Dock Company and th e  New H arbour  Dock Company, e l i m i n a t e d  
t h e  t h i r d  company a n d  e v e n t u a l l y  amalgamated  i n  1900.  P r i o r  
t o  1866 s t e a m s h i p s  a n d  t h e  l a r g e r  s a i l i n g  v e s s e l s  had  t o  
w a i t  in  t h e  Poads  w h i l e  c o n s i g n e e s  s e n t  ou t  s p e c i a l  b o a t s  to  
c o l l e c t  t h e i r  c a r g o e s .  T h i s  was i n c o n v e n i e n t ,  e n t a i l i n g  l o s s  
o f  t im e  and o f t e n  l o s s  o f  goods due t o  t h e f t s .  When t h e  
f i r s t  l i n e  of w harves  were r e a d y  i n  1866 th e  ocean-going- 
v e s s e l s  s h i f t e d  from th e  S in g a p o re  P i v e r  to  New H arbour .
Here t h e y  c o u ld  come r i g h t  up to  b e r t h  and to  d i s c h a r g e  t h e i r  
c a r g o e s  s p e e d i l y  a n d  w i t h  s a f e t y ,  The f i r s t  dock was com ple ted  
in  1868 .  By 1876 t h e r e  were f o u r  docks b e l o n g i n g  to  t h e  t h r e e  
com pan ies .  By 1880 t h e  t h i r d  company and i t s  dock h ad  c l o s e d ,  
b u t  a n o t h e r  dock h a d  b e e n  b u i l t  i n  1879 "by t h e  T an jo n g  P a g a r  
Dock Company. D ocking  f a c i l i t i e s  drew s t e a m e r s  t o  S in g ap o re  
b e c a u se  t h e y  p r o v i d e d  th e  s e r v i c e s  s u c h  as  r e p a i r s  b e lo w  th e  
w a te r  l i n e  which t h e s e  v e s s e l s  n e e d e d .  By th e  t u r n  o f  the
1. A S in g a p o re  C e n te n a r y :  A S o u v e n i r  Volume, S in g ap o re  1919»
P.34.
68
century the Tanjong Pagar Doch Company, which had absorbed
its rival, had ceased to expand the facilities it provided
to shipping and what it did provide was inadequate. This
consideration, in addition to the fact that the government
felt that the company’s monopoly status was undesirable in
view of its dominating importance in the trade of the colony,
led to its expropriation by the government in 1905. The
company was eventually reconstituted as the Singapore Harbour
Board in 1912 and in that year an extensive programme of
expansion of wharf accommodation and dock building was begun
1by the government, which was completed in 1918.
In 1916, on the basis of total tonnage entered and cleared,
Singapore ranked as the seventh largest port in the world and
the fourth in the British Empire. It was the hub of Southeast
Asian steamship communication with the whole world, lying
as it did on the ’main line’ shipping routes. In 1869 there
2were only seven trans-ocean shipping companies in Singapore 
but in 1897 no less than 23 such shipping lines were party 
to a Conference agreement.^
Singapore was a centre of a network of communications 
that reached out all over the world, bringing to it instant­
aneous information. In December 1870 the Singapore-Madras
1. See Bogaars, The Tanjong Pagar Dock Company. 1864-1905.
2. George Bogaars, ’The Effect of the Opening of the Suez 
Canal on the Trade and Development of Singapore’, JHBEAS 
vol• XXVIII 1955, p.107.
3. See chapter VIII p. 204and Statistical Appendix XV.
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submarine cable was laid, placing Singapore in direct commun­
ication with India, Europe, Britain and America* Prom 
Singapore the line branched off to Java, Australia and China.
In 1882 the telegraphic position of Singapore was described 
thus in military publications:
Singapore is an important station in the line of 
telegraphic communication between India, China 
and Australia* Prom it submarine cables run 
as under -
(l) Singapore - Malacca, Penang, Madras*
(2; Singapore - Penang, Rangoon, thence overland to
Calcutta
(3) Singapore - Saigon (Cochin-China), Hong Kong,
Shanghai, Nagasaki, Vladivostok, 
thence overland to Europe.
(4) Singapore - Batavia, Palmerston (Australia)
(5) Singapore - Palmerston
There is thus telegraphic communication to Europe 
either through India or by Hongkong.1
In March 1874 only 74,900 words were telegraphed but at the
end of the period under study, in March 1914» 1,111,416
words were telegraphed. The telephone was introduced in
1882 and in that year 36 businesses had installed telephones;
in 1919 there were 1,832 exchange lines in Singapore.1 2 The
less rapid means of communication - the mails - were efficient
and reliable. The first P & 0 mail steamer, the Lady Mary Wood,
arrived in August 18455 in 1862 the French Messageries Maritimes
introduced its mail service to Singapore, and in 1886 a German
service was established. In 1850 the Singapore to London
1. Quoted in 100 Years of Singapore. vol.II, p.151«
2. Ibid.,pp.169-70
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mail took between 43 and 45 days, but in 1880 it was only 
28 days, a period that fell even further, to 22^ days, by 
1905.  ^ In addition to the access to information regarding 
markets overseas, the value of Singapore itself as a market 
was also increased hy the provision of information "by the 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce, one of whose stated objectives 
was the ’collecting and classifying of mercantile information’. 
The Chamber was also to contact commercial associations and 
business houses in other places and to invite them ’to
2correspond with and communicate information to the Chamber*•
In 1887 the Chamber published information on the
Course of Exchange.
Bank Bill Rates of Discount.
Price of the sovereign (which was important as the 
silver dollar was depreciating).
Resolutions of the Chamber in force (e.g. ’That all
produce be delivered at the godov/ns of the purchaser’ ).
Rates of Commission at Singapore (first adopted at a
General Meeting of Merchants on 19 February 1830, 
revised on 8 May 1855» and 29 April 1879, by 
Chamber of Commerce).
Scale of Charges for Receiving, handling or shipping 
goods (including Boat and Codlie Hire), and for 
storage (first passed 10 September 1866).
Scale of Boat Hire (applied from 26 August 1881).
Scale of Tonnage (10 December 1885).3
In 1914 the Chamber continued to publish all these as well as:
Pilotage Tariff (new rates from 6 November 1911)
Summary of Straits Settlements imports and exports.^
1. Ibid., p.170.
2. See Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the 
British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, viz. Penang. 
Malacca and Singapore, with a History of the Malayan States 
on the Peninsula of Malacca (2 vols»)'vol.II. London 1839. 
PP.391-9.
3.&4. SCCAR 1887. 1914.
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The Chamber of Commerce also took an active part in the con­
troversy regarding the accuracy of the Straits Settlements1 2
import and export statistics and exhorted its members to do 
their best to supply accurate figures to the Registrar. It 
also assisted materially to this end by checking daily mani­
fests of imports and exports from the Registrar of Imports 
and Exports and by publishing them daily for the immediate 
correction of errors.1
Yet another of the attractions of the Straits Settlements 
to trade was the creation of special services to meet the 
requirements of trade. In the nineteenth century tin was 
the most important single commodity in the colonyTs entrepot 
trade. In 1887 the newly-established Straits Trading Company, 
which became the foremost dealer in tin, began operating a 
smelting works on Pulau Brani, off Singapore. Shortly 
afterwards it introduced the gas furnace to tin smelting.
Prom the start, due to a sympathetic administration in some 
of the Malay States, the company flourished, and quickly 
attracted !a very conspicuous share of the smelting trade 
from its Chinese rivals1 who operated in the Malay States.^
In the early part of the twentieth century the works in 
Pulau Brani were further improved by the use of the regenera­
tive gas-fired reverberatory process, and plants were
1. See Historical Appendix A .
2, Y/ong, * Western Enterprise and the Development of the 
Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*» pp.41-2* See also Allen 
and Donnithorne, western Enterprise in Indonesia and 
Malaya. pp.158-60. See also chapter VII, pp.180-2,
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installed for the preliminary treatment of the ores and the 
recovery of the tin from the furnace fires.1 2 In I898 a 
Chinese tin-smelting works "began in Penang where a "branch 
of the Straits Trading Company also appeared in 1902. The 
Chinese firm was quite successful and in 1907 turned itself 
into a limited liability company employing modern Western 
processes. In July 1911 it was "bought out "by British inter­
ests and "became the Eastern Smelting Company Limited. As a 
result of tin-smelting facilities the Straits Settlements 
established a command of the tin trade and Singapore became 
the largest centre of tin-smelting in the world. It processed 
a great deal of ores from Malaya and attracted ores from 
Indonesia, Siam, Australia and South Africa. An attempt by 
a ’Company of American origin’ to export ore direct to 
America to be smelted was quickly foiled by the British
administration and the trade in tin remained in British 
2hands.
In the twentieth century rubber became an increasingly 
important commodity and was second only to tin in 1915« In 
1910 the Singapore Chamber of Commerce decid,ed to ’consider 
and report as to the advisability of holding periodical 
auction sales of rubber under the direction of this Chamber 
in Singapore.-' Shortly afterwards, in June I9H ,  the Chamber
1. Allen and Donnithorne, p.157*
2. SSAR 1903. p.566. See also chapter VII,pp.180-2.
3« SCCAR 1910. App. P. p.6l.
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held a meeting to establish the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
Rubber Association.^ By a strange coincidence, this meeting 
was chaired by the managing director of the Straits Trading 
Company. In 1912 the results of the auctions showed that 
10,06l pikuls of rubber had been offered for sale, of which 
8,769 pikuls were sold. The stated objectives of the Rubber 
Association were to improve the condition of the trade in 
rubber, to facilitate the transaction of business, and to
pkeep records of the rubber trade . Signal success attended
its efforts and the Singapore Rubber Market has grown to be
the largest in the world.
The provision of credit facilities^
The colony’s trade with the surrounding regions was
carried on through the system of credits based at Singapore.
In 1906 a merchant in Singapore declared:
...it is the credit given by the European 
merchants which enables the Chinese traders 
to go to the Hinterland, providing partly 
the capital which opens it up, and which 
enables the traders to bring down that produce 
which we ship, and which attracts steamers to 
our ports.4
The American commercial agent who examined the trade of the 
colony in 1916 drew attention to the importance of credit 
in the local trade. He also noticed that British merchant
1. 3CCAR 1911. PP.34-35.
2. Ibid. ,' ; pp.34-35.
3. More will be said in chapter IV under Credit in the 
Entrepot Trade, PP*92-101.
4. SSLCP 1906, 12 January, p.B8.
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h o u s e s  imposed more s t r i n g e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  when g r a n t i n g  
c r e d i t ,  and d i d  so f o r  d i o r t e r  p e r i o d s  t h a n  European  f i r m s . ^
Of th e  f i v e  a d v a n t a g e s  t h a t  S in g a p o re  o f f e r e d  t o  t r a d e  
o n ly  one ,  th e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  l o c a t i o n ,  was p e rm a n en t .  But i t  
c o u l d  n o t  he  improved upon .  The o t h e r  a d v a n t a g e s  were 
c o m p e t i t i v e ;  t h e y  c o u ld  he  n e u t r a l i s e d  o r  n u l l i f i e d  hy  s u p e r ­
i o r  s i m i l a r  a d v a n t a g e s  o f f e r e d  hy com pet ing  p o r t s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  
A s i a .  The v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c o lo n y  was n o t  l o s t  s i g h t  
of hy t h e  m e rc h a n t s  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s .  They 
j e a l o u s l y  gua rd ed  t h e  f reedom  o f  th e  p o r t s  and  o f  t r a d e  and 
w a tch ed  c l o s e l y  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  s e r v i c e s .  The 
governm ent  was a l s o  s y m p a th e t i c  to  m e r c a n t i l e  i n t e r e s t s  and 
i n v a r i a b l y  c o n s u l t e d  i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  on m a t t e r s  t h a t  
a f f e c t e d  t h e  t r a d e  o r  t h e  t r a d i n g  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  c o lo n y .
Why d i r e c t  t r a d e ?
T here  was a p e r s i s t e n t  c o m p la in t  t h a t  t h e  co lony  d i d  
n o t  c o n t i n u e  to  e n g r o s s  a l l  th e  t r a d e  t h a t  f o r m e r l y  came 
to  i t ,  t h a t  i t  l o s t  t r a d e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d e c r e a s i n g  a t t r a c t ­
i v e n e s s  o f  i t s  f a c i l i t i e s  and  th e  i n c r e a s i n g  t e n d e n c y  o f  
t r a d e  to  b y - p a s s  t h e  m idd le -m an  and go d i r e c t l y  be tw een  
p r o d u c e r s  and consum ers .  A t y p i c a l  c o m p la in t  was v o i c e d  i n  
1903:
I t  i s  p r o b a b l y  t r u e  t o  s a y  t h a t  i f  t h e  co lo n y  
now h e l d  a n y t h i n g  l i k e  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t r a d e  
t r a n s a c t e d  i n  h e r  p r i n c i p a l  m a r k e t s  which she
1 .  O d e l l ,  C o t to n  Goods i n  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s , p .43*
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did ten years ago, enormous expansion would 
have been apparent, hut high freights, the 
exclusion of competition in shipping, and also 
the natural tendency for trade to he done 
direct, have retarded the progress of Singapore 
as a distributor between the countries of supiDly 
and consumption.l
Taking the trade of the colony with Indonesia and Siam as 
examples it can he seen there was probably some cause for 
alarm. Straits Settlements trade with Indonesia expanded 
more rapidly than total imports and exports of Indonesia 
between 1870 and 1900 but its growth v/as tardy compared 
with the rapid growth of Indonesian trade between 1900 and 
1915-* 2 Straits Settlements exports to Siam increased less 
rapidly than total imports of Siam although the colony’s 
imports from Siam kept pace with total exports of Siam over 
the period 1870-1915» The Straits Settlements did not always 
therefore obtain a proportionate share of the increase in the 
trade of its neighbours.
1 • SSÄP, 1905. P.490.
2. There are three principal sets of figures of Indonesian 
imports and exports: (a) Private trade in merchandise 
and treasure, (b) Government trade in merchandise and 
treasure, and (c) Total private and Government trade in 
merchandise and treasure. The Encyclopaedic van Neder- 
landsch-Indie, vol.ii, Leiden 1918, p.27 gives the values 
for all three, but except for 1875, 1911, 1912 and 1913, 
all the figures for 1876-1910 are five-yearly averages.
J.H. Boeke in his book Economie van Indonesie. Haarlem 
1951, p.220, gives values for total private and govern­
ment trade but his figures for the period 1870-1910 
are also five-yearly averages. J.S. Purnivall in Nether­
lands India, A Study in Plural Economy. New York 1944, 
p.207, gives the values of trade at five-yearly intervals 
between 1870 and 1900, but for reasons which he does not 
state gives only values of imports of private merchandise 
and exports of private and government merchandise. The 
Statesman’s Year Books give annual values for all three 
sets of figures but the volumes available only go back 
to 1885» It was decided for consistency to use Purnivall’s method of giving import values of Indonesia. The Straits Settlements imports from and exports to Indonesia refer to merchandise trade.
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TABLE VI
Growth of Straits Settlements merchandise trade with 
Indonesia compared with growth of Indonesian trade (1870-1915)
(a) Value
Trade of 
Indonesia
Imports Exports
1,000 guilder
S3 trade 
with Indonesia
Imports Exports
1,000 dollars
1870 44,1+59 107,759 7,065 6,1641875 108,173 172,243 8,955 11,8171880 145,220 175,286 10,929 14,7671885 119,153 185,128 19,883 16,4331890 141,322 175,895 22,670 17,8841895 145,051 223,933 27,912 31,5581900 176,078 258,237 52,391 43,996
1905 196,206 308,552 50,168 41,8211910 315,332 451,556 56,642 43,680
1915 373,620 771,103 69,566 59,203
(h) Index Numbers (1900 = 100)
Indonesian
Imports
. .................  _
SS
Ex )orts
iaIndonesia
Indonesian
Exports
SS
Imports
from
Indonesia
1870 25 Ik
' r 1
42 13
i  1875 61 27 67 17
i 1880 82 33 68 211885 68 37 72 381890 80 41 68 43
1895 82 72 87 531900 100 100 100 100
1905 111 95 119 961910 179 99 175 1081915 212 134 299 133
(Source: Indonesian statistics 1870-1900 from J. S. Purnivall
Netherlands India, A Study in Plura Economy, New
York 1944, P.207. Indonesian statistics 1905-1915
from The Statesmans Year Books, London).
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TABLE V II
Growth o f  S t r a i t s  S e tt lem en ts  tra d e  w ith  Siam compared 
w ith  growth o f  Siam ese tra d e  ( 1 8 7 O -I9 1 5 )
( a )  V a lu e
T r a d e
~ ----------------------
o f  S iam SS t r a d e w i t h  S iam
Imp 0 r t  s  Exp 0 r t  s
m. b a h t
I m p o r t  s  E xpo r t  s
m. d o l l a r s
!
1 8 7 0 7 .9 1 1 1 .0 5 3 .9 0 4 . 2 1
1875 1 0 . 6 4 1 4 . 0 4 5 .2 8 5 .9 5
1 8 8 0 1 0 . 5 7 1 6 . 1 7 7 .0 6 5 .3 0
1 8 8 5 1 1 . 3 8 1 5 .7 3 7 .5 4 6 . 7 0
1 8 9 0 2 6 . 3 1 3 2 . 1 0 1 0 .7 2 I I . 7 1
1 8 9 5 3 2 . 3 1 4 2 .3 0 1 4 .2 2 1 2 .9 1
1 9 0 0 4 3 . 3 9 5 2 .0 0 1 9 .7 4 1 3 . 0 0
1 9 0 5 6 8 .8 8 1 0 6 .9 6 3 1 .0 9 1 6 . 5 8
1 9 1 0 6 8 .2 1 1 0 8 .9 1 2 8 .7 7 1 2 . 1 4
1915 7 5 .4 5 1 0 5 .9 8 5 1 .1 4 1 4 . 7 9
(b ) Index Numbers (1900 = 100)
S ia m e se
I m p o r t s
SS
E x p o r t s  
t o  S iam
S ia m e se
E x p o r t s
SS
I m p o r t s  
fro m  Siam
1 8 7 0 18 32 12 20
1875 2 4 46 15 28
1 8 8 0 24 4 1 18 36
1885 2 6 5 2 17 38
1 8 9 0 6 l 90 35 5 4
1895 7 4 9 9 4 7 72
1 9 0 0 100 100 100 1 0 0
1 9 0 ^ 1 5 9 1 2 7 2 0 6 157
1 9 1 0 1 5 7 93 210 1 4 6
1915 1 7 4 1 1 4 2 0 4 259
( S o u r c e :  Siam ese s t a t i s t i c s  from James C. Ingram,
Economic Change in  T h ailan d  s in c e  1 8 5 0 . 
A pp . C. p p . 2 4 0 - 1 ".)
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The reasons for ^ o s s 1 of trade can he summarised under 
three heads --- competition, re-direction and restriction.
The rival ports of Southeast Asia were able to compete 
with Singapore in the provision of services to trade. Batavia, 
for example, was well located for ships using the Straits 
of Sunda which was the alternative route between Europe and 
China. It also had a good harbour in Tanjong Priok and it 
had 'behind it possibly the richest and best developed region 
in Southeast Asia --- Java. Batavia was therefore a compe­
titor to be reckoned with. Other ports in Southeast Asia 
were potential rivals ofSingapore, the main ones being 
Bangkok, Manila and Macassar. Improvements to the harbours 
and additions to facilities offered
attracted trade to them. If they developed merely as collec­
ting points of Southeast Asian produce which they then 
forwarded to Singapore, they were not rivals but feeder- 
ports of Singapore, as were Penang and Labuan. But if they 
collected the goods that used to go to Singapore, and then 
exported them directly to Britain, Europe and USA then they 
developed at Singapore^ expense.
The establishment of direct shipping services between 
Southeast Asian ports and Europe, and coastal ones to pick 
up the produce from the multitude of sources in Southeast 
Asia and to bring it to ports with direct shipping connexions 
led to the by-passing of Singapore. The development of 
European shipping was partly the result of the grovrth of 
industrialization which in turn encouraged the growth of
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nationalism. Together with other factors, including the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the expansion of trade, shipping 
tonnage expanded so rapidly that hy the early 1880*3 the supply 
had "begun to overtake the demand.1 23
The growth of nationalism in Europe introduced restrictive 
practices in colonial territories in Southeast Asia. The rest­
riction on trade practised hy the Dutch in Macassar has "been 
mentioned in chapter I. In the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century the French in Indochina introduced tariff jjolicies 
whose effect was to restrict the trade of the colony with non-
pFrench regions. The incidence of . wars in Southeast Asia 
led indirectly to the colony* s loss of trade with the affected 
areas. The Dutch wars in Acheh were frequently "blamed for 
the decline in trade between Penang and Sumatra.-^
These factors which could affect the trade of the Straits 
Settlements adversely were not subject to direct control by 
the colony. Only a vague and indirect influence could be 
exerted through the Colonial and Foreign Offices, revealing the 
vulnerability of Straits Settlements' foreign trade, a vulner­
ability which was, paradoxically, the result of its earliest
and possibly greatest advantage --  the freedom of the ports
and of trade. As free ports practising free trade the colony 
was unable to retaliate against discriminatory action and 
restrictions as to do so was to lessen its attractiveness at 
a time there was greater need to add to its charms.
1. See chapter V,pp.118-9 and chapter VIII,pp.200-3.
2. See chapter VI,pp.156-9«
3. SSAR 1890, p.127.
THE STRUCTURE OP TRADE
The trade of the Straits Settlements was divided almost
entirely between European and Chinese merchants. Since the 
largest portion of the colony’s trade was located at Singapore 
the analysis of the structure of trade refers specifically to 
that port hut, with suitable modifications, it applies also 
to Penang. The Europeans handled the trade that centred on 
New Harbour in Singapore while the Chinese monopolised the 
trade at the Singapore River. The imports over the wharves 
became exports at the river mouth and vice-versa. Manufactured 
goods came in ocean-going vessels v/hich called at the Tanjong 
Pagar wharves and were transported to Raffles Place where the 
European merchants had their shops. The produce of Southeast 
Asia arrived in coastal steamers and native boats at the mouth 
of the river and was collected by Chinese traders whose 
establishments lined Boat Quay on the bank of the river.
Boat Quay was the centre of the trade in Southeast Asian 
produce as Raffles Place was that of trade in Western manu­
factures. The division between the two sections of trade 
was carried on in the different languages used - English in 
the 'foreign’ markets and Malay in the bazaar.1 
The European merchants
European merchants handled the trade westwards, that 
is, the import of European manufactures and the export of
1. Odell, Cotton Goods in the Straits Settlements. p.l|£.
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Southeast Asian produce to the West. It is not known how 
many firms there were in 1870 hut in 1897 there were 20 
European import-export firms engaged in the trade westwards, 
and this number grew rapidly so that in 1908 there were 60 
such firms.^ A study of six of the largest merchant firms 
provides an outline of the structure of European business in 
Singapore. All these firms are still functioning today, five 
being British and one German. They are Boustead & Co.,
Guthrie & Co., Paterson, Simons & Co., Gilfillan, Wood & Co. 
(renamed Harper, Gilfillan & Co.), Borneo Co., and Behn, Meyer 
& Co. (Germany).
All these firms had head offices abroad, the British firms 
in London and Behn Meyer in Hamburg. These offices were 
managed by senior partners who had had first hand
1. PC on Shipping Pinp;s , Evidenee. Cd. 2+668 1909, p.18. 
Evidence of P.D. Holt of the Ocean Steam Ship Company 
(or the Blue Funnel Line). He. gave neither the names 
of these firms nor the criteria by which he identified 
an import-export firm in the Straits Settlements. These 
figures were used by a member of the Legislative Council 
in 1910 (SSLCP 1910. 11 April, p. B35) and it is possible 
he was quoting Holt. But they were not refuted and can 
be taken to be correct.
An examination of the Directories for China, Jaoan.
Korea. Indochina. Straits Settlements. Malay States. Siam. 
Netherlands India. Borneo. Philippines, etc.. Cpublished 
in Hongkong) for the years 1885, I896 and 1906 showed 
that 40, 52 and 57 European firms were listed as Merchants 
and commission agents1 in the respective years. No dis­
tinction was clearly made between import-export merchants 
and general merchants. It v/as decided that Holt's figures 
were, under the circumstances, to be preferred.
52
experience in the Straits Settlements or elsewhere in the East. 
It was the usual practice for the younger members of a firm 
to serve several years in the Straits Settlements as resident 
partners before retiring to London as senior partners .^  In 
the firm of Bousteads, for example, the founder Edward Boustead 
who established it in 1830 retired to London; in 1885 one 
T. Cuthbertson was resident partner in Singapore and in 1896 
he was a senior partner in London, his position in Singapore 
being filled by a J.P. Cuthbertson, who was probably a relative. 
It was quite common for some families to be associated with 
certain firms so that as an elder retired a younger member 
took his place in Singapore. Thus, when Alexander Guthrie
pretired in 1847 he was succeeded by his nephew James Guthrie.
The Shelfords, Thomas and William Heard, father and son, were 
associated with the firm of Paterson, Simons & Co., as indeed 
were the Patersons, - William, Cosmo G., and G. Paterson.
As a result of the senior partners being in England the 
control of the firms in Singapore was exercised from overseas. 
Senior partners of some of the six firms mentioned made an 
arrangement in I897 which brought about the Straits Homeward
1. See C.N. Parkinson, A History of Malaya; British 
Intervention in Malaya. 1867-1877. Singapore i960, p.20.
2. Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia 
and Malaya, p.54«
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Confe rence  o f  t h a t  y e a r  which, c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  c a r r i a g e  o f  ca rgo  
to  B r i t a i n  a n d  B u ro p e .^  S e n io r  p a r t n e r s  who had  many s h a r e s  in  
t h e  Tanjong P a g a r  Bock Company e s t a b l i s h e d  a London C o n s u l t a ­
t i v e  Committee i n  1883 t o  e x e r c i s e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  company i n  S i n g a p o r e . 2 3 These  e x - S t r a i t s  r e s i d e n t s  were 
a l s o  the  cham pions  o f  c a u s e s  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  a n d  
t h e y  formed t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  A s s o c i a t i o n  i n  1868 t o  
a c t  more e f f e c t i v e l y .  The i n a u g u r a l  m ee t in g  was h e l d  i n  t h e  
London o f f i c e s  o f  Edward B o u s t e a d ,  and  among t h e  members o f  
th e  f i r s t  c o m m it tee  were James G u t h r i e  and W i l l i a m  P a t e r s o n . ^ 1 
The bond  b e tw ee n  t h e  c o l o n i a l  a n d  t h e  m e t r o p o l i t a n  
t e r r i t o r i e s  was f u r t h e r  s t r e n g t h e n e d  by t h e  a g e n c i e s  which 
t h e s e  f i r m s  h e ld  f o r  f i r m s  l o c a t e d  i n  E ng lan d  and  E urope .
The s i x  f i r m s  m en t io n ed  e a r l i e r  h e l d  a t o t a l  o f  74 a g e n c i e s  
i n  1885,  104 i n  1896 ,  and  149 i n  1906.  I n s u r a n c e  a g e n c i e s  were 
t h e  most numerous ,  a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  more t h a n  h a l f  t h e  t o t a l  
number i n  1885 and 1 8 9 6 , f a l l i n g  s l i g h t l y  i n  1906.  S h ip p in g  
a g e n c i e s  came n e x t ,  t o t a l l i n g  1 6 , 26 and 46 i n  t h e  t h r e e  
d e c a d e s .  Banicing a g e n c i e s  i n c r e a s e d  from s i x  to  11 and 
t h e n  rem a in ed  a t  t h a t  f i g u r e  i n  1 9 0 6 . A g e n c ie s  f o r  m ac h in e ry  
m a n u f a c t u r e r s  and p r o d u c e r s  o f  consum pt ion  i tem s  ( s u c h  a s
1.  See c h a p t e r  V I I I ,  p .  204«
2.  See B o g a a r s ,  Tan.iong P a g a r . p p . 166 - 7 6 .
3 .  O o i , *The F i r s t  C o l o n i a l  G ove rnor ,  S i r  H a r ry  O rd ’ , 
App.A, p . i .
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w h isk y )  were a l s o  on th e  i n c r e a s e .
These  f i r m s  were a l s o  s lo w ly  e x t e n d i n g  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  t h e  l o c a l  s c e n e .  Some h e l d  a g e n c i e s  f o r  l o c a l  gove rn m en ts  
s u c h  as  J o h o r e ,  Lahuan  an d  B r i t i s h  N o r th  Borneo.  P a t e r s o n ,  
Simons & Co. was a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  and  h a n d le d  t h e  "business  o f  
t h e  New Harbour  Dock C o . ,  w h i l e  G u t h r i e s  l a u n c h e d  t h e  T an jong  
P ag a r  Dock Co..  B o th  t h e s e  dock companies were t h u s  a s s u r e d  
o f  a minimum volume o f  b u s i n e s s ,  w h e reas  t h e  t h i r d  dock 
company, h a v in g  no such  c o n n e x io n s  and s u p p o r t ,  q u i c k l y  
c o l l a p s e d  i n  t h e  p r i c e - w a r  t h a t  e n s u e d .  I n  I896 and 1906 
managing a g e n c i e s  were j u s t  a p p e a r i n g ,  b u t  t h e i r  im p o r ta n c e  
was t o  grow. Under t h i s  sys tem  m erchan t  f i r m s  f o r  a commi­
s s i o n  to o k  on th e  management o f  b u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  u s u a l l y  
t i n  m ines  and  r u b b e r  e s t a t e s ,  which were owned by companies  
l o c a t e d  i n  E n g la n d ,  Europe  and  e l s e w h e r e  ."** These im p o r t -  
e x p o r t  f i r m s  e x te n d e d  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  e a s t w a r d s  a s  w e l l .
In 1847 G u t h r i e s  had  c o n n ex io n s  i n  Siam, China ,  Sa igon  and 
B o rn e o . 1 2 3 A F r e m a n t l e  (W e s te rn  A u s t r a l i a )  b r a n c h  was o p e r a t i n g  
by 1906.^ I n  1896 t h e  Borneo Co. had  b r a n c h e s  i n  Bangkok, 
Sarawak, B a t a v i a ,  and. S o u rabaya ,  and t e n  y e a r s  la  t e r  had  
a c q u i r e d  b r a n c h e s  i n  Chiengmai ,  Rahang and Lakon i n  Siam, 
b u t  had  c l o s e d  i t s  b r a n c h e s  i n  Sourabaya  and Sarav/ak. Behn 
Meyer i n  1906 had  b r a n c h e s  i n  M ani la  and  Sandakan.
1 . See A l l e n  and D o n n i t h o r n e ,  c h a p t e r  I I ,  ’The I n s t r u m e n t s  o f  
W es te rn  E n t e r p r i s e ’ p p . 49-60 f o r  a c a r e f u l  s t u d y .  The 
modern i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  sys tem  a r e  examined b y  J . J .  
P u t h u c h e a r y  i n  Ownership  a n d  C o n t ro l  i n  t h e  Malayan Economy, 
S in g a p o re  i9 6 0 , c h a p t e r s  I I  a n d  I I I ,  ’Agency H o u s e s ’ and 
’ Commerce’ p p . 23-60.
2. A l l e n  and  D o n n i t h o r n e ,  p .54»
3 . The D i r e c t o r i e s , f o r  t h i s  and  o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h i s  
p a r a g r a p h .
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The European merchant trading in Singapore depended 
on his Chinese employees who knew the local dealers and 
spoke their languages and who therefore did the talking, 
bargaining and buying and selling for him. In 1900 an Eng­
lishmen travelling through Singapore described the position 
thus:
The business of the European firms - and this is 
true of almost the whole Far East - could not be 
carried on for a week without their Chinese 
shroffs, compradors, and clerks.1
Through his Chinese employees the European merchant disposed
his imports of, say, textiles to Chinese merchants, usually
on two to three months’ credit. He then bought from his
Chinese connexions the raw materials and foodstuffs which
he v/anted for exporting to the West; frequently he accepted
goods to the value of money due to him from the Chinese
merchant to whom he sold his goods on credit. He did not
trade directly with the consumers and producers of Southeast
Asia.
There were difficulties of language and geography. A 
large number of languages was spoken in Southeast Asia, which 
consisted of a large number of small market outlets for 
Western manufactures and sources of Southeast Asian produce - 
very frequently these were small villages hidden away behind 
mountains and jungles or nestling high up in the reaches of
1. Henry Norman, The Peoples and Politics of the Far East. 
Travels and Studies in the British. French. Spanish, and 
Portuguese Colonies. Siberia, China. Japan. Korea,
Siam, and Malaya, London 1900, p.42.
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rivers and streams. To reach them and to he able to commun­
icate with the inhabitants who might never have seen a white 
man were indeed major obstacles. Nor was the European 
population of the Straits Settlements adequate in number 
for such a task even if it had the inclination. Between 
1871 and 1911 the European population averaged less than two 
percent of the total population and never exceeded 6,000 in 
number.'*' The Europeans were to be found in the colonial 
administration, the armed forces, the church, the professions 
and business enterprises. The East-West trade rested with 
20 import-export firms in 1897 and 60 in 1908, in which year 
seven firms accounted for 60 per cent of the trade. The 
European merchant was an importer and exporter, an agent 
for innumerable insurance, shipping and other business, had 
his hands in local economic enterprises and did his share of 
public duties. He was concurrently engaged in all these and 
in expanding the business of his firm, while at the same 
time he sought to acquire concessions from Malay rulers and 
to apply pressure in the right places to extend British 
control over native territories so that trade and production 
might be stimulated.^ On top of all this he had a limited 
period of time in the colony before he returned to take up 
a senior partnership in London. It was therefore a better
1. See Statistical Appendix XIV. Only males are considered.
2. It was a leading Singapore merchant, W.H. Head, who 
provided Sir Andrew Clarke with the excuse to intervene 
in the Malay States.
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economic proposition and an easier one to trade with the 
Chinese merchants than to trade direct.
John Anderson is a good example of European merchants 
in Singapore. He came to Singapore in 1859 and served for 
twelve years in the government before joining Boustead & Co. in 
1871. He left Bousteads in I876 to join Guthries where he 
rose to he resident partner, Under his direction the firm 
expanded its interests and added coffee and tapioca plantations 
to its spice estates. In 1895 an experimental rubber estate 
was started. The firm also obtained managing agencies for 
three planting companies by 1886. John Anderson himself 
became concurrently director of two other companies—  the 
Jelebu Tin Mining and Trading Co. and the Raub Australian Gold
Mining Co. Ltd.--  and became chairman of the Tanjong Pagar
Dock Company for the period 1900 to 1904« He was at various 
times Chairman or committee member in the Singapore Chamber 
of Commerce, the Singapore Exchange and the Straits Settle­
ments Association (Singapore Branch). Prom 1886 he spent, 
many years as a member of the Straits Settlements Legislative 
Council and was eventually knighted in 1912. He was chairman of 
the Commission of Enquiry into the consumption of opium in 
the Colony and a redoubtable opponent of the Shipping 
Conference. He was also at one stage Consul for Siam and 
spoke Malay fluently, probably because he had worked for
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the government.^
The Chinese merchants
The Chinese merchants of Singapore were the middlemen 
in a middleman’s economy. They stood "between the European 
merchants who imported Western manufactures and the producers 
of Southeast Asia who ultimately bartered their produce for 
manufactures. In a sense their position was epitomised in 
the person of the "bullock-cart contractor v/ho undertook the 
transportation of goods "between the New Harbour wharves and 
Raffles Place thereby bringing about the exchange between 
manufactures and produce - he was a Chinese.
The Chinese merchant obtained manufactured goods from 
his European connexion and disposed of them all over South­
east Asia in return for the produce of the area. This he 
could do in any of three possible ways. He could barter 
cotton piece goods, for example, fof produce brought by 
native producers to the Singapore River. By 1870, however,
1. Information on John Anderson from 100 Years of Singapore 
vol. II. See also, Allen and Donnithorne, p.54, Bogaars, 
Taniong Pagar, pp.216-222. He resigned after a dispute 
with the London Consulting Committee. The Directories 
1885, 1896 and 1906, v/ere also used. John Anderson v/as 
a v/ell-known pro-opiumist and his appointment as chair­
man of the Straits Settlements’ Opium Commission in 1909 can be taken as an indication of government decision 
not to abandon opium altogether. On the recommendation 
of the Commission the system of farms was abolished and 
a Government Monopolies Department established to take its place in 1910. It is interesting that this depart­
ment purchased its opium through an agent - Guthrie 
& Co. of which John Anderson v/as the Singapore partner.
(SSAR 1910. Report on the department, para. 16/ p.88.)
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this was a practice that was on the decline as the direct 
conveyance of goods hy producers was being replaced by coast­
ing vessels.^ The second and more common method was for 
the merchant to dispose of his goods to his agents in South­
east Asia. Finally, the Chinese merchant could himself sell 
direct to native consumers, and this was sometimes done in 
the Malay Peninsula. This was something that his agents in 
Southeast Asia would have had to do. Here, however, a 
greater degree of enterprise was required; besides textiles 
the merchant took along such necessities as fish, rice, 
salt and matches and went to a village where he exchanged 
his stock for gutta percha, rattans, arecanuts and other 
produce which he then took back to Singapore. A contemporary 
Chinese has described this method of trading in eloquent 
terms:
As commercial travellers they (the Chinese) penetrate 
into many islands where a white man is never seen.
In the past they have watered with their blood 
many a savage territory, and paved the way for the 
introduction of civilization and better government 
into many lands.1 2
The ability of the Chinese to trade directly and effectively 
in Southeast Asia was due to the fact that
1, Wong, ’Trade of Singapore 1819-18691 pp.105-6.
2. Noctes Orientales. Being A Selection of Essays Read 
Before the Straits Philosophical Society between the 
Years 1895 and 1901. Singapore 1913. Tan Teck Soon, TChinese Local Trade’, 10 August 1901, pp.195-204*
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... they /"the Chinese_J7 have established 
connexions in almost all the islands to which 
our foreign /"that is, Western/7 commodities 
are carried. Their agents reside in Sumatra,
Borneo, and on the Indochinese mainland, 
collecting produce by barter with the natives, 
to whom they are not infrequently related by 
social as well as by commercial ties.l
The Chinese also were able to command corresponding facil­
ities which were enjoyed by European firms in the trade 
westwards. Shipping in particular gave Chinese merchants 
a great advantage - Chinese steamers shipped European manu­
factures or intra-Asian commodities such as fish and rice 
and brought in the produce to be sold to Europeans. The 
development of Chinese dipping was greatly encouraged by 
legislation passed in the colony in 1852 whereby old 
Chinese residents could become naturalized British subjects. 
By the 1860s Chinese-owned vessels flying British colours 
plied the ports between Singapore and Siam, Cochin China 
and the islands of the Archipelago."' In 1896 two Chinese 
merchant firms which were listed in the Directories had 
agencies for six steamers (tramps) and two steamship compan­
ies, as well as two insurance companies. Some of these 
Chinese-owned steamers had European captains. Some Chinese 
merchants in Singapore financed the cultivators of pepper 
and gambier in Johore ’on the understanding that they were
1. J. Thompson, The Straits of Malacca. Indochina. China. 
or Ten Years’ Travels. Adventures and Residence Abroad. 
London 1875, p.12.
2. Wong, ’Trade of Singapore, I8I9-I869’, p.232.
to have the monopoly of all produce from the plantations 
of their debtors’.-*- In 1867 the Pepper and Gambier Society 
or the Kongkek was established in Singapore for the benefit 
of the financiers and producers and for the regulation of 
the trade in these commodities. The Kongkek also handled 
complaints from European merchants regarding the quality of 
these products; in 1887 its representatives met with the 
representatives of European firms dealing in these commodities 
in the offices of The Singapore Chamber of Commerce to 
discuss ways and means of improving their quality. They agreed
0to call upon the Sultan of Johore for his help. This was 
a perennial complaint and the Annual Reports of the Chamber 
are full of complaints and suggestions of overcoming 
inferior quality.
The biggest advantage of the Chinese over the Europeans 
in the trade eastwards was their numbers. They comprised 
between 55 and 70 per cent of the population of the Straits 
Settlements in the period 1871-1911, and exceeded 272,000 
persons in 1911.^ Equipped with a canny commercial instinct 
and. connected with other Chinese and agents in the surrounding 
countries, the Chinese in Southeast Asia formed an inexorable 
army of commercial travellers who probed, pushed and
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1. Ong Siang Song, One Hundred Years of the Chinese in 
Singapore, London 1923, p.37*
2. SCCAR 1887. App.E
3. See Statistical Appendix XIV. Only males are considered.
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penetrated everywhere, collecting produce in exchange for 
food and manufactured goods.
European and Chinese merchants were not competitive in 
the entrepot trade of Singapore; they were complementary and 
interdependent. The European merchants depended on the 
Chinese to dispose of their imports of manufactured goods, 
and for their supply of exports of Southeast Asian produce. 
The Chinese merchants depended on the European merchants 
for credit facilities with which to trade.
Credit in the entrepot trade
Upon the credit-nexus rested the relationship "between 
Chinese and European merchants.
As early as 1835 a meeting of European merchants tried 
to draw up rules to regulate the granting of credit to 
Chinese merchants. It was agreed that credit was to "be 
reduced from the six months then customary to three months, 
payment to "be strictly enforced after three days’ grace.
But in practice credit continued to stretch over six months, 
repayment coming in instalments proportionate to the degree 
of pressure applied. In 1852 the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce resolved that none of its members should grant 
credit for longer than three months. That it was.probably 
not strictly carried out is evidenced by its re-affirmation 
in 1858. In 1864 there was a commercial crisis and two 
European firms failed due, it was said, to insufficient 
care in granting credit to Chinese merchants who were 
encouraged to over-trade. The laxness was occasioned by
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keen competition "between European firms to dispose of their 
poods to Chinese middlemen, the newly arrived German firms 
granting extended credit in order to attract "business.1 23
Prior to 1870 insolvency was punishable by imprisonment. 
The bankrupt merchant could and frequently did disappear 
from the colony. What caused grave concern to the Europeans 
was the dishonest merchant who set out to cheat his creditors 
by declaring himself bankrupt. While his European creditors 
were trying to make something of his business books he was 
secretly sending his assets to China. After a term of 
imprisonment he retired to China to enjoy what he had saved 
from his creditors. In 1870 imprisonment for debt was 
abolished by the Bankruptcy Ordinance (XXI of 1870). The 
result, claimed the Chairman of the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce, was that ’the majority of our trading bankruptcies 
are tainted with fraud’.^
In 1885 a Commission of Enquiry^ found that ’special 
circumstances’ in the Straits Settlements assisted fraudulent 
debtors:
1. Wong, ’Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869’, pp.228-239«
2. SSLCP 1885. 17 August, p. B105.
3. SSL CP 1885. App. 46, ’Bankruptcy Commission P.eport’ , 
29 December 1885. There was one Chinese member
Tan Keong Saik, a merchant. There was no doubt that 
the Commission examined the problems of fraudulent 
Chinese bankruptcies.
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1.  A g r e a t  d e a l  o f  th e  t r a d e  o f  t h e  c o lony  was 
w i t h  rem ote  p l a c e s  which made i t  p r a c t i c a l l y  
i m p o s s i b l e  to  f o l l o w  a s s e t s ,  w i th  th e  r e s u l t  
t h a t  c r e d i t o r s  v/ere f o r c e d  t o  a c c e p t  sm a l l  
c o m p o s i t i o n s  w h i l e  d e b t o r s  l a t e r  s o l d  o f f  
t h e i r  h i d d e n  goods t o  r e a l i z e  a n e a t  p r o f i t .
2.  The a c c o u n t s  of  A s ia n  t r a d e r s  were k e p t  i n  
l a n g u a g e s  o t h e r  t h a n  E n g l i s h ,  and  f a l s e  a c c o u n t s  
c o u ld  be  p r e p a r e d  a g a i n s t  f a i l u r e .
3 .  The c l a n n i s h  n a t u r e  o f  A s ia n  t r a d e r s ,  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  t h e  C h in ese ,  e n a b l e d  t h e  d i s h o n e s t  ones 
t o  hand o v e r  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  to  f r i e n d s  and 
r e l a t i v e s  f o r  s a f e - k e e p i n g  u n t i l  t h e  s to rm  
r e s u l t i n g  from t h e i r  d i s h o n e s t y  had  blown 
o v e r .
4« A s ian  t r a d e r s  c o u ld  e a s i l y  r e t i r e  to  t h e i r  
own c o u n t r i e s  to  a v o id  l e g a l  p r o c e e d i n g s  
a g a i n s t  them.
5 .  Some monied p e r s o n s  t r a d e d  i n  the  name of 
young r e l a t i v e s  and  f r i e n d s  o f  no means,
’ t a k i n g  th e  p r o f i t  i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  w i th o u t  
i n c u r r i n g  l o s s e s  i n  th e  case  o f  f a i l u r e 1  2.
The 1870 B a n k ru p tcy  Law' was d u ly  amended to  make in s o l v e n c y  
’ so m e th in g  a p p r o a c h i n g  a c r i m e ’ . ' D i s a b i l i t i e s  were heaped  
on the  b a n k r u p t  who had  to  p ro v e  h i s  p l i g h t  was due to  
t r a d i n g  and n o t  t o  p e r s o n a l  c a u s e s  o r  s u f f e r  s e v e r e  p e n a l ­
t i e s ;  he  c o u ld  n o t  i n s t i t u t e  c o u r t  a c t i o n  o r  l e a v e  t h e  co lony  
w i t h o u t  th e  c o n s e n t  o f  th e  O f f i c i a l  A s s ig n e e  or  t h e  C o u r t . 1 
But the  s i t u a t i o n  d i d  n o t  im p ro v e .  One d i s g u s t e d  merchant  
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  money s p e n t  on l a w y e r ’ s f e e s  t o  t a k e  a d e b t o r  
t o  c o u r t  was ’ i n  f a c t  t h ro w in g  good money a f t e r  b a d ’ . In
1 .  SSLC^ 1 8 8 7 . 15 A u g u s t ,  p .  B104, 1 s t  r e a d i n g  o f  ’A B i l l  
t o  Amend t h e  Lav/ o f  B a n k r u p tc y ’ .
2 .  SSLCP 1 8 9 3 , App. I ,  23 F e b r u a r y  1893• ’ R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
Committee a p p o i n t e d  to  e n q u i r e  i n t o  t h e  work ing  o f  th e  
B a n k ru p tc y  Depar tm ent  and  O r d i n a n c e ’ , 24 December 1892. 
E v idence  o f  C.H. V a l t r i n y ,  a m erc h an t ,  p .  C 25.
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1895 imprisonment for debt was re-introduced,^ despite a 
massive Chinese protest that it was ’contrary to the usage 
of civilized nations’. As late as in 1908 and 1910, however, 
amendments were still being made to the lav/ of bankruptcy.
Recovery of debts was understandably difficult. The 
problem was aggravated in some cases because European 
merchants did not know who were the people with vtfiom they 
had business dealings. The Chinese were unwilling to reveal 
who the partners in a firm were; there v/ere only rumours 
that certain we11-known wealthy men were partners. Quite 
often they were partners, participating in the profits 
from a business venture which they financed or in which they 
had a share. If the business failed they disclaimed partner­
ship and the European merchant v/as then left to deal with a 
Chinese merchant of no wealth and no standing who had traded 
on the strength of a claimed, but no proven, relationship 
v/ith rich Chinese ’partners’ , and on European credit which 
they v/ere thus able to obtain. The legal position was well 
stated by the Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements 
in 1885:
There is no difficulty as to a person who re­
presents himself to be a partner because he is. 
a partner to those to whom he makes these 
representations. He cannot say afterwards he
1. SSLCP 1895 & 1896. Bankruptcy Ordinance Amendment Bill,
25 November, 6 December, etc., passed 18 June 1896.
2. SSLCP 1896. App. 16,2 April, 1896, p. C 169-173. Petitions 
to the Governor came from the Chinese in Singapore (333 
signatures), Penang (238) and Malacca (8l).
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i s  no t  a p a r t n e r  t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ;  he i s  a 
p a r t n e r .  A d i f f i c u l t y  does  a r i s e  when a 
p e r s o n  w ish e s  t o  o b t a i n  goods on t h e  c r e d i t  
o f  a n o t h e r  p e r s o n  who i s  n o t  a p a r t n e r  h u t  
whom he r e p r e s e n t s  a s  one.  Such a p e r s o n  i s  
n o t  hound by t h e  o t h e r s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,  and 
as  t h e r e  i s  p r o h a h l y  no t ime to  f o l l o w  up 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  made i n  t h a t  way, d i f f i c u l t i e s  
a r i s e .1
The r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  f i r m s  was p r o p o s e d . 1 2 D e t a i l s  o f  a f i r m ’ s 
name, h e a d  o f f i c e ,  b r a n c h e s  and a g e n c i e s ,  chop» and th e  
names,  a d d r e s s e s  and d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a l l  p a r t n e r s  o r  p e r s o n s  
h o l d i n g  th e  power o f  a t t o r n e y  were t o  he k e p t  i n  a r e g i s t e r  
f o r  r e f e r e n c e .
The s o l e  p u r p o s e  was t o  e n a b l e  E uropean  m e r c h a n t s  to  
he  a b l e  to  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  p a r t n e r s  i n  a f i r m  b e f o r e  g r a n t i n g  
c r e d i t .  V a r io u s  m ea su re s  were s u g g e s t e d  t o  remove t h o s e  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  made f r a u d  easy  t o  p e r p e t r a t e .  F o r  exam ple ,  
t o  a s s i s t  t h e  n o n - C h i n e s e - r e a d i n g  European, a l l  r e g i s t e r e d  
f i r m s  were t o  be  r e q u i r e d  t o  d i s p l a y  t h e i r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  
numbers ’ i n  a c o n sp ic u o u s  p o s i t i o n  i n  E n g l i s h  l e t t e r s  and 
f i g u r e s  e a s i l y  l e g i b l e . ’ To p r e v e n t  t h e  k e e p i n g  o f  a c c o u n t s  
which were a m y s t e r y  to  a l l  b u t  t h e  Chinese  k e e p e r  h i m s e l f  
and to  p r e v e n t  t h e  m a n u fa c tu re  o f  s p u r i o u s  a c c o u n t s  i t  was 
p ro p o s e d  a t  one s t a g e  t h a t  -
1 . SSLCP 1 8 8 5 . 17 A u g u s t ,  p .  B109.
2 . SCCAR 1 8 8 8 , App. C, p p .  1 8 -2 4  ’A B i l l  I n t i t u l e d ^ A n  
O rd in an c e  f o r  th e  R e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  P a r t n e r s h i p  F i r m s ,  1887* .
* A kind, o f  stamp o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  mark of  t h e  C h in e s e  f i r m .
A f i r m  h a d  b o t h  a name and  a c h o p , i n  much t h e  same way 
a s  a European  f i r m  might  have a name and a t r a d e  mark 
f o r  i t s  p r o d u c t s .
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A l l  m e r c h a n t s 1 23 and t r a d e r s 1 "books he  s tam ped ,  
t h a t  i s  to  s a y ,  t h a t  t h e  Stamp O f f i c e  f o r  a 
sm a l l  f e e  ( t h e  Stamp O f f i c e  i s  n o t  to  make a 
revenue  ou t  o f  t h i s -) s h a l l  stamp e v e ry  l e a f  
of t h e  j o u r n a l  and l e d g e r  -  b e f o r e  t h e  hook 
i s  begun -  e ac h  s h e e t  o f  t h e  hooks to  he  
numbered c o n s e c u t i v e l y  -  t h a t  a p e n a l t y  o f  
two y e a r s 1 im pr isonm ent  he awarded f o r  evepy 
l e a f  m i s s i n g  e x c e p t  where t h e r e  i s  c l e a r  p r o o f  
o f  f i r e  o r  such  l i k e  u n a v o i d a b l e  a c c i d e n t ,  
and f i v e  y e a r s ’ im pr iso n m en t  i n  c a s e s  where 
unstamped  hooks a r e  u s e d . l
I t  was t h e n  p o i n t e d  out  by t h e  Chinese  member of  the  L e g i s ­
l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  t h a t  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  to  p r e v e n t  Chinese  
from r e g i s t e r i n g  anybody o r  even any name a s  p a r t n e r . ^  I n  
1895 when t h e  B i l l  was a g a i n  d i fecussed  i t  was p r o p o s e d  t h a t  
p a r t n e r s  be  r e q u i r e d  t o  hand i n  s t a t u t o r y  d e c l a r a t i o n s  o f  
t h e i r  i d e n t i t y  o r  C e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  I d e n t i t y  s i g n e d  by a 
S o l i c i t o r  o f  t h e  Supreme C o u r t ,  a M a g i s t r a t e ,  J u s t i c e  o f  
t h e  P e a c e ,  a Commissioner o f  A f f i d a v i t s ,  a bank  manager ,  
a c c o u n ta n t  o r  c a s h i e r ,  a member o f  t h e  S in g ap o re  o r  Penang
Chamber o f  Commerce, o r  a P o l i c e  O f f i c e r  n o t  be lo w  th e  r a n k  
•5
o f  I n s p e c t o r ; ' '  a E u ropean  v/as t h u s  r e q u i r e d  to  c e r t i f y  t h e  
i d e n t i t y  o f  a C h in ese .  In  1900 a f u r t h e r  amendment was 
p r o p o s e d ,  t h a t  p h o to g r a p h s  o f  p a r t n e r s  accompany s t a t u t o r y  
d e c l a r a t i o n s  and C e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  I d e n t i t y .  I f  women p a r t n e r s  
were r e g i s t e r e d ,  th e  ’ name o f  h e r  f a t h e r  a n d  t h e  name o f  h e r
1 .  SSLCP 1 8 9 5 . App. I ,  23 F e b r u a r y  1893,  ’B ankrup tcy  
Depar tm ent  and  O r d in a n c e ,  Committee R e p o r t ’ , 1892, p .C 27 .
2.  SSLCP 1 8 9 5 . 3 A u g u s t ,  p .  BI7 7 .
3 .  SCCAR 1 8 9 5 , App. E,  Col. Sec.  t o  SCC, 3 September 1893» 
P ro p o s e d  amendments t o  the  B i l l .
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husband or reputed husband if any1 2 were also required.***
Chinese opposition to the registration of partnerships 
was well based. Such an ordinance would have introduced 
many serious inconveniences without any compensatory advan­
tages. Yet for a long time there was considerable Chinese 
support for the principle of registration. The Chinese 
spokesman in 1892 suggested that firms trading on their ov/n 
capital be given the option to register but that firms
ptrading on borrowed capital be compelled to do.^ In 1905, 
when further discriminatory measures were proposed, he 
declared:
The Chinese do not want registration and the 
supporters of it are limited to a few European 
firms doing business with a small section of 
the Chinese. If therefore, registration is 
to be enforced, I am of opinion that it should 
be limited to the European and to those Chinese 
trading with them.3
This sensible compromise went unheeded and Chinese opposition 
rose to a high pitch in 1906. The Chinese Advisory Boards 
and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Penang and Singapore
1. History of the Movement for the Registration of 
Partnerships in the Straits Settlements, published 
by Penang Chamber-of Commerce I9I0, pp. 224-228
1A Bill Intituled An Ordinance for the Registration 
of Partnerships and Firms1, November 1905.
2. SSL CP 1895. App. J, pp. 17-18,
SSLCP 1906. App. 61, 30 November 1906, !Report of 
Select Committee on the Registration Bill 19051, Rider 
by Tan Jiak Kim, the Chinese member.
3 .
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(newly founded in 1906)protested vigorously.
Yet it was not Chinese hut European opposition that 
led to the Bill Being rejected. The Chinese as a community 
were not at first opposed in principle to registration, and 
indeed tried to suggest ways and means of achieving precisely 
what the Europeans had in mind. It was principally European
opposition to the Bill that caused its withdrawal --  Chinese
protests were merely in support of a resolution of the 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce to reject the Bill,-** Opposition 
came from the older and Better established European firms 
in Singapore. In 1905, when the Bill was discussed By the 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce, 19 firms voted that the Bill 
was ’not desirable in the trading interests of the Port’.2 3
Of these,ten were import-export firms and of the ten,seven 
were responsible for 60 per cent of the export trade to
•z;Europe.^ In favour of registration were seven firms, five 
of which were relatively small or new import-export firms.
The conflict of interests between the older and better 
established firms and the new small and weak firms was 
described in ironical terms by a supporter of registration:
1. SSLCP 1907. App. 4, 8 February 1907, SCC to Col. Sec., 
12 December 1906, p. 9*
2. SCCAR 1905, p. XXXI, ’Report of the Special general 
meeting of the Chamber held on 19 December 19051.
3. See chapter VIII, p.205-6.
100
Let the man with the largest purse, the man 
with the "best sources of information, the man 
longest here, win. 1 2Y/e can afford to give 
credit on our own accounts, you cannot afford 
to do; if you follow our example, you must 
take the consequences. If a smash comes, we 
can afford to write off the loss; you are a 
small man, and it will "break you. Do not 
introduce legislation which will facilitate 
the introduction of new firms into the Colony, 
which gives small capitalists as much chance 
* as large capitalists1.1
This was in fact the crux of the problem. New firms were 
anxious to obtain a share of the market but their experience 
and knowledge of Chinese merchants was limited. They were 
often compelled to grant more generous terms while, because 
they were new or small, their trading positions were relat­
ively weak. Such firms therefore favoured registration 
because they would have been assured of at least some
safeguards --  the men they traded with would have been
legal partners, answerable in a court of law. The older 
and stronger firms opposed registration. Possessing better 
financial resources and better knowledge of the market than 
their competitors, they argued that the granting of credit 
was a matter of individual judgment, and that if some
merchants had better information than others, it was not
2the role of government to interfere. The registration of 
firms would have tended to reduce their advantage. In a 
period of increasingly sterner competition --  the number
1. SSLCP 1906. 12 January, p. B15. Punctuation is mine. 
Except for full stops this speech was originally not 
punctuated at all.
2. SCCAR 1905. 1 Memorandum on the Registration of Partner­
ships Bill at present before Council1 (by the Committee 
of the Chamber), p. xv.
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of import-export firms in the Straits increased from 20 in
1897 to 60 in 1908 --- the knowledge that these older firms
possessed was a valuable advantage, which would have "been 
reduced by the registration of [partnerships.
In the final analysis relations between Chinese and 
European firms were surprisingly harmonious. Although fraud 
was relatively easy to perpetrate, there was little of it.
In 1904, of a total import and export trade of §710 m in 
the Straits Settlements, the total value of business failures 
recorded by the Official Assignee came to only $1.5 m.^
In 1892 little interest was shown by merchants in the 
deliberations of the Commission of Enquiry into Bankruptcy.1 2 
Despite temptations trade was carried on in a highly satis­
factory and commercially honest manner.
The East-West and the intra-Asian Sections of Straits 
Settlements' trade
The trade of the Straits Settlements can be divided 
not only into European and Chinese, but also into East- 
West and intra-Asian sections. At the Singapore Harbour 
Western manufactures were imported and Southeast Asian 
produce exported while at the Singapore River the reverse
1. SSLCP 1906. App. 6l, 30 November, 1906. ’Report of 
the Select Committee appointed to consider and Report 
upon the Provisions of the Registration of Partnerships 
and Firms Bill’, Rider by W.H. Shelford, p. C232.
2. SSLCP 1893. App. I, 23 February 1893. ’Bankruptcy 
Department and Ordinance, Committee Report’, 1892, 
p. C2.
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took place: manufactures were exported and produce imported, 
This was the East-West exchange of commodities in Straits 
Settlements trade. At the Singapore River there was in 
addition a section of trade which did not enter into the 
East-West exchange. This was the intra-Asian trade which 
comprised the exchange of commodities whose origin and 
destination were hoth Asian. Rice and fish are typical 
commodities in the intra-Asian trade: they were imported 
from countries in Asia and re-exported to Asian countries.
The intra-Asian trade can he seen as one of three 
’flows’ of Straits Settlements foreign trade (see Graph 
Three). The first two flows, the West-to-East and the 
East-to-West, comprise the colony’s East-West trade. These 
flows are: the colony’s imports from the West which are
subsequently re-exported to Asia and the reverse -- those
imports from Asia which are subsequently re-exported to the 
West. The third flow consists of that portion of imports 
from Asia which is subsequently re-exported to Asia. The 
value of the intra-Asian trade, it can be seen, is included 
in the value of Straits Settlements total imports from and 
exports to Asia.
It will be interesting to separate the intra-Asian 
from the East-.Zest section, and to compare it with the 
latter. Two methods of estimating its value are used, the 
first crude and rather hypothetical and the second more 
refined. The difference lies in the assumptions made.
In the first method the assumptions are made that there
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were (a) no consumption of imports within the Straits Settle­
ments and (b) no value added to the (re-) exports. Taken 
thus, the colony’s trade can he easily divided into its two 
sections. The West-to-East flow is Straits imports from 
the est, which hy definition equals Straits exports of 
Western goods to Asia, while the East-to-'Vest flow is Straits 
exports to the Y/est, v/hich again hy definition, is equal to 
that portion of Straits imports from Asia Y/hich is intended 
for export to the West. This disposes of the East-West 
trade. The value of intra-Asian imports and exports is 
found hy subtracting Straits exports to the West from Straits 
imports from Asia, and hy subtracting Straits imports from 
the West from Straits exports to Asia. The intra-Asian trade 
so derived is shown in Table VIII, and the values in 
Graph Three(l) are the values derived for the year 1900.
If these assumptions were removed, the values derived 
would change. The direction of the change, though not the 
degree, can he deduced. When consumption of imports in 
the colony is taken into account, then equating imports 
from the '..est with’ Straits re-exports of Western goods 
to Asia is to over-value the re-exports, with the result 
that the true intra-Asian exports are under-valued. At 
the same time, equating exports to the ".est with imports 
from Asia intended for such, re-export is to under-value 
these imports, with the result that the intra-Asian imports 
for re-exports are over-valued, "lien value added to (re-)- 
exports is taken into account, the reverse happens: intra-
*S N O I l l l N  ui S U V 1 1 0 Q
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TABLE V I I I
Flows i n  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  f o r e i g n  m erc h an d ise  
t r a d e ,  1870-1915 (§000)  ----  I
SS t r a d e w i t h  A s i a S3 t r a d e w i t h  t h e I n t r a - A s i a n  t r a d e
!
West1 o f  £3S
L u Im p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s E x p o r t s
1870 28 ,6 8 8 21 ,259 13 ,848 1 2 ,7 0 4 1 5 ,9 8 4 7 ,4 1 1
1875 3 7 ,7 3 9 29 ,551 12 ,345 16 ,181 21 ,558 17 ,2 0 6
1880 4 7 ,4 7 6 3 7 ,5 4 7 17 ,585 21 ,4 1 4 26,062 1 9 ,9 6 2
1885 7 2 ,0 9 6 45 ,315 22 ,421 33 ,587 38 ,309 2 2 ,8 9 4
1890 1 0 3 ,0 4 7 61 ,6 9 8 28 ,285 4 5 ,9 1 2 37 ,133 3 3 ,4 1 3
1895 144»200 84 ,9 5 5 30 ,1 4 9 6 4 ,7 5 2 79 ,448 54 ,8 0 6
1900 229 ,9 7 3 125 ,167 49 ,960 1 14 ,553 113 ,120 7 5 ,207
1905 262 ,975 1 3 5 ,9 8 1 56 ,820 129 ,273 133 ,702 79 ,1 6 1
1910 280,178 1 5 0 ,7 9 4 65 ,057 155 ,817 124 ,361 85 ,737
1915 3 6 2 ,9 0 5 1 8 4 ,9 1 5 62 ,912 212,409 150 ,496 122 ,003
— 1
A s ian  e x p o r t s  a r e  o v e r - v a l u e d  and im p o r t s  u n d e r - v a l u e d .
I n  com par ing  t h e  two s e c t i o n s  o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  
t r a d e ,  t h e  E a s t - W e s t  and t h e  i n t r a - A s i a n ,  two p o i n t s  must 
be  b o r n e  i n  mind. F i r s t l y ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  c o r r e c t  t o  add  
t o g e t h e r  th e  va lue  o f  S t r a i t s  im p o r t s  from th e  West a n d  
S t r a i t s  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  West to  a r r i v e  a t  t h e  E a s t -W e s t  t r a d e  
o f  t h e  c o lo n y ,  i t  i s  i n c o r r e c t  to  do t h e  same f o r  t h e  v a lu e  
o f  t h e  i n t r a - A s i a n  i m p o r t s  and e x p o r t s  which a r e  shown i n  
T ab le  V I I I .  T h is  i s  b e c a u s e  t h e  E a s t -W e s t  t r a d e  i n v o l v e s  
two d i f f e r e n t  and  c o n t r a r y  f l o w s  o f  t r a d e ,  one o f  m a n u f a c tu r e s  
and t h e  o t h e r  o f  p r o d u c e ,  w h i l e  t h e  i n t r a - A s i a n  t r a d e  i s  one 
and th e  same f lo w :  i m p o r t s  r e a p p e a r  a s  e x p o r t s .  To sum 
im p o r t s  and e x p o r t s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  d o u b l e - c o u n t i n g  t h e  v a l u e  
of  t h e  c o l o n y ' s  i n t r a - A s i a n  t r a d e .  S e c o n d ly ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  
the  s tu d y  of  t h e  e n t r e p o t  t r a d e  t h a t  i s  i m p l i c i t  i n  th e
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examination of flows of trade, it is the value of the exports 
in the flows of trade that merits attention. The value of 
the colony’s exports to the best is known, while the re-exports 
to Asia which originally came from the 7/est is, "by definition, 
equal to imports from the West, The value of the colony’s 
entrepot intra-Asian trade is the value of the intra-Asian 
exports shown in Table VIII.
The value of the three flows of trade of the colony 
at export values as arrived at hy this method can be seen 
in Graph Four. It is apparent that the East-"est section 
of trade is much more valuable than the intra-Asian, which 
only amounts to between one-third and one-half of the value 
of the East-West trade, so that the Straits Settlements 
was more important as an East-West emporium than as an 
intra-Asian emporium. It is also evident that the Chinese 
merchants were handling a larger proportion of the colony’s 
total trade than their European counterparts, the excess 
being the intra-Asian trade. At the same time the flow of 
trade was more East-to-West than West-to-East, so that in 
Singapore the traffic was more in the direction of river 
to harbour than vice-versa. The Chinese merchants were selling 
increasingly more to their European counterparts v/ho were • 
selling increasingly less in relation to total trade.
The two-way direction of error of the estimates thus 
crudely obtained has been described. That the estimates 
are wrong is also obvious from the fact that intra-Asian
imports were consistently larger than exports: if there were
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no co n su m p t io n  o f  i m p o r t s  a n d  no v a lu e  added to  e x p o r t s  t h e y  
must  of n e c e s s i t y  e q u a l  one a n o t h e r  i n  t h e  same way t h a t  t h e  
o t h e r  two f lo w s  a r e  e q u a l  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s .  
C l e a r l y  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  a r e  u n r e a l i s t i c .
The seco n d  method o f  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  i n t r a - A s i a n  and  
t h e  E a s t - W e s t  t r a d e  i s  more r e a l i s t i c  b e c a u s e  i t  t a k e s  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  b o t h  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  o f  consum ption  an d  v a l u e  a d d e d .
The c o l o n y 1s c o n su m p t io n  o f  im p o r t s  from t h e  West i s  
t a k e n  t o  be  35 p e r  c e n t  o f  i t s  v a l u e .  T h i s  f i g u r e  i s  b a s e d  
on th e  c o l o n y ’ s a v e r a g e  p e r  c e n t  c o nsum pt ion  o f  i t s  i m p o r t s  
o f  c o t t o n  p i e c e  goods i n  the  p e r i o d  1870-1915» t h i s  i te m  
b e i n g  t h e  s i n g l e  most  i m p o r t a n t  im p o r t  from the  W est .  The 
v a lu e  ad d ed  to  r e - e x p o r t s ,  b o t h  t o  A s ia  and  to  the  W est ,  i s  
seven  and  a h a l f  p e r  c e n t  of  r e - e x p o r t s  a t  im por t  p r i c e s  
/  which works ou t  a t  a b o u t  seven  p e r  c e n t  o f  r e - e x p o r t s  a t  
e x p o r t  va lues_J7 .  T h i s  f i g u r e  i s  b a s e d  on t h e  a v e r a g e  v a l u e  
added t o  r e - e x p o r t s  o f  c o t t o n  p i e c e  g o o d s ,  r i c e ,  opium, 
and f i s h .  I t  s h o u l d  be  s t a t e d  t h a t  i n  t h i s  method o f  
c a l c u l a t i o n ,  a s  i n  t h e  f i r s t ,  no a c c o u n t  h a s  b een  t a k e n  o f  
changes  i n  s t o c k s  and e x p o r t s  of  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e .
The i n t r a - A s i a n  t r a d e  i s  e a s i l y  o b t a i n e d  by a p r o c e s s  
o f  s u b t r a c t i o n :
I  SS t o t a l  e x p o r t s  to  A s ia
minus V a lu e  added  to  r e - e x p o r t s *
SS t o t a l  e x p o r t s  to  A s ia  a t  im p o r t  p r i c e s
# Seven a n d  a h a l f  p e r  c e n t  o f  im por t  v a l u e s  o r  sev en  
p e r  c e n t  o f  e x p o r t  v a l u e s .
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II SS imports from the West
minus Consumption of imports from the West (35 per cent)
SS exports of imports from West at import prices 
(that is, West-to-East-flow)
III (I minus II)
SS total exports to Asia at import prices
minus SS exports of imports from West at import prices
SS exports of Asian goods to Asia at import prices 
i.e. Intra-Asian imports
The East-to-West flow is similarly obtained:
IV SS exports to the West
minus Value added to re-exports
SS exports to the West at import prices (that is, 
East-to-West flow)
The values so obtained for the three flows of trade 
are import values and exclude consumption in the Straits 
Settlements and value added to re-exports (Table IX). 
Comparing these values with those obtained by the first 
method, it can be seen that the intra-Asian imports are 
slightly larger than the intra-Asian exports obtained by 
the first method, while the East-to-East flow is slightly 
smaller due to value added having been excluded, but the 
East-to-West flow is considerably smaller because of the 
larger proportion of consumption of these imports in the 
colony. The large discrepancy between the intra-Asian 
imports and exports of the first method is due to consumption 
in the colony of imports from Asia which, because neither
imports consumed nor value added was taken into account, 
attributed (incorrectly) to intra-Asian imports. The values 
of Straits Settlements consumption of imports from Asia and 
the West as well as value added to re-exports are given in 
Table X, together with the resultant import surplus in the 
colony1s trade.
The difference between the tv/o methods is that the first 
considers the total foreign trade of the Straits Settlements 
while the second focusses on the entrepot trade and isolates 
consumption and value added.
VTHE GROWTH OF STRAITS SETTLEMENTS' FOREIGN TRADE,
1870-1915
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The growth of Straits Settlements foreign trade in the 
period 1870-1915^' was more rapid than in the preceding decades, 
as can he seen by comparison with the growth of imports and 
exports of the colony from 1833 to 1863 (Table i). The growth 
in these 45 years falls into two periods : the first period 
of 26 years from 1870 to 1896 was one of steady expansion 
broken by two brief periods of stagnation, I883-I885 and 
1888-1890, and by one of decline, 1890-1892. In the second 
and shorter period from 1897 to 1915, the development of 
imports and exports was more rapid but uneven and ended in 
decline with the onset of World War I (see Graph Five).
There was a general correspondence between the trend 
of Straits Settlements foreign trade and that of world 
trade in the period 1870-1915 • in both cases growth was 
more rapid in the period from 1895-99 to 1913 than in the 
period from 1872-73 to 1895-99 (see Tables XI and XII).
The increase in the value of Straits Settlements trade 
was, however, more rapid than that of world trade between 
1872-73 and 1913 : it had increased 800 per cent compared 
with 300 per cent in world trade.
It is desirable to glance at the major factors that 
contributed to the increase in the value of international 
trade after the middle of the nineteenth century and the 
accelerated increase in the last decade before attempting
1. See Statistical Appendix VIII.
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TABLE XI
Growth o f  World T rad e  i n  t h e  N i n e t e e n t h  C en tu ry :  
E s t im a ted .  A g g re g a te d  V a l u e s ,  D i s t i n g u i s h i n g  E x p o r t s  
and  I m p o r t s ,  i n  S e l e c t e d  Y e a r s ,  1800-1913 (£ m i l l i o n )
T o t a l  T rade  
(World)
E x p o r t s
f  . o . b .
I m p o r t s  :
c . i . f .
1800 320 150 170
1820 340 155 185
1840 56O 260 300
1850 800 370 430
I 860 1 ,4 5 0 680 770
I 8 7 2 - I 873 2 ,8 9 0 1 ,360 1 ,5 3 0
1895-1899 3 ,9 0 0 1 ,8 7 0 2 ,0 3 0
1913 8 ,3 6 0 4 ,0 5 5 4 ,3 0 5
(S o u rc e :  A l b e r t  Im lah ,  Economic E le m e n ts  o f  Pax 
B r i t a n n i c a  . T ab le  27,  p . 1 8 9 .  ) ~
TABLE XII
Growth o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  ' f o r e i g n  t r a d e  (m e r c h a n d i s e  
and t r e a s u r e )  ^ m i l l i o n
T o t a l  T rade
( s s )
E x p o r t s
f  . o . b .
I m p o r t s
c . i . f .
1872-1873 109 53 56
1895-1899 535 247 288
1913 873 389 484
( S o u r c e :  Computed from S t a t i s t i c a l  Appendix  I.) 
t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  t r a d e  
and i t s  f a s t e r  r a t e  o f  g row th .
The g rowth  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  in  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  
The n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  was by and l a r g e  a c e n t u r y  o f  
p e ac e  i n  which i n d u s t r y  and t r a d e  were a b l e  to  d e v e lo p  
w i t h o u t  s e r i o u s  i n t e r r u p t i o n .  I t s  b e g i n n i n g  saw t h e  con ­
c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  N a p o le o n ic  Wars and  i t s  end saw th e  t h r e a t
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o f  a w o r ld  w a r , "  The i n t e r v e n i n g  y e a r s  were i n  t h e  main, 
p e a c e f u l .  B r i t a i n  was t h e  ’ o n ly  t r u e  i n d u s t r i a l  s t a t e ’ and 
t h e  u n d i s p u t e d  l e a d e r  i n  t e c h n o lo g y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  of th e
p
c e n t u r y ,  * "but Germany and F ra n ce  and USA made r a p i d  g a i n s  i n  
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . 3 The e x p a n s io n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  
was e n co u rag e d  hy more l i b e r a l  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s ,  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  
o f  p r o h i b i t i o n s  and th e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  I n  t r a d e  
a s  i n  i n d u s t r y ,  B r i t a i n  l e d  t h e  way : i n  1842, u n d e r  S i r  
F o b e r t  P e e l  B r i t a i n  s e t  a c o u r s e  f o r  f r e e  t r a d e .  In  i 860 
F r a n c e  f o l l o w e d  an d  s ig n e d  a t r e a t y  w i t h  B r i t a i n  which removed 
v a r i o u s  p r o h i b i t i o n s  and  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  t h e  t r a d e  b e tw e e n  
t h e  two c o u n t r i e s .  Between i8 6 0  and 1880 t h e r e  was a g e n e r a l  
l o w e r i n g  o f  t a r i f f s  i n  E u r o p e .^
Developments  i n  t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s  gave im pe tus  t o  
t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  ( s e e  T ab le  X I I I ) .
7/or i d  s team  tonnage  i n c r e a s e d  r a p i d l y  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  f o u r  
f a c t o r s .  F i r s t ,  c o a l  o u t p u t  i n c r e a s e d  r a p i d l y  be tw een  1870 
and 1 9 0 0 ,^  making a v a i l a b l e  t h e  power when i t  was n eed e d .
1 .  See A l b e r t  Im lah ,  Economic E lem ents  in  t h e  Pax B r i t a n n i e n , 
S t u d i e s  i n  B r i t i s h  F o r e i g n  T rade  i n  t h e  N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r y , 
H a rv a rd  1958, p p .  1 -19•
2. S i r  John  Clapham, An Economic H i s t o r y  o f  l o d e r n  B r i t a i n , 
F r e e  Trade and S t e e l ,  1 5 5 0 - 1 8 8 6 . Book I I I .  Cambridge 1952,
p .1 1 2 .
g .  See C l iv e  Day, A H i s t o r y  o f  Commerce. New York 1917* 
an d  7/.G. Hoffmann, The Growth o f  I n d u s t r i a l  E co n o m ie s , 
( t r a n s l a t e d  from German), M an ch e s te r  1956*
4 . Day, p .3 4 8 .
5 .  The o u t p u t  o f  c o a l  i n  t h e  f o u r  m a jo r  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s ,
1870,  1900 ( m i l l i o n  t o n s )  1870 1900
B r i t a i n n o 225
America 30 241
Germany 26 108
F ra n c e 13 32
Source:  E s s a y s  i n  Economic H i s t o r y .  R e p r i n t s  e d i t e d  f o r  t h e  
Economic H i s t o r y  S o c i e t y . E.M. C a ru s -W i lso n ,  London, 1954. 
H.L. B e a l e ,  ’ The' ** G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n ” i n  I n d u s t r y  and T r a d e ’ ,
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TABLE X I I I
Growth o f  World S h ip p in g  Tonnage and  R a i lw a y  M ileag e
S h ip p in g  
( o c e a n -g o in g )
M i l l i o n n e t  t o n s R a i lw a y s
■
S a i l i n g Steam M iles
1820 5 .8 1 0 .0 2 n . a .
1840 9 .0 1 0 .3 7 5 ,4 0 0
1850 n . a . n . a . 2 4 ,000
i 860 1 4 .8 9 1 .7 1 67 ,4 0 0
1870 1 2 .9 0 3 . 0 4 n . a .
1880 1 4 .4 0 5 .8 8 224,900
1890 9 .7 0 8 .3 0 386 ,000
1900 6 ,6 7 13 .8 6 500,000
1910 4 .6 2 23 .05 n . a .
( Sources A l b e r t Im lah ,  Economic E lem en ts
i n  Pax B r i t a n n i c a , T able  23, P.
1 7 5 , f o r  s h i p p i n g  s t a t i s t i c s ;
I s a a c  L i p p i n o o t t ,  The Development 
o f  Modern World T r a d e , p p .U5o-9  
f o r  r a i lw a y  s t a t i s t i c s ,  e x c e p t i n g  
1890,  which  came from S i r  John 
Clapharn, An Economic H i s t o r y  o f  
M0d e r n  B r i t a i n , Book I I I ,  p . 2 1 4 ) .
S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  conrpound e n g in e  t o  s team ­
s h i p s  i n  I 865 hy A l f r e d  H olt  ( t h e  f o u n d e r  o f  t h e  Ocean 
Steam Sh ip  Company, 1866) e s t a h l i s h e d  t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  
s te am  v e s s e l s  ove r  s a i l i n g  o n e s .  The c o nsum pt ion  of  c o a l  
f e l l  hy a b o u t  h a l f ,  t h e r e b y  r e d u c i n g  c o s t s  and  i n c r e a s i n g  
space  and  p r o f i t s . 1 The t h i r d  f a c t o r ,  t h e  o p e n in g  o f  t h e  
Suez Canal  i n  I 8 6 9 , h a s t e n e d  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from s a i l  t o  
s te am .  I t  r e d u c e d  th e  d i s t a n c e  be tw een  Europe  and A s ia  —-
1 .  C.E. P a y l e ,  A S h o r t  H i s t o r y  of t h e  W o rld 1s S h ip p in g  
I n d u s t r y , London 1934 (2nd I m p r e s s i o n ) ,  p p .2 4 1 - 2 4 2 .  
P a y l e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  c r u c i a l  d a te  i n  th e  s t r u g g l e  
b e tw ee n  s a i l  and  s team was 1865 an d  no t  1869.
118
that "between London and Singapore was 11,740 miles via the 
Cape of Good Hope hut only 8,326 miles hy way of Suez.1 
The fourth factor was the upsurge of nationalism in Europe 
from 1880 which led governments to encourage the expansion 
of national tonnage hy such means as steamship subsidies.2 3
Britain had completed building its network of railways 
hy the mid-nineteenth century, and British capital and 
technical know-how aided the development of the fairly com­
prehensive railway system in western Europe betv/een 1850 and 
1870. The first trans-continental railway was completed 
in America in 1869; by 1880 there were three trans-contin­
ental lines.
As a result of these developments the cost of trans­
portation fell and more markets were made accessible to 
producers. Steamship freight rates in particular fell very 
greatly; in I869 freight rates from Calcutta to Europe were 
£10 to £12 per ton but by I887 they had dropped to 20s and 
30s.J The trade in bulky but cheap commodities such as 
wheat, corn, petroleum and coal increased, and inter-regional 
specialization was encouraged. Other economies resulting 
from greater speed, certainty and regularity of transportation
1. L.C.A. Knowles, The Economic Development of the British 
Overseas Empire. London 1924* P•15•
2. First begun by Prance in 1881, followed by Germany in 
1885, then virtually all countries in Europe. Other 
countries that took up this practice were Japan and 
America.
3. Boyd Cable, A Hundred Year History of the P & 0. 1837- 
1937. London 1937, p.183.
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enabled traders to increase the number of transactions and 
to reduce the expensive holding of stocks.
With the introduction of telegraphic communication the 
world became in effect a single market. By the end of the 
nineteenth century cables crossed both the Atlantic and the 
Pacific Oceans and afforded instantaneous communication with 
every part of the globe. It made for direct and immediate 
contact between buyers and sellers, eliminating uncertainty 
and reducing risks. The telegraph also brought about a more 
turnover of business by enabling merchants to ! sell on the 
v/ater1 . Goods could be bought and sold while they were being 
shipped across the ocean from producing to consuming countries 
v/ith the result that with the same amount of capital as 
previously merchants could increase the volume of their 
business.
The character of world trade
In the nineteenth century the British economy was the 
decisive segment of the world economy, influencing and 
affecting the rate and character of economic development 
elsewhere.1 Prices in Britain were rising from 1850 to 
1873, falling from 1873 to I896 and rising again from 1897 
to 1913. With minor variations these price movements were
1. See W.W. Rostow, British Economy of the Nineteenth 
Century. Oxford 1958, p.28.
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TABLE XIV
W h o le sa le  p r i c e  in d e x  i n  B r i t a i n .  Germany and  America
(1 8 9 1 -1 9 0 0  = 1 0 0 )
1 B r i t a i n Germany America
1841-1850 136 128
1851-1860 145 130 131
I 861 - I 870 151 130 140
1871-1880 144 132 137
1881-1890 113 108 115
1891-1900 100 100 100
1901-1910 110 115 117
(S o u r c e :  S i r  W a l t e r  T. L ay ton  and G e o f f r e y
C ro w th e r ,  An I n t r o d u c t i o n  to t h e  
S tudy  o f  P r i c e s , p 7 2 S ) .
r e p e a t e d  i n  t h e  m a jo r  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  v/orld  
( s e e  T a b le  X IV ) .1 2
The e f f e c t  o f  t h e  h i g  f a l l  i n  p r i c e s  from 1873 t o  I 896
was to  dampen t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
t r a d e  i n  t h a t  p e r i o d .  The f a l l  i n  p r i c e s  was a lm o s t  40 
2p e r  c e n t .  The a p p a r e n t  s lo w n e ss  i n  t h e  growth  o f  t r a d e  
was e x a g g e r a t e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  b o t h  th e  p r e c e d i n g  and 
s u c c e e d in g  two d e ca d es  were p e r i o d s  o f  r i s i n g  p r i c e s .  The 
growth  i n  volume o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  from 1880 was
1 .  See a l s o  Simon S. K u z n e tz ,  S e c u la r  Movements i n  P r o d u c t i o n  
P r i c e s .  T h e i r  N a tu re  and  T h e i r  B e a r i n g  Upon C y c l i c a l  
F l u c t u a t i o n s . New York 1930. I n  C h a p te r  I I I  'T he  
S t a t i s t i c a l  M a t e r i a l  P r e s e n t e d 1 (pp .  70-199)>  K uzne tz  
p r e s e n t s  57 p a i r s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  and  p r i c e  s e r i e s ,  which 
embraced c r o p s ,  m i n e r a l s  and  m a n u f a c tu r e s  o f  A m erica ,  
B r i t a i n ,  Germany, P r a n c e ,  Belg ium , and a few o t h e r s .
Though h e  d i s c l a i m s  h a v in g  made a d e t a i l e d  h i s t o r i c a l  
s tu d y  o f  e a c h  s e r i e s ,  he  n e v e r t h e l e s s  m o d e s t ly  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  t h e  su r v e y  i s  ’ c o m p r e h e n s iv e ’ . So i t  i s ;  half- 'way 
th ro u g h  h i s  s t a t i s t i c a l  m a t e r i a l ,  w h i le  exam in in g  
B e lg iu m ’ s p i g  i r o n  s e r i e s ,  he  c o u ld  speak  w i t h  c o n f i d e n c e  
o f  ’ t h e  u s u a l  c o u r s e :  a r i s e  t o  1873? t h e n c e  a d e c l i n e
to  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  t h e  ’ 9 0 ’ s ,  an d  a r i s e  a g a i n  t o
1913T, p . 1 4 2 . ;
2. L ay ton  a n d  Crow ther ,  p . 8 l .
hampered hy a return to protectionism. The Anglo-French 
Treaty signed in i860 was not renewed in i860 and a new 
tariff system was introduced in France in 1882. Other 
countries in Europe followed the example of France and 
raised tariffs. Thus the impetus given to trade hy the 
liberalization of trade in 1860-1880 was withdrawn and trade 
was once again restricted as the countries of Europe pursued 
policies designed to protect and to promote the trade of 
their own nationals.
'The extension and the effects of European political control in 
Southeast Asia
The rapid increase in the industrial output of Europe 
and in the expansion of trade sharpened the competition for 
markets and opportunities for profitable investment in the 
less advanced regions of the world. Thus industrialism 
reinforced nationalism and tended to transform nationalism 
into an agency of imperialism!Whereas prior to I870 
trade was the principal interest of the Europeans in South­
east Asia, from 1870 onwards the spirit of imperialism 
became increasingly dominant. From merchants the Europeans 
became rulers in Southeast Asia.
In Malaya the ’forward movement’ began in 1874 with 
British intervention in the states of Perak, Selangor and
121
1. Witt Bowden, Michael Karpovich; Abbot Payson Usher,
An Economic History of Europe since 1750. New York 1937> 
P.130.
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Sungei Ujong.L In 1895 Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri 
Sembilan, the four Malay States under British protection, 
were combined to form the Federated Malay States« British 
influence was increased “by the conclusion of the Anglo- 
Siamese Treaty of 1909 whereby the four northern states of 
Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, previously under 
Siamese suzerainty, were transferred to the British. These 
four states, together with Johore, were known as the 
Unfederated Malay States.
British interests also increased in Borneo and Burma.
In 1877 the Sultan of Brunei leased a part of North Borneo 
to some British merchants who in 1884 established the British 
Forth Borneo Company. Four years later the Company received 
Crown protection. In I89I the boundary between 1 British1 
and Butch Borneo was demarcated and in 1906 the Sultan of 
Brunei accepted British protection. In Burma relations 
between the British, who were already firmly entrenched 
in Lower Burma, and the King deteriorated from 1878. His 
attempt, unsuccessful though it was, to obtain French 
assistance led to the invasion of Upper Burma in 1885. The 
royal line was ended and Burma was added to the British 
Empire of India.
1. There are several works on the subject, among them
M.I. Knowles, The Expansion of British Influence in the 
Malay Peninsula. Ph.D. thesis, V7i scons in 1935> (Mi c r o~ 
film copy, ANU Library), C.N. Parkinson, A History of 
Malaya: British Intervention in Malaya. 18^7-1877. 
Singapore i960, and C.D. Cowan. Nineteenth Century Malaya 
he Origins of British. Political Control. London 1961.
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Elsewhere in Southeast Asia other European powers were 
pushing forward. In Indochina the French sought to regain 
national prestige after their defeat hy Germany in the war 
of 1871. The French declared a protectorate over Annam and 
Tonkin in 1884-1885. In I887 the administration of the 
four French territories in Indochina (Cochin-China 1867, 
Cambodia 1868, Annam and Tonkin) was unified, with head­
quarters at Hanoi. In 1893, as a result of the Franco- 
Siamese Treaty concluded in that year, the French added 
Laos to their area of influence. Following the Anglo- 
Dutch Treaty of 1871, which removed certain obstacles, the 
Dutch embari<e d on the conquest of Sumatra which ended only 
in 1899. The Spanish in Manila in 1872 sent marine forces 
to bambard Sulu in order to bring it under control. Siam 
alone in Southeast Asia retained its independence although 
it lost portions of its traditional territory to the French 
in 1893 and ceded its four southern states to the British 
in 1909.
European rule in Southeast Asia led to the establishment 
of the law and order v/hich are necessary conditions for 
economic development. Y/hereas to pursue wealth in the 
unsettled states of Southeast Asia before European rule was 
to risk both capital and life, after the establishment of 
European political control life v/as relatively secure.
The rapid expansion of international trade at this time and 
the introduction of Y/estern technology and new crops to
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Southeast Asia combined to inaugurate a new period in the 
history of the region. European activity, with the exception 
of the Dutch in Java, had been primarily concerned with 
trading, but from 1870 a growing interest was taken in mining 
and plantation enterprises. The result was the stimulation 
of output, particularly of goods demanded in European 
countries.
The expansion of tin output is a good example. In 
1873 the output of the Malay Peninsula trailed behind that 
of Australia, Britain and Indonesia but by 1883 it led the 
world. In 1893-1896 five-sixths of the world’s output of 
tin came from mines in Kalaya.1 Tin mining in Malaya was 
virtually a Chinese industry and in 1914 European mines 
accounted for only one-quarter of total output.2 3 The 
production of sugar in Java doubled between 1870 and 1885 
and doubled again in I9OO-I914, while that of tea increased 
five times altogether.-^ Coal was mined in French Indochina 
and British Borneo and oil wells were sunk in Indonesia 
and in Burma.
The output of rice also increased rapidly. In Burma 
there were only 0.3 m acres under rice cultivation in 1845 
but in I87O there were 1.7 m acres, and by 1885 a further
1. Knowles, p.4&0.
2. Wong ’Western Enterprise and the development of the 
Malayan tin industry to 1914’, p*10.
3. Harrison, South-east Asia, A Short History, up.209, 215.
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million acres had "been planted with rice.1 In Indochina
the French drained and irrigated the Mekong Valley for rice
cultivation. In independent Siam the area planted with rice
2increased rapidly from 1850. It was Burma that exported 
rice to Britain when its supplies from America failed during 
the Civil ,'arp between 1870 and 1900 Burma’s exports of 
rice doubled in quantity.^- The exports of rice from Indo­
china formed more than 7Ofo by value of its total exports 
at the end of the century.5 The rice exports of Siam 
consistently represented 60 to 70 per cent of total exports 
over the whole century from 1850 to 1950.^
One of the most important developments resulting from 
European rule was the introduction of para rubber (hevea 
brasiliensis). It was introduced in 1877 to Malaya from 
Brazil by way of Kew Gardens in London and is distinct 
from the other varieties of rubber which were found in South­
east Asia --  Borneo, India and rambong rubber. Para rubber
was planted as a commercial venture in the last years of the 
nineteenth century. In 1897 there were less than 500 acres 
in Malaya but its cultivation increased rapidly so that in 
1905 there were 50,000 acres and in 1914, over a million.7
1. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, p.650.
2. James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand since 1850.
IFR, Stanford 1954, p. 43 •
3. Hall, p.650.
4» Harrison, p. 199»
5» Trade and Shipping in South East Asia 19Q1, p .5• In 1898 
and 1899 rice and its derivatives accounted for £3,905,000 
and £3,917,000 of total exports of £5,100,000 and £5,406,000.
6. Ingram, p.37«
7. E.M. Gull, British Economic Interests in the Far East.IFR, L ondo n 1943, P .9 2.
126
It was an industry that quickly attracted European capital, 
although Chinese and Malays were not slow to take advantage 
of the opportunities for wealth that the new industry re­
presented. It has been v/ell described as ’one of the greatest 
achievements of Y/estern colonial enterprise1 2 which was also 
one of the last.**" Rubber trees were also planted in Sumatra, 
Dutch Borneo and Indochina.
The economy of Southeast Asian countries developed into
2a ’dual-economy’ which was ’lop-sided1. The export sector 
of the economy was highly specialized, usually in one or 
two crops or industries, and was heavily dependent on the 
fluctuations and vagaries of international demand and prices. 
On the other hand the subsistence sector comprising farming 
and small-scale industries was still largely based on a 
system of barter and was virtually unaffected by external 
economic forces.
The trade of the Straits Settlements reflected the 
economic trends of the advanced countries and the rapid 
economic development taking place in the countries of South­
east Asia.
The pattern of Straits Settlements trade
The development of Straits Settlements trade, its 
expansion decline or stagnation, reflected British price
1. Allen and Donnithorne, p.l06.
2. Applied in particular to Malaya, see Tay Boh Dim,
Problems of the Malayan Economy, Singapore 1956, p. 3.
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movements and  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  economy. When p r i c e s  
i n  B r i t a i n  f e l l  b e tw e e n  1873 and I 896 t h e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  c o l o n y ' s  
i m p o r t s  and e x p o r t s  r o s e  o n ly  s l o w l y ,  h u t  when p r i c e s  r o s e  
b e tw ee n  1897 and 1913  t h e y  a c c e l e r a t e d  r a p i d l y .
The e x p a n s i o n  in  t h e  c o l o n y ' s  t r a d e  from 1870 t o  1878 
was s low ,  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  f a l l  i n  p r i c e s  in  B r i t a i n .  The 
more r a p i d  e x p a n s i o n  from I 879 t o  1883 was a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  upsw ing  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  economy which to o k  p l a c e  d e s p i t e  
g e n t l y  f a l l i n g  p r i c e s ,  w h i l e  t h e  down-swing t h a t  fo l lo w e d  
from 1883 t o  1885 was a l s o  communicated t o  t h e  c o lo n y .  I n  
1.886 t h e  B r i t i s h  economy to o k  a n  u p t u r n  which was f o l l o w e d  
by th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s .  Prom 1890 t o  1892 t h e  c o l o n y ' s  
t r a d e  s u f f e r e d  from ' s e v e r e  d e p r e s s i o n '  and ' f i n a n c i a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s '  , and  some Chinese  and E uropean  f i r m s  f a i l e d .^ *
A f t e r  some r e c o v e r y  i n  1893 and 1894 th e  c o l o n y ’ s t r a d e  s u f f e r e d  
a r e l a p s e  i n  1895 and 1 8 9 6 . The p e r iod .  I 89O -I896 was one 
o f  s e v e r e  d e p r e s s i o n  i n  E n g lan d  where t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i c e  l e v e l
p
f e l l  from an in d e x  number o f  96 t o  86,""
I n  1897 t h e  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  
e n t e r e d  a p h a s e  o f  v e ry  r a p i d  e x p a n s io n .  Again  t h i s  p a t t e r n  
o f  growth t a l l i e d  w i th  t h a t  o f  B r i t i s h  economy b u t  t h e r e  
was one e x c e p t i o n  — •• t h e  c o l o n y ' s  im p o r t s  and  e x p o r t s  
f l u c t u a t e d  a n d  f e l l  be tw een  1903 and 1905. T h i s  was p o s s i b l y
1 . See 3SAR 1 8 9 0 -1 8 9 2 .
2 .  Rostow, p . 8 7 .
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the result of the uncertainty that attended the transition 
from a silver currency to the gold exchange standard : in 
1903 new Straits dollars were introduced preparatory to 
fixing the exchange rate of the colony’s currency in terms 
of sterling, which was not done until January 1906. After 
that date Straits Settlements trade made some recovery 
despite the international malaise of 1906."- But it was not 
until 1910, when there was again an upswing in the British 
economy due largely to the appearance of new industries such 
as the motor industry, that the trade of the colony which 
now included rubber also picked up rapidly, only falling 
after the outbreak of the 7/orld 7/ar.
The growth of the colony’s trade by value: the effect of prices
The growth in the value of Straits Settlements trade
appeared to be very much more rapid than that of world trade
(see Tables XI and XII) because it was valued in silver
dollars while that of world trade was calculated in rounds
sterling. If the colony’s trade is converted into pounds
sterling at the then current rates of exchange, the growth
of imports and exports between 1870 and 1915 is seen to be
2less than five and half times instead of almost 11 times.
The growth of Straits Settlements' trade was therefore
not as large as it would at first seem. The rate of exchange
1. Clapham, An Economic History of ködern Britain. 1887-1914. 
1917-1929. Book IV, p. 54.
2. See Statistical Appendices I and III.
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"between the colony’s silver dollar and pounds sterling
declined from 1873 to 1897* when it steadied at 2s., until
it was pegged at 2s. lid, in 1906. The decline in the value
of the dollar coincided with a fall in the level of prices.
If the dollar depreciated 50 per cent, and prices of imports
from gold countries and exports to such countries fell 50
per cent, the net result was that the level of prices in the
Straits Settlements remained constant in terms of silver
dollars. While no such correspondence was in fact exhibited,
the exchange rate of the silver dollar and the level of
prices in England did march in the same direction, at speeds
not too disparate (see Graph Six)"*" Between 1873 and 1897
the silver dollar fell 55 per cent while the British price
level fell 40 per cent. The result was that prices of
commodities in the trade of the Straits Settlements either
remained relatively "buoyant as in the case of tin, copra
and cotton piece goods, or were rising as in the case of
2gambier, pepper coal and rice."“
The export prices of tin in the Straits Settlements 
illustrates this clearly (see Table XV). The wholesale 
price index number of tin in Britain fell from 71 to 53 
between 1892 and 1894» The sterling value of the dollar
1. See also Statistical Appendices IV and V.
2. See Statistical Appendix X.
f e l l  30 p e r  c e n t  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d .  The e x p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  t i n  
i n  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  r em a in ed  f i r m .
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TABLE XV
E f f e c t  o f  d o l l a r  d e p r e c i a t i o n  on t i n  p r i c e s  i n  
t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  1890-1897
P a t e  o f  
exchange o f  
d o l l a r  ( s . d .  )
!
W h o lesa le  
p r i c e  in d e x  
number o f  t i n  
i n  B r i t a i n
E x p o r t  p r i c e  o f  
t i n  p e r  p i c u l  i n  the 
S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  
H i g h e s t  Lowest
I £ £
1890 3 /5  i 7 1 .6 35 9 2 i 28 6 7 1
1891 3 /3  . 6 9 .1 34 40 20 25
1892 2 /1 1 * 7 0 .8 40 50 34 05
1893 2 / 3 -t- 6 5 .5 40 75 35 95
1894 2 / l f 5 2 .7 40 40 35
1895 2 / l f 4 8 .0 36 75 33 05
1896 2/2A 4 5 .3 33 3 7  i 31 40
1897 1 /1 1 -1 5 A 6 4 6 .0 39 62 32 12
(S o u r c e :  Exchange r a t e  from S t a t i s t i c a l  Appendix IV
In d ex  Number from S t a t i s t i c a l  Appendix  V.
P r i c e s  o f  t i n  f r o n T sCGAR 1 8 9 7 . Ao q . dT ) ~
I n  1894 th e  Annual R e o o r t  o f  t h e  c o lo n y  r e c o r d e d  t h a t  t h e r e
was a f a l l  o f  19i  p e r  c e n t  o v e r  1893 i n  t h e  s t e r l i n g  p r i c e
o f  t i n  i n  London.  At t h e  same t im e  t h e r e  v/as a f a l l ,  o f  18
p e r  c e n t  i n  t h e  exchange r a t e  o f  t h e  d o l l a r  i n  t e rm s  o f
s t e r l i n g .  The r e s u l t  was t h a t  t h e  p r i c e  o f  t i n  i n  S in g a p o re
showed no change from t h a t  o f  1893, a n d  t h e  q u a n t i t y  e x p o r t e d
i n  f a c t  r o s e  by 17 p e r  cent.***
The s i l v e r  c u r r e n c y  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  i n s u l a t e d
i t s  economy from t h e  G re a t  D e p r e s s io n  o f  1873-1896 .
1 .  S3AR 1 8 9 4 . p .  257.
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The recovery of prices in Britain "began in 1897 and 
the price level rose about 34 per cent "between 1897 and 1913. 
In 1897 the decline in the exchange rate of the dollar had 
virtually ceased and from 1902 onwards there was even a 
small rise until the value of the new Straits dollar was 
fixed at 2s.4-d. in 1906. This meant that rising prices in 
Britain after 1897 were reproduced in the Straits Settlements 
"because of the relative steadiness in the exchange rate 
"between 1897 and 1906 and in the fixity of exchange from
1906.
Thus prices in the Straits Settlements were kept at 
a high level while they were falling in gold countries, and 
they rose when prices in the latter rose. This accounted 
for the much greater rise in the value of the colony’s 
trade considered in terms of dollars when compared with the 
growth of world trade taken in terms of pounds sterling.
The quantitative growth of Straits Settlements trade
The increase in the physical quantity of Straits 
Settlements trade, as contrasted with value, can "be found 
"by means of a constant price series. The formula Pqqq 
represents the current value of a commodity, p-^  "being current 
price and current quantity. Its value at constant price 
is indicated "by P0gq, where Pp is the price at a selected 
"base year, and q^  the quantity in the current year. The 
summation of all items in the trade at current value would 
"be^p q , while the growth of trade with the effect of prices
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eliminated, is £ p oQ.i. It is not possible, however, to take 
into account every commodity that entered into the colony's 
trade in these 45 years. Sometimes quantity data is not 
available, as in the case of telegraph materials, or is not 
available over the required period, in that of birds' nests. 
Sometimes quantity is recorded in ways which are not compar­
able due to absence of conversion information — — tea is 
recorded in piculs (the usual measure in the colony) as well 
as in cases. The item of machinery is not quantified, and 
in any case, in a period of rapid technological change, there 
would have been such qualitative changes as to render com­
parison of dubious usefulness. Again, some commodities 
had not appeared in the trade transactions of the base-year, 
so that no 'constant price' could be assigned, the most 
important of which was para rubber. Then there were those 
commodities of negligibly small value such as live cattle 
and swine.
Thus the selection of commodity items to compute a 
constant price series was based on the availability of 
comparable quantity data and economic significance. The 
result was that 20 raw material items, 25 foodstuffs, 13 
textile and two types of fuels, comprising a total of 60 
items or 34 different commodities,1 were selected. They 
accounted for more than 70 per cent of imports and about
1. See Note B.
Some commodities such as pepper comprised several
items - black pepper, white papner and long jjepper.
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80 p e r  c e n t  o f  e x p o r t s  o f  m erc h an d ise  i n  a l l  y e a r s  e x c e p t  
1910 a n d  1915 ( s e e  T a b l e  XVT).
TABLE XVI
P r o p o r t i o n  o f  60 s e l e c t e d  i tem s  (54 c o m m o d i t ie s )  
t o  t o t a l  m erc h a n d ise  t r a d e
---------- !
E x p o r t s Im p o r t s Im p o r t s E x p o r t s
1870 73 .3 0 8 3 . 0 4 1895 73 .5 1 7 9 .1 8
1575 7 5 .2 2 8 0 .3 7 1900 7 2 .9 3 8 0 .1 7
1880 7 3 .8 4 8 I .71 1905 7 4 .3 1 7 9 .9 0
1885 7 3 .0 3 7 9 .9 0 1910 6 9 .2 2 7 3 .4 5
1890 73 .6 7 8 0 .3 6 I 9 I 5 61 .6 5 5 9 .4 9
The y e a r  1900 was t a k e n  a s  b a s e  y e a r  on t h e  g ro u n d s  t h a t  
i t  a f f o r d e d  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  c o m p a r iso n s  w i th  o t h e r  d a t a .
I t  a l s o  s e r v e d  to  e m p h a s i s^  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  c o l o n y ’ s t r a d e  ----  t h e  r e l i a n c e  on t i n
and o t h e r  s t a p l e s  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  on t h e  e x p o r t  s i d e  and 
on opium and  t e x t i l e s  on t h e  im p o r t  s i d e .  P a ra  r u b b e r  was 
a c h i l d  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y .  C o n s t a n t  o r  b a s e - y e a r  
^ r i c e s  f o r  t h e  s e l e c t e d  60 commodity i t e m s  were c a l c u l a t e d  
by d i v i d i n g  v a l u e  i n  t h e  y e a r  1900 by q u a n t i t y  i n  t h a t  y e a r ,  
f o r  b o th  im p o r t s  and  e x p o r t s .  The summation o f  t h e s e  p r i c e s  
m u l t i p l i e d  by  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c u r r e n t  q u a n t i t i e s  r e s u l t e d  in  
t h e  c o n s t a n t  p r i c e  s e r i e s  o f  q u a n t i t y .  (See Graph Seven 
and T a b le  XVTl).
The growth o f  a c t u a l  t r a d e  was more r a p i d  i n  t h e  
p e r i o d  from 1870 t o  1895 t h a n  i n  t h a t  from I 895 t o  1 9 1 5 .
The i n f l u e n c e  o f  p r i c e s  i s  v e r y  c l e a r l y  s e e n .  Between 1895
Para rubber of current price
I MPORT  S
/vSel^cflpn at current price
Selection at constant price (1900)
*200
1870 1900
Para rubber at/current priceE X P O R T S
^Sejectipnat current price
»"^Selection at constant price (1900)
1900
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i?ABLE X V I I
V alue  o f  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  a t  c u r r e n t  an d  c o n s t a n t  
(1900 "base y e a r )  p r i c e s  (}000)
?---------
C u r r e n t P r i c e s C o n s ta n t P r i c e  s
Im p o r t s E x p o r t s Im p o r ts E x p o r t s
1 1870 3 1 ,1 8 2 2 8 ,2 0 3 6 5 ,5 9 0 6 0 ,8 9 8
1875 3 7 ,6 7 5 3 6 ,7 5 7 77 ,0 9 8 76 ,0 9 6
1880 48 , Oij-6 4 8 ,1 7 8 89 ,501 8 9 ,9 5 2
1885 6 9 ,0 3 2 63 ,0 4 5 123 ,013 111 ,343
1890 9 6 ,7 5 3 86 ,4 8 5 168 ,427 14 5 ,5 7 7
1895 128 ,176 118 ,551 194 ,179 1 7 9 ,6 4 4
1900 204 ,183 192 ,197 204,151 192 ,197
1905 2 3 7 ,6 6 4 2 1 1 ,434 222,873 202,185
1910 238 ,981 225 ,226 226,321 217 ,640
1915 262,537  
—  ..
2 3 6 ,3 7 2 241,860 2 2 5 ,6 4 4
and 1900 t h e  v a l u e  o f  i m p o r t s  i n c r e a s e d  "by 60 p e r  c e n t  an d  
t h a t  o f  e x p o r t s  "by 40 p e r  c e n t  h u t  t h e  q u a n t i t y  i n c r e a s e s  
( i . e .  t h a t  o f  v a l u e  a t  c o n s t a n t  p r i c e s )  were o n ly  f i v e  p e r  
c e n t  and s e v en  p e r  c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The p e r i o d  o f  most 
r a p i d  growth  was 1880-1895• The growth  o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  
t r a d e  hy q u a n t i t y  b e tw ee n  1880 and  1915 was 250 p e r  c e n t  
w h i l e  t h a t  o f  w o r ld  t r a d e  was o n ly  170 p e r  c e n t . ' 3'
The grov/th o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  t r a d e  i n  t h i s  
p e r i o d  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  v/orld  t r a d e .  I t s  more 
r a p i d  g row th  v/as due to t h e  s t i m u l u s  g i v e n  t o  economic 
d eve lopm en t  hy  E u ro p e a n  r u l e  which l e d  t o  t h e  r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  
i n  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  e x p o r t  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d .  The c o l o n y ’ s
1.  R ag n a r  N u rk se ,  P a t t e r n s  o f  Trade  a n d  D ev e lo p m en t . 
( Y / i c k s e l l  L e c t u r e s  1 9 5 9 ) ,  Oxford  196I ,  p . 1 9 .
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trade reflected the development of the regions for which it 
served as a collecting centre.
The contribution of para rubber
■Rubber consisting of four items, Borneo, India, Ramhong 
and para, was responsible for the rapid increase in the value 
of Straits Settlements total trade in the twentieth century.
In 1905 the proportion accounted for by rubber in the colony’s 
export trade was quite insignificant but by 1910 it had 
risen to over seven per cent of all exports and in 1913 it 
was almost 20 per cent and was only exceeded in value by tin. 
Of these four items, para rubber was the most important, 
accounting for $50.5m out of a total import value of $51.lm 
in 1915. The omission of rubber from the selection of 
commodities taken for the constant price series is evident 
from the fall in. the proportion formed by the selection in 
relation to total imports and exports in 1910 and 1915 
(see Table XVI).
Para rubber almost alone was responsible for the 
exceptionally rapid rise in the value of the colony’s trade 
in the early years of the century. The development of the 
trade in this commodity, like that of the colony’s total 
trade, was characteristically the result of factors external.
to the Straits Settlements --  in this case it was the
birth of the motor vehicle industry.
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Thus the development of the colony’s trade, though 
strongly influenced "by and in general harmony with the trend 
of Western economic developments, was more rapid as the 
result of three factors. Firstly, the colony’s quantitative 
growth was faster than that of world trade, due to the 
stimulus to production given to its neighbours in Southeast 
Asia hy the advent of European rule and the demand for 
foodstuffs and raw materials. Secondly, the rapid growth 
in the twentieth century was almost solely the result of the 
introduction and the development of para rubber. Thirdly, 
the increase of the colony’s trade by value was the result 
of exchange rate depreciation which maintained the prices 
of commodities in the Straits Settlements at a high level 
when they were falling in gold countries.
VT
THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF STRAITS
SETTLEMENTS FOREIGN MERCHANDISE TRADE,
1870-1915
The regional trade of the Straits Settlements can he
divided into three sections -- trade with Southeast Asia,
South and East Asia, and the Western countries (the West).^ 
The three sections showed only slight changes between 1870, 
1900 and 1915 (See Table XVIII).
TABLE XVIII
General Distribution of Straits Settlements total 
trade, 1870, 1900, 1915 (imports and Exports = 200%)
Southeast Asia South and East Y/est Total
£
Asia
%. %. £
1870 87 43 70 2001900 98 36 66 200
1915 104 28 68 200
The proportion of trade with Southeast Asia had increased 
at the expense of trade with South and East Asia, while that 
with the West remained quite steady.
1. See Note A on Regions.Southeast Asia comprises Malaya, Indonesia (Netherlands 
East Indies), Siam, Burma, Indochina, British Borneo 
(i.e. British North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and Labuan) 
and the Other Southeast Asia (Philippines and Papua-New 
Guinea).
South Asia comprises British, French and. Portuguese 
India, and Ceylon.
East Asia comprises Hongkong, China and Japan.
The West comprises principally Britain, Europe, America, 
but the Middle East and Africa and Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada have also been included here under Others. Their 
contribution was negligible and, in terms of distance 
from the Straits Settlements, were too far to be included 
under Asian trade.
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The direction of flow of imports and exports in the 
colony1s trade with these regions had, however, altered 
considerably in this 45-year period. (See Table XIX)
TABLE XIX
General Trend of Straits Settlements Foreign Merchandise
Trade (1870-1915)
SEA S & E
IMPORTS
West Total SEA
EXPORTS 
S & E West
------1
Total
Asia & Asia w
1870 44*42 22.98 32.52 100 42.92 19.62 37.38 100
1875 47.07 28.22 24.63 100 43.68 20.89 35.35 100
1880 45.44 27.49 27.01 100 44.51 19.32 36.29 100
1885 53.08 23.19 23.71 100 39.69 17.74 42.56 100
1890 56.20 22.39 21.52 100 41.37 15.96 42.67 100
1895 58.37 24.34 17.28 100 44.47 12.26 43.25 100
1900 57-96 24.16 17.84 100 40.19 12.02 47.78 100
1905 61.82 20.35 17.74 100 41.10 10.11 48.69 100
1910 60.16 20.94 18.94 100 38.69 10.42 50.79 100
I9I5 67.92 17.24 14.75 100 35.82 10.66 53.42 100
Imports from Southeast Asia had increased considerably; from
South and East Asia they fluctuated and declined. Imports 
from the Zest had decreased considerably by the end of the 
nineteenth century. Exports presented a rather different 
picture ; exports to Southeast Asia, despite some fluctuations 
amounted to a steady 40 to 45 percent of all exports up to 
1905, after which date a small decline took place. Exports 
to South and East Asia fell rapidly while those to the West 
increased rapidly.
The flow of trade passing through the Straits Settlements 
had become more East-to-West than West-to-East.
The factors that attracted trade to the Straits
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S e t t l e m e n t s  a s  v /e l l  a s  t h o s e  t h a t  c a u s e d  i t  t o  l o s e  t r a d e  
have  b o th  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  I I I .  I n  t h e  e x a m in a t io n  
o f  t h e  c o l o n y ’ s r e g i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t r a d e  t h a t  f o l l o w s ,  
t h e  o p e r a t i v e  f a c t o r s  i n  e ach  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  a r e  examined 
i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  ( s e e  T a b le s  XXI and  XXII) .
' ? r a d e  w i t  h Ma1aya
R e q u i r i n g  s p e c i a l  t r e a t m e n t ,  hov/ever,  i s  t h e  c o l o n y ’ s 
t r a d e  w i th  Malaya.  I f  Malaya i s  e x c l u d e d ,  t h e  c o l o n y ’ s 
i m p o r t s  f rom S o u th e a s t  A s ia  amount to  a s t e a d y  35 to  40 p e r  
c e n t  o f  t o t a l  im p o r t s  h u t  e x p o r t s  f a l l  from a lm o s t  40 t o  j u s t  
o v e r  20 p e r  c e n t .  I t  i s  o n ly  when t h e  c o l o n y ’ s t r a d e  w i t h  
Malaya i s  i n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  w i th  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  shows 
r a p i d  e x p a n s i o n ,  ( s e e  Table  XX)
TABLE XX
S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  trad e  w ith  Sou theast  A s ia ,  w ith and 
w ithou t Malaya, (1870-1915)
S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  
( i n c l u d i n g  M a lay a )
I m p o r t s  E x p o r t s
S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  
( e x c l u d i n g  Malaya)
Im p o r ts  E x p o r t s
1870 4 4 .4 2 42 .9 2 3 4 .4 5 3 8 .6 2
1875 4 7 .0 7 4 3 .6 8 3 6 .9 5 3 8 .8 7
1880 4 5 .4 4 44 .5 1 3 6 . 3 4 3 9 .4 1
1885 5 3 .0 8 3 9 .6 9 4 0 . 20 3 4 .4 9
1890 5 6 .2 0 41 .3 7 3 9 .7 0 3 1 .7 9
1895 5 8 .3 7 44 * 47 3 5 .8 0 32 .9 6
1900 5 7 .9 6 40 .1 9 3 5 .5 3 29 .5 6
1905 6 1 .8 2 4 1 .1 0 3 4 .0 0 27 .46
1910 6 0 ,1 6 3 8 .6 9 3 5 .0 8 23 .18
1915 6 7 .9 2 3 5 .8 2 3 7 .8 8 21 .16
The t r a d e  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  w i t h  Malaya
i n c r e a s e d  r a p id ly  in  a b s o lu te  terms as w e l l  as in  r e l a t io n
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to total trade as the result of several factors. The first 
was the extension of British political control and influence to 
the Malay Peninsula from 1874* Soon after intervention a 
British merchant expressed the hopes of merchants in the 
colony when he said:
It was feared that the opening; of the Suez Canal 
would lead to direct trade with Siam and other 
places that had "been previously dependent upon 
us, and that Singapore would lose its position; 
hut we shall now look forward to a very hopeful 
future, knowing that the immense country at our 
hack will develop and we shall see British 
influence in the Archipelago occupying that 
position which it ought to do.l
This ’hopeful future’ was more than amply realized. With 
British intervention came law and order, a sound adminis­
tration and public works. In particular, an excellent trans­
port system was created and in 1916 an American visitor 
recorded his view that:
It is doubtful if any country of similar size in 
the world possesses a more excellent system of 
roads than the Straits Settlements and the 
Federated Malay States.2
There were more than 2,000 miles of metalled roads and only 
a little less of unmetalled roads and bridle paths. Most 
of these v/ere on the west coast of Malaya as were the railways 
which linked the tin areas with the coast. Railv/ay lines 
ran throughout the length of Malaya from Singapore to Penang
1. Quoted in Bogaars, ’The Effect of the Opening of the 
Suez Canal on the Trade and Development of Singapore’,
p.120.
2. 0dell, Cotton Poods in the Straits Settlements, p .10.
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in 1914 and went on to Bangkok in 1918.^
Secondly, Malaya was extremely rich in natural resources, 
particularly tin. Fven "before British intervention enter­
prising Chinese miners, gum gatherers and pepper and gambier 
cultivators from the Straits Settlements had reaped fortunes 
in the hinterland, despite the hazards of political instability. 
With the establishment under British rule of more congenial 
conditions for the exploitation of these resources, capital 
and labour flowed from the colony to the Malay States; at 
first capital as well as labour were largely Chinese, but 
British capital followed. In 1887, for example, the Straits 
Trading Company was established to participate in the tin 
industry of Malaya (until then virtually a monopoly of the 
Chinese). It was financed from Singapore by the import- 
export firm of Gilfillan, Wood & Co. and the Chartered Bank.1 2 
The expansion of trade of the Federated Malay States, parti­
cularly in exports, is eloquent testimony of the rapid 
development that took place in the export sector of the 
economy, (see Table XXIIl)*
The third factor in the rapid increase of Straits 
Settlements trade with Malaya was the fact that the ports 
of the colony formed the natural points for its exports and 
imports: the ports of the Straits Settlements were the ports
1. Gull, British Bconomic Interests in. the Far Bast,
IFR, London 1943, p.92.
2. Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia 
and Maiaya, p.159*
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TABLE X X II I
T rad e ,  Revenue and E x p e n d i tu r e  o f  t h e  F e d e r a t e d  
Malay S t a t e s ,  1875-1915-  ($000)
Im p o r ts E x p o r t s Revenue E x p e n d i tu r e
1875 831 740 409 437
1880 2 ,231 1 ,9 0 7 882 795
1885 8 ,667 9 ,6 9 2 2 ,2 0 9 2 ,262
1890 1 5 ,4 4 4 17 ,6 0 2 4 ,8 4 0 5 ,2 3 7
1895 22 ,653 3 1 ,6 2 5 8 ,4 8 1 7 ,583
1900 36 ,403 60 ,3 6 1 1 5 ,6 1 0 12,729
1905 50 ,575 80 ,058 2 3 ,9 6 3 20 ,750
1910 53 ,255 102 ,852 26 ,553 23,599
1915 60,016 161 ,838 40,775 42 ,8 3 9
(S o u rc e :  B r i t i s h  Malaya, T ra d e  and  Commerce 1924 ,  p . 4 / )
o f  Malaya.  There  was v e r y  l i t t l e  d i r e c t  t r a d e  "between 
Malaya and t h e  o u t s i d e ,  w o r l d .  I n  1910-1913 more t h a n  f o u r -  
f i f t h s  o f  t h e  im p o r t s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s  and two- 
t h i r d s  o f  t h e  e x p o r t s  v/ere c o n d u c te d  t h r o u g h  th e  S t r a i t s  
S e t t l e m e n t s ,  ( s e e  T able  XXIV).
What l i t t l e  d i r e c t  t r a d e  t h e r e  was i n  Malaya was done 
th r o u g h  P o r t  Swettenham. I t  was on ly  c r e a t e d  i n  1901 and 
a lm o s t  succumbed im m e d ia te ly  to  a n  o u t b r e a k  o f  m a l a r i a  i n  
S e la n g o r  which  s e v e r e l y  a f f e c t e d  l a b o u r  i n  t h e  p o r t
# The g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o l o n y ’ s t r a d e  w i t h  Malaya was 
w i t h  t h e  F e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s .  The t r a d e  with, t h e  
U n f e d e r a te d  Malay S t a t e s  was much s m a l l e r ,  and m a in ly  
w i th  J o h o r e .  I n  1910, f o r  exam ple ,  t h e  co lo n y  im p o r ted  
o v e r  $71m from t h e  FMS, and a b o u t  $ l 6m from th e  Un-FMS, 
o f  which  $10m came from J o h o r e .  The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
e x p o r t  f i g u r e s  were 842m, §8m, and |5m. (S o u rc e :
S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  Blue  Books 1 9 1 0 ).
/  For  t h e  y e a r s ,  1875 and 1885, t h e  f i g u r e s  r e f e r  t o  on ly  
t h r e e  s t a t e s  -  P e r a k ,  S e l a n g o r  and  N e g r i  Sem bilan .  From 
1890 Pahang i s  i n c l u d e d .
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TABLE XXIV
R e g io n a l  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  F e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s  T rade
(1910-1913)
IMPORTS
S in g a p o r e Penang Malacca T o t a l B r i t a i n O th e r s T o t a l
SS
■
1910 5 2 .2 3 3 3 .2 9 2 .9 0 8 8 .4 2 7 .5 4 4 .0 4 100
1911 4 5 .4 3 3 8 .1 7 0 .9 4 8 4 .5 4 9 .4 8 5 .9 2 100
1912 4 3 .9 1 3 7 .6 9 1 .0 1 8 2 .6 1 1 0 .4 7 6 .9 2 100
1913 4 0 .7 8 3 1 .6 9 0 .9 0 73 .2 9 I 8 .4 3 8 .2 8 100
EXPORTS
1910 3 2 .7 3 3 6 .4 8 0 .6 8 6 9 .8 9 23 .3 5 6 .7 6 100
1911 3 3 .5 0 4 0 .5 4 0 .4 1 7 4 .4 5 21 .16 4 .3 9 100
1912 3 3 .3 6 3 3 .4 1 0 .7 1 6 7 .4 8 28 .0 5 4 .4 7 100
1913 4 1 .0 4 3 6 .0 1 0 .6 9 7 7 .7 4 17 .9 1 4 .3 5 100
(S o u rc e :  P e r c e n t a g e s  computed from s t a t i s t i c s  i n  Ra lph  Mu O d e l l  
C o t to n  Goods in  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s , 1915,  p • 9 . )
and c a u s e d  s h i p s  h ead ed  f o r  i t  t o  he  d i v e r t e d  t o  S in g ap o re
o r  P enang .  U n t i l  1907 t h e  s h i p s  t h a t  c a l l e d  a t  P o r t  Swettenham
were c o a s t a l  s t e a m e r s ,  n a t i v e  b o a t s  and some s t e a m e r s  from
I n d i a ,  h u t  f rom 1907 s t e a m e r s  a l s o  c a l l e d  d_ i rec t ly  from
E u ro p e .  The r a p i d  economic  deve lopm ent  o f  t h e  F e d e r a t e d
Malay S t a t e s  b r o u g h t  f o r t h  p r o p o s a l s  t h a t  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  o f
th e  p o r t  he  improved t o  t u r n  i t  i n t o  an. o c ean  p o r t ,  so t h a t
t h e  t r a d e  o f  t h e  Malay S t a t e s  might  he  l e s s  d e p en d e n t  on
S in g ap o re  and Penang .  I n  1912 work b e g a n  on t h e  wharves  which
were c o m p le te d  i n  1914» Thus t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  deve lopm ent
o f  t h e  p o r t  l i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  scope  of  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y . ^
1. See Mon B in  J a m a l u d d in ,  A H i s t o r y  o f  P o r t  Sw et tenham . 
No.3;  S in g a p o r e  S t u d i e s  on Borneo and Malaya,  S in g a p o re  
1 963 , f o r  a b r i e f  s u r v e y .
The success of Port Swettenham from 1901 to 1915 was 
limited. In 1906 the direct trade accounted for "by Port 
Swettenham was only three and a half per cent of the value 
of Federated Malay States imports; in 1907 it was almost 
seven per cent and in 1908, ten per cent.^ Port Swettenham 
was more important as a port of export; in 1909 it exported 
nearly 40 per cent of the total production of rubber in the 
Federated Malay States due largely to its proximity to 
Selangor, Lower Perak and parts of Negri Sembilan. Singapore 
exported only 32 per cent and Penang 28 per cent of the 
total output of 3>331 tons that year. In 1910 Port Swettenham 
exported 57 per cent of a total of 6,504 tons. Port 
Swettenham*s success was largely confined to rubber. Its 
development was limited by geographical and administrative 
factors. It lay at an awkward bend of the river which 
rendered navigation difficult for ocean-going vessels. It 
could not offer services equal to those of Singapore and its 
requests for the construction of wharves were refused by
pthe government of the Straits Settlements at Singapore.
The expansion of trade with the * immense country at 
its back* was fortunate for the Straits Settlements because
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1. Selangor CCAR 1909. Appendix F, ’Rubber and the Shipping 
Trade, The Future of Port Swettenham* by H.P. Clodd,
p. 40.
2. Ibid, p.43*
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its trade with some of the other regions of Southeast Asia 
was threatened.
Trade with Indonesia
Improved shipping and port facilities in Indonesia 
encouraged the development of direct trade and led to some 
"by-passing of the Straits Settlements. Direct steamship 
services "between Indonesia and Europe decreased Indonesian 
reliance on the Straits Settlements for export and import.
At the same time coasting steamship services channelled the 
trade of the outer islands towards the principal Indonesian 
ports which had "been rendered more attractive "by developments 
in port facilities.
Prior to 1870 there was no steamship service "between 
Indonesia and Holland, and the quickest communication with 
Europe was "by British lines at Singapore. In 1870 the 
Nederlands Xine was established to re-capture the carriage 
of this trade from the British.^" In 1874 it inaugurated a 
monthly service between Indonesia and Holland. In 1879 a 
fortnightly service was started and in 1883> in conjunction 
with the Rotterdam Lloyd, another Dutch steamship company 
which had been established in 1875» it began a weekly service. 
In 1891-1898 ocean-going vessels of these lines called at 
14 ports in Indonesia.1 2 The efforts of British shipping to
1. Allen and Donnithorne, p. 211.
2. SS Trade Commission. Report 1933-4. vol. i, p.36*
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meet the challenge of Dutch competition resulted in another 
direct service between Indonesia and Holland. The Holts 
formed a subsidiary company, the Nederlandse Stoomvaart 
Maatschappij (NSMO), which instituted a direct service trade 
betv/een Amsterdam and Batavia and so were able to compete 
in the Java trade. The NSMO, although a British line, was 
registered in Holland, flew the Dutch flag, and could compete 
on equal terms with the Nederlands and the Rotterdam Lloyd.’*'
In 1900 when the Batavia *Vrachten1 Conference was established 
all these three lines were party to it, and shortly afterwards 
were joined by two other trans-ocean steamship lines - the 
Deutsch-Australische Dampschiffs-Gesselschaft and the 
Messageries Maritimes.
The creation of coasting services between the islands
of Indonesia further reduced the entrepot trade of Singapore.
In 1888 the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KFM) was
started for the purpose of collecting and bringing the
produce of the islands to Batavia, which was the terminal
for the two Dutch ocean-going lines. It was discovered in
that year that, except for Java, the trade of Sumatra,
2Celebes and Moluccas was centred at Singapore. The 
operations of the KPM increased the flow of trade from the 
islands to Batavia and Sourabaya and diverted it away from
1. Francis Hyde, Blue Funnel. A History of Alfred Holt and 
Company of Liverpool, from 18^5 to 191U. Liverpool 
1957, P.54.
2. Allen and Donnithome, p. 216.
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Singapore* Singapore lost, for example, the trade in tobacco
from Deli in Sumatra. In 1879-1880 Holts had introduced
a steamer to bring the tobacco of Deli to Singapore to
connect with its main-line services to Europe. In 1891 the
KPM began to call at Belawan, the port of Deli, to transport
the tobacco to Batavia. A German line, the Norddeutscher
Lloyd, also entered the field and freight changes fell.
The threat to its coasting trade led Holts to create a second
subsidiary company, the East India Ocean Steam Ship Company,
which was established in partnership with the Singapore firm
of V/. Mansfield & Co., The East India line traded to Sumatra,
Moluccas and Celebes and tried to divert all merchandise to
Singapore while the KPM tried to channel it to Batavia.^
Holts were unable to withstand the stiff competition in
Sumatra and in the Celebes and were gradually pushed out
because the KPM was a quasi-state department and was used
’as a tool of economic policy’. It could endure losses which
no private company such as Holts could. In 1912, for
example, despite government subsidies the KPM’s losses came
to 260,000 florins. In 1915 a total of 24 out of its 43
2services were running at a loss.
Indonesia was also able to attract trade to its ports 
because of improvements to them. A new harbour, Tanjong
1. Hyde, p. 94*
2. Allen and Donnithorne, p. 220.
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Priok, was built for Batavia in 1873* Further harbour
improvements were carried out at Batavia, Sourabaya, Macassar
and Belawan and other ports after 1885, which enabled them
to accommodate ocean-going vessels."^ The development of
Macassar was a good example of how Singapore lost trade. It
was made a free port in 1847 but it showed no success. During
the enquiry into the Straits Homeward Conference in 1902 it
was brought out that Macassar had attracted trade to itself,
particularly copra, at the expense of Singapore. In 1896
Macassar had exported 2m kilos of copra to Europe and 6^m to
Singapore. In 1901 its exports of copra to Europe were over
12m kilos while those to Singapore had fallen drastically to 
282,000 kilos. It was argued at the Enquiry that Singapore 
lost the re-export trade in copra because of its excessively 
high freights, but this was not a completely valid reason.
The difference in freights obtaining in Singapore and in 
Macassar was quickly adjusted by a decline in Singapore*s 
and a rise in Macassar's with the creation of a Conference 
there. Macassar was physically closer to the coconut 
producers of the Celebes than Singapore and the
1. SS Trade Commission, Report 1935-4, p.37, vol.i, App.4.
The greatest development admittedly took place after 1912. 
A total of 18lim guilders was spent on Tanjong Priok 
(50m) , Sourabaya (78m) , Samarang (13m), Macassar (I4im), 
Belawan (26m), Padang (5im) and Tjilatjap (2^m).{_18lim guilders = about £15mJ7.
2. SSLCP 1902, App.40, 'Report of the Commission on the 
Eastern or Straits Homeward Conference as affecting the 
Trade of the Colony', p.C295.
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adven t o f  h arbou r improvements and d i r e c t  sh ip p in g  s e rv ic e s  
to  Europe tip p e d  th e  s c a le s  in  i t s  fav o u r.
S t r a i t s  S e ttlem en ts  tr a d e  w ith  In d o n es ia , however, 
rem ained s u b s ta n t ia l  and con tinued  to  form a la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  
o f  th e  co lo n y 1s t o t a l  t r a d e .  The reason  fo r  t h i s  was th a t  
i t  was a b le  to  o f f e r  c e r t a in  advantages o f  which th e  p ro v is io n  
o f  s e rv ic e s  was th e  most im p o rta n t. Singapore was a b le  to  
o f f e r  th e  s e rv ic e s  o f a g r e a te r  number o f sh ip p in g  l in e s  to  
a g r e a te r  number o f  p o r ts  in  Europe th an  any o th e r  p o r t  in  
S ou theast A s ia , and i t  a l s o  o f fe re d  s p e c ia l  f a c i l i t i e s  and 
advan tages fo r  th e  p ro c e s s in g , s o r t in g  and g rad in g , b u lk in g  
and d esp a tch in g  o f  S ou theast A sian p roduce. A lthough th e  
developm ent o f  B a tav ia  and th e  KPM d iv e r te d  a c o n s id e rab le  
amount o f  t r a d e ,  S ingapore was a b le  to  h o ld  i t s  own a g a in s t  
th e  o th e r p o r ts  in  th e  tr a d e  o f most com m odities. M acassar 
was ab le  to  a t t r a c t  th e  copra o f  th e  Celebes and ex p o rt i t  
d i r e c t  to  Europe because copra was a commodity th a t  re q u ire d  
v ery  l i t t l e  p ro c e s s in g  which could  be c a r r ie d  ou t by th e  
p roducers th em se lv es. I t  was exp o rted  to  only  a l im ite d  
number o f  p o r ts  in  Europe. There was, th e r e fo r e ,  no p a r t i c u la r  
advantage in  send ing  i t  to  S ingapore f o r  r e -e x p o r t .  In  th e  
case o f  gums, g u tta  p e rch a , gambier and o th e r  p roduce, 
r e q u ir in g  s p e c ia l iz e d  s e rv ic e s  to  make them m arke tab le  in
Europe and d e s tin e d  f o r  a l a r g e r  number o f  p o r t s ,  th e  p u ll  
o f  S ingapore was s t i l l  very  s tro n g . M acassar in  1902 had
only two d i r e c t  steam ship  s e rv ic e s  to  Europe, one Dutch
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and one German, which served a total of only three ports,1
Singapore also made strenuous efforts to attract trade. 
Besides the East India Ocean Steam Ship Company, the Straits 
Steamship Company was established by the Holts in co-operation 
with Chinese merchants in 1890. In the twentieth century it 
became ’one of the major instruments in the development of 
the Archipelago*.2 In 1920 it served 53 ports in Southeast 
Asia. The company used ships designed to suit the conditions 
of Southeast Asian trade. The Chinese in Singapore had ties 
of blood and business with Chinese in the Indonesian islands 
and trade continued to be drawn to Singapore. The KPM found, 
for example, the competition from Chinese vessels in the 
Singapore-Sumatra trade was very keen.
In the competition between the Straits Settlements and 
the Indonesian ports for the carriage of trade Singapore’s 
superior geographical position and services enabled it tc 
hold on to a good proportion of the increasing volume of 
trade. Prom 1900 onwards it was, however obvious that the 
development of shipping services sind port facilities were 
having an effect on the colony’s trade with Indonesia.
Between 1900 and 1905» Straits Settlements imports from 
and exports to Indonesia each fell by $2m, while in contrast
1. SSLCP 1902. App.40, Commission on Straits Homeward 
Conference, Report, p. 302.
2. Allen and Donnithorne, p. 217-
the imports of the colony from Malaya rose by $l6m and 
exports to that country rose by #llm,
Trade with Indochina
The colony* s trade with Indochina was lost as a result
of restrictions imposed by the French authorities on non-
French imports into Saigon. In I887 the authorities in
Saigon imposed an import tariff. The scale of duties was
not accurately determined,^ which did not prevent the
Singapore Chamber of Commerce from concluding that it brought
the ’large and important export trade from Singapore to that
port ... to an entire standstill’. The exports, in fact,
showed a decided expansion from $1.9m in 1885 to $2.6m in
1890. The most important commodity e^qported to Indochina
was cotton piece-goods of which Indochina took 39 per cent
in 1885. In the same year Indochina also took 28 per cent
3of Singapore* s exports of areca-nuts. The tariff appears 
to have been French retaliation against Canadian discrimin­
atory tariffs on non-British goods which included those of
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1. The Singapore Chamber made enquiries to the Saigon 
Chamber, and to the London Chamber without any apparant 
success. See SSCAR 1887. App. I, SCC to Saigon CC,
18 July 1887, p.73, and SCC to LCC, 10 August 1887, p. 76.
2. SCCAK 1887. SCC to Col. Sec. p. 76.
3. SSBB 1885. (computed).
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Prance.1 234 Also Prance was swinging "back towards protectionism 
at this time; in 1877 a protectionist majority was returned 
to the Chambers in Prance and in 1882 a revision of the 
tariff reversed the policy begun by the i860 Anglo-French
ptreaty.* There was an increase in import duties, but a fresh 
series of commercial treaties cushioned their full force.
In 1892 the Chambers decided that there was to be a 
minimum tariff beyond which concessions would not be made, 
and equal protection was given to agriculture and industry 
so that Prance had a ’full-blown protectionist system’
This new customs tariff was passed in the French Chambers 
in January 1892 and brought into force in Saigon in January 
1893* Its most favoured nation clause was applied to 
European nations almost without exception including Britain 
so that British manufactures exported direct to Saigon 
were admitted under the tarif-minimum rates of duty. The 
benefits of this clause were not extended to the British 
colonies, so that British manufactures re-exported from the 
Straits Settlements as well as other Straits exports to 
Saigon were subject to the tarif general. Thus the tax on 
cotton textiles was 77 francs per 100 kilos under the minimum 
tariff, and 100 francs under the general tariff.**
1. SCCAR 1887. App. I, HBM Commercial Attache in Paris to 
PO, enclosed in Col. Sec. to SCC, 20 December 1887, p.85.
2. A. Bifcnie, An Economic History of Europe. 1760-1939.
5th Edition, London 1948, p • 73.
3. Ibid., p. 73*
4. SCCAR 1893. App. D. SCC to Col. Sec. 28 January, 1893,
p. $&•
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The effect of this new tariff on the colony’s trade was 
instantaneous. In 1892, before the new tariff was applied, 
the Straits Settlements exported 517>905 pieces of cotton 
piece goods to Saigon. In 1893 it exported only 132,720 
pieces. The trade was being conducted direct between Britain 
and Indochina.^ The value of the colony’s exports to Indo­
china fell by $lm between 1890 and 1895> a fall of 35 per cent. 
A proposal that the minimum tariff be extended to British
re-exports from Singapore which were accompanied by certifi-
2cates of origin was rejected by the French government.
Another unsuccessful approach claimed that the 1892 tariff 
operated on a basis of reciprocal advantages and that the 
colony’s exports to Indochina ought to be subjected only to 
the minimum tariff because French exports to the Straits 
Settlements, which were free ports, entered tax-free.^
The third and successful claim was made on behalf of 
those goods which originated from Southeast Asia.^ It was 
pointed out that the tariff had worked against the interests 
of Indochina. Indochinese trade with the Straits Settlements 
was essentially one of barter and the restriction of Straits
1. SSAP 1893. p. 191.
2. SCCAR 1895. App. I. The Manchester Chamber proposed this, 
which was taken up by the FO in Paris and in Saigon. The 
French were unmoved, pp. 59-61.
3. SCCAR 1896, App. G. Gov. SS to Sec. of State, No.363>
4 September 1895> PP* 52-3*
4. SSLCP 1897. App. 7> An Aide Memoire from Gov. SS to 
Governor-General Indochina, 18 March 1897> PP* C29* The 
words actually used were ’merchandise which derives its 
origin in the colony of the Straits Settlements’.
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exports to Saigon had meant that Straits imports of Indo­
china’s chief export commodity, rice, had "been reduced. Rice 
was now imported from Siam, to the detriment of Indochina.
A commission was appointed in Indochina to study this proposal
which recommended the reduction of the tariffs on these 
2commodities. On “being consulted, the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce supplied a list of 68 items, all Southeast Asian 
produce.3 The colony’s trade with Indochina in other items 
did not alter until the beginning of World War I when the 
tariffs were finally relaxed.**
The French were able to restrict the Straits Settlements 
trade with Indochina quite effectively because of facilities 
for direct trade between France and Indochina. Saigon, the 
principal port of Indochina, was taken by the French in 1859, 
and in 1862 the Messageries Maritimes inaugurated a monthly 
service between France and Saigon.5 in 1890-1899 French 
tonnage amounted to 40 per cent of total tonnage cleared 
from Saigon while the British share was 27 per cent. The 
Germans and Japanese came third and fourth respectively.
1. SCCAR 1897. App. P. ’Memorandum on Trade between Saigon 
and the Straits Settlements, by the Gov. SS. to Governor- 
General, Indochina’, p. 176.
2. Ibid., Governor-General Indochina, to Gov. SS, 16 May 
1897, p. 178.
3. Ibid., SCO to Col. Sec. 25 August 1897, p. 179.
4. 100 Years of Singapore, vol. II, p. 41.
5. Ibid., p. 110.
6. Trade and Shipping of Southeast Asia 1901, p. 10.
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Trade w ith  Siam
Im ports from and ex p o rts  to  Siam were o f  equal v a lu e  in  
1870, "but im ports had  in c re a se d  13 tim es hy 1915 w hile ex p o rts  
had in c reased  only  fo u r and a h a l f  tim es. Pour major f a c to r s  
accounted  fo r  th e  r a p id  expansion o f im p o rts .
F i r s t l y ,  the  fo re ig n  tr a d e  of Siam, which was alm ost 
synonymous w ith  th e  t r a d e  o f  Bangkok, was hand led  hy B r i t i s h  
and Chinese m erchants who had connexions w ith  S ingapore. In  
1919 a S ingapore m erchant w rote th a t  a t te m p ts  to  do a d i r e c t  
tra d e  betw een Europe and Bangkok were no t su c ce ss fu l and 
Singapore co n tin u ed  to  h an d le  the  tra d e  of Bangkok because 
o f the p resen ce  o f S ingapore ag en cies  and b ranches in  th a t  
port.'*’ In  1931» fo r  which y ea r an e s tim a te  i s  a v a i la b le ,  
more than  95 p e r  cen t of Siam1 234s in d u s try  and commerce was in  
B r i t i s h  and Chinese han d s .^
Secondly, the  sh ip p in g  th a t  c a r r ie d  th e  ex p o rts  from 
Siam was a ls o  la r g e ly  B ritish -o w n ed . In  1882 H o lts  in tro d u ced  
steam ers to  c a rry  r ic e  from Bangkok to  S in g ap o re .^  T his 
connexion co n tin u ed  d e s p ite  two changes. In  1891 th e  s e rv ic e s  
from Bangkok and D eli were r e - c o n s t i tu te d  as th e  E ast In d ia  
Ocean Steam Ship Company, and in  1899 th e  l in e  was so ld  to  
th e  G-erman N orddeutscher L lo y d .^  A c o n d itio n  of the s a le
1 . 100 Y ears o f S in g ap o re , v o l.  I I ,  p . Ip-•
2. H a rriso n , p . 211.
3 . Hyde, p . 5 1 -2 .
4 . I b id . ,  p . 95* r . 0 ’ U .).
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A condition of the sale was that the line was to continue to 
act as a feeder service to Holts1 234 main-line services from 
Singapore* In 1900 the Norddeutscher Lloyd bought out the 
Scottish Oriental Steam Ship Company, another British line*
In terms of total tonnage cleared from Bangkok the British 
share declined from 80 per cent in I897-98 to 70 percent in 
1899 while the German share rose correspondingly; in terms 
of service to, and trade with, Singapore, there was no change.1
The third factor was an indirect one. The problems
encountered in the colony’s trade with Indochina most likely
caused a diversion of imports from Saigon to imports from 
2Bangkok. It is also possible that the opening of the Suez 
Canal stimulated the European demand for Asian rice and 
diverted the Burmese crop from Asian markets to the European 
one, leaving Siamese rice to meet this unsatisfied demand.^ 
There was a threat to the colony’s trade with Siam in the 
middle of 1893 during the Mekong Valley Question.^ There was 
considerable fear that in the event of French protection
1. Trade and Shipping in Southeast Asia 190-1, p. 30.
2. See ante, p. 159.
3. See Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand since 1850. 
p. 42.
4. SCCAR 1893. App. C. SCC to Col. Sec. 23 June 1893,
p. 42. See ante p.123 Under the Franco-Siamese Treaty 
signed that year, Siam relinquished claims to the 
territory on the east bank of the Mekong River. France 
added Laos to its empire in Indochina.
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being extended over Siam, the same restrictions as applied
in Saigon would be introduced, to the detriment of the trade
of the Straits Settlements.^ However, the danger passed in
1896 when the British and the French in a Joint Declaration
undertook to maintain the territorial integrity of Siam.
Both parties agreed to avoid provoking the other and undertook
2not to acquire special privileges from Siam.
Fourthly, the nature of the exports of Siam seemed to 
ensure their continued gravitation towards the Straits 
Settlements. Siam’s principal exports were rice, tin and 
teak in the nineteenth century and rubber in the twentieth. 
Except for teak, the Straits Settlements was Siam’s ideal 
market. The trade in rice, Siam’s principal export commodity, 
was essentially intra-Asian in character, and very little was 
exported direct to Europe, possibly because European demands 
were met by Burma. In any case direct rice exports to Europe 
came to four per cent of the total rice exports of Siam in 
1870-1874, seven percent in 1880-1884, and nine per cent in 
1900-1904. On the other hand, Singapore accounted for 20 
per cent, 50 per cent and 36 per cent respectively.^ Thus 
direct trade between Europe and Southeast Asia did not affect
1. Ibid., SCO to MCC 4 September 1893, P* 48« The Singapore 
Chamber bombarded the local authorities, the Manchester 
Chamber, the British Foreign Office, and one of its 
friends in Parliament, a Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour, 
with letters and telegrams, see pp. 46-54*
2. SCCAR 1896. App. 1. ’Declaration between Great Britain 
and France with regard to the Kingdom of Siam and other 
matters’, London 15 January 1896, enclosed, Col. Sec. to 
SCC, 30 April 1896, pp. 6l-6.
3* Ingram, p. 42. The other major port was Hongkong.
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the colony’s imports from Siam because this trade was essen­
tially intra-Asian. There was, however, some direct trade 
between Siam and Indonesia which by-passed Singapore,^ which 
possibly explains the relative decline in rice imports from 
Siam in the period 1900-1904»
The colony’s export trade to Siam was affected, however, 
by direct trade between Europe and Siam. In 1903 the Annual 
Reports noted that Siam was importing yarn direct from 
Europe.1 2 * In 1906 it was apparent that the trade in several 
varieties of textiles was being done direct with European 
and Indian exporters. Steel also began to go direct from 
England to Siam and Singapore lost that portion of its re­
export trade as well.^4
The net result was that the Straits Settlements con­
tinued to import increasingly larger amounts of intra-Asian 
commodities from Siam while it lost ground in the distribu­
tion of Western products to that country.
Trade with Burma. British Borneo, and Other Southeast Asia
The exports of Burmese rice, it was noted earlier, were 
possibly diverted to the British and European market after 
the opening of the Suez Canal. It was largely the result of
1. Allen and Donnithorne, p. 218.
2• SSAR 1905. p. 494»
3
4
SSAR 1906. p. 286
SSAR 1905. p. 275
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d i r e c t  sh ip p in g  f a c i l i t i e s  between Burma and th e  W est. The 
e n te r p r is e  o f  a s in g le  sh ipp ing  l i n e , t h e  B r i t i s h  In d ia  (B l) ,  
made Rangoon a sh ipp ing  m e tro p o lis .^  By the 1870s th e  BI 
ranged from London to  China and i t  was th e n  the c a r r i e r  o f 
th e  r i c e  tr a d e  from Rangoon to  C a lc u tta . In  1898 BI sh ip s  
c a r r ie d  90 p e r c e n t o f th e  Burmese ex p o rts  o f r i c e .  Im ports 
from Burma in to  the  S t r a i t s  S e ttlem en ts  were sm all and d id  
n o t in c re a se  much because most o f Burmese tr a d e  was w ith 
In d ia  and Europe. S t r a i t s  S e ttlem en ts  im ports from Burma 
com prised m ainly r i c e ,  which was Burma’ s m ajor ex p o rt 
commodity. E xports from th e  colony to  Burma were even sm a lle r  
and b a re ly  expanded. The S t r a i t s  S e ttlem e n ts  was no t a 
s ig n i f i c a n t  e n tre p o t f o r  Burmese tr a d e .
The case  o f th e  B r i t i s h  Borneo was q u ite  d i f f e r e n t .  
Im ports s tay ed  a t  one and a h a l f  to  two p e r  cen t and ex p o rts  
one to  two p e r  c e n t .  In  a b so lu te  term s im ports and ex p o rts  
grew s ig n i f i c a n t ly  from l e s s  th an  $lm in  im ports in  1870-1875 
to  over $6m in  the tw e n tie th  c e n tu ry . E xports had c o r re s ­
ponding ly  r i s e n  from $fm to  over $5m. These t e r r i t o r i e s  
ex p o rted  in  common th o se  com modities -  g u tta  p e rch a , r a t t a n s ,  
gam bier, sago, p ep p er, gums, b i r d s ’ n e s t s ,  co p ra , co ffee  
and tobacco^ -  f o r  which Singapore was the  id e a l  m arket, and 
im ported  th o se  -  r i c e ,  f i s h ,  opium, c lo th s ,  m achinery, 
te le g ra p h  and ra ilw ay  m a te r ia ls  -  fo r  which th a t  p o r t  was a
1 . George B lake, B .I .  C entenary , 1856-1956, London 1956, 
p . 92.
2. See Trade and Shipping in  S ou theast A sia 1901, pp . 80-87*
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convenient source. They were also well connected with 
Singapore hy steamship services; Sandakan, the capital of 
British North Borneo, was served "by Holt’s subsidiary services, 
with three or four steamers running between the two ports. 
There was some trade from Sandakan with Hongkong which was 
connected by one or two steamers. Sarawak was served by 
the Straits Steamship Company which ran a boat between 
Singapore and Kuching every ten days. Labuan, an off-shore 
island like Singapore, played the same kind of role on a 
very minor scale. It was connected with Singapore in the 
same way as Kuching and it forwarded to Singapore the produce 
collected from the neighbouring coasts of Borneo and the 
Sulu Archipelago.^
The trade with Other Southeast Asia - the Philippines 
and German (later British) Quinea - was insignificant and 
can be ignored.
Trade with South and East Asia
Straits Settlements imports from South Asia were 
falling relative to total imports while exports accounted 
for a steady proportion of total exports. The most important 
item of imports was opium. In 1870 it comprised almost a 
tenth of all imports of the colony by value, but as a 
proportion of total imports it was declining between I870 
and 1915* This was the result of a number of factors:
1. Ibid., p. 87
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Bengal, which was the chief source for opium, was offering 
an increasingly smaller number of chests of opium at the 
monthly auctions but at increasingly high prices, which 
discouraged trade. The price per chest in December 1891 was 
$460; the following year it rose by 25 per cent to $580.
A portion of the trade in this commodity was going direct, 
from India to Java for example, so that Singapore was by­
passed.^- By the twentieth century the anti-opium movement 
was beginning to makeitself felt and in 1907 various countries
in the world were making definite attempts to prohibit or
2restrict its consumption in their territories. Prom a high 
$l8m in 1910 Straits Settlements total imports of opium fell 
to just over $4m in 1915.^ Opium was not the only article 
in which trade was declining. Textiles were being sent 
direct from India to Siam^ and Indian coal suffered from 
competition by imports of Japanese coal.-* Straits Settlements 
exports to South Asia increased very slowly but steadily.
The exports consisted of articles of Southeast Asian produce 
(such as areca-nut, rattans, gambier, tin) which were with 
advantage to be bought from the colony.
The trend of Straits Settlements trade with East Asia 
was the reverse of that with South Asia: imports
1. SSAR 1892. p. 198-9.
2. See Cheng ’Opium in the Straits Settlements, 1867-1910*>
p. 62•
3• See Statistical Appendix XI.
4. SSAR 1906. p. 286.
5. See chapter VII, p. 196
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remained steady relative to total trade "but exports did not. 
Imports grew more than ten times between 1870 and 1915 and 
exports less than five times. Imports from China and Hongkong 
might have been expected to decline for two reasons. Firstly, 
trade tended to go direct to Britain and Europe as a result 
of speedier communications following the use of steamships 
and the opening of the Suez Canal. Secondly, trading condit­
ions improved considerably after the second China War (1856- 
1860). In 1864 the Governor of the Straits Settlements had 
noticed that ’shippers were becoming better acquainted with 
the demands of the China market and consequently shipping 
their goods d i r e c t * B u t  Straits imports from East Asia 
increased rapidly because of the increasing demand for 
Chinese goods from the Chinese in Southeast Asia, a demand 
which was relatively easy to supply due to the rise of 
Hongkong. Another factor for the increase of imports from 
East Asia was the rapid development of Japan. Newly-opened 
in 1857 by Commodore Perry of America, the total trade of 
Japan with the Straits Settlements in 1870 amounted to less 
than $100,000. Fifteen years later it was still less than 
$lm.2 Thereafter in increased rapidly, Japanese coal in 
particular becoming an important item, competitive with the 
British and Indian variety.3 Exports to East Asia increased 
more slowly. The tendency for trade to go direct increased
1* Quoted in Bogaars, ’Suez Canal’, pp. 122-123.
2« From SSBB.
3* See chapter VII p.196
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with the creation of several new shipping lines, --  the
China Navigation Co* (begun in 1872), the China Shippers’ 
Mutual Steam Navigation Co. (or China Mutual, begun in 1882), 
and the Japanese Nippon Yusen Kaisha Ltd.. Indonesia began 
to ship Langkat petroleum direct to China by-passing its 
former entrepot port, Singapore. ^
Trade with Britain, Europe and USA.
As already indicated, there was an increasing tendency 
for direct trade between Britain and Europe and Southeast 
Asian countries, with the result that the Straits Settlements 
was by-passed. There was also a tendency for direct trade 
between the colony and various European countries, resulting 
in Britain, the intermediary in the East-West trade in Europe, 
being by-passed. Direct trade between the colony and the 
USA was also increasing, with further loss to Britain’s 
re-export trade.
Straits Settlements imports from Europe increased more 
rapidly than imports from Britain (see Table XXV). This 
increase was probably more apparent than real, for it was 
most likely that European goods which previously came via 
Britain now came direct as the result of more direct services 
being established from Europe to the East. The 1896 Royal 
Commission on foreign competition in the British Empire 
found that in those commodities which Britain produced and 
could be expected to compete with foreign countries, 26 per
1. See ante, chapter II, p.20 and footnote 2.
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cent of* the Empire’s imports came from foreign countries in 
1884 and 32 per cent in 1895* However, the Commission agreed 
that the increase was due to foreign imports coming direct 
instead of being re-exported from Britain.^"
TABLE XXV
Regional Distribution of Straits Settlements trade with
the West, 1870-1915
Britain
IMPORTS
Eurooe America Total.
EXPORTS
Britain Eurooe America Total..
incl.
Others
incl.
Others
1870 85 12 1 100 66 3 29 1001875 79 16 1 100 63 14 19 1001880 85 10 3 100 53 16 28 1001885 77 17 4 100 61 26 10 1001890 70 24 3 100 54 25 18 1001895 67 27 2 100 45 31 21 1001900 59 34 4 100 52 22 24 100
1905 59 29 6 100 44 26 28 1001910 59 25 6 100 50 28 19 100
1915 58 19 11 100 36 16 46 100
Straits Settlements exports to Europe and the USA had
increased while those to Britain had declined in proportion
to total exports to the West. But exports to Britain still
a
remained between a quarter and/fifth of the colony’s total 
exports. Britain was losing its ’depot trade’ or re-export 
trade in colonial produce, of which woo}, and cotton were the most 
important, followed by coffee, tea, tin and l*ter, rubber.1 2
1. Cited in dapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain. 
1887-1914. Book IV, p. 38.
2. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain 1850-1886. 
Book III, p. 230.
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The value of these re-exports were £59m in 1887 and £56m in 
1913f despite the rise in prices that had taken place.'1 2’
Straits Settlements* exports to USA., despite fluctuations, 
expanded rapidly from 1890. The development of industries in 
America stimulated imports of raw and semi-raw materials for 
use in the factories, such as hides, skins, silk, wool and 
other fibres, as well as foodstuffs like sugar, coffee and 
tea.^ These imports did not have to compete with American 
industry and were not prevented from entering hy prohibitive 
tariffs.
The imposition of tariffs in USA played an important 
part in the re-direction of Straits Settlements exports hy 
diverting them from Britain to America. The tariff made its 
appearance in i860 during the Civil War.^ Between 1892 and 
1912 four major changes in tariff policy took place. In 
1892 the McKinley tariff raised tariffs to an average of 
49*5 per cent on imports of manufactures although in 1894 
a reaction took place and tariffs were lowered under the 
Wilson Act hy 20 per cent. Two years later, however, the 
Dingley Act raised tariffs to an average of 57 per cent at 
which level they continued until 1912 when the Underwood 
Tariff cut lowered them to an average of 30 per cent. These
1. Clapham, Book IV, p. 4, and S.B. Saul, Studies in British 
Overseas Trade. 1870-1914. Liverpool I960, p. 225.
2. E.L. Bogaart and D.L. Kemmerer, Economic History of the 
American People. New York 1948, p. 571.
- 3. Ibid., p. 576.
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tariffs reflected the determination of America to industrial­
ize. The McKinley tariff "brought into existence an American 
tin-plate industry.^ Prior to June 1891 there was no produc­
tion of tin-plate on a commercial scale in America and nearly 
all American demands were supplied by the Welsh sources. In 
1892-1893 American output was not even one-sixth of imports 
but by 1895-1696 local production and imports were about 
equal, and in 1898-1899 local output exceeded imports by 
seven times. Imports had also fallen to a quarter of the 
1891-1892 quantity. The result was the stimulation of 
American imports of the raw material and a decline of the 
finished article. The trade of the Straits Settlements 
reflected this : in 1891, just before the tariff came into 
operation and although it was a year of severe depression, 
there were ’abnormally heavy* shipments of tin to America, 
at ’artificially high prices’.1 2
The regional distribution of Straits Settlements trade, 
like its growth, was highly sensitive to external influences. 
The development of direct shipping services to Europe and 
the rise of tariffs in Southeast Asia and in USA left their 
marks. The continued expansion of Straits Settlements trade 
was the result of the over-all development of world trade 
and the development of the countries of Southeast Asia which 
were served by the Straits Settlements, in particular the 
development of its Malayan hinterland.
1. Clapham, Book IV, p. 3 6 .
2. SSAR 1891. p. 80.
THE COMMODITY COMPOSITION OP STRAITS SETTLEMENTS TRADE
üi%
The largely entrepot nature of Straits Settlements 
foreign trade ensures the similarity of commodities on the 
import and the export side« A few ma;jor commodities accounted 
for the hulk of the colony’s trade although a very large 
variety of commodities went to make up the total trade. In 
chapter V it was found that 34 commodities comprising a total 
of 60 separate items accounted for almost three-quarters of 
all imports and four—fifths of all exports of the colony’s 
merchandise trade hy value between 1870 and 1905, this prop­
ortion falling only in 1910 and 1915- In this chapter, 20 
of these commodities and in addition rubber have been selected 
for closer examination. In Table XXVI they have been arranged 
in order of magnitude for exports in the year 1900, exports 
having been chosen in preference over imports in order to 
emphasise the entrepot nature of the trade - virtually all 
exports were entrepot while some imports were destined for 
local consumption. It can be seen that the first 16 commo­
dities each exceeded one per cent by value of total merchandise 
exports in 1900 while the remaining five did not.
The first 16 commodities accounted for about two-thirds 
of the colony’s imports for the period 1870-1910 and 53 per 
cent in 1915 (see Table XXVII). They formed a higher 
proportion of exports - about 70 per cent — but once again 
the proportion fell in 1915, to 54 per cent. But closer 
examination reveals that the first nine commodities - tin,
I72
173
(3
3
6
£
•H
<D
o m 
*lH H  On 
tQ H  
- P  I 
Ö O 
0  r- 
6  oo 
0  H  
H * —•* 
■P 0  
■P bO
<a•p
ö  
0 0 -p o 
•H J~i 
id 0
&  f t  
• P
CO >5
e p<+H-- 'o
0 Ö no o cd 
•h f-. 
-p -P 
•H
0 0 
O  0  ft *H 
S  *0 O Ö o cd
N o  
■P u  
•H 0
«Ö 6 
O
5
CO
Eh
f t
I 01 
■P Ö I  
cd cdt 
f t  -p |
• H
Eh
o  - J -  cm H M D  m i n o  
I i H n r n r n n n m - d -
o o o o o o o o
r^o-^m-^cMincMcMCM
i n  o v o  m m o v m o v h -
...............................................•  •
OOOrlrlrlrlCMHCJ
i n  o o  i n  cvj h  cm h  ° o  
o  m - 3' f s- r ' » i n - 3 * - d , r >' -• i • • • • • • • »
O  O  H  o  H  H  CM - O’ CM
O V O  O  CM m  O  H  C M v o  v o
r ^ - m c o  o o  o  h  - t o o  r -  m• • • • • • • • f t *
O H H C M m r n C M C M C M C M
v o  m v o  cm o o  K \ i n H 4 is -m cM inooH H oom cM•  • • • • • • • • •
CM H  H  o
C M O V C M V O V O c Q O O - C t C M
cm cm m ^ r - r ^ o  cm a v r -• • • • • • « • • •
HHHrlHHCMrlOO
m m - c t r - m c o  i n m o o  o
C O H V O  O V O  i n  OV CM c O  H  •  • • • • « • • • •  
- O ’ c o  m r - m c M  cm m  h  cm
mh-CMCM-O-CMOO^ -Or  ^
ov-4 -cm m m-O’cm cm m cm« • • • • # • • • •
o v m m o  c o  m i n m - O m
H  H  H  H
-0-0 h  Is“ r—Oh  o  vo m -Omovo m m  m o  cm ov •  » • • • • • • • •
o v  h  o v o  m m i n - O m o
H  H
- O C M  H  H  r^ - VO  H  cm m - 3 * 
o  n r - i A H O c M n n i n  » » » » » * » • • •  
- O  O  CM H  KV H  - O  H  CM O
c ^ - O r - O M n o  o v c o  o o  r -
d H i n n o o H C h O i n• • • • • • • • • •
inOHOM^HCnnHfO  
H  H  H  H  H  H
h - o  cm cm m  v o  c M O o n  
m v o  - O m n  m o v m m m.............................
o  o o  h - ( T v  cm r ^ - a o  m o v o
H  H  H  H  CM H  CM
cd
0
>H
o  m o  m o  m o  m o  i n
r ^ - r ^ - o o o o  G V O V O O H H  
c O c O c O o O c O c O O V O V O V O V
H H H H H H H H H H
K \ H  O ’00 H  H  00 - O m C M  
VO CO O M n  H  o o  VO m  CM CJV•  • • • • • • « « •
O O H H C M H H H H O
h  ovo r-vo o m i ^ r i o
c o o o c M m H H c o - O - o m• • • • • • • • • •
H H m C M C M C M H C M H H
h  O i n n O n  m n  c o  
h  o o  v o  m  m  o v  o n  o  o v• I • • • • • • • •
O  O H H C M H C M V O C M
f ^ - h - h - o  i n r - o o  h -v o  cm 
m  cm h  o - m  O ’ r -  h  h -  cm • • • • • • • • • •
OHCMCMCvi mCMmCMCM
- O v o  O W O O n H M ^  
cm - O h  o v o  m  r * - m o o  m  •  • • • • • • • • •
i n c o v o  -0  i n  m  cm cm h  o
O V 00 O C M O C M m C M O Hvo movm-3-mco n j^ h• • • • • • • • • •
H H C M C M C M C M C M H H H
VO H  (M O V O  O V O V O  H  CM
c o  k v c m  v o  c o  - O  o  r ^ - v o  m  •  * « » • * « • • •  
r - o  i n  c o  i ^ - m - O m c M  cm 
H
m v o  c o  cm m c M  H i n c o r ^ -  
h v o  v o  m c o  c o  cm r*-  h *  r -  •  • • • • • • • • #
c o  cm o  r ^ - m - O - O m c M C M  
H  H  H
- O c o i n o c o  cm m o o  n - o v  
m - o o v m m o  h  o v - O h• • • • • • •  • • •
o v h  o M ^ m m i n m m o  
H
cm cm m o o  i n  o v o  v o  o n  
cm c o  c o  N i n o  m v o  cm v o• • * * * » • • • •
VO O  CM CM - O  CM VO H m o
vo m o v o  m in o v o  -d*-3 - w m o m H c o m H v o i  • » * • • • • • • •
-CtVO Ovr-HOOVOHCM 
H H H H H
ovmr- r-co invo h-ovo oooo ovmoo ovm J-ino• • • • » • • • • •
m o  ov mvo o  i A0 4 m
H H  H  H  CM CM m  CM CM
o m o i n o i n o i n o i n  
r - r ^ - c o  c o  o v  o v  o  o  h  hco 00 co CO co CO OV OV OV Ov
H H H H H H H H H H
o c, o  c ; ) r -  l
i • t •
‘ ■.
• •
r>l tr. H . •. * . 5
■1 O :• - ' ■ . : ■ -
o  - ", c
/U - i >, • ■ ■ (
o  ■ - ■ ■ ■ :
1 1 I
i 0
I
. . V  ,  j  , .
.  * .  . 9 9 P 9  '9
i
1 ! '  i * : ! - . ■ 1 •. ! / . , j < I j  ,  : ' * 1
. . .  ' • . /
: . i .  •: ■
i i
r -  > i
*■ * * P m « «■ ¥ *
1 , ; r  •  •
$
* *  *  °  * l
: ' c  ,> V /• * fr***
■ {  . ,  o  r j !  C  r r c  ;■
{
i t  ' - ( ,  r _ ■- 1 ! ■ 1 . r ; ! ' ! !
c  ' t  • : . >• !• : ' . . . . .  -  ’ -  ,
C-> • , ' . . .  .■ A 3  <~J- : t
r n  \ i  i ’ . I - !  ; ! -*
—  > 1
* ;
!
!
174
•öo
g
• H
*PÖoo
g
— --------------------------- ---------
3
o
Eh
1 CMI H H O \ H l O H m H 0  
1 CM H  a \  CM H  r»- CM P t  O  VO
+1 • • • • « • • • • •
vo co Is- a - co a - co o  o  m  
H l  v o v o v o v o v o v o v o r - r - A -
c M i n A - o o v o c o m m A -  
oo m  ca a - ca ca cm ca ca m  
• • • » • • • • • •
m p J - - 4 m p t m v o  m v o  a - 
i— r - - r ^ - r ^ r - - r - - i — n - r —p -
H l  m o O  CM P t C A O  CAPfoO 00
i o J p  cm r ^ c n c o  co c r \co  r*-co m
P  <P|CM| • * * • * » * • » •
3  o p  P t - 4 v o  co m v o  r - r - o  cm 
r a  eh|  h  cm
c o m ^ i ' O ^ c A m ^ ' P P t ’ 
a - co cm p t v o  m  H  vo O  H  • • • • « • • • « •
cm m c o  o> cm m m p f - o  m
H  CM
C
o
a
l vo  o  m  r - c o  o  m c o  m cM  
CM O v o  CA CM P t  00 CA CA 1""- * • • • • • • • • •
1 H  CM CM CM CM CM CM H  H  H
c M ^ r m m m H - 4 m c M H
o h o o o h o o h h
« • • • • • • • • •
o o o o o o o o o o
H
id
es m c A v o  r ^ - o v o  h  c A P t v o  CM H  m c o  co vo co 00
• • • • • # • • • «
H H O H O O O O O O
CM Is-  A-VO K D  co co VO VO P t  
co  H  m  a - oovo  vo m p t p t
•  • • • • • • • • •
H H H C M O O O O O H
0  
p
1
o v o  o  cm m cm m 4 ^ o  
H  o  p t m t u p t v o  - 4 oo Is-
• • • • • • • • • •
O O O O O O O H  P tv O  
H
c M O C A O H v o c A P f m m  
H  n m m M M i o  H  a - a -
• • • • • • • • • •
O O O O O H O W H J ,
H
IM
PO
RT
S
Ol H  N"WOVO mcO V O  m t ' - m
O l A - m  Is- CM CO P t  m - = t m  CM
1 O l • • • • • • • • • •
O (Öl 
Eh P i
EX
PO
RT
S
cm cm cm m o  a - a - vq m o  
co  cm ca m v o  co a - on o  a-
• • • • • • • • • •
O C M C M m O O O O H O
1
U
a
co
CQJ N C M | C \ 4 w o m N
b a  1 1 H 0 0  O  A - O  CM0000
C |  • • • • • • • •
o |  H O H H C M C M H H
cm c A O M ^ - A - m o v o  
i i h  m p t v o  c a c a  a - h
• • • • • • • •
m o o o o o o H
H l  C A m O  Is- t - H  P f  CM m  O
1 « r ^ .  CO m  CA m  CM CO
P - P | H |  • • • • • • • • • •
3  O K *  H m C A c O C M O O C M C A m  
CO ehI v o v o  m m v o v o  vo vo m m
p I-cm m  a - h  A - m n  A - m  
o  m v o  cm cm m n  m c o  - 4  
•  • • • • • • •  • •
m  o  <a v o  c M o m n u ) 4  
a - a - v o v o  a - a - a  a -vo m
1 1
o  |  m m m v o m c M h -
^  a |  CA CM CM l A N M O
-P p j  I I I  • • • • • • •
0  0 |  O H H H O O O
&  h |
ca p t p t  a  a c o  vo  
m o o  a  o  p t P t m
i i i  • • • • • • •
O  O  O  H  O  o  O
1 1 o O M n c O  W 4 H C 0 n m
<lH 0 |  CA l’'"- CA mVO CA oO P f  m  CM
O 01 • • • • • • • • • •
O  <l-»| O H O O O H O O O O
m i A r i 4 M ^ o > m c o i n  
H C T i P t m C M C M O O  CM CM
• • • • • • • • • •
h h h o h c m h h o o
I O c O l A C ^ N O H N H C h  cm cm - 4  co a - o  A - m c o  a -• • • • • • • • • •H H H O O H O O O O p t v o  oo cm 4 4 m m v o c o  H  o> h  cm 4 m n  m  m c \ i...................................... ...... • •c m h c m h h h h o  h h
cs . o  m m  h - m v o  co  vo co
Ü + 3 |  m v O  C APtt '-C A CO  ( A H
0) p |  | • » • • • • • • •
d |  O O O O O O O O H
m  m v o  vo p t  a  P t  P t  h  
m o  co  o v o  m v o  c o  o
i • • • • • • • • •
O H H O H H H H C M
L Y
ea
r o m o m o m o m o m
r ^ A - c O  c O C T \ ( ? i O O H H  
oO cO oO cO cO cO  CA CA CA CA
H H H H H H H H H H
o m o m o m o m o m
A A c O c O C A C A O O  H H  
OOOOCOcOOOOOCACACACA
H H H H H H H H H H
175
rice, gutta, opium, cotton piece goods, pepper, rattans, 
gambier and fish - accounted for an excess of 50 per cent of 
imports and exports for the period 1870-1910. Only in 1915 
did the proportion fall to 45 per cent.
Five commodities including rubber, which each accounted 
for less than one per cent of the colony’s exports in 1900, 
totalled less than ten per cent of imports and exports up to 
1905, with imports forming a larger percentage than exports. 
This was due to the relatively larger proportion of imports 
taken up by coal, which amounted to two to three per cent 
over the whole period which was not matched by corresponding 
exports.1 In 1910 and 1915 the proportion formed by these 
five commodities showed a sudden and very rapid increase to 
over 10 per cent in 1910 and to over 22 per cent in 1915*
This sudden development was attributable almost solely to 
the trade in rubber.
The other 14 commodities that had been selected to 
compute the quantitative growth of Straits Settlements trade 
in chapter V accounted for less than 10 per cent of total 
Straits Settlements imports and exports of merchandise.
In Graph Eight and Table XXVIII, a total of 16 commodities 
in Straits Settlements trade have been regrouped roughly into 
East-to-West, West-to-East and intra-Asian flows of trade.
These 16 commodities are the same as the first 16 in Table 
XXVII, except that rubber has been substituted for petroleum.
1. See p. 34
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They accounted for a total of 60 to 70 per cent of total 
merchandise imports and over 70 per cent of exports. The 
East-to-West flow is represented by a total of 11 commodities, 
the West-to-East by one - the most important, and the intra- 
Asian flow by four commodities.
It can be seen that the proportions of the East-West and 
the intra-Asian trade represented have not changed very much 
in these 45 years, and the changes that took place were 
confined to those of individual commodities. In the East-to- 
West flow tin had increased rapidly in relation to total 
trade until 1905, when rubber, hitherto of negligible impor­
tance, became a significant commodity in the colony’s trade. 
The trade in the nine other items of Southeast Asian produce 
remained relatively steady, forming a large proportion of 
the colony’s imports and exports until 1905 when, like tin, 
it fell off rapidly to 1915- In the West-to-East trade, 
which is here represented by cotton piece goods, the colony’s 
imports and exports (almost a fifth each of total trade in 
1870) fell very rapidly. In the intra-Asian flow of trade, 
opium had declined considerably while the other items - rice, 
fish and arecanut —  increased steadily from 1870 to 1915» the 
increase being confined mainly to rice. Thus the East-West 
trade can be seen to have developed in the direction of East- 
to-West while the intra-Asian trade was increasingly Southeast 
Asian as opium declined in importance.
180
The commodities in Straits Settlements trade
Tin was the most important commodity in the East-to-West 
flow of trade for the whole of the period 1870-1915 and only 
in the twentieth century was its predominant position 
challenged hy rubber.
Prior to 1886 the Straits Settlements imported only 
smelted tin and no ores, due to the prohibition of the export 
of ores from the Malay States.1 2 In 1886 the firm of Sword 
and Muhlinghaus, renamed the Straits Trading Company in 1887, 
obtained permission from the Selangor Government to export 
tin ore for a number of years. The same concession was 
obtained from Sungei Ujong that year and after some initial 
difficulties from the state of Perak in 1889* The company 
built a smelting works in Pulau Brani (an island in New 
Harbour Singapore) and by 1896 was attracting the trade in
ptin ores away from its Chinese rivals in the Malay States.
In 1897 a Chinese smelting works was built in Penang which in 
1907 became the Eastern Smelting Company.^ in 1902 the 
Straits Trading Company started a smelting works at Penang 
to compete with this rival. The result of these smelting 
facilities in the Straits Settlements was that the colony 
began to import tin ore in large quantities for smelting.
The trade of the colony in tin therefore became one of tin
1. Wong, 1Western Enterprise and the Development of the 
Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*> P* 39*
2. Ibid., p. 48*
3* Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Malaya 
and Indonesia, p. 160.
and t i n  o re s  from 1886
TABLE XXIX
S t r a i t s  S e ttlem en ts  tr a d e  in  t i n  and t i n - o r e ,  1870-1915
( * ooo)
IMPORTS jEXPQRTS
TIN TIN--ORE» TIN
P ic u ls D o lla rs P ic u ls D o lla rs P ic u ls D o lla rs
1870 152,260 4,410 _ 154,385 4,719
1875 148,027 4,306 - - 224,106 4,964
1880 203,086 4,830 - - 212,926 5,880
1885 336,863 9,003 - - 375,074 10,708
1890 444,144 14,100 92,387 1,865 537,190 18,074
1895 626,783 21,473 399,006 9,150 885,795 31,313
1900 325,279 23,675 587,134 29,464 806,935 60,768
1905 397,588 31,814 946,332 49,090 989,149 80,729
1910 198,553 15,007 987,233 51 ,634 964,401 75,405
1915 121,354 9,115 1,433,231 78 ,594 1,155,641 91,601
(Source: S t r a i t s  S e ttlem en ts  Blue Books)
The im ports  o f  t i n  d e c lin e d  a f t e r  1895 w h ile  im ports o f  t i n -  
o re  in c re a se d  r a p id ly . In  1900 Singapore had th e  l a r g e s t  sm elt­
in g  works in  th e  w orld .^
The co lony ’ s command over the im port o f t i n - o r e s  was 
th re a te n e d  by an American company in  1903* The I n te rn a t io n a l  
T in  Company, formed by a group o f American t i n  d e a le r s ,  c o a l-  
owners and ra ilw ay  d i r e c to r s ,  s e t  ou t to  cap tu re  th e  market 
f o r  t i n  in  A m erica. To do t h i s  i t  in ten d ed  to  persuade th e  
government o f  the  USA to  impose a p r o h ib i t iv e  duty  on im ported 
sm elted  t i n ;  th e  n ex t s tep  was to  o u s t the  S t r a i t s  T rading
1. SS Trade Commission. R ep o rt. 1953-4 . v o l .  i ,  p . 6 l
* E xports o f  t in - o r e  were n e g l ig ib le .
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Company as a "buyer of ores; then it would itself export the
tin-ores of Malaya to USA to he smelted there* To foil this
intention the Federated Malay States imposed an additional
duty of $30 per picul on all tin-ore exported for smelting
outside the Straits Settlements except Britain.1 Commenting
on this in the Annual Report of the colony, the Registrar of
Imports and Exports declared:
The /~tinJ7 industry was prohahly considered to he too intimately hound up with the welfare of the 
colony and the Federated Malay States to permit 
of its subjection to the speculative operations 
of American trusts.1
The American company was not discouraged hy the exorbitant 
duty on exported ores and for a time the Straits Trading Com­
pany was very worried. Then in May 1907 the threat was removed 
hy legislation in the Federated Malay States which empowered 
the government to cancel or refuse the right to purchase ores
if the object of the business was to secure a monopoly 
2control.
The effect of prices on Straits Settlements trade was 
mentioned in chapter V. Its all-powerful influence on the 
most important commodity of Straits Settlements trade is 
clearly demonstrated in Table XXX. The quantity exported 
fell by almost 80,000 piculs from 1895 to 1900 but the value 
had almost doubled due to rising prices.
x : w-' ' £ h... .if; '••■ "i i- it the t"
1« SSAR 1903. p. 490.
2. Wong, fTin*, p. 51
to face page 183.
(Source: The export values of tin are from the Straits
Settlements Blue Books, while average price in 
dollars was calculated. The rate of exchange 
is taken from Statistical Appendix IV. The 
London price for tin is taken from the Report 
of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rinses, 
1909, vol.iv, Appendix XVI, p.101, evidence 
submitted by C. McArthur of the Straits 
Trading Company.
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TABLE XXX
Effect of prices on Straits Settlements exports of tin,
1890-1905 ($000)
*— —
SS Exports of Aver- Rate of London price for tin Britishtin age Exchange High- Lowest est MeansPrice
tinPrice price
indexPiculs Dollars $ s. d. £ s. £ s. £ s. number
1 8 9 0 537,190 18,074 3 3 . 6 4 3. 5i 1 0 4 . 0  88. 0 9 6 . 0 7 1 . 6
1895 885,795 31,313 35.35 2. ll 6 9 . 0  59. 0 6 4 . 0 4 8 . 01900 8 0 6 , 9 3 5  6 0 , 7 6 8 75.31 2 .0 3 / 8 152.0 108. 0 130.0 100.0
1905 989,149 80,729 81.61 2 . oi 166.5 129.15 1 4 8 . 0 1 0 7 . 6
There were no significant innovations in the tin-plate 
industry in the period 1850-1886, hut the canning industry 
grew rapidly. In the late 1860*s Australia was producing 
tinned meat and in the 1870’s USA was producing "both tinned 
meat and fruit.1 In this period tin-plate was the largest 
industrial demand for tin. In 1871 British consumption of 
imported tin had already exceeded the output of Cornwall, 
and the hulk of imports came from the Straits Settlements.
In the period 1875-1884 Malayan tin faced serious competition 
from Australian tin, hut from 1882 it was evident that the 
output of the Australian mines was declining. The colony’s 
position in the trade in tin was strengthened hy the establis­
hment of smelting facilities in Singapore and Penang.
The colony’s trade in tin expanded hy over 20 times in 
value between 1870 and 1915 and accounted for a fifth of 
all imports and a fourth of all exports in the twentieth 
century. In the beginning of this period opium and cotton 
piece goods exceeded tin in value hut from 1885 its predomin­
ance in the colony’s trade was unquestioned and almost
1. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain. Book III, 
P.91.
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unchallenged until the appearance of para rubber at the end 
of the period.
The creation and expansion of the rubber industry was 
very largely due to efforts of H.N. Ridley, the government 
botanist, who began to exhibit para rubber from 1890.*** The 
invention of the pneumatic tyre by J.B. Dunlop in 1888 and 
the subsequent development of the motor vehicle industry led 
to the rapid increase in demand for rubber. After 1905 the 
industrial demand for rubber switched from the unreliable 
'wild* supply to plantation rubber.1 2 Malaya had a head 
start in the creation of the rubber industry because of its 
reliance on the South American plant which yields more latex 
than other types of rubber and because of Ridley’s work. 
Indonesia, which was also early in the field, did not really 
develop its rubber industry until 1903*^
In the early stages of the industry London was the 
rubber market through which sales were made. In 1908, how­
ever, several firms, including Guthrie and Co., began to sell 
rubber in Singapore and in the latter part of 1911 a local 
Rubber Association was started.^ In 1904 the price per picul 
of para rubber was $270, in 1911 it had risen to $640.
1. Allen and Donnithorne, p. 109#
2. Clapham, Book IV, pp. 142-4*
3* Allen and Donnithorne, p. 117*
4* 100 Years of Singapore, vol. ii, pp. 84-7*
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Singapore was thus the major market for the trade in rubber 
as it was for tin.
The colony’s trade in rubber (all types) was not signi­
ficant until para rubber entered the trade from 1905 onwards. 
In 1915 rubber (mainly of the para variety) accounted for 
one-seventh of all imports and one-fifth of all exports.
More rubber did come to the colony from Malaya but as it was 
for transshipment this did not appear in the trade returns.^ 
Even so, tin and rubber together in 1915 made up about two- 
fifths of total value of merchandise trade of the Straits 
Settlements.
Gutta percha was the colony’s third most important 
export commodity in 1900. It was originally used in Malaya 
to make moulded handles of the kris* but early in 1840 a 
Malay trader introduced it in Singapore in the form of riding 
w h i p s I t  made its appearance in London in 1843* In 1851 
it was discovered that it made an excellent waterproof coating 
for the submarine cables then used in under-water telegraphy 
and world demand for the commodity rapidly increased.
Only two trees yielded the true gutta percha,^ the
1. See ante, p.20.
♦ Malay dagger.
2. 100 years of Singapore, vol* ii, p. 63.
3* Ibid., p. 63, see also Clapham, Book III, p.43*
4* In 1898 a new classification was introduced of gutta in­
ferior, which was considerably cheaper than gutta percha. 
It had previously been added to gutta percha, but it was 
a different commodity. It came from jelutong and was 
used in making chewing gum. The separation of this 
cheaper ’gutta* from gutta percha probably partly explains 
the doubling of the price in gutta percha from an average 
of $71 in 1895 to $147 in 1900.
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tab an tree (dicho~psis gutta) and the sundek tree (pavena 
leeric) which were found only in South Malaya, Sumatra and 
Borneo. The trees grew wild and took 30 years to mature, 
when they attained a girth of three feet. It was necessary 
to fell the tree in order to obtain the yield of about two 
katis or two and two-thirds pounds avoirdupois of gutta gum.
Stimulated by high prices   the export price per picul of
gutta percha exceeded that of tin at one stage —  there was 
indiscriminate felling of the trees without thought to 
conservation. The government prohibition on gutta collection 
was a dead letter and in 1897 it was lifted.^- By the end 
of the 19th century the forests in Malaya were almost denuded 
of the gutta trees.^
The trade in gutta was quite small. In 1870, at the 
time of the boom and rapid development of submarine telegraphy, 
imports and exports averaged five per cent and the price 
then was $59-60 per picul. The trade declined relative to 
total trade until 1900 when once again imports and exports 
averaged five per cent, the price being $145 per picul. In 
terms of volume the trade in gutta had not grown much and 
after 1900 declined very rapidly in value, quantity, price
and importance. There are three reasons for the decline ---
the decrease in supply which resulted from the trees being 
exhausted, the fall-off in demand after the main programme
1. Trade and Shipping in South East Asia 1901, pp. 64 and 73*
2. Trade and Commerce in British Malaya (1924).
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o f  c a b l e - l a y i n g  was c o m p le te d , and  th e  c o m p e t i t io n  o f  p a r a  
ru b b e r*
P e p p e r  was a t r a d i t i o n a l  ite m  o f  th e  E a s t - to - W e s t  t r a d e  
----  i t  was t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  s p ic e s  t h a t  h ad  b ro u g h t  th e  P o r tu ­
g u ese  to  A s ia  i n  1498* T h ere  a r e  two p r i n c i p a l  ty p e s  o f  
p e p p e r ,  w h ite  and b l a c k ,  th e  r e s u l t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  m ethods o f  
p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  th e  b e r r i e s .  W ith  b la c k  p e p p e r  th e  o u te r  
l a y e r  o f  th e  b e r r y  was r e t a i n e d  w hereas w ith  w h ite  i t  was 
s lo w ly  rem oved by subm erg ing  i n  ru n n in g  w a te r  f o r  a b o u t t e n  
d a y s .  W hite p e p p e r  was th e  more e x p e n s iv e  ty p e  b e c a u s e  i t s  
p r e p a r a t i o n  was more e l a b o r a t e  and i t  was p r e p a r e d  from  th e  
b e t t e r  b e r r i e s .  Up to  1890 p e p p e r  was a f a i r l y  im p o r ta n t  
commodity in  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  t r a d e  b u t  t h e r e a f t e r  i t  
was a r e l a t i v e l y  m inor com m odity. In  1890 im p o r ts  and  
e x p o r t s  o f  b la c k  p e p p e r  re a c h e d  th e  h ig h e s t  q u a n t i t y  f o r  
th e  w hole p e r io d  a f t e r  w hich th e r e  was a c o n s id e r a b le  d e c l i n e .  
P r i c e s  f l u c t u a t e d  c o n s id e r a b ly  o v e r  th e  p e r i o d ,  a v e ra g in g  
$8 .5 6  i n  1 8 7 0 , $ 1 5 .0 5  i n  1890 and $ 2 9 .0 9  i n  1 9 0 0 , a f t e r  
w hich th e y  f e l l .
The t r a d e  in  r a t t a n s  was a  sm a ll  b u t  c o n s ta n t  p r o p o r t io n  
o f  th e  c o lo n y ’ s t r a d e ,  a v e ra g in g  one to  two p e r  c e n t  i n  
im p o r ts  and one to  t h r e e  p e r  c e n t  i n  e x p o r t s .  I t  r e a c h e d  
i t s  maximum i n  q u a n t i t y  and v a lu e  i n  1900 , when p r i c e s  w ere 
h ig h e s t  and  d e c l in e d  t h e r e a f t e r .
G am bier was one o f  th e  more im p o r ta n t  e x p o r t  co m m o d itie s  
in  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu r y .  The t r a d e  in  g am b ier s t a r t e d
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very early in the history of the settlement. The earliest 
plantations were in Singapore and in 1850 there were 800 
of them which were, however, failing as gamhier is a plant 
that rapidly exhausts the soil* Soon afterwards the culti­
vators, who were mainly Chinese, shifted over to Johore. In 
1883, stimulated hy high prices, Europeans tried to enter 
the industry hut were unable to compete against the Chinese 
who had a greater knowledge and control of the Chinese coolies 
employed in gamhier cultivation, and who were able to extract 
more labour for lower wages, part of which was received hack 
in the form of profits from the sale of opium and food.^
The leaves of the gamhier tree were collected three times 
a year which when boiled yielded a yellow precipitate which 
was then collected and cut into cubes. Commercially gamhier
was used as a tanning agent for leather, medically it was 
2an astringent. Most of the colony’s imports came from 
Johore and the trade was regulated hy the Pepper and Gamhier 
Society in Singapore.-^ Prom 1900 the trade in gamhier was 
on the decline and in 1915 it amounted to less than one per 
cent of total trade.
Cotton piece goods was the most important commodity hy 
value in the West-to-East flow of trade to Southeast Asia.
1. 100 Years of Singapore, vol. ii, p. 80.
2. Ibid.. p. 71*
3. See ante, pp.90-1
189
Prior to extensive trade with India and subsequently with
Europe, cotton cloth was an important article of exportation
from island to island in Southeast Asia. This trade was
killed by competition from the cheaper and better cloths
from Britain which, in John Crawfurd’s words written in 1820,
was ’one of the proudest and most unquestionable triumphs of
the arts and sciences of a civilized people’.1 2 In 1870
cotton piece goods formed the single most important commodity
in the trade of the Straits Settlements, comprising a fifth
of imports and exports. This proportion, however, fell very
rapidly; in 1900 cotton piece goods trailed behind exports
of tin, rice, gutta and opium and accounted for only five
per cent of either imports or exports. In 1915 the proportion
fell even further to three per cent. But even in that year
it was the second largest item of those imports (after rice)
2which were partially consumed in the Straits Settlements.
The importation of cotton piece goods, though increasing 
very slowly in value, was stationary or declining in quantity. 
Between I870 and 1905 the value of imports had doubled, from 
$8.ijm to $16.9m but the quantity of imports of cotton piece 
goods (all types) had in fact decreased from 4*9m pieces 
to 4*8m pieces.
1. John Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago; contain­
ing an account of the manners, arts, languages, religions. 
institutions and commerce of its inhabitants, vol. Ill, 
Edinburgh 1Ö2Ö, pp. 353-355*
2. Odell, Cotton goods in the Straits Settlements, p. 14*
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In 1870 opium was the most important commodity in the 
intra-Asian trade, forming one-tenth of all imports and 
exports in that year. By 1900 its importance had halved 
and hy 1915 opium accounted for "below one per cent of either 
imports or exports. The purchase tax on opium was important 
as the major source of revenue in the Straits Settlements. 
Being free ports, there were hardly any items that could "be 
taxed without objections from one or another section of the 
mercantile community. The tax on opium was acceptable to 
the mercantile community and remunerative to the government.
The decline in the trade in opium was largely due to 
factors overseas. The supply from India had decreased while 
prices increased, and the development of direct shipping 
had led to direct exports to areas formerly served by the 
colony.1 The trade in opium waned as the anti-opium movement 
grew in strength. In 1874 the Society for the Suppression 
of the Opium Trade was created and two decades later it 
secured a Royal Commission into opium in India. Only in the 
twentieth century was there an anti-opium movement in the 
Straits Settlements, which was led by progressive young 
Chinese. The Straits Settlements Opium Commission of 1908 
was without doubt biased and its Report can be read as ’a 
last desperate effort to justify the Government’s policy of 
collecting revenue from opium’.2 But with international
1. See ante, p.166.
2. Cheng, ’Opium in the Straits Settlements, 1867-1910*,
P. 73.
p r e s s u r e  to  r e s t r i c t  th e  t r a d e  i n  opium and m ea su re s  "by 
C h in ese  to  d is c o u ra g e  i t s  co n su m p tio n  among C h in ese  in  th e  
S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n ts ,  th e  t r a d e  i n  opium d e c l in e d  in to  
i n s i g n i f i c a n c e .
R ic e  was th e  m ost im p o r ta n t  commodity i n  th e  i n t r a -
A s ia n  t r a d e  i n  th e  w hole p e r io d  1870-1915* I t  was e x p o r te d
m a in lan d
b y /S o u th e a s t  A s ia  ( e x c lu d in g  M alaya) and  im p o rte d  hy  i s l a n d  
S o u th e a s t  A sia  (an d  M a la y a ) . The v a lu e  o f  im p o r ts  and 
e x p o r t s  o f  r i c e  o f  th e  c o lo n y  in c r e a s e d  s t e a d i l y  and  r a p id ly  
b e tw een  1870 and 1915* As in  th e  c a se  o f  t i n ,  t h e r e  was a 
s te a d y  and r a p id  r i s e  i n  th e  p r i c e  o f r i c e  ( e x c lu d in g  p a d i ) ,  
w h ile  th e  i n c r e a s e  in  q u a n t i t y  was r a t h e r  l e s s  r a p i d .  F o r 
ex am p le , im p o r ts  o f  r i c e  s t a g n a te d  a t  6 .7  m i l l i o n  p i c u l s  in  
1890 to  1895 an d  f e l l  s l i g h t l y  t o  6.5  m i l l io n  p i c u l s  i n  1900 
th e  v a lu e ,  hov /ever, r o s e  s t e a d i l y  from  $ 1 6 .7  m to  $ 1 8 .8  to  
$25*lm .
R ice  and f i s h  fo rm  th e  s t a p l e  d i e t  o f  S o u th e a s t  A s ia n s .  
The t r a d e  i n  f i s h  w as, h o w ev er, c h i e f l y  o f  th e  s a l t e d  and 
d r i e d  v a r i e t y .  Up to  1890 th e  t r a d e  s t e a d i l y  in c r e a s e d  i n  
p r o p o r t io n  a f t e r  w h ich  d a te  i t  s e t t l e d  a t  t h r e e  p e r  c e n t  o f  
im p o r ts  and  s l i g h t l y  l e s s  o f  e x p o r t s .  The r i s e  i n  p r i c e s  
was r e l a t i v e l y  s l i g h t  a n d  th e  i n c r e a s e  in  t r a d e  was q u a n t i ­
t a t i v e  i n  n a tu r e .  Im p o r ts ,  f o r  exam p le , in c r e a s e d  s t e a d i l y  
and r a p id ly  from  l e s s  th a n  5 5 ,0 0 0  p i c u l s  in  1870 to  o v e r 
lm p i c u l s  by 1910-15*
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The importance of the various commodities in the two sections 
of Straits Settlements trade
In the East-West trade of the Straits Settlements, the 
exports of six types of Straits produce comprised about 90 
per cent of all exports to the West. This is based on the 
assumption that all exports of these commodities went to
the West --  that is, to Britain, Europe and America. This
was not strictly so because a small proportion went to Asian 
countries but it does not alter the basic fact that a few 
commodities comprised the bulk of the colony’s exports to 
the West. Tin was undoubtedly the most important export 
and only in 1910 and 1915 did rubber begin to challenge its 
dominant position. In 1915 the two together accounted for 
four-fifths by value of the colony’s exports to the West.
The colony’s imports from the West comprised mainly textiles 
in 1870, with cotton piece goods forming over 60 per cent 
of imports. In 1880 a new item, sarongs, entered the trade.
Even assuming that all of these two items came from Western 
countries the proportion they formed had fallen to just over 
30 per cent in 1910 and 1915* Obviously the composition of 
imports from the West had changed —  textiles having decreased 
so considerably. Such other items were machinery and metal 
goods, building materials and the like became increasingly 
important as the facilities of the ports were expanded and 
as the Malay States were developed under British administration.
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In the intra-Asian trade the most important commodities 
were rice, opium and fish, which together accounted for two- 
thirds to one half of all exports, calculated crudely at 
export values.^ Rice v/as easily the most important commodity 
and its importance increased as that of opium declined.
The origin and destination of commodities
The examination of the origin and destination of 
commodities in the trade of the Straits Settlements is 
based on the trade of Singapore because it was the most 
important of the three ports, being responsible for nearly 
three-quarters of the value of imports and exports of 
merchandise (see Table XXXIII).1 2 Singapore handled the 
bulk of the trade in the major commodities.^ Penang was 
only significant in pepper and tin and later in para rubber. 
Penang, however, sent a considerable proportion of its tin 
to be re-exported from Singapore which accounts for the 
latter’s considerable excess of exports over imports in 
tin.^ Another reason for selecting Singapore for analysis 
is its superior position as the centre of telegraphic and 
steamship communications and the entrepot for the East-West 
and the intra-Asian trade.
1. See ante, pp.190-1.
2. See also Statistical Appendix VI.
3* See also Statistical Appendix IX.
4* See Statistical Appendix XI >and XIII.
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TABLE XXXIII
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  f o r e ig n  m erc h an d ise  
t r a d e  be tw een  th e  t h r e e  p o r t s  1870-1915 ( p e r c e n ta g e )
S in g ap o re
Im p o rts
P enang  M alacca s s  ,
E x p o rts
S in g a p o re  P enang  M alacca ss
1870 73.64 23.86 2 .5 0 100 7 2 .2 2 26.76 1 .0 2 100
1875 72.66 25.15 2.19 100 69.52 29.37 1.11 100
1880 74.94 22.91 2.15 100 7 5 .1 6 24.13 0.71 100
1885 69.46 28.88 1 .6 6 100 63.62 35.96 0.42 100
1890 70.61 29.03 0.36 100 71.55 2 8 .1 6 0.29 100
1895 75.05 24.77 0.18 100 73.64 2 6 .00 0.36 100
11900 78.59 21.32 0.09 100 7 5 .0 4 24.68 0.28 100
|1905 73.02 26.85 0.13 100 71.58 27.96 0 .4 6 100
1910 72.40 27.27 0 .33 100 68.33 3 1 .1 0 0.57 100
1915 75 .14 2 4 .1 0 0.76 100 72.33 2 3 .6 2 4.05 100
T h ere  were r e l a t i v e l y  few  ch an g es in  th e  o r i g i n  a n d  
d e s t i n a t i o n  o f  com m odities*  In  th e  E a s t- to -W e s t  t r a d e ,  
S in g a p o re  c o l l e c t e d  t i n  and t i n - o r e  p r i n c i p a l l y  from  M alaya, 
th o u g h  a l i t t l e  came from  In d o n e s ia  and  Siam , and e x p o r te d  
m ain ly  to  th e  W est, a s m a ll  p r o p o r t io n  g o in g  to  I n d ia ,  Hong­
kong and J a p a n , B r i t a i n  and  A m erica to o k  th e  h u lk  o f  
S in g a p o re ’ s e x p o r t s  o f  t i n ,  h u t  E u ro p e ’ s s h a re  in c r e a s e d  
r a p id ly  b e tw een  1870 and  1890* I n  th e  o th e r  ite m s  o f  S o u th ­
e a s t  A s ia n  p ro d u ce  ----- g u t t a  p e rc h a ,  p e p p e r ,  r a t t a n s ,  gam hier
and p a ra  ru b b e r  ----  th e  a lm o s t i n v a r i a b l e  p a t t e r n  o f  t r a d e
was t h a t  S in g ap o re  im p o rte d  p r i n c i p a l l y  from  In d o n e s ia ,
M alaya and B r i t i s h  Borneo and e x p o r te d  p r i n c i p a l l y  to  B r i t a i n ,  
E urope and  A m erica , o c c a s io n a l ly  to  I n d i a ,  China and  Hongkong. 
The m ost im p o r ta n t  s u p p l i e r  o f  t i n ,  p e p p e r  and gam bier to  
S in g a p o re  was M alaya. Consuming a n  in c r e a s in g ly  l a r g e  
p r o p o r t io n  o f n e a r ly  a l l  i te m s  o f  S t r a i t s  P roduce  was E u ro p e .
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In the West-to-East trade Singapore continued to import 
most of its cotton piece goods from Britain. The imports 
from India, Europe and East Asia were relatively small and 
at no time exceeded 25 per cent and were frequently less than
five per cent. Singapore’s export markets --- the lahole of
Southeast Asia --  showed only one major change --- the
rapid decline of exports to Indochina from 1890, due to the 
operation of tariffs.^ Exports to Malaya picked up rapidly 
after 1905.
Singapore’s imports of coal showed interesting changes.
In 1870 more than 90 per cent of Singapore’s coal came from 
Britain. In 1900, however, Japanese coal had captured over 
three^fifths of the market and British coal retained less 
than one-fifth. Indian and Australian coal had also entered 
as competitors and "by 1910-15 British coal was all hut driven 
out of the market hy coal from Asia, mainly Japanese.
Similarly an Asian source of petroleum replaced the Western 
source. In 1885, when the trade had just begun, all petroleum 
came from America. In 1890 America and Russia supplied equal 
shares. In 1895 Indonesia alone supplied almost half the 
imports of the colony and in 1915 more than 85 per cent.
In the intra-Asian trade, rice was imported from three
principal granaries, --- Siam, Burma and Indochina, --- and
exported to Indonesia, Malaya and British Borneo. Pish came
1. See ante, pp.156-9 .
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mainly from Indochina and Siam and was exported to Indonesia 
and Burma. Both these commodities were almost wholly Southeast 
Asian in origin and destination. Opium came almost entirely 
from India and was exported to Hongkong and China, Malaya, 
Indonesia, Siam and Indochina. In 1915 the opium trade had 
dwindled to insignificance and exports had virtually ceased 
to all countries except British Borneo which took about half 
of a much depreciated quantity of exports.
It can be seen that in the period from 1870 to 1915 the 
trade of the Straits Settlements had become increasingly one 
of trade in Southeast Asian produce, either for the East-to- 
West flow of trade or the intra-Asian flow, and the ’Western1 
element represented by cotton piece goods and the Asian (as 
against Southeast Asian) element represented by opium had 
both declined. The increasing importance of the Southeast 
Asian element in the commodity composition of Straits 
Settlements trade and the increasing importance of one 
particular region, Malaya, are both shown by the fact that 
the two most important commodities of the colony’s trade, 
tin in the nineteenth century joined by rubber in the twen­
tieth century, were imported mainly from Malaya.
VIII
THE EFFECT OF THE STRAITS HOMEWARD CONFERENCE
The Straits Homeward Conference was alleged hy its 
opponents to have had adverse effects on the trade and ship­
ping of the Straits Settlements, in particular on that of 
Singapore. Its supporters, on the other hand, claimed that 
the increasing prosperity and the growth of the port were 
the result of the operations of the conference. The con­
troversy caused ’ endless heart-hurning and turmoil in 
mercantile circles for many years’.^
The Straits Homeward Conference operated from the ports 
of the Straits Settlements to ports in Britain and Europe.^ 
Little is known of its operations in Penang,  ^and the concern 
of Straits merchants was focussed on its effects on the trade 
and shipping of Singapore. The conference directly affected
only a portion of the East-to-West trade --  that of
Singapore’s exports to Britain and Europe. Only indirectly 
affected were Singapore’s exports to America and its imports 
from Asia. The intra-Asian trade was unaffected. Thus the
1. 100 Years of Singapore, vol. 11, p. 43«
2. There was apparently also a Straits Outward Conference, 
hut there was virtually no mention of it in Singapore, 
and nothing was attributed to its operations. See 
Royal Commission on Shipping Rings. Evidence, vol. iv 
Minutes of Evidence, 1909» p. loo, Evidence of R.D. Holt 
of the Ocean Steam Ship Company.
3« SSLCP 1902. App. 40, ’Report of the Commission on The 
Eastern Shipping or Straits Homeward Conference as 
Affecting The Trade of the Colony’ p. C293» It stated 
that no information was obtained on Penang but declared 
that ’no doubt’ some arrangement existed.
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conference was more the concern of European merchants and 
was only of peripheral interest to the Chinese.
The purpose and origin of the conference system
A shipping conference is an agreement between the owners 
of shipping lines to eliminate, restrict and regulate competi­
tion in the carrying trade on a given trade route or routes.
The various member-lines in the conference remained separate 
and independent enterprises : they only combined to combat 
competition. The competition between members of the conference 
was restricted and regulated by rationalizing sailing 
schedules, controlling freight rates and, occasionally, pool­
ing cargo and freight earnings. External competition (from 
vessels which did not belong to conference lines) was 
eliminated or kept to a minimum by means of the deferred 
rebate, the aim of which was to secure for conference vessels 
the exclusive patronage of shippers of cargo.
The deferred rebate tied shippers to the conference
system. Shippers who shipped exclusively by vessels belonging
to the conference lines were given, at the end of a six-
months* period, a rebate amounting to five per cent of total
freights paid by them during that period to the conference
as a whole. If at any time during these six months they
shipped by non-conference vessels, they forfeited their
claim to this rebate. In the following six-months* period,
if shippers again patronised exclusively conference vessels
as they had done in the first period, then they again received
a five per cent rebate on freights contributed in this period. 
In addition to this, however, they received a further five
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per cent rebate on the freights paid in the previous period. 
The penalty for anything less than complete loyalty to the 
conference was the forfeit of these two over-lapping deferred 
rebates. There was also the possibility of being refused 
space in conference vessels when needed, which could cause 
serious losses.
The conference on its part undertook to provide shippers 
with adequate tonnage on the trade route concerned in order 
to carry all the cargo they wished to load, and to run 
regular services with known times of departure and arrival, 
calling at the ports to which shippers wished to consign 
their cargoes. If it was unable to do this, then the shippers 
were at liberty to ship by non-conference vessels without 
forfeiture of rebates.^*
Shipping conferences arose as a result of the changing 
character of trade in the nineteenth century. Before the 
coming of steamships, sailing vessels only sailed when they 
had a full cargo and their departure from and arrival at any 
ports were not fixed. As a result, merchants were virtually 
forced to make large and often speculative shipments in 
anticipation of the demands of the market, since opportunities
1. See Daniel Marx Jr., International Shinning Cartels: A
Study of Industrial Self-Regulation by Shipping Conferences. 
Princeton, N.J. 1953» also Royal Commission on Shinning 
Rings. Report, vol. i. In some conferences, in addition 
to the deferred rebate, ’fighting ships’ were used to 
meet external competition. The fighting ship was berthed 
ready to compete with any non-conference vessel, sailing 
on the same day, stopping at the same ports, at the same 
or lower rate, any losses incurred being covered by the members of the conference. (Marx, p. 54;*
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for shipping were not frequent. With the advent of steam­
ships, which were not dependent on seasonal and variable 
winds, and the introduction of telegraphy, shipments were 
made on orders received, sind in almost exact correspondence 
with the requirements of the market.'1 2' Prom the 1870s, how­
ever, the old balance between the outward (from Britain and 
Europe) and the homeward cargoes began to change : the out­
ward became increasingly larger and more important than the 
homeward. At the same time, the rapid development of steam 
tonnage led to an excess of tonnage in the trade between 
Europe and China, resulting in what was described as a
’regular scramble’ to get freight, and a drastic fall in 
2freight rates.
It was essential and inevitable that the cut-throat 
competition between the large and powerful shipping lines 
should be brought under control and a remunerative freight 
rate obtained through agreements between themselves. Liner 
services were more expensive to run than tramp steamers and 
sailing ships. Liners kept to an advertised schedule of
1. RC on Shipping Rings. Report, vol. i pp. 100-11.
2. RC on Shipping Rings. Evidence, vol. iv, p.l?8 Evidence 
of R.D. Holt. See also Hyde, Blue Funnel. A History of 
Alfred Holt and Company of Liverpool, from 1§65 to 1914. 
pp. 53"7* The tonnage of British steamships alone rose 
from 454,000 in 1869 to 1,112,000 in 1870 to 2,723,000 
in 1880 (RC on Shinning Rings. Report, vol. ip. 11).
The freights from Calcutta to Europe fell from £10 to
£12 per ton in I869 to 20s to 30s in 1887* (See ante,p.118.
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sailings and plied a fixed and known route calling at a number 
of ports, whereas the latter sought freights wherever they 
could be found and sailed only when fully loaded, and called 
at only a limited number of ports, usually two.
It was necessary for freights to be sufficiently high if 
liner services were to be run at all. The shipping industry 
was one that required very heavy capital investment which 
did not show a profit until after a considerable length of 
time, and in which fixed costs were very great. Unless ships 
operated at a certain minimum capacity and charged a minimum 
rate, loseeswould result, which in turn would discourage 
further investment in the industry and prevent improvements 
in technology which could lead to the reduction of the costs 
of providing these services. The conference system was a 
means of ensuring an adequate return to capital investment.
The first shipping conference was the outward Calcutta 
Conference, vtfiich was introduced in August 1875* Equal 
rates were charged at each of the ports in Britain from 
which steamers sailed and no preferential terms were given 
to large shippers, who grew discontented and chartered steamers 
on their own account. Large shippers in the days of sailing 
vessels and even with the coming of steamships were able to 
exact very favourable terms from shipping companies due to 
the large size of their cargoes as well as the excess of 
supply of tonnage. In September 1877 the deferred rebate 
system was introduced to enforce loyalty to conference lines.^
1. RC on Shipping Rings, Report, vol, i, p. 12
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This conference provided the model for later conferences 
which quickly appeared on various trade routes of the world*
The Par Eastern Conference, outv/ard and homeward, was estab­
lished in 1879 and the Australian and South African Conferences, 
both outward, in 1884 and 1886 respectively. In the beginning 
conferences comprised only British lines but very shortly 
afterwards they became international in composition.^
The homeward conference was harder to organise than the 
outward. Firstly, in addition to the excess of tonnage, the 
homeward cargoes were smaller than the outward so that there 
was more space available than cargo obtainable. Secondly, 
most of the commodities in this trade, such as grain, oils, 
ores, timber, foodstuffs and raw materials were bulky and 
cheap and were very suitable for carriage by tramp steamers, 
since speed was not important.
The Straits Homeward Conference and the Secret* rebate
The early Straits Homeward Conferences were unsuccessful. 
The first was organised in 1885 utilizing the deferred rebate 
system, but it lasted only until 1887. In 1893 a conference 
was organised without a deferred rebate but was abandoned in 
1895* The following year the conference was re-organized 
with the deferred rebate system. Like the earlier conferences 
it did not operate effectively until 1897 when a special
1. Marx, p. 47
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agreement was reached with some of the major exporting firms 
of Singapore.1 2
This agreement was signed "by 23 shipping lines, called
the steamship-owners, and three merchant firms, called the 
2freight agents. The latter were the London head-offices 
of Singapore firms: Adamson, Gilfillan & Co., Arnold Otto 
Meyer & Co., and Edward Boustead & Co. They undertook to 
discontinue both directly, and indirectly, chartering, 
loading or shipping by sailing vessels or non-conference 
steamships to European ports except to Marseilles*. They 
also undertook to ’do their utmost to prevent the competition 
of outside steamers and to maintain freights at a paying 
level*. In return, they received as did all other shippers, 
a deferred rebate which was paid on freights charged on all 
exports from the Straits Settlements, with the exception of 
goods transshipped at these ports and of rice, hemp, tobacco 
and treasure, on which no rebate was payable and which could 
be shipped by non-conference vessels without incurring the 
forfeiture of the deferred rebate. But in addition, these 
freight agents, and any other shippers they chose to admit, 
shared among themselves a special ’secret* rebate, so called 
because a ’remarkable want of knowledge appeared to exist* 
as to its nature on the part of the local representatives 
of the firms that obtained a share.^
1, For the conferences prior to 1897» see RC on Shipping 
Rings. Evidence vol. iv, pp. 178-185, Evidence of 
R.D. Holt, and Hyde p. 88.
2. See Statistical Appendix XV.
3* SSLCP 1902. App. 40, *SS Commission on Straits Homeward 
Conference, Report ...* p. C 292.
The s e c r e t  r e b a te  was a  u n iq u e  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  
Homeward C onference*  T h is  was com posed o f a Common Fund in  
London, i n to  w hich th e  member c o n fe re n c e  l i n e s  each  c o n t r ib u te d  
f i v e  p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  t o t a l  amount o f  f r e i g h t s  s e c u re d  from  
a l l  th e  homeward sh ip m en ts  in  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts ,  when 
th e  a v e ra g e  f r e i g h t  r a t e  in  th e  s ix  m o n th s1 p e r io d  am ounted 
t o ,  o r e x c e e d e d , 2 5 s . p e r  to n .  T h is  a v e ra g e  f r e i g h t  r a t e  
was c a l c u l a t e d  on th e  sum o f  th e  g ro s s  f r e i g h t s  e a rn e d  on a l l  
i te m s  e x c lu d in g  t i n ,  and  th e  e a r n in g s  on t i n  above 1 7 s . 6 d . 
p e r  to n .  T hese  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  w ere c o l l e c t e d  by th e  P&O and  
handed  o v e r  to  Edward B o u s te a d  & C o ., th e  m ost im p o r ta n t  f i r m ,  
to  be d iv id e d .^
A t o t a l  o f  se v e n  f i rm s  s h a re d  t h i s  s e c r e t  r e b a t e ,  in  
p r o p o r t io n s  re a c h e d  by  n e g o t i a t i o n s  among th e m s e lv e s .2 3 They 
w e re , i n  S in g a p o re , th e  l o c a l  b ra n c h e s  o f  th e  t h r e e  f r e i g h t  
a g e n ts  in  London: G i l f i l l a n ,  Wood & C o ., B ehn, M eyer & C o ., 
B o u ste ad  & C o ., and  f o u r  o th e r  f i rm s  s u b s e q u e n tly  a d m it te d
to  th e  ’ in n e r  r in g *  ----- P a te r s o n ,  Simons & C o ., H u tte n b a c h
B r o th e r s ;  B rinkm ann & Co. and  th e  Borneo C o.^ T hese seven
1 . RC on S h ip p in g  R ings A p p e n d ic e s , v o l  i i ,  p .  I l l  App. XXV 
'P r e f e r e n t i a l  A greem ent b e tw een  S h ip p in g  C o n fe re n ce  and 
c e r t a i n  m erch an t f i r m s  in  S t r a i t s  Homeward C onference*  
(h anded  in  by  R.D. H o l t ) .  R e p r in te d  in  SSLCP 1 9 0 8 . App.
4 0 . T h is  ag reem en t was d a te d  31 O c to b e r 1901 , and  was 
s a id  to  be  s i m i l a r  to  th e  1897 ag reem en t w hich was n e v e r  
p ro d u c e d .
2 . RC on S h ip p in g  R in g s . E v id e n c e , v o l .  i v ,  p .  17* E v id en ce  
o f  W.H. S h e l f o r d ,  m anag ing  d i r e c t o r  o f  P a te r s o n ,  Simons
& C o ., one o f  th e  s h a r in g  f i r m s .  No f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  
w ere g iv e n .
3 .  SSLCP 1 9 0 8 . App. 2 7 , 'R e p o r t  on S h ip p in g  F r e ig h t  C o n fe re n ­
c e s  o p e ra t in g  in  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n ts ’ by th e  R e g i s t r a r  
o f  Im p o rts  and E x p o r ts  (A . S t u a r t ) ,  p .  C 99 .
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firms handled 60 per cent of the export trade homewards.1 23'
Five of these firms were shipping agents holding among them
the agencies of a total of 15 of the 23 conference lines in
1902, thus having additional reasons for supporting the 
2conference.
It was the secret rebate which assured the success of 
the 1897 Straits Homeward Conference. It secured to the 
conference the custom and the support of seven of the most 
important shippers. Thus, whereas prior to 1897 the impor­
tant shippers tried, often with success, to beat down freights,
which went as low as 5s. for tin and 6s. 3<*. for copra, sago
■2and tapioca and pepper in October 1896, they now found it 
to their interest to raise the charges and to keep them at 
a high level.
The effectiveness of the new conference was immediately 
demonstrated. Freights were raised twice in 1897 and once 
in 1898. (see Table XXXIV)
1. RC on Shipping Rings. Evidence, vol. iv, p. 180. Evidence 
of R.D. Holt of the Ocean Steam Ship Company, one of 
the original promoters of this conference.
2. From Singapore and Straits Directory 1902.
3. SSLCP 1902. App. 40, *SS Commission on Straits Homeward 
Conference Report ...* p. C 291*
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TABLE XXXIV
Average rate of freights homeward 1892-1898, (average of 
highest and lowest rates in each month) s. d.
Tin Gambier BlackPepper Copra Rattans Measurement
18 9 2 6 /5 24/4 26/- 24/7 23/- 28/41893 5/6 2 3 /1 0 2 3 /1 0 23/5 21/4 2 5 /1 01894 5/1 2 6 /6 2 6 /6 25/5 22/9 28/51895 6 / 9 2 0 /1 1 2 0 /1 0 20/- 19/5 22/8
18 9 6 5 / 4 13/3 13/3 13/1 13/7 1 4 / 6Jan.-Apr. 1897 1 V4 21/7 21/7 21/7 21/7 21/7May -Dec. 1897 15/11 22/2 22/9 23/- 23/9 2 9 /8
1 8 9 8 23/9 33/9 38/9 31/3 33/9 43/9
(Source: SOGAR 1907. App. D. p. 50)
The challenges to the conference
Two factors operated in favour of those who sought to 
challenge the control of the Straits Homeward Conference over 
the homeward freights. Firstly, there was an excess of 
homeward tonnage. In the case of Singapore (and of the 
Straits Settlements generally) there was an indisputable 
surplus of homeward tonnage despite the fact that the East- 
to-West trade was more valuable than the West-to-East; it 
is not improbable that the surplus of tonnage was because 
of it. The general scarcity of homeward freight in the 
ports of China led the homeward vessels to hurry to and 
congregate at Singapore in the hope of loading up there.
The port therefore always hact a surplus of tonnage and as a 
result the rates were usually low. In 1896, for example, 
there was a total of 3,919,000 tons, compared with
3,228,000 tons for 1895, with the result that the rates in 
1896 were very low, precipitating the re-establishment of
208
the conference. Secondly, much of the cargo lifted from 
the Straits Settlements was best handled by chartered tramps 
and sailing vessels. Many of the commodities were bulky 
and cheap and did not require speedy despatch to the con­
signees. Nor was any great care needed in the transportation
of these commodities : prior to the 1897 conference, tin
1was sometimes carried free in place of ballast.
The earliest challenge to the conference came as early
as 1897 from the Kingsin Line, a German company, which
carried cargo to Hamburg in competition with conference
vessels. The Singapore Conference committee, comprising
representatives of the freight agents and several shipping
lines, urged the principals in London to reduce rates and
to provide more tonnage to that port, in order to prevent
2the conference from failing. Attempts to persuade the 
Kingsin to join the conference were not successful and the 
threat was only removed by the expedient whereby the 
Norddeutscher Lloyd, a conference line, bought out the 
Kingsin.-^ A similar challenge arose in 1905-6 from the
1. RC on Shipping Conference. Evidence, vol. iv, p. 179» 
Evidence of R.D. Holt.
2. SSLCP 1902. App. 40, 1 23SS Commission on Straits Homeward 
Conference, Report ...’ pp. C416-7» App. 1. ’Abstract 
of Minutes of Meeting of Straits Homeward Conference 
Committee*•
3. Ibid., p. C312 Evidence of John Anderson, corroborated 
by A. Stuart in his ’Report on Shipping Freight Con­
ferences operating in the Straits Settlements’ (SSLCP 
1908, App. 27, p. C99)* It is also mentioned in The 
Ring and The Book (about 1908) an anti-conference tract 
published by the Singapore Free Press and distributed free. It attacked in particular the seven recipients 
of the secret rebate, and called for government legislation against the conference.
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Liverpool firm of H.J. Harrison, vfoich sent steamers to 
participate in the carrying trade of the East. It was re­
moved in similar fashion hy the merging of this firm with a 
British conference line, the ’Shire*.^
The conference was also challenged hy large shippers 
which were able to charter vessels on their own account.
This danger was probably foreseen because the agreement 
between the conference lines and the three original freight 
agents provided for the sharing of the secret rebate between 
them and any other shippers they chose to admit. Two export 
firms were admitted when they either threatened to charter 
or actually did so. Brinkmann & Co. was ’squared* after 
it indicated that it was not prepared to put up with the 
terms of the conference, and Huttenbach Brothers was admitted 
to the secret rebate after the firm chartered three vessels
pin 1900. Two other important export firms were subsequently 
admitted to a share in the secret rebate - Paterson, Simons 
& Co., and the Borneo Co. - presumably for similar reasons.
Thus the secret rebate was the bond which tied the 
most important shippers to the conference and ensured its 
effective functioning.
1. SSLCP 1908. App. 27 ’Report on Shipping Freight 
Conferences operating in the Straits Settlements*, p. C99*
2. SSLCP 1902. ’SS Commission on Straits Homeward Conference, 
Report ...’, pp. C312-4* Evidence of John Anderson.
3. SSLCP 1908. App. 27 ’Report on Shipping Freight 
Conferences operating in the Straits Settlements’ 
p. C99 and The Ring and The Book’ p. 32.
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The Straits Trading Company, the "biggest dealer in
tin, handling about two-thirds of Malaya’s output was able
to resist the efforts of the conference to raise freight
rates in tin. In May 1900 the rate on tin was raised from
27s. 6d. to 40s. The company threatened to sell tin directly
in London and thereby deprive the merchants of Singapore of
the handling of its export. These merchants were members
of the ’inner ring’ and within a week the rate reverted to
its former level.1 2 In November 1906 the rate was raised
by 5s. and the company again threatened to sell direct, with
2the result that the rate fell to 25s! The Straits Trading 
Company was able to resist the conference because it could 
apply pressure on the shippers’ (freight agents’) side.
The numbers of non-recipient firms in the Straits 
Settlements increased from 15 to 53 from 1897 to 1908 while they
■2continued to account for only 40$ of the homeward trade.
They were too many in number and too divergent in interests 
to be able to combine. In October 1899 the non-recipient 
firms, a total then of 15, met under the chairmanship of 
one G.A. Friedrich, the manager of Brinkmann & Co., to
1. SSLCP 1908. App. 27, ’Report on Shipping Freight Con­
ference operating in the Straits Settlements’, p. C97*
2. Ibid., p. C97, also RC on Shipping Rings. Evidence.
vol. iv, p. 4, Evidence of C. McArthur, Managing director 
of the Straits Trading Company.
3* Ibid., p. 181, Evidence of R.D. Holt. In 1897 there 
were only 20 import-export firms in the Straits 
Settlements, trading homeward; in 1908 there were 
60 such firms. The seven firms sharing the secret rebate accounted for a total of 60$ of the homeward trade.
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discuss action against the conference. John Anderson of 
Guthrie & Co. proposed taking the issue before the government, 
hut Friedrich wanted first to consult with his principals 
in London.^" What they said is not known; in Singapore 
nothing more was done. It was discovered later that Brink­
mann & Co. became participants in the secret rebate. After 
this the firms made no attempt to undermine the conference 
and it was left to the government to take action against its 
restrictive policies.
Government action against the conference
From the outset the Straits Homeward Conference came
under the scrutiny of the Registrar of Imports and Exports
2of the Straits Settlements, Alexander Stuart. It was his 
continued attacks on the conference, supported by John 
Anderson of Guthrie & Co., who was chairman of the Singapore 
Chamber of Commerce in 1901, that led to the setting up of 
a Commission of Enquiry into the effects of the conference 
on the trade of the colony.**
1. SSLCP 1902 . App. 40 *SS Commission on Straits Homeward 
Conference, Report...1 234 p. C314, Evidence of John Ander­son. Friedrich denied that this took place, p. C340,
but there was no denying that his firm became a recipient 
of the secret rebate.
2. See SSAR 1898. p. 243.
3. See SCCAR 1901. p. 10.
4. SSLCP 1902. 28 January, p. B19. Proposing the enquiry, 
the Acting Colonial Secretary stated it was requested 
by the Singapore Chamber of Commerce.
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TheCommission1 23s Report was unsatisfactory. It declared 
that the freight rates were 'not excessive' and were in 
fact 'reasonable', although higher than those charged in 
neighbouring and competing ports; but comparable charges in 
these ports were not produced as information could not 
be obtained. Nevertheless the Commission concluded that 
'the influence of the conference has not been satisfactory 
so far as regards the development of the commerce of the 
colony, and that had not the conference been created, the 
trade of the colony might be greater than it now is* .1 The 
Report was confined to the study of Singapore, and all 
witnesses called and examined were Europeans, since it was 
the East-to-West trade that was directly affected.
No action followed this Report. Stuart continued to 
attack the conference; in 1905, for example, he wrote that 
the 'blighting effects of the shipping conference are no 
longer disputed'. In that year the New York Freights 
Conference was established and immediately raised freights 
to America. Stuart claimed that this move was taken to 
prevent continued comparison between the rate homeward and 
the previously lower rate to America.
1. SSLCP 1902. App. 40, 'SS Commission on Straits Homeward 
Conference, Report...', pp. C294-5, C300.
2. SSAR 1905. p. 272.
3. SSLCP 1908. App. 27, 'Report on Shipping Freight 
Conferences operating in the Straits Settlements' by 
Alexander Stuart, p. Cl01.
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Meanwhile shipping conferences were under attack else­
where.^ The Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire 
in 1906 passed a resolution that conferences had had ’injurious 
effects upon British trade’ and urged legislation against the
system of deferred rebates, which was thought to be the
2cornerstone of the conference system. The British Govern­
ment decided in that year to set up a Royal Commission on 
Shipping Rings. In January 1907 the Colonial Office sent 
out a circular asking for information on shipping rings in 
the colonies.-'
The information from the Straits Settlements came 
from Alexander Stuart who began his reply with the statement 
that the colony’s trade was ’being throttled by a number of 
so-called Conferences’ The Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
which in 1902 had abstained from the controversy after 
requesting the Enquiry now bestirred itself. Comprising 
both members of the ’inner ring’ and merchants outside the 
select seven, the committee of the Chamber had generally 
side-stepped the question until 1907 when a sub-committee, 
comprising a banker and merchants from two preferred firms 
and tv/o outsiders, drafted a reply which criticised the con­
ference. This draft reply was endorsed at a Special General
1. RC on Shipping Rings. Appendices, vol. ii, App. II, ’Short 
History of the Question, prepared by direction of the 
Board of Trade, pp. 12-14* See also Marx, Chapter IV ’Early 
Investigations of Shipping Conferences’ pp. 46-71* Marx 
deals with British and American investigations.
2. Ibid., p. 14*
3. SCCAR 1907. App. D, p. 34 CO Circular was dated 29 Jan.1907.
4* SSLCP 1908, App. 27, ’Report on Shipping Freight Conferences 
°P^^ting in the Straits Settlements’ dated 30 March 1907,
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Meeting of the Chamber by 16 votes to two, with eight 
abstentions."^ In 1908 the Chamber set up a Freights Sub­
committee to report on any changes which might be prejudicial
pto the interests of the port.
The five-volume Report of the Royal Commission on
Shipping Rings at last appeared in 1909* It contained a
Majority and a Minority Report, and both the pros and cons
of shipping conferences were cogently argued without any
useful recommendations being made. The Majority Report
declared itself against making deferred rebates illegal while
the Minority Report recommended the creation of Shippers’
3Associations to counterbalance the conference system.
The Majority Report did condemn the secret rebate of 
the Straits Homeward Conference as an ’undesirable expedient’ 
and recommended legislation against it, ’if the course 
adopted be persisted in’^ . This suggestion was taken up 
in the Straits Settlements. A petition, signed by over 
700 ’merchants, traders and residents of Singapore of all 
races, complaining of the evil effects of the combinations
1. SCCAR 1907. p. 17 and App. D, pp. 34-42.
2. SCCAR 1908. p. 4.
3. RC on Shipping Conferences. Report, vol. i, pp. 82, 115*
4* Ibid., p. 80.
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of shipowners and others known as the Conferences*, was
presented to the Legislative Council in April 1910.1 23 A
resolution calling for legislation against the Straits
2Homeward Conference was adopted.
The Freight and Steamship Ordinance
The Straits Settlements government introduced the 
Freight and Steamship Bill in June 1910. Its lengthy preamble 
declared that the operations of shipping conferences were 
’injurious to the trade of the colony and inconsistent with 
the public welfare*. The aim of the bill was *to protect 
shippers of goods from excessive charges and undue restric­
tions*. A duty of 20 per cent was levied on every bill of 
lading over $100, which was to be paid by the steamship 
agent and which was not to be transferred to the shipper. 
Non-conference steamers were exempted, and shippers could 
demand a rebate of ten per cent of freights paid in any 
six-months* period. Conference vessels were defined as 
common carriers, so that they could not legally refuse to 
accept cargo for shipment. Conference vessels breaking the 
law were liable to a maximum fine of $2,500.3 The Free Press 
succinctly summarised the effect the bill in the following 
words:
1. SSLCP 1910. App. 24, p. Cll6.
2. SSLCP 1910. 11 April, pp. B 32-47.
3. Straits Settlements Government Gazette. 26 August 1910, 
p. 16>71. See also SSLCP 1910. 19 August, 9 September,
30 September, 7 October, 14 October for debate on Bill.
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Hand over 20 per cent of all freights until you 
prove you do not "belong to a squeeze organization.1 23
The "bill was opposed "by only one unofficial member of the
Council --  C.W. Darbishire (of Paterson, Simons & Co., a
recipient of the secret rebate). He described the bill as
a ’monstrous, unbusiness-like, un-British and a freak
legislation’, and warned of the possibility of the conference
lines shifting to Macassar or other Dutch ports, to the
2detriment of Singapore.
The Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir John
Anderson*, derided Darbishire’s threat as ’a bogeyman to
frighten small boys’ and went on to say
.... from the point of vie?/ of the government, 
the Bill is not a revenue bill, it is not a 
taxation bill, it is an instrument of war, 
and it is because we believe that the war is 
a justifiable one, one which is absolutely 
necessary in the interests of this Colony, 
that we put this measure forward as what we 
consider the best means of putting a short 
and speedy end to that war.3
1. SFP 23 June 1910.
2. SSLCP 1910. 2 September, p. B94. Writing in 1919, on 
’Commerce and Currency’ in 100 Years of Singapore, 
vol. ii, p. 42, Darbishire reiterated this, that as 
the time drew near for the Ordinance to operate, there 
was a possibility of conference tonnage being with­
drawn, with none to replace it.
* To be distinguished from the merchant John Anderson of 
Guthrie & Co., who was also a doughty opponent of the 
conference. The merchant John Anderson was knighted 
in 1912. See also ante, P*8?.
3. SSLCP 1910. 2 September p. B99.
The Bill passed with one dissentient voice. It did not, 
however, come into operation."^
At a meeting in May 1911 at the Colonial Office "between 
Sir John Anderson, who was on leave to Britain, and the 
representatives of the Straits Homeward Conference, the 
Java Homeward Conference and the New York Steamer Conference 
three points of agreement were reached. Firstly, the con­
ference representatives undertook to abolish the secret 
rebate, although they were allowed to compensate the seven 
merchants affected by the payment of a single lump sum. 
Secondly, the over-lapping six-monthly deferred rebate was 
replaced by one based on triennial periods, beginning from 
1 January 1912, at the end of which all rebates were to be 
fully paid back to shippers who were then free to leave or 
to continue shipping by conference vessels. All rebates 
due up to 31 December 1911 were to be fully repaid. Thirdly 
’in return, Sir John Anderson agreed that the Straits 
Settlements Freight and Steamship Ordinance should be 
repealed.*2
1. SSLCP 1910. 17 December, p. B159. The Ordinance was 
suspended. Allen and Donnithorne in Western Enterprise 
in Indonesia and Malaya, pp. 222-3 referred to the resolution of April 1910 calling for legislation 
against the shipping conference but went on to say that 
’no effective action was taken’. In so far as that 
the Ordinance was suspended this is correct.
2. SSLCP 1911. App. 26. ’Minutes of a meeting held at the 
Colonial Office on the 25th May 1911> between Sir John 
Anderson, G.C.M.G., Governor of the Straits Settlements, 
and Representatives of the Homeward Java and Straits 
Conference and the New York Steamer Conference*,
pp. 74 - 5.
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The result was the ’complete cessation of all agitation*, 
until 1933» when the conference again came under public 
scrutiny.1 23
Effects of the Straits Homeward Conference on Shipping
The Straits Homeward Conference, with its deferred and 
secret rebates, operated from 1897 to 1910. In the course 
of these 14 years its activities were alleged to have led 
to the marked increase of foreign as opposed to British
2shipping tonnage, and to a loss of sailing and tramp tonnage.
Prom the point of view of the port as a whole, the 
nationality of shipping did not matter; all that mattered 
was that there was an adequate supply of tonnage for the 
requirements of trade. The growth of foreign tonnage cannot 
be attributed to the conference. The number of British 
shipping lines in the Straits Homeward Conference had 
actually increased from six to seven between 1901 and 1933» 
while that of foreign lines decreased from 17 to 1 6 .^ The
1. SS Trade Commission, Report 1933~4, vol. i, p. 75*
2. These charges, and those regarding the trade of the colony 
(see pp.228-§)were made in the ’Report of the Commission
on the Eastern Shipping or Straits Homeward Conference 
as affecting the Trade of the Colony’, SSLCP 1902. App.40; 
the ’Report on Shipping Freight Conferences operating 
in the Straits Settlements* by the Registrar of Imports 
and Exports, SSLCP 1908. App. 27; ’Answers by the Sub­
committee appointed by a General Meeting of the Singapore 
Chamber of Commerce held on 5th April 1907 to questions 
enclosed with Circular of 29th January 1907, from the 
Colonial Office on the matter of Conferences on Shipping 
Rings’, SCCAR 1907. App.D; the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Shipping Rings’. 1909» as well as the 
debates in the Legislative Council in 1910, SSLCP 1910. 
These were also commented on in the SS Trade Commission. 
Report 1933-4. vol. i, p. 75*
3. SS Trade Commission. Report. 1953-4. vol. i, p. 80.
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tonnage of British merchant ships entering Singapore had,
however, declined from 67 per cent of total merchant in
1895 to 52 per cent in 1910, while that of European shipping
had increased from 31 per cent to 39 per cent. The sharpest
increase was that of Japanese tonnage, from less than one
per cent to over seven per cent. Between 1910 and 1915 it
rose to almost 17 per cent while the share of British and
/
European tonnage declined, (see Tables XX3S3T and XXXVI).
The increase in foreign tonnage was the result of factors 
that were in operation before the Straits Homeward Conference 
of 1897 was created. The growth of nationalism in Europe 
from the 1880s spurred the development of national shipping 
which was supported by the system of government subsidies 
to private companies, a practice also adopted by Japan.1 
In comparißön with the growth of tonnage of Britain, the 
leading maritime nation, the growth of foreign tonnage, which 
began with a smaller base, appeared very rapid, but in 1910 
British tonnage calling at Singapore still exceeded the 
combined tonnage of the Germans, Dutch and French by 50^, 
and exceeded the German and Dutch tonnage by about four times 
each and French tonnage by almost ten times, (see Table 
XXVTI).
The second charge was that the conference had driven 
away sailing vessels and tramp steamers. This was one of
1, See ante, p.118, footnote 2
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the objects of the agreement signed between the conference
lines and the freight agents, and in this success was achieved.
It was pointed out during the Straits Settlements Commission
of Enquiry in 1902 that homeward sailing vessels which had
berthed at Singapore in 1892-1897 had ceased to call after
the creation of the conference."^" The absence of sailing
vessels in Singapore was confirmed by the president of the
Sailing Ship Owners International Union (established in
1904) before theRoyal Commission in 1908; he declared ’there
are no sailing ships there ^f"in the Straits Settlements^
2at all’. The exclusion of tramp steamers was also successful 
by 1902. Only Huttenbach Brothers chartered ships on own 
account in 1900, before being admitted as a member of the 
inner ring. The two shipping companies that tried to compete 
against the conference were bought out. Thus the conference 
had a complete control of the homeward tonnage, successfully 
excluding sailing ships and tramps.
These losses to the port were not serious. Sailing 
ships were on the way out and the conference only shortened 
the death throes. Merchants were not concerned about the 
loss of tramp tonnage in itself --- what they wanted was
1. SSLCP 1902. ’SS Commission on Straits Homeward Conference, 
Report ...’, p. C392, Evidence of John Anderson, corro­
borated by statement by the Secretary of the Singapore 
Chamber of Commerce. According to the agreement of 1901, 
only Marseilles of the ports in Europe was exempted
from the operations of the conference.
2. RC on Shipping Rings. Evidence, vol. iv, pp. 198-9* 
Evidence of John Archibald Roxburgh.
1tramp rates for liner service.
The shipping tonnage calling at Singapore was adequate 
for the requirements of its trade, in fact an excess was 
more common both before and after the conference was estab­
lished. Prior to 1897 ships were compelled to reduce rates 
whenever an excess of tonnage gathered at the port, but
after 1897 conference vessels sailed empty rather than 
2reduce rates.
TABLE XXXVIII
Merchant shipping entering Singapore, 1892-1910 (000 tons)
Number
of
Shins
Tons Year
Number
of
Shins
Tons
1892 4,143 3,280 1902 4,987 5,651
1893 4,435 3,519 1903 5,216 6,ou
1894 4,380 3,648 1904 5,410 6,176
1895 4,303 3,547 1905 5,242 6,3621896 4,551 3,993 1906 5,290 6,673
1897 4,86l 4,117 1907 5,168 6,7961898 4,860 4,145 1908 5,187 6,985
1899 4,745 4,416 1909 5,304 7,0451900
1901
4,652
4,934
4,836
5,456
1910 5,332 7,407
(Source: SSAR)
1. SS Trade Commission. Report. 1955~U.vol.iv. p. 13,
App.3 ’British Malaya and the Shipping Conferences’, 
by Conference representatives.
2. SSLCP 1902. *SS Commission on Straits Homeward Conference 
Report ... p. C319* Evidence of A.P. Adams, partner in 
W. Mansfield & Co., agent of the Ocean Steam Ship 
Company.
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In fact, as Table XXXVIII shows, merchant shipping calling 
at Singapore increased more rapidly after 1897* In 1894 and 1895 
the tonnage was lower than that in 1892, hut from 1897 it 
increased every single year up to 1910. In the five years 
1892-6, the tonnage increased hy only 0.7m tons whereas in 
the five years 1897-1901, the increase was 1.3m tons; the 
increase was thus approximately twice as great as in the 
previous period. It is difficult to attribute the increase 
directly to the operations of the conference because of two 
factors. Firstly, after 1897 there was a sudden expansion 
of European commercial interests in the East and the tonnage 
calling at Asian ports increased in consequence. The increase 
at Singapore is evident from Table XXXVIII. Secondly, the 
statistics of shipping tonnage given in Table XXXVIII, 
include all vessels, steam and sailing, over 50 tons. To 
examine the effects of the conference it would have been 
necessary to isolate only steam tonnage clearing for Britain 
and Europe, in which case the first factor would still 
operate. However, betv/een 1902 and 1915> for which years 
figures are available, the annual number of sailings from 
Singapore and Penang by the Straits Homeward Conference was 
generally on the increase and picked up rapidly from 1906 
(see Table XXXIX).
The Straits Homeward Conference brought some benefits 
to Singapore. One of these was stability of freight rates.
Prior to 1897 rates fluctuated as much as 100 per cent
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TABLE XXXIX
S t r a i t s  Homeward C o n fe re n c e , A nnual NunTber o f  
S a i l i n g s  from  S in g a p o re  and Penang* 
Y ear S in g a p o re Penang Y ear S in g ap o re Penang
1902 271 157 1909 350 182
1903 271 147 1910 366 197
1 9 0 4 261 155 1911 347 195
1905 263 135 1912 356 207
1906 332 182 1913 362 193
1907 3X8 167 1914 281 157
1908 342 196 1915 212 107
b e tw ee n  s e a s o n s ;  a f t e r  t h e  c o n fe re n c e  th e y  w ere q u i te  
s t a b l e ,  a s  can  be s e e n  i n  T a b le  XL. The a d v a n ta g e  was th e  
rem oval o f  one s p e c u la t i v e  e le m e n t in  a h ig h ly  c o m p e ti t iv e  
t r a d e ,  and  fo rw a rd  c o n t r a c t s  c o u ld  in  co n seq u en ce  be  made 
v /ith  some d e g re e  o f  c o n f id e n c e .
S ta b le  f r e i g h t  r a t e s  a r e  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  f l u c t u a t i n g  
o n e s , b u t  i f  th e y  a re  to o  h ig h  th e n  th e  a d v a n ta g e  m ight w e ll  
be o u tw e ig h e d  by th e  d is a d v a n ta g e s .  The r a t e s  w ere u n d o u b t­
e d ly  h ig h e r  th a n  th e y  w ere in  th e  f i v e  y e a r s  b e fo r e  th e  
c o n fe re n c e  ( s e e  T a b le  XXXIV), b u t  i t  i s  un p ro v en  t h a t  th e y  
w ere n o t  co m parab le  w ith  th o s e  c h a rg e d  in  n e ig h b o u r in g  and 
co m p e tin g  p o r t s .  The 1902 S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  Com m ission 
o f  E n q u iry  th o u g h t th e  c o lo n y ’ s f r e i g h t s  w ere to o  h ig h ,  b u t  
c o u ld  p ro d u ce  no s t a t i s t i c s  to  p ro v e  t h i s  c h a rg e . I f  t h i s  
w ere t r u e ,  th e y  w ere so f o r  o n ly  a s h o r t  p e r io d .  T h ere  w ere 
c o n fe r e n c e s  o p e r a t in g  i n  o th e r  p o r t s  w hich had  th e  same
1 . RC on S h ip p in g  R in g s . R e p o r t , v o l .  i ,  p .  14*
* (S o u rc e : SS T rad e  C om m ission, R e p o rt 1 9 5 5 -4 » v o l . i ,
p .5 0 7 .)
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TABLE XL
F r e i g h t  R a te s  in  S in g a p o re  a f t e r  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  th e  
c o n fe r e n c e ,  1897-1906 ( s . d . )
T in Gam bier B lack Copra R a t ta n s M easure-P e p p e r m ent
J a n .  -  A pr. 1897 W h 2 1 /7 2 1 /7 2 1 /7 2 1 /7 2 1 /7
May -  Dec. 1897 1 5 /1 1 2 2 /2 2 2 /9 23/ - 2 3 /9 2 9 /8
1897 2 3 /9 3 8 /9 3 8 /9 3 1 /3 3 3 /9 4 3 /9
1899 2 7 /6 3 8 /6 4 3 /6 3 5 /6 3 8 /6 4 8 /6
1900 2 7 /6 3 1 /3 4 2 /5 3 0 /1 0 3 3 / - 4 9 /2
1901 2 7 /6 3 2 /6 4 0 / - 2 7 /6 3 2 /6 5 0 / -
1902 27 /6 3 2 /6 4 0 / - 2 7 /6 3 0 / - 5 0 / -
1903 2 7 /6 3 2 /6 4 0 / - 2 7 /6 3 0 / - 5 0 / -
1904 2 7 /6 3 2 /6 4 0 / - 2 7 /6 3 0 / - 5 0 / -
1905 2 7 /6 3 2 /6 4 0 / - 2 7 /6 3 0 / - 5 0 / -
1906 2 8 /1 3 2 /6 4 0 / - 2 7 /6 3 0 / - 5 0 / -
(S o u rc e ; SOGAR 1 9 0 7 . App.D , su b -a p p , D I I ,  p .  5 0 ) .
o b j e c t s  o f  r e g u l a t i n g  c o m p e t i t io n  and m ax im is in g  p r o f i t s .
T h e re  w ere c o n fe re n c e s  in  Hongkong and Ja p a n  ( t h e  F a r  E a s te r n
C o n fe re n c e  s t a r t e d  i n  1879)» in  Ja v a  ( th e  B a ta v ia n  V ra c h te n
, th e
C o n fe re n ce  o f  1900) and M a c a ssa r“1 2 a n d /P h i l ip p in e  C o n feren ce  
b eg an  in  1904 . Most o f  th e s e  c o n fe re n c e s  co m p rised  
s i m i l a r  m e m b e r- lin e s . The F a r  E a s te r n  C o n fe re n ce  was o rg a n ­
i z e d  by  th e  H o lts  o f  th e  O cean Steam Ship  Company and John  
S w ire . The H o lts  w ere a l s o  m em bers, in d e e d  p ro m o te r s ,  o f
p
th e  S t r a i t s  Homeward, th e  J a v a ,  and th e  P h i l i p p in e  C o n fe re n c e s . 
In  1911 S i r  John  A nderson  h ad  m et w ith  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  th e  
S t r a i t s  Homeward, th e  Ja v a  Homeward and th e  New York (A m erica 
hom eward) C o n fe re n c e s  in  a l l  o f  w hich  th e  H o l ts  w ere l e a d in g
1 . SSLCP 1 9 0 2 . *SS Com m ission on S t r a i t s  Homeward C o n fe re n c e . 
R e p o rt . . . ’ p .  C300.
2 . RC S h ip p in g  R in g s . E v id e n c e , v o l .  i v ,  p p . 165-185* 
E v id en ce  o r  k .u .  H o lt  o f  th e  Ocean Steam Ship  Company.
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members, and the agreement which resulted from this meeting 
was binding on all three conferences. When it is further 
recalled that the Holts made very determined efforts to 
channel trade from the neighbouring countries to Singapore 
for their main-line steamers to carry back to Britain,1 23it 
is difficult to imagine that the rates charged by the Straits 
Homeward Conference were injuriously high or tended to dis­
courage shipments from Singapore. Furthermore, the seven 
merchant firms who co-operated with the conference were 
exporters of Southeast Asian produce and it is unlikely 
that they would have permitted the decline of Singapore’s 
entrepot trade as a result of high freights. It is very 
doubtful that the high quality of service could have been 
provided at rates ruling before 1897. Further, the conditions
of trade altered considerably after 1897 because of the
2rapid rise in the prices of Straits exports. But the rate 
of freight hardly altered after 1898.
The quality of Singapore shipping services undoubtedly 
improved after 1897* There were frequent sailings with 
fixed and regular departures and arrivals, and merchants
7were assured of all their cargoes being lifted. There was 
no necessity to book space ahead, with the risk of possible
1. See ante, p.l5fj.
2. See ante, p.127.
3. Hyde, (introduction), p. xvi.
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penalties for cancelling 'bookings.'1 23’ Vessels of better
quality and greater speed were constantly being added to the
service, to the benefit of shippers, in the lower rates of
marine insurance and the greater case in securing banking 
2services.
The market outlet of exporters also increased because 
the conference provided regular services to virtually all 
important ports in Britain and Europe.^ The claim of the 
conference that it introduced uniformity of rates to all 
shippers, big and small, was rejected by the Straits 
Settlements Commission of Enquiry as well as by the Royal 
Commission because of the existence of the secret rebate. 
Vi/hen it was abolished this was a correct claim.
Effects of the conference on trade
The Straits Homeward Conference was held responsible 
for a decline in the exports of the colony because its 
freights were higher than those charged by competing ports, 
thus giving rise to direct trade between these ports and 
Britain and Europe. It was also accused of having brought 
about the increase of direct shipments to Europe at the 
expense of Britain’s re-export trade because of higher 
freights to Britain, and of having directed exports to
1. RC on Shipping Rings. Report, vol. i, p. 36*
2. SCCAR 1907. ’Answers by the Sub-Committee ...’ p. 42.
3. Ibid., p. 42
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America instead of homewards "because of cheaper freights 
to that continent
The decline of exports homeward is difficult to sub­
stantiate. According to A. Stuart, the Registrar of Imports 
and Exports the loss of cargo that had been re-exported from 
Singapore in the past was 40,000 to 50,000 tons per annum, 
while the loss of potential cargo, which he argued would
have been attracted to the port but for the conference, was
2another 40,000 to 50,000 tons. The estimate of the Singapore 
Chamber of Commerce sub-committee was a total loss of actual 
trade of 4,007,000 piculs between 1897 and 1906^ or 240,000 
tons for ten years, vhich is about half the first estimate.
The possible loss or possible gain depended on the number 
of commodities taken into consideration. Table XLI below 
gives the quantity of Singapore’s exports of 16 commodities 
at five-yearly intervals between 1890 and 1910. A steady 
increase not a decline, is evident. The growth in quantity 
of exports was slower after 1895 but the increase in 1910 
over 1905 exceeded that of 1895 over 1890. It does not 
appear that there was any loss of actual trade. The available
1. See footnote on p. 218.
2. SSLCP 1908. App. 27, ’Report on Shipping Freight 
Conferences in the Straits Settlements’, p. C100.
3* SCCAR 1907. App. D, ’Answers by sub-committee ... on ... 
Shipping Rings ...’ sub-app. Dill, p. 49*
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TABLE XLI
S in g a p o re ’ s e x p o r t s  o f  E a s t-W e s t c o m m o d itie s , 1890 -1910 ,
(OOO p i c u l s )
T in  B e e s -  Copra G am bier Raw- R a t-  Gums*» 
wax h id e s  t a n s
G u tta
p e rc h a
G u tta
i n f e r i o r
1890 324  4 282 769 37 354 73 76
1895 553 5 553 858 48 442 141 44 -
1900 460 4 544 785 66 612 152 97 95
I 9O5 482 4 775 617 54 421 201 35 207
1910 448 4 1 ,3 2 0  484 51 432 232 60 425
B orneo C o ffee  S ugar Sago T a p io c a  P ep p er TOTAL TOTAL
ru b b e r (000 
p i c u l s )
in  to n s
1890 15 47 222 516 404 343 3 ,4 6 6 204 ,490
1895 12 80 214 742 475 307 4 ,4 7 4 263 ,966
1900 9 115 326 655 430 185 4 ,5 3 5 267 ,565
1905 35 57 516 712 437 284 4 ,8 3 7 285 ,3 8 3
1910 25 30 481 998 386 365 5 ,7 4 1 338 ,7 1 9
s t a t i s t i c s  o f  ca rg o  c a r r i e d  i n  c o n fe re n c e  v e s s e l s  i n  th e  
p e r io d  1902-1915 s u p p o r t  t h i s  v iew  ( s e e  T a b le  X L I l) .  The 
d e c l in e  in  f a c t  seem s to  h ave  s e t  i n  a f t e r  1910 , a f t e r  com­
p l a i n t s  h ad  c e a se d !
As to  th e  l o s s  o f  p o t e n t i a l  t r a d e  ----- t h a t  t r a d e  w hich
m igh t have  come to  S in g a p o re  to  be  r e - e x p o r te d  ----- th e  R oyal
Com m ission’ s v iew  was t h a t  th e  ten d e n cy  f o r  t r a d e  to  go 
d i r e c t  b eg an  in  1870 and ’ e x i s t e d  q u i te  in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  th e  
c o n fe re n c e  sy s tem : £  i t  wasJ  a te n d e n c y  due to  th e  g row th  
o f f o r e ig n  s te a m sh ip  l i n e s  t r a d i n g  to  th e  P a r  E a s t ,  and  to
*8« in c lu d in g  gum b e n ja m in , cam phor, c o p a l ,  dammar and  s t i c k l a c
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TABLE XLII
Tonnage o f  c a rg o  c a r r i e d  in  v e s s e l s  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  
Homeward C o n fe re n c e , 1 9 0 2 -1 9 1 5 , e x c lu s iv e  o f  c a rg o  
from  P o r t  Sw ettenham , and t r a n s s h ip m e n t  from  any  so u rc e
S in g a - Penang T o ta l S in g a - Penang T o ta l
p o re to n s p o re to n s
1902 2 0 5 ,8 1 4 6 4 ,0 7 3 26 9 ,8 8 7 1909 269 ,5 1 9 7 6 ,7 8 9 3 4 6 ,3 0 8
1903 209 ,1 8 1 7 2 ,9 8 8 2 8 2 ,1 6 9 1910 297 ,362 8 3 ,8 6 0 381 ,2 2 2
1904 212 ,6 3 9 7 6 ,9 0 4 2 8 9 ,5 4 1 1911 24 8 ,7 6 0 8 8 ,9 3 1 337 ,6 9 1
1905 209 ,092 6 9 ,7 3 8 2 7 8 ,8 3 0 1912 249 ,112 8 7 ,5 1 8 3 3 6 ,6 3 0
1906 198 ,8 2 6 6 8 ,9 4 4 2 6 7 ,7 7 0 1913 2 5 3 ,5 0 3 91 ,4 7 6 3 4 4 ,9 7 9
1907 225 ,843 7 6 ,3 6 9 3 0 2 ,2 1 2 1914 2 6 3 ,3 4 8 9 5 ,8 3 0 3 5 9 ,1 7 8
1908 259 ,1 6 7 8 3 ,4 3 9 3 4 2 ,6 0 6 1915 26 2 ,3 8 1 8 4 ,9 4 9 3 4 7 ,3 3 0
(S o u rc e s  SS T rad e  C om m ission. R e p o rt 1955-U . v o l .  i ,  p*505)
an e f f o r t  on th e  p a r t  o f  f o r e ig n  g o v e rn m e n ts , e s p e c i a l l y  th e  
D u tch , t o  d ev e lo p  th e  t r a d e  o f  th e  c o lo n ie s  by d i r e c t  N a t io n a l  
l i n e s  s u b s id iz e d  f o r  th e  p u rp o s e 1 23
The developm en t o f  d i r e c t  s h ip p in g  s e r v i c e s  b e tw een  
E urope and th e  E a s t  was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  th e  in c r e a s e d  e x p o r ts  
to  E u ro p e , r e l a t i v e  to  th o s e  to  B r i t a i n ,  so  t h a t  th e  l a t t e r
p
d id  lo s e  p a r t  o f  i t s  r e - e x p o r t  t r a d e .  The r a p i d  in c r e a s e  
in  e x p o r t s  to  A m erica was p o s s ib l y  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  t a r i f f  
p o l i c i e s  a d o p te d  in  t h a t  c o u n try  be tv /een  1892 and 1912 w hich 
aim ed a t  c u r t a i l i n g  im p o r ts  o f  m a n u fa c tu re d  goods and e n - 
c o u ra g in g  th o s e  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s .
1* RC on S h ip p in g  R in g s . R e p o r t , v o l .  i ,  p .  67
2 . See a n t e , p p .168 - 7 0 .
3 .  See a n t e ,  p p .1 7 0 -1 .
232
The influence of the Straits Homeward Conference on 
the volume of exports and on its direction was therefore 
negligible. Why then was there so much *  heart-burning and 
turmoil* for so many years?
*The secret commission is really the crux of the whole 
difficulty*, the Attorney-General of the Straits Settlements 
shrewdly analysed during the debate in the Legislative 
Council of April 1910^. The effect of the secret rebate was 
to give the seven fortunate participating firms a preference 
of eight and one-third per cent over the remaining 53 rival 
exporting firms. This was equivalent to a preference of
p2s.6d. in a freight rate of 30s, which was a considerable
advantage in a trade becoming increasingly competitive,
as can be seen in the proliferation of firms from 20 in
1897 to 60 in 1908. It was argued that this was equivalent
to the advantage that the larger shippers had enjoyed in
chartering prior to 1897 but it was an advantage which was
bitterly resented by the other merchants after 1897-
Nobody who lived in Singapore and mixed with its 
leaders from 1905 to 1910 would have failed to 
be deeply imbued with an anti-conference mentality.3
1. SSLCP 1910. 11 April, p. B43-
2. RC on Shipping Rings. Evidence, vol. iv, p. 180.
Evidence of R.D. Holt.
3. SS Trade Commission. Report. 1933-4. vol. iv, App.7>
1 Preliminary Memorandum on Shipping Conferences* by 
Roland Braddell, pp. 80-1.Francis E. Hyde in his book *Blue Funnel. A History of 
Alfred Holt and Company of Liverpool, from 1865 to 1914*, 
using the records of the company wrote erroneously that
*the merchants at Singapore unanimously supported the 
shipowners in their desire for a conference system ...*
P. 133.
233
Realizing this, Sir John Anderson made the abolition of the 
secret rebate a prerequisite to the settlement of 1911«
As the canny Attorney-General predicted in 1910, the 
agitation died down,^ The 1911 settlement resulted in the 
secret rebate remaining with the shipping companies so that 
there were no preferred firms. It is doubtful if the new 
triennal arrangement gave shippers any greater freedom, yet 
there were no complaints.
In the final analysis, it is possible that the over­
all effects of the conference on Singapore1s trade were 
favourable. The development of facilities in New Harbour 
by the dock companies catered for the rapid technological 
changes in the shipping industry, while the conference 
system brought a high quality service to the port and thus 
increased its attractiveness.
1. SSLCP 1910. 11 April, p. B43
THE EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION
The Straits Settlements experienced three major prob­
lems in connexion with its currency in the period 1870-1915. 
Firstly, there was a regular scarcity of dollars from 1870 
until 1895, when the British government provided the 
facilities at its Indian Mints for the striking of British 
trade dollars for circulation in the Straits Settlements, 
Malaya, Hongkong and the Far East generally. Until 1903 
the colony had no currency of its ov/n and depended for its 
supply of money on the silver dollars of Mexico and other 
South American states, and on the Hongkong, American, 
Japanese and British (1895) trade dollars; only in 1903 
was a Straits Dollar struck specifically for the colony. 
Secondly, there was considerable anxiety in the colony 
regarding the security of the bank note circulation. Bank 
notes were issued by the commercial banks to serve the 
needs of internal trade; they were not legal tender and 
were redeemable in silver. Confidence in the security of 
these private notes was shaken when one of the banks failed 
to redeem its notes in May 1884* This problem was over­
come in 1899 when the colonial government established a 
government note issue which was completely secured legal 
tender. Private bank notes were allowed to continue in 
circulation.1 The third problem, and the most important
1. These two and other currency problems are examined in 
Historical Appendix C.
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for purposes of foreign trade was the instability of value 
of the colony’s silver dollars.
Between 1873 and 1906 the colony’s currency fluctuated 
and depreciated in terms of gold. These changes excited 
little interest until 1893 when the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce called attention to the effects of currency on 
trade, and called upon the government to look into the 
matter of ’securing greater fixity of exchange*.1 23 Ten years 
later, on the recommendation of the Straits Settlements’ 
Currency Committee (the Barbour Report), the colony took 
the first move towards fixity of exchange by introducing 
the Straits dollar. In January 1906 the new dollar was 
fixed at 2s. 4cL
For ten years the merchants, bankers, government 
officials and other interested persons in the colony had 
argued as to the effects of the depreciating currency on 
its trade.^ Those who favoured fixity --  the ’gold*
1. SCCAR 1892. AGM January 1893» PP» 6-14, Resolution passed calling for government attention. Also SSLCP 
1895. App.28, A./Col.Sec. to SCC, 24 July 1893, p. C256. Government accepted the Chamber’s proposal to set up
a Committee to look into the matter.
2. Straits Settlements Currency Committee Report. May 1903, 
Cd. 1556, 14 PP~.
3. There was less debate on the effects on the fluctuations 
which were often violent. They caused inconvenience to 
trade although it was possible, by forward sales and 
hedging, to reduce their effects. The exchange banks speculated in currency fluctuations, frequently reaping 
rich profits.
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advocates --  argued that the declining rate of exchange
had had adverse effects, while the * silver* advocates claimed 
that the depreciating dollar was the basis of the colony’s 
prosperity and opposed any measure for fixity.
The depreciation of the colony’s silver currency 
resulted from causes originating in Europe which destroyed 
the gold-silver balance that had obtained for over two 
centuries.^- The supply of gold in the world increased rapidly 
between 1850 and 1870 as the result of discoveries in 
America and Australia. But instead of there being a fall 
in the value of gold as might be expected, there was a rise. 
This was due to the suddenly increased demand for gold for 
monetary purposes which outstripped the supply. The imme­
diate cause was the payment in 1871 of indemnity of £200m 
by Prance to Germany, following the Pranco-Prussian war.
In that year Germany took the first step towards the estab­
lishment of a gold standard which it completed in 1873 by 
buying gold and selling silver in the European market.1 2
1. Final Report of the Royal Commission appointed to enquire 
into the recent changes in the relative values of the 
precious metals. 1888, Reprinted, with Introduction by 
Ralph Robey, by Columbia University Press, 1936, p. 2. 
From the mid-seventeenth century until 1873» gold had 
not varied more than 3 per cent on either side of a 
ratio of 15^ of silver to 1 of gold.
2. See J.T. Walton-Newbold, ’’The Beginnings of the World 
Crisis, 1873-96”, in Economic History (A Supplement 
to the Economic Journal), vol. II, January 1932,
pp.425-41» and R.G. Hawtrey, The Gold Standard in Theory 
and Practice. London 1947» pp. 72-6.
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This led to a sudden scarcity of gold and the value of gold
1in terms of silver rose.
The change in the ratio between gold and silver brought
an end to effective bimetallism in Europe. It had depended
on the free convertibility of silver and gold at a fixed
ratio; following the action of Germany silver flooded the
countries of Europe and the mints v/ere threatened with a
complete loss of the more valuable gold in exchange for
the less valuable silver. Between 1873 and 1878 the mints
were closed to the free coinage of silver and Europe began
2to move towards the gold standard.
The increased demand for gold in the 1870s and 1880s for 
monetary purposes was not matched by a corresponding increase 
in the supply. The output of 1850-1870 had equalled the 
total output of the previous three and a half centuries,-^
1. Hawtrey, p. 74«
2. Britain had been on the gold standard since 1816 and 
Portugal since 1854« In 1873 Denmark and Sweden 
switched to a gold currency and were äiortly afterwards 
joined by Norway. Between 1873 and 1878, the mintsof the Latin Union - Prance, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland 
and Greece - were closed to silver. The other mints 
followed suit, Holland 1873» Russia 1876, Spain I878, 
and Austria-Hungary 1879* During the transitional 
period between bimetallism and a full gold standard, 
these countries used a ’limping standard’, so described 
because ’silver limps behind gold, without enjoying 
the privilege of free coinage accorded to the standard 
metal, but nevertheless finding a large use as money, 
and kept at par with the standard’. See Stability of 
International Exchange. 1903, p. 466.
3. D.H. Leavens, Silver Money. Cowles Commission for 
Research in Economics, Monograph No.4, Indiana 1939,
p. 7.
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and the increased supply of gold made a gold standard in 
Europe ’a practical possibility1 2*45."*■ The desire for gold 
monometallism was in fact expressed at the International 
Monetary Conference of 1867 held in Paris. Of the 20 
nations represented 19 favoured the gold standard claiming 
it to be the only practical basis for international unifor­
mity. At this time only Britain (since I8l6) and Portugal 
(since 1854) employed the gold standard. When the potential
demand for gold became actual from 1873 the supply of gold
2was insufficient. The gold production of 1873-1898 was 
less than that of 1850-1873; supply could not keep pace 
with the mounting demand and equilibrium necessitated a 
fall in prices.*^
Prices in Europe began to rise in 1897 and at the same
time the production of gold began to increase rapidly.^
Prices rose by about 40 per cent between 1896 and 1914»
by which year the transition to a gold standard was almost 
5completed.
Effects of the depreciating currency on Straits Settlements 
trade
The gold price of the silver dollars circulating in
1. Ibid., p. 30.
2. Layton and Crowther, An Introduction to the Study of 
Prices, p. 27.
3* Hawtrey, p. 84> see also Layton and Crowther, pp. 83-8.
4. Layton and Crowther, p. 104*
5. Hawtrey, p. 85.
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the Straits Settlements, about 4s. 6d. in 1870, began to 
fall in 1873 and, except for a few years, continued to fall 
until 1902. Then it rose in value from 1903 to 1906, at 
which date it was pegged at 2s. 4^. The net result was 
that the sterling value of the silver dollar was approxi­
mately halved between 1873 and 1906.
The most important effect of the depreciation of Straits 
Settlements currency was that its economy was insulated 
against the Great Depression of I873-96.1 The depreciation 
of the silver dollar resulted in higher dollar values for 
Straits Settlements imports and exports to Britain, Europe 
and America. If these imports and exports were converted 
into pounds sterling at the current rate of exchange and 
reconverted into dollars at the original par value of 4s.
6d. which obtained prior to the fall of silver, the value 
of the trade can be seen, as it would have been if there 
had been no fall in the rate of exchange. (See Graph Nine, 
and Table XLIII.)
The decline of the dollar should have meant that the 
colony’s imports from gold countries had become relatively 
dearer in terms of dollars with the result that such imports 
were discouraged. At the same time, because the colony’s 
exports to gold regions were determined in London, these 
commodities should have received higher dollar export values
1. See ante, pp.128-32
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in the Straits Settlements, thereby stimulating exports.
Such trends are not revealed by a study of the colony1s 
trade with gold and silver countries, nor were they to be 
expected, because concurrent with the decline in the exchange 
rate of the silver dollar in the period I870- 1897 there 
was a decline in prices of commodities in the gold countries, 
which acted as a neutralizing force.
The imports and exports from gold and silver regions 
between 1870 and 1890, taken quinquenially, do not appear 
to have been affected by the one decline of one shilling 
in the exchange value of the dollar. There was little 
interest in the declining dollar during this period. The 
value of the trade with gold regions increased rapidly 
between 1875 and 1880 while that with silver decreased, 
as the result of the conversion to gold of Indonesia in 
1877. (See Tables XLIV and XLV)
In the four years from 1890 to 1893 the dollar fell 
by well over a shilling. This steep fall appears to have 
made an impression on the direction of the colony*s trade 
with gold and silver regions (see Table XLVl). These 
were years of depression. The import and export trade 
with silver countries fell during 1890-1892 but rose in 
1893 when total trade seemed to recover. The dollar fell 
by 83d. in 1893* Imports from the gold regions of Britain 
and Europe, America, and Indonesia for the years 1891,
1892 and 1893 were all below those of I89O, suggesting 
that they were inhibited. Exports in these four years were
TABLE XLVI (a)
S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  t o t a l  f o r e ig n  t r a d e  w ith  m ajo r 
g o ld  c u rre n c y  a r e a s  ( I 890 - 1 9 0 6 ) ($ 0 0 0 )
IMPORTS
! T2 ™
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
3 / 5 i  3 0 ,3 8 0  2 3 ,3 4 9  ^On s i l v e r  (On s i l v e r
3 /3  2 8 ,1 0 3  22 ,721  c u r r e n c y )  c u r re n c y )
2/ l l f  2 7 ,9 9 1  2 1 ,4 2 0  " "
2 /3  3 /8  2 8 ,5 4 7  2 2 ,2 8 3  2 4 ,2 6 7  "
2 / l |  3 5 ,3 2 1  3 0 ,8 2 4  2 9 ,2 9 3  "
1895
1896
1897
1898 
1899
2 / l f  3 0 ,0 2 7  2 8 ,7 6 1  3 2 ,8 4 3  "
2 /2  1 /8  3 0 ,3 2 3  2 9 ,3 9 2  3 5 ,3 7 0  "
1 /1 1  1 5 /1 6  3 8 ,7 8 8  3 1 ,7 3 7  4 3 ,9 2 1  5 ,7 2 6
1 /1 1  l / l 6  4 3 ,8 6 0  3 7 ,6 3 9  5 9 ,4 1 4  5 ,1 6 5
1 /1 1  1 5 /1 6  4 3 ,2 9 4  4 5 ,6 8 8  6 1 ,7 6 3  5 ,4 2 3
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
2 /0  3 /8  4 9 ,9 7 8  5 2 ,8 9 5  60 ,073  7 ,4 9 7  
1 /1 1  3 /8  5 0 ,1 3 6  4 7 ,8 2 7  5 9 ,3 7 8  7 ,9 7 0  
1 / S i  4 9 ,3 5 3  4 9 ,1 9 4  7 5 ,1 1 2  7 ,3 5 3  
1 /9  1 /8  5 8 ,8 6 9  5 2 ,1 5 3  6 6 ,6 3 2  6 ,6 1 0  
1 /1 0  1 5 /1 6  5 2 ,7 1 0  5 3 ,4 9 1  7 8 ,8 2 5  7 ,9 0 5
1905
1906
2/ o i  5 0 ,7 6 6  5 0 ,7 2 4  4 7 ,4 6 9  6 ,3 5 4
2 /4  5 1 ,3 3 1  5 1 ,8 3 4  4 7 ,5 0 0  5 ,0 4 6
EXPORTS
R a te  o f  B r i t a i n  S e r i e s .  Indon -  I n d ia  *  Ja p a n
exchange & E urope e s i a  Burma
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
3 / 5 i  3 6 ,3 3 6  8 ,4 1 6  2 2 ,3 5 0  (On s i l v e r  (On
3 /3  3 8 ,0 1 6  8 ,7 1 2  2 8 ,9 2 0  c u r re n c y )  s i l v e r
2 / l l f  4 0 ,2 5 3  1 0 ,9 1 7  2 8 ,9 8 8  " c u rre n c y
2 /3  3 /8  4 7 ,0 5 1  6 ,4 4 8  3 3 ,0 0 0  1 0 ,0 1 2  "
2/ l |  5 3 ,6 1 8  1 0 ,2 9 1  3 9 ,0 1 6  9 ,4 7 3  "
1895
1896
1897
1898 
1899
2 / l i  5 0 ,2 7 6  1 3 ,8 1 5  3 8 ,3 3 3  9 ,4 0 6  "
2 /2  1 /8  4 9 ,0 9 6  1 3 ,4 2 0  4 0 ,3 2 7  9 ,8 0 4  "
1 /1 1  1 5 /1 6  4 5 ,4 3 9  1 8 ,5 4 1  4 3 ,7 4 3  1 3 ,2 8 1  5 ,1 2 1
l / l l  1 /1 6  5 2 ,8 4 2  22 ,611  4 5 ,0 4 4  1 2 ,8 7 4  3 ,7 0 6
1 /1 1  1 5 /1 6  7 4 ,9 0 2  2 9 ,9 9 1  4 4 ,7 9 6  1 2 ,3 5 8  946
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
2 /0  3 /8  8 5 ,7 8 6  2 7 ,0 3 9  5 0 ,1 7 7  1 4 ,2 6 2  1 ,9 7 5  
1 /1 1  3 /8  7 9 ,3 5 7  3 2 ,8 7 5  5 3 ,067  1 5 ,3 4 7  1 ,5 3 7  
1 / S i  9 7 ,1 6 9  3 8 ,5 3 1  5 1 ,4 1 4  1 6 ,0 2 9  3 ,3 9 7  
1 /9  1 /8  103,769 4 2 ,3 1 0  4 7 ,4 3 8  2 8 ,3 9 4  3 ,2 5 4  
1 /1 0  1 5 /1 6  9 0 ,3 5 9  3 4 ,9 7 8  4 9 ,5 6 1  3 5 ,8 1 1  3 ,8 8 0
1905 
1 I 9Ö6
2 / 0 $  9 0 ,2 3 8  3 6 ,2 8 8  4 7 ,0 9 6  1 4 ,1 7 0  2 ,435
2 /4  110,715 3 4 ,6 2 9  4 6 ,5 6 5  2 0 ,7 1 2  2 ,3 9 1
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TABLE XLVI ( h )
S tr a its  Settlem ents to ta l  fo re ig n  trade  
with major s i lv e r  currency areas (1890-1906)
IMPORTS
Rate o f  
exchange Malaya East Asia * Siam
Indo­
china
India & 
Burma
1890 3 /5  i 21,986 26,203 10,724 2,946 26,204
1891 3 /3  „ 19,849 21,580 9,969 4,776 23,947
1892 2/111 25,587 21,126 10,438 7,053 23,280
1893 2 / 3 3 / 8 30,826 27,576 14,413 6,450 (On gold
1894 2 / l f 38,172 50,059 14,731 6,187 currency)
1895 2/ 14- 39,909 41,213 14,627 5,472 t!
1896 2/2 1 /8 38,785 40,688 15,614 5,707 it
1897 1/11 15/16 35,894 £ 2 7 , 9 1 7 7 19,290 10,634 ♦»
1898 1/11 1/16 39,976 Z l29,117lZ 19,529 5,966 it
1899 1/11 15/16 57,223 T 3 5 ,2431 / 20,675 5,882 i t
1900 2/0  3 /8 64,100 Z l 4 1 , 3 1 3 _ Z 20,642 7,043 ti11901 1/11 3 /8 70,500 2 2 3 5 , 8 5 6 _ Z 25,758 4,857 it
11902 1/84 85,977 Z j a ,  25412 (On gold 4,985 11
1903 1/9  1 /8 99,489 4163 ,7391 / currency) 5 ,034 11
1904 1/10 15/16 91,518 T 39 ,5 3 6 1 / 11 4,042 11
1905 2 /04 9 0 ,3 3 4 N /~ J > 6 , 8I 0 Z 11 4,300 11
1906 2 /4 (On gold) £ 3 7 ,3 5 9 1 / it 4,878 11
EXPORTS
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
3 /5  t 
3/3  
2/11 f  
2/3  3 /8  
2 / l f
14,756 14,238 11,706 3 ,206 12,813
14,296 11,730 6,172 4,731 9,267
16,806 14,306 6,662 4 ,802 8,183
17,565 14,079 9,357 3 ,474  (On gold
21,899 17,475 12,672 5,335 currency)
2 /1  i  
2 /2  1 /8  
1/11 15/16 
1/11 1/16 
1899 1/11 15/16
1895
1896
1897
1898
2 2 , 2 8 0
22,609
23,085
26,671
28,826
17,986
17,576
Z Il7 ,067  7  
7122 ,2891 / £>2,159^
13,403
13,496
16,609
16,879
13,737
2,953
3,235
3,167
3 ,533
2,552
1 9 0 0
1901
1902
1903
1904
2 /0  3 /8  
1 /1 1  3 /8  
l / 8 £
1 /9  1 /8  
1/10 15/16
33,522
34,381
38 ,8 2 1
42 ,8 0 2
4 2 ,0 3 8
22,066>1,275;
2 0 ,9 0 0
> 5 , 951'
26 ,5 2 0
13,668 
15,253  
(On gold  
currency)
»t
3,109
3,301
3,803
2 ,394
2,406
1905
1906
2 /0  i
2 /4
43,731  
(On gold) £19,010 7  18,71837 2,0052,398
* £  J  -  excluding Japan
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rising (except for a fall to America in 1893) which seems 
to point to stimulation of exports. These changes were 
possibly the result of the very rapid fall in silver that 
took place in these years (see Graph Six). The extreme 
uncertainty in the future of silver as a currency possibly 
had an inhibiting effect on the import trade with gold 
countries, while exports were stimulated by the low exchange 
as well as the McKinley tariff in America
Prom 1893 to 1906 no clear connexion can be seen be­
tween the colony1 2s trade with silver and gold regions and 
the fall, stagnation or rise of the exchange rate (See 
Table XLVl). Trade with both regions showed an expansion 
from 1897 and a decline between 1903 and 1906. The expan­
sion was a reflection of the rise in prices which marked
the close of the nineteenth century while the decline was
2the result of the international depression as well as the 
uncertainty regarding the rate of exchange. In 1903 the 
local government took the decision to change to a gold 
currency, but the rate of exchange of the new and token 
Straits Dollar was not fixed until January 1906.
Trade with gold and silver countries
No shift of trade can be observed from gold regions 
to silver regions where problems connected with currency 
depreciation did not arise. There was, however, a shift
1. See ante, p.171
2. See ante, p,128
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"by some regions trading with the Straits Settlements from
a silver currency to one "based on gold. In 1893 India went
off the silver standard and on to a gold-exchange standard.
Burma, which was then a part of the Indian Empire, also
changed and the rupee, which like the dollar had depreciated
was fixed at Is. 4<i. in that year. In 1897 Japan made the
change to a gold exchange standard. In 1902 the Siamese
government and the American administration in the Philippines
decided to convert from silver to gold. In 1903 the Straits
*
Settlements and the Malay States also decided to do so.
The result was that the trade of the colony was increasingly 
with ’gold1 countries (See Table XLVIl).
TABLE XLVII
Gold and silver distribution of Straits Settlements trade
1890 -1906
Percentage gold 
trade to total
Percentage gold 
trade to total
Imports Exports Imports Exports
1 8 9 2 35.95 60.02 1901 5 4 . 1 2 6 9 . 0 2
1893 48.49 6 7 . 1 0 1902 6 0 . 3 5 75.92
1896 4 7 . 8 8 6 5 . 3 8 1905 5 8 . 3 0 7 4 . 5 2
1897 55.46 6 6 . 5 0 1 9 0 6 8 7 . 3 9 9 2 . 8 9
Prom 1906, when the colony, and Federated Malay States
the
and Johore together completed/switch to the gold exchange 
standard, the claim of the gold advocates can be put to 
the test. About nine-tenths of the colony’s trade was then 
with gold regions and there was no longer any uncertainty 
in the exchange rate. But the value of the colony’s total
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imports and exports fell "between 1906 and 1909. Only in 
1910 did it "begin to recover (see Table XLV and Graph Five). 
The trade with both gold and the remaining silver regions 
fell. It cannot therefore be argued that the colony’s 
currency was responsible for the stagnation, decline, or 
expansion of the colony’s trade. These occurred both in 
the period of silver currency and in that of 
gold currency. The colony’s trade merely reflected the 
trend of world trade.1 2 Only in a small way was the silver 
currency responsible for the direction of imports and 
exports. This was in I890-I893, as described earlier, but 
the colony’s over-all trade was also affected, perhaps 
more so, by the world depression in trade in those years.^ 
The trade of the colony with Indonesia showed very 
little in common with the colony’s trade with the gold 
regions of Britain, Europe and America. It was more 
similar to that with the silver regions of Malaya and 
Siam. This suggested that the pull of trade was East-to- 
West, with the demand for raw materials and foodstuffs 
originating in the west and the supply coming from the 
Asian countries. The force exerted by currency on the 
direction and flow of trade was weak. With regard to 
imports from Indonesia the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
sub-committee of 1897 tried to argue that ’the increasing
1. See ante, p.127.
2. See ante, p.127.
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uncertainty of our exchange appears to be neutralizing the 
advantage of our natural position and shipping facilities,
and tending to prevent the trade from coming past Java and
. 1Celebes ports . The Chamber of Commerce was of the 
opinion that imports and exports could be greatly increased 
if fixity of exchange were established. It admitted that 
both had increased but argued that this was due to ’the
2advantages of our natural position and shipping facilities’. 
This circular argument was rejected by the opponents of 
fixity of exchange who pointed out that these changes were 
the result not of currency problems but of the ’remarkable 
development in steamer communication between the East and 
West, which has carried trade past our doors that formerly 
came into our hands’ It is doubtful that currency prob­
lems arose in the colony’s trade with Indonesia. In 1854 
the silver standard was established in Java and silver 
guilders were struck. Although the Currency Act of 1877 
established a gold standard in the Dutch possessions, the 
gold coin of ten guilders had a very small circulation and 
the old guilders remained legal tender at face value and 
were accepted as such.^ Commercial transactions with
1. SCCAR 1897. App.C, ’Report of Sub-Committee appointed 
by the Committee of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
to enquire into the local Currency with a view of 
calling attention of Government to the question of 
converting the Straits Currency to a Gold Standard’.
(pp. 27-35* with Statistical Appendices), p. 30.
2. Ibid., p. 30 and p. 32.
3. Ibid., Comment by T.E. Earle, p. 58. See also ch. V.
4. Leavens, p. 108.
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H olland and o th e r  European c o u n tr ie s  in  Europe were s e t t l e d  
by b i l l s  drawn on Amsterdam or London. M erchandise trad e  
was b a la n ced  by sh ipm ents o f  s i l v e r . 1 2
S i lv e r  d o l la r s  were u sed  in  many p a r ts  o f  In d o n e s ia .
The Mexican and B r i t i s h  d o l la r s  c ir c u la t e d  in  Sumatra and 
to  a l e s s e r  e x te n t  in  th e  C e leb es  and Dutch Borneo. They 
were in  demand becaue a la r g e  p r o p o r tio n  o f  the tra d e  o f  
th e se  a r e a s  was w ith  th e  S t r a i t s  S e tt le m e n ts  where th ey  
were a ls o  l e g a l  ten d er; i t  was a l s o  found th a t  C hinese  
la b o u r e r s  in  th e s e  a r e a s , who in v a r ia b ly  had c a l l e d  a t  
Singapore on t h e i r  way out were fa m il ia r  w ith  th e s e  d o l la r s ,  
u s u a l ly  i n s i s t e d  on payment in  them s in c e  th ey  c o u ld  be 
c o l l e c t e d  and saved  fo r  e v e n tu a l c a r r ia g e  back to  China. 
D o lla r s  were so r e a d i ly  a c c e p ta b le  th a t  th e  N ederlandse  
H andelsm aatchappij is s u e d  la r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  a k in d  o f  
banknote which was redeem able in  s i l v e r  d o l la r s .  These  
n o te s ,  l i k e  d o l l a r s ,  had no o f f i c i a l  s ta tu s  in  In d o n e s ia , 
b u t th ey  c ir c u la t e d  s id e  by s id e  w ith  th e  g u i ld e r s .  The 
s a la r ie s  o f  government o f f i c i a l s  were p a id  in  g u i ld e r s  
and ta x e s  were c o l l e c t e d  in  th a t  c o in , but f the cu rren t  
c o in  of th e  g r e a t  m asses o f  the p e o p le  was th e  s i l v e r  
d o l la r 1. ^
In th e  S t r a i t s  S e tt le m e n ts  i t  was not q u ite  c e r ta in  
w hether In d o n esia  was in  f a c t  a g o ld  stan dard  cu rren cy .
1 . C harles A. Conant, A H isto ry  o f  Modern Banks o f  I s s u e .
6 th  E d it io n , New York 1 9 2 7 , p . 571 .
2 .  S t a b i l i t y  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  Exchange 1903 , p p . 453-5*
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The Singapore Chamber of Commerce classified all the islands
of Indonesia under fgoldf between 1890 and 1901.1 The
Registrar for Imports and Exports in 1893 classified
Sumatra as a 'silver' region, and in 1894, and as late
as 1898, he still classified the Natunas Islands as a silver
regions although by this time he had decided that Sumatra 
■5was on gold.
The negligible effect of a depreciating silver currency 
on the direction and flow of trade was also seen in the 
free trade of India between 1873 and 1893 (when the rupee 
was fixed at Is, 4d.). An examination of the trade in 
commodities exported almost solely to either gold or silver 
regions and those divided about equally betv/een the two 
regions showed that the rate of exchange had no influence 
on trade.
So far as any conclusion is deducible from a 
scrutiny of trade returns, it hardly lends 
support to the view that the declining exchange, 
assuming it to have supplied the stimulus, 
had in practice any 'prevailing' effect on the 
course of trade.4
The change to the gold standard
In view of the fact that the depreciating silver
currency does not seem to have affected the direction of
1. SCCAR 1897. App.C, sub-Appendix A, p. 37> for I890-I896, 
and SCCAR 1902. App.F, sub-Appendix A, p. 73> for 
1890-1901.
2. SSAR 1893. p. 188.
3. SSAR 1894, p. 265, SSAR 1898. p. 244.
4. Parimal Ray, India's Foreign Trade since 1870. London 
1934, P. 154.
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trade, why did the Straits Settlements decide to change to 
a gold exchange standard currency?
The uncertain fate of silver first stimulated thought 
as to the currency destiny of the Straits Settlements in 
1893* Silver had "been falling steadily for two decades and 
it was probably only prevented from falling further by two 
factors. Firstly, the Indian mints were open to the free 
coinage of silver into rupees. Secondly, although the 
Coinage Act of 1873 had committed the USA to a gold currency, 
it carried on a prolonged affair with silver: the Bland- 
Allison Act of 1878 and subsequently the Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act of 1890 pandered to the silver interests by 
creating a state demand for silver. Following the unsucc­
essful efforts of three International Monetary Conferences 
(1878, 1881 and finally 1892) to rehabilitate silver, both 
the Indian administration and the USA closed their mints 
to the free coinage of silver. The result was the steep 
decline of the value of silver in that year, and the exchange 
rate of the silver dollars in the Straits Settlements fell 
by 83d. The possibility of failure of the Brussels Con­
ference (1892) and the announced proposal of the Indian 
administration and the American government to abandon 
silver if the conference failed led to the first call in 
the Straits Settlements to look into the problem of fixity 
of exchange.^ The decision of Japan to change from silver
1. See ante, p.235
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to gold in 1897 was followed by another call "by the Singapore 
Chamber of Commerce for a gold standard.*1 234" In 1902-1903 
there were signs, some of which were soon confirmed, of 
further abandonment of silver currency. China, the tradi­
tional silver country and apparently an insatiable ’consumer*
of silver, and Mexico, the producer of the renowned Mexican 
2dollars, together in 1902 called on America for assistance 
in establishing stability of exchange. In November 1902 
Siam suddenly abandoned the free coinage of silver and 
moved on to a gold exchange currency.^ In 1902 the gold 
value of the silver dollar fell quite sharply. This pro­
voked a third call by the Singapore Chamber for fixity of 
5exchange. The Chamber was aware that the Americans in
1. SCCAR 1897. App.C., SCC to Col.Sec. 4 February 1898, 
pp, 104-0 , conveying the Report of the sub-committee 
which called for a gold standard, and the resolution 
of the general meeting which accepted the Report by 
17 votes to 14 against.
2. See Historical Appendix C .
3. The studies and proposals made were published under 
Stability of International Exchange. Report on the 
Introduction of the Gold Exchange Standard into China. 
and other Silver-using countries. 55th Congress. 2nd 
Session, Washington Government Printing Office 1903; 
and Gold Standard in International Trade. Report on 
the Introduction of the Gold-Exchange Standard into 
China, the Philippine Islands, and other Silver-using 
countries, and on the Stability of Exchange. Washington 
Government Printing Office 1904* Mexico subsequently 
took to gold in 1905 but China continued on silver 
until 1935.
4. See Ingram Economic Change in Thailand since 1850. chapter 
7, ’Currency and Exchange in Thailand’.
5* SCCAR 1902, App.F, SCC to Col. Sec. 17 December 1902, 
pp.59-64.
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1 2 the Philippines and the French in Indochina were con­
sidering currency reforms. Thus the Chamber was able to 
point out, as a point for fixity of exchange, to the 1 2extreme 
uncertainty as to the future of this metal silver^’
A second factor that led to the call for a gold currency 
in the Straits Settlements was the fact that an increasingly 
larger proportion of its trade was with gold countries 
(see Table XLVIl). In 1892, prior to the drastic fall 
in silver, 65 per cent of the colony’s imports came from 
and 40 per cent of its exports went to silver countries.
In 1902 the Barbour Report pointed out that the conversion 
of many Asian countries to gold had meant that the colony’s 
trade with gold regions had become larger than its trade 
with silver regions, and that the trend was increasing.^1
1. Ibid., p. 62. In March 1903, a gold exchange standard 
was established on the recommendation of investigations 
carried out in 1902.
2. The French set up a Commission of Enquiry into Indoch­
inese currency in December 1902, (Gold Standard in 
International Trade 1904, P* 494) and the Chamber of 
Commerce in Paris in May 1903 proposed measures as to 
ways and means of achieving a gold exchange currency. 
(Stability of International Exchange. 1903, p. 388).
The French Administration of Indochina had also 
approached the Governor of the Straits Settlements to 
suggest co-operation, together with the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Hongkong and Siam, in bringing about fixity 
of exchange. T SSLCP 1903. App.2, 3 February), Gov. SS 
to Sec. of State for the Colonies, SS.310, 16 July
1902, p. C135.
3* SSLCP 1903. App.2, 3 February, SCC to Col. Sec. 9 June
1903, P. 132.
4» SS Currency Committee 1903, p. 9«
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A change in the currency would mean transferring the problems 
of the exchange rate from the larger portion of trade to 
the smaller.
In 1897, when the Singapore Chamber called for a gold 
currency, it was pointed out by a European merchant that 
it would dimply transfer the difficulties and responsibili­
ties of exchange from Collyer Quay to Boat Q u a y * T h i s  
was because exchange problems arose only in the Western 
section of the colony’s trade which was handled by the Euro­
pean merchants. An invitation by the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce to ’various of the leading and most influential
of our Chinese residents* to meet the Committee to discuss
2the problem was not answered. The only available evidence 
of Chinese opinion in 1897 was hostile to the suggestion of 
fixity of exchange.-^ In 1893 the Chinese member of the 
Committee set up to look into the question of fixity of the 
exchange stated quite clearly that ’the interests of the 
Europeans would be opposed to those of the Chinese’, and
1. SCCAR 1897. App.C., p. 95.
2. Ibid., p. 64.
3. Song, 100 Years of the Chinese in Singapore, p. 344* 
This was an article 1The Currency Question*by Tan 
Keong Saik in the Straits Chinese Magazine. vol.I, 
1697» P* 144. (The Chairman of the Singapore Chamber, 
a supporter of the gold standard, declared that as he 
construed it, it ’leans to fixity*, SCCAR 1897.
App. C., p . 65).
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asked for two more Chinese persons to sit on the committee.
All three Chinese and three European members, out of a total
of 12 in the Committee, opposed the change to a gold currency.1 234
In 1903» however, this same Chinese, now a member of the
Legislative Council, assured the Council of full Chinese
2support for the Barbour Plan.
Thirdly, the course of action that could be taken was
quite clear. In 1897, when the call for a gold currency
3was made, some merchants as well as the Governor of the 
colony^- objected to a decision being made then on the 
grounds that the Indian and Japanese experiments were yet 
incomplete and argued that it was prudent to await the 
outcome. By 1902 the Indian currency system was success­
fully converted to one backed by gold and had been extended 
to Ceylon. The Japanese currency change had also proved 
successful. The Barbour Committee, aware of anxieties 
in the Straits Settlements that nothing should be done 
which might impair trade, recommended the plan it proposed 
for a gold exchange standard with the words that it was 
’perfectly safe’.^
1. SSLCP 1893. App. 28, 2 November, p. C263 Report of 
Straits Settlements local currency committee 1893*
2. SSLCP 1903. 29 May, p. B72 (Tan Jiak Kim)
3. SCCAR 1897. App.C, Special General Meeting to receive 
and deal with the Report of the Sub-committee on 
Straits Currency, p. 83*
4. SSLCP 1902. App. 45, ; Gov. SS to Sec. of
State for the Colonies, SS 67, 9 March 1898, p. C466.
5* Straits Settlements Currency Committee Report 1903, p. 13.
258
These were not, however, factors that necessitated 
a change to a stable gold-hacked currency, although they 
were certainly points in favour of it. The declining silver 
currency had undoubtedly favoured the development of the 
colony1s trade: prices were maintained at a high level 
despite their fall in gold standard currencies, and the low 
exchange had given an advantage to tin miners in the Malay 
Peninsula in competition with their rivals in gold standard 
countries. According to the manager of the Straits Trading 
Company in 1893, the low price of silver enabled miners 
to work the inferior mines, and the increase in tin exports 
had been stimulated largely to the high dollar prices 
received by the producer.1
The receivers of fixed incomes did not do very well 
during currency depreciation, and they did very poorly if 
the goods they consumed came from gold regions. Prices 
from Britain and Europe were falling from 1873, which was 
fortunate for this class of the population, almost all 
of whom were Europeans. The drastic decline of silver in 
1893» which was not accompanied by a corresponding fall 
in prices, led to a rise in the cost of living for salaried 
Europeans in the Straits Settlements. The rise of prices 
in the West from 1897, this time unaccompanied by a decline 
in the exchange rate, again went against this class.
1. SSLCP 1895. App. 28, 2 November, p. 271. Evidence
of H. Muhlinghaus before the local Straits Settlements 
currency committee, 1893-
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One possible solution was exchange compensation. In
1894 the Straits Settlements Legislative Council decided
that half the salary of the colony’s civil servants was to
be paid at the exchange rate of 3s. to the dollar."1* In
that year the dollar was worth only 2s. lfd. The falling
exchange rate had made it difficult for civil servants
to meet their obligations in sterling areas. This exchange
compensation was subject to the annual vote of the Council
and as a result of this uncertainty the recruitment of
cadets in England was made difficult. The solution was to
makethe exchange compensation payments ’permanent but not
pensionable’.2 In 1901 the members of the Cadet Civil
Service of the colony petitioned for ’more liberal’ exchange
compensation on the grounds that the dollar had declined
*in value to below 2s. A Select Committee of the Council 
to enquire into the salaries of the civil service was 
most sympathetic and recommended exchange compensation to 
all grades, which would have amounted to an increase in 
salaries of 21.34 per cent.^ The Secretary of State decided, 
however, to grant exchange compensation to full salaries 
and this led to an increased cost of 25 per cent which was 
accepted by the Council.^
1. SSLCP 1901. App.8, , p. 034.
2. SSLCP 1899. 31 January, p. B7.
3. SSLCP 1901. Ap d . 8. of State for the Colonies, 
stering the Government, SS
Petition to the Secretary 
through the Officer Admini- 
. p. C34*
4. SSLCP 1901. App. 24, p. Cl01-5 .
5. SSLCP 1901. 24 September, p. 92.
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Exchange compensation was also made by the Government 
in its Widows and Orphans Funds payments: in 1897 it was 
agreed by the Council that the exchange rate was to be 3s. 
to the dollar instead of the ruling rate.'1" Exchange com­
pensation was also paid by the Municipality, the Banks, 
some mercantile firms and the Dock companies. Lawyers 
secured an increase in fees, while professional men raised 
their charges.2 Exchange compensation was not completely 
satisfactory nor equitable. In 1902 the Barbour Committee 
in recommending a gold exchange standard declared:
The time has come when those interests which 
have continuously suffered from the fall /~in the exchange rate_J7 may fairly claim to be 
protected from further loss.3
In 1902 there was also considerable anxiety that the 
silver currency would discourage the inflow of capital 
that was needed for development of public works in the 
Straits Settlements and of private enterprises in the Malay 
Peninsula. The colony intended to raise loans for carrying 
out important public works. The capital could not be obtained 
locally and had to be obtained at a high rate of interest 
in Britain. A fall in the rate of exchange of silver dollars 
would increase the burden of the debt, of interest charges 
and repayment of the principal. The same problem arose 
with regard to the gold obligations of the government in
1. SSLCP 1897. 18 March, p. B5.
2. SCCAR 1897. App.C, p. C27, ’ Report of Sub-Committee... 
to enquire into the local currency...’
3* SS. Currency Committee 1903, p. 9-
the form of pensions to officers who had retired to gold 
countries. It was also argued that private capital might 
he similarly discouraged from entering the Malay Peninsula 
to develop its natural resources.1
Thus, the colony’s trade was not the primary consider­
ation in the decision to change to a gold exchange standard. 
The major considerations were the removal of the ’injustice’ 
done to the wage-earning class, comprising mainly Europeans, 
and the anticipation of capital inflow from gold countries 
with which to increase the facilities of the ports and 
to develop the colony’s trade, as well as to tap the wealth 
of the Malay States. The effect of currency on trade was 
minimal, and the Barbour Report was of the opinion that 
the change to gold would not effect the trade, which was 
the result of Singapore’s natural advantages and the free 
port.
The Barbour Report was right. The hopes of capital 
inflow were also realized. In the twentieth century para 
rubber developed under a stable exchange rate as the tin 
industry had developed under an unstable one in the 
nineteenth.
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1. Ibid., pp. 7 “ 10
XCONCLUSION
The m a jo r in f lu e n c e s  in  th e  t r a d e  o f  th e  S t r a i t s  
S e t t le m e n ts  in  th e  p e r io d  1870-1915 can he d iv id e d  i n to  
two h ro a d  c a t e g o r i e s ,  th o s e  w hich w ere W estern  in  o r i g i n  
and  th o s e  w hich o p e ra te d  in  S o u th e a s t  A sia  and in  th e  
c o lo n y . The r a p id  e x p a n s io n  o f  s te a m sh ip  to n n ag e  w hich  
d a te d  from  I86fj, th e  o p e n in g  o f  th e  Suez C anal in  1869  
and th e  co n n ex io n  by t e l e g r a p h  o f  S o u th e a s t A s ia  to  E urope 
in  1870 in a u g u ra te d  a new p e r io d  in  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e  tvfeen E a s t  and W est.
E x te rn a l  d ev e lo p m en ts  which w ere beyond  th e  c o n t r o l  
o f th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  d e e p ly  a f f e c t e d  i t s  p a t t e r n  o f  
t r a d e .  The in c r e a s e  i n  th e  number o f  d i r e c t  s te a m sh ip  
s e r v i c e s  be tw een  S o u th e a s t  A s ia  and E u ro p e , i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o o p e ra t io n  to  r e g u la te  and  u l t i m a t e l y  to  a b o l i s h  th e  
t r a d e  in  opium and  th e  d e c i s io n  o f F ra n c e  to  i n s t i t u t e  
d i s c r im in a to r y  t a r i f f s  in  In d o c h in a  a r e  some o f  th e s e  
d e v e lo p m e n ts . Even th e  a p p a r e n t ly  l o c a l i z e d  in f lu e n c e s  
o f  th e  S t r a i t s  Homeward C o n feren ce  and th e  d e c l in e  in  th e  
exchange  r a t e  o f th e  s i l v e r  d o l l a r  h ad  t h e i r  o r i g i n s  in  
d ev e lo p m en ts  o u ts id e  th e  c o lo n y . The e f f e c t s  o f  th e  f a l l  
in  th e  g e n e ra l  p r i c e  l e v e l  in  th e  W est from  1873 t o  1896  
w ere n o t ,  how ever, t r a n s m i t t e d  to  th e  c o lo n y  b e c a u se  o f  
c o u n te r - b a la n c in g  f a l l  o f  th e  exchange  r a t e  w h ile  th e  r i s e  
in  th e  p r i c e  l e v e l  from  1897 to  1913 was r e f l e c t e d  b e c a u s e  
o f  th e  r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y  in  th e  g o l d - s i l v e r  r a t i o  in  
th e  p e r io d .
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The development of closer ties between Europe and 
Southeast Asia stimulated the growth of trade, sharpened 
the rivalry between the European powers and precipitated 
the establishment of Western rule over virtually all of 
Southeast Asia. Production increased in response to Western 
demand for the raw materials and foodstuffs of this area 
while Western rule created the conditions conducive to 
economic development.
The expansion of the colony's trade reflected the 
rapid economic development that took place in the countries 
of Southeast Asia in these 45 years, particularly in 
Malaya. The flow of trade through the Straits Settlements 
from East to West developed more rapidly than the reverse 
flow of West-to-East, indicating the strong demand for 
Southeast Asian goods and the rapid response from the 
region. The rapid economic development in Southeast Asia 
is also revealed by the rapid growth of the intra-Asian 
flow of trade.
It was obvious, however, that the interests of the 
Straits Settlements were most closely linked with those 
of the Malay States which formed the hinterland to the 
colony. Following the extension of British control in 
Malaya they came under common British rule. The capital, 
labour and enterprise that developed these states came 
very largely from or through the Straits Settlements and 
the exports of these states, the most important of which
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were tin in the nineteenth and rubber in the twentieth 
century, can be^regarded as returns to investment. Their 
unity of interests is "best illustrated "by the firm and 
deliberate action taken by the FMS government to retain 
the smelting of tin ores in the Straits Settlements and 
to prevent it from passing into USA hands.
The Straits Settlements depended on its ability to 
bring about the exchange of goods more efficiently than 
could be done by the trading countries trading directly.
The flows of trade through the colony were attracted by 
its central location in relation to Southeast Asia and its 
strategic position on the trade routes between Europe and 
East Asia. They were also attracted by the provision of 
trading services, credit facilities and the freedom of 
the ports and of trade. The last advantage meant that the 
value of goods was enhanced by their being made more 
marketable in the colony while there was no cost incurred 
in the form of taxes on trade which would have discouraged 
such flows and encouraged direct trade. The colony there­
fore took great pains to ensure that these freedoms were 
not impaired or curtailed, and though some taxes were levied, 
they fell only on goods consumed in the colony while the
entrepot trade --  of re-exports from the colony --  was
not taxed at all and great care was taken to see that 
impediments to its flow were kept at a minimum. The Straits 
Settlemets, unlike other regions in Southeast Asia, had 
virtually no exports of its own except value added to re-
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exports, its production consisting not of goods "but of 
services. It had therefore virtually nothing to trade with 
and paid for the imports it consumed with the profits it 
made as a market-place. It had no permanent claim on the 
trade that came to it and its role in Southeast Asian trade 
may he compared with the position occupied by a highly 
attractive mistress who was aware that her fortunes depended 
on her ability to continue to charm. The colony was unable 
to retaliate against French discriminatory tariffs in 
Indochina which adversels^affected its trade because its 
true interests were served by attracting trade and not by 
discouraging it.
The Straits Settlements, however, enjoyed complete 
political stability in these 45 years when rapid political 
changes took place in Southeast Asia. It did not suffer 
from the general instability that was part and parcel of 
theMalayan mainland before British intervention; it was 
not involved in wars of conquest as was the case of Sumatra; 
nor did it face the uncertainties of Siam arising out of 
Anglo-French diplomatic disputes. There were neither civil 
disorders nor invasions although the colony made yearly 
contributions towards the maintenance of its defences. 
Political stability and the security of life and commerce 
were, in the final analysis, the cornerstones of Straits 
Settlements prosperity without which all its other 
advantages would have been in vain. This situation is 
not without relevance to the trade of Singapore today.
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NOTES ON THE STATISTICAL APPENDICES
The s t a t i s t i c s  o f  i m p o r t s  and e x p o r t s  o f  m erc h an d ise  
and t r e a s u r e  and the  d i v i s i o n  o f  t r a d e  be tw een  t h e  t h r e e  
s e t t l e m e n t s  a r e  g i v e n  i n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e t a i l  b e c a u s e  no t  
a l l  t h e  r e q u i r e d  volumes of  s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  l o c a t e d  i n  any 
one p la c e o  There  i s  no com ple te  s e t  i n  A u s t r a l i a  o f  the  
S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  B lue  B ooks , which  form th e  so u r c e  f o r  a 
m a jo r  p a r t  o f  t h e s e  s t a t i s t i c s  and t h e  volumes a v a i l a b l e  a r e  
s c a t t e r e d  among t h e  v a r i o u s  l i b r a r i e s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y .  Even 
th e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  th e  N a t i o n a l  L i b r a r y  i n  S in g a p o re  i s  i n ­
com ple te  b u t  f o r t u n a t e l y  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  ( a l s o  i n c o m p le t e )  
o f  the  S t a t i s t i c s  Depar tm ent  S in g a p o re  f i l l s  i n  t h e  gap s .
The s t a t i s t i c s  w h ich  have  b e e n  computed f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  
o f  a n a l y s i s  a r e  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  b u t  a r e  g iv e n  f o r  f i v e - y e a r l y
i n t e r v a l s „
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NOTE A
Classification of regions in Straits Settlements foreign
trade
The regions that traded with the Straits Settlements
have heen grouped into three 'broad regions --- the West,
South and East Asia, and Southeast Asia --  on a rough
criterion of distance from the colony» These three regions 
can "be imagined to form three concentric circles having the 
Straits Settlements as the centre with the Western countries 
lying along the outmost circumference, the South and East 
Asian along the second, and the Southeast Asian closest to 
the colonyo In the Stra_i_ts Settlements_J31ue Books the areas 
that traded with the colony were divided into two broad
regions --  British Empire and Foreign Countries» The
classification was by individual countries in the case of 
the West (the countries of Europe being all named in the 
trade returns), by colonial authority in the case of South 
Asia ( British India, French India and Portuguese India ) 
and by islands or ports in Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Saigon, 
Java and Bali for example)o 
The West
In the present study the countries of Europe have all 
been grouped together so that the colony’s trade with the 
major Western regions of Britain, Europe and the United 
States can be compared» The colony’s trade with Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada, which was very small, has been
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included under the "broad category of trade with the West, and 
so has the trade with the Middle East and Africa« While 
thee regions are not Western in the sense that Britain and 
Europe are Western, they are in terms of distance from the 
colony almost as far, and are certainly well outside the 
Asian circle« The value of this trade was also small and 
does not affect the analysis of trade of the colony with 
Western countries« In Tables XXI and XXII the trade with 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Middle East and Africa has 
been classified under Others1«
Soubh and East Asia
In the colony's trade with these regions, that with 
India in the case of South Asia and that with Hongkong 
and China in East Asia were predominant« The other countries 
were of minor significance and little was to be gained by 
considering them separately«
Southeast Asia
The countries in these regions have been listed in­
dividually, In most cases modern political divisions and 
names have been used, such as Malaya (but excluding Penang, 
Malacca and Singapore), Indnesia (instead of Netherland's 
East Indies and including West New Guinea whose trade with 
the colony was insignificant anyway), Burma, and Siam (used 
in preference to Thailand), Indochina has, however, been 
retained as one unit because the tariffs that were applied 
from 1887 affected all the French possessions in that part
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of Southeast Asia«, The British possessions in Borneo have 
teen grouped together as British Borneo to distinguish 
them from Kalimantan (Dutch Borneo) which is given under 
Indonesia» The trade with the Philippines and German New 
Guinea (to-day Australian) was very small and has Been 
grouped under ’Other Southeast Asia’»
The classification of countries that traded with the
Straits Settlements is shown in the table Below:
Cl a s_s_if l c a t ion in thesis Straits
THE WEST
Britain
Europe
Settlements Blue Books
United Kingdom
Austria - Hungary
Belgium
Denmark
Prance
Germany
Holland
Italy
Norway
Russia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United States of America United States of America
Others Australia
New Zealand 
Canada
Middle East and Africa —
Aden
Arabia
Egypt
Gibraltar
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Present Classification
SOUTH and EAST ASIA 
South Asia
East Asia
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Malaya
Straits Settlements 
Blue Books
(Middle East and Africa) 
Madagascar 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Natal 
Persia 
Turkey
India (British) 
French India 
Portuguese India 
Ceylon
Maidive Islands 
Nicohar Islands
China
Japan
Hongkong
(Federated Malay States) 
Negri Sembilan 
Pahang 
Perak 
Selangor
(Unfederated Malay States) 
Johore 
Kedah 
Kelantan 
Perils 
Trongganu
270
Indonesia
Siam
Burma
Indochina
British Borneo
Other Southeast
Acheh 
Anambas 
Bal i
Borneo (Dutch)
Celebes
Java
Lingga Archipelago
Lombak
Moluccas
Natunas
New Guinea
Piau Archipelago
Sumatra
Bangkok 
Pat ani 
Singora
Burma
French Indochina Colony and
Protectorate
Saigon
British North Borneo
Brunei
Labuan
Sarawak
Asia German New Guinea
Philippines and Sulu 
Archipelago
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NOTE B
Selection. of cc mm od_iti e s in _St_ra_its__Sett_l_ejnents trade
A total of 34 commodities which accounted for a total 
of 6° were taken for the purposes of calculating the
quantitative growth of Straits Settlements Trade in Table 
XVIo These 34 commodities and rubber (4 items) are re­
grouped in Table XXVII„ In all cases both quantity and 
value are available <= The rough division of the various 
commodities into raw materials? foodstuffs? textiles and 
fuels is also indicated below;
Commodities Items
Raw materials
lc Tin lo Tin
2c Tin ore
2 o Beeswax 3° Beeswax
3° Copra 4o Copra
4° Gambier 5° Ga mb i er
5 o Hides raw 6 o Hides raw
6 o Horns 7 o Horns
7o Rattans 8c Rattans
8. Gums 9° Gums; benjamin
0oI—1 camphor
lie copal
12o cutch
13o resin
14. dammar
15. dragon’s blood
l6o gambodge
17. sticklac
18. safflowers
9« Gutta 19. Gutta percha
20 o Gutta inferior
(jelutong)
272
lOo Rubber 21 o Rubber :  Borneo
22 o I n d i a
23c Rambong
24c P a ra
F o o d s t u f f s
11 0 R ice 25c R ice
26 o P ad i
12 . B eche-de-m er 27 c B ech e -d e -m er
13 o P i s h 28 o P i s h  d r i e d  an d  :
l4o Pishmaws 29c Pishmaws
15 c S h a r k s ’ f i n s 3 0 o S h a r k s ’ f i n s
1 6  o C o f fee 31» C offee
17 o Sugar 32c Sugar
18 o Tobacco 33c Tobacco
19 c Opium 34c Opium: B en are s
35 c P a tn a
36o Turkey
37 c P e r s i a n
20 o Sago 38 c Sago: raw
39 0 f l o u r
40 0 f l a k e
4 lc p e a r l
21» T ap io ca 42» T a p io c a :  f l o u r
43 c f l a k e
44 . p e a r l
22 o A r e c a - n u t 45 c A r e c a - n u t
23c Nutmeg 46 = Nutmeg
24c Pepp e r 4 7 . P e p p e r :  b l a c k
48 = w h i t e
49 = l o n g
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T e x t i l e s
2-5 o C o t t o n ■p i e c e  - goods C o t to n  p i e c e  goods:  
( a l l  t y p e s )
5 1 . p l a i n
5 2 0 c o lo u r e d
53 o p r i n t e d
26 o S arongs  and s a l e n d a n g s 5 k . Sarongs and s a l e n d a n g s
27 o B l a n k e t s 55° B l a n k e t s
28 o C o t to n  rav; 5 6 . C o t to n  rav;
29 o C o t to n  y a r n 57 - C o t to n  y a rn :  dyed
5 8 . g rey  and "bleached
30 o S i l k  rav; 59o S i l k  raw
31c S i l k  p i e c e  goods 60 0 S i l k  p i e c e  goods
0OJ W oollen  p i e c e  goods 6 lo W oollen  p i e c e  goods
33 o W oollen  " b lan k e ts 62 0 Woollen B l a n k e t s
F u e l s
34° Coal 63 c Coal
3 5 . P e t r o le u m 64» P e t ro le u m
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STATISTICAL APPENDICES
' Annual' values '
I Annual values in dollars of Straits Settlements 
foreign trade, merchandise and treasure, 1870-1915°
II Annual values in dollars of Straits Settlements 
inter-settlement trade, 1870-1915»
III Annual values in pounds sterling of Straits Settlements 
foreign trade, 1870-1915»
IV Annual values of Straits Settlements silver dollars 
in terms of sterling and the value of silver in 
London 1870-1915»
V Index numbers of British wholesale prices 1871-1913 
and of selected commodities„
VI Annual distribution of Straits Settlements foreign 
trade between the three ports, 1870-1915»
VII Annual distribution of Straits Settlements foreign 
trade between the three ports, excluding trade with 
Malaya, 1870-1915»
FIVE-YEARLY VALUES
VIII Straits Settlements foreign trade in merchandise 
and treasure 1870-1915»
IX Percentage distribution of trade in major commodities 
between Singapore and Penang, 1870-1915»
X Average import and export prices of major commodities 
in Straits Settlements trade, 1870-1915»
XI Value of major commodities in Straits Settlements 
trade, 1870-1915»
XII Value and regional distribution of Singapore’s trade 
in major commodities by value 1370-1915.
XIII Singapore’s imports of tin, 1870-1915»
OTHERS
XIV Population of the Straits Settlements, 1871-1911»
XV Signatories to the Straits Homeward Conference,
31 October 19010
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX I
Annual  v a l u e s  i n  d o l l a r s  o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  
f o r e i g n  t r a d e ,  m erc h an d ise  and t r e a s u r e ,  1870-1915
M erch an d ise
Im p o r ts
42,537 
42,964 
48,667 
50,530 
50,915
33,963
36,574
44,480
42,585
43,171
5,345
4,855
5,245
6 ,5 0 6
6,454
7,842
7,740
8,612
1 0 ,6 0 3
8,313
47,882
47,819
53,912
57,036
57,369
Expo r t s
41,805
44,314
53,092
53,187
51,485
1 8 9 0  1131 ,322
1891 1122,152
1892 129,897
1893 '144,268
1894 '173,468
1895 !174,349
1896 ;i76,492
1897 1187,691
1898 ;213,171
1899 1246,278
1900 279,933
1901 283,171
1902 1311,243
1903 :337,865
1904 1325,985
1 0 7 ,6 1 0
107,771
115,732
126,357
1 5 0 , 0 2 8
149,708
151,711
1 6 1 ,0 3 6
185,055216,060
239,720
2 4 5 ,1 1 0
273,680
2 7 2 ,2 6 6
255,508
15,975
13,734
11,531
1 5 ,8 8 1
35,886
23,868
24,851
32,309
34,939
37,661
34,157
2 7 , 2 1 0
40,241
52,295
42,842
20,314
18,035
18,906
18 ,4 0 1
23,872
23,267
2 2 , 0 1 0
30,331
27,253
22 ,995
22,897
21,444
27,794
52,581
56,999
147,297
135,886
141,428
160,149
209,354
198,217
201,343
2 2 0 , 0 0 0
248 ,1 1 1
283,939
314,090
310,381
351,484
390,161
368,828
1875 50,084 45,731 4,203 8,399 54,288 54,130
1876 51,410 43,725 4,699 8,148 56,109 51,873 j
1877 56,429 48,752 6,190 8,679 62,619 57,431
1878 54,636 48,094 8,519 11,855 63,155 59,949
1879 61,238 55,972 10,310 12,185 71,548 68,157
1880 65 , 06l 58,962 8,449 1 0 ,8 6 3 73,510 69,8251881 77,517 63,336 7,082 6,392 84,599 69,728
1882 80,451 70,249 10,473 11,861 90,924 82,111
I883 92,770 83,169 11,872 12,942 104,643 96,111
1884 94,931 81,877 9,311 13,948 104,242 95,825
1885 94,517 78,902 8,502 15,547 103,019 94,450
1886 99,927 85,970 12,548 11,478 112,475 97,447
1887 112,566 96,251 19,217 14,657 131,783 110,907
i 1888 126,718 108,948 20,141 14,432 146,859 123,380
1889 133,744 110,082 12,395 13,350 146,139 123,432
127,924
125,806
134,638
144,757
173,900
172,975
173,721
191,367
212,309
239,055
262,617
266,553
301,474
324,847
312,508
J_
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STATIST ICAL APPENDIX I  ( c o n t i n u e d )
i M e r c h a n d i s e T r e a s u r e T o t a l T r a d e
I m p o r t s E x p o r t s  j I m p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s Exp o r  t  s
: 1905 3 1 9 ,7 9 5 2 6 5 ,2 5 3  ! 1 2 ,4 3 9 1 7 ,7 0 8 3 3 2 ,2 3 4 2 8 2 ,9 6 1
1906 3 1 8 ,0 0 6 2 8 1 ,3 5 1 2 1 ,3 0 2 2 9 ,6 5 5 3 3 9 ,3 0 8 3 1 1 ,0 0 6
1907 3 2 3 ,0 3 0 2 8 2 ,2 7 9 2 7 ,5 4 0 2 3 ,0 2 3 3 5 0 ,5 7 0 3 0 5 ,3 0 2
1908 2 9 6 ,2 0 0 2 6 1 ,7 6 0 1 9 ,7 5 7 1 1 ,2 6 6 3 1 5 ,9 5 8 2 7 3 ,0 2 6
1909 3 0 0 ,7 2 1 2 6 6 ,8 2 5 1 2 ,0 0 0 1 3 ,6 4 5 3 1 2 ,7 2 1 2 8 0 ,4 6 9
j 1910 3 4 5 ,2 1 8 3 0 6 ,6 0 9 1 8 ,6 4 9 1 6 ,8 5 3 3 6 3 ,8 6 8 3 2 3 ,4 6 2
1911 3 7 9 ,6 5 7 3 2 4 ,3 2 2 17,6.63 1 3 ,6 3 3 3 9 7 ,3 2 0 3 3 7 ,9 5 5
1912 4 2 7 ,7 4 1 3 5 2 ,3 9 4 2 1 ,5 8 4 1 8 ,3 6 4 4 4 9 ,3 2 5 3 7 0 ,7 5 8
1913 4 5 8 ,2 1 1 3 6 8 ,6 9 8 2 5 ,0 6 6 1 5 ,9 7 6 434,193 3 8 8 ,9 3 0
1914LAI - 3 7 5 ,1 5 9 3 2 3 ,2 9 3
1 5 ,4 4 4 8 ,1 3 0  j 3 9 0 ,6 0 3 3 3 1 ,4 2 3
r—
1913 4 2 5 ,8 1 7 3 9 7 ,3 2 4 1 0 ,6 9 5 5 ,3 8 8 4 3 6 ,5 1 1 4 0 2 ,7 1 3
S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  Blue  Books and R e tu r n s  of  
Im p o r t s  and E x p o r t s .
S o u r c e :
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX I I
A nnual v a lu e s  in  d o l l a r s  o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  
i n t e r - s e t t l e m e n t s  t r a d e ,  1870-1915
i Im p o rts E x p o r ts
i Im p o rts E x p o r ts  !
2870
1871 ;
1872 j
1873 j
1874 I
I1
6 , 5 6 7
8 ,1 9 8
9 ,7 3 8
7 ,7 5 9
9 ,7 4 9
6 ,1 8 5
7 ,4 9 4
9 ,008
7 ,1 2 5
1 1 ,1 5 9
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1 1 , 3 5 3
8 , 9 7 8  
8 , 6 4 6  
9 ,4 6 7  
1 4 ,7 9 7  
1 2 ,8 2 8
9 ,8 0 1  i
8 ,4 7 7  :
8 ,3 7 4  
9 ,3 9 8  
12 ,886
1 2 ,8 3 8  j
\------------ 1
1875 8 , 8 5 0 8 ,363 1896 1 0 ,1 3 6 1 0 ,5 7 7  J
1876 7 ,6 7 5 7 ,3 4 3 1897 1 2 ,3 0 7 1 2 ,6 2 0
1877 7 ,0 2 9 6 ,4 8 4 1898 1 0 ,6 1 3 9 ,6 7 8  ;
. 1878 7 ,7 6 0 5 ,6 9 9 1899 9 ,2 3 9 1 0 ,1 6 7  i
! 1879 8 ,2 6 7 6 , 4 6 8 1900 11 ,1 6 2 1 1 ,8 3 7
f 1880 1 0 ,2 0 8 8 ,2 2 7 1901 1 0 ,1 3 9 12 ,2 0 1
1881 1 0 ,2 6 0 8 , 1 9 8 1902 1 1 ,4 5 1 12 ,5 6 1
! 1882 1 0 ,6 0 2 9 ,4 8 4 1903 1 2 ,8 7 7 1 1 ,8 5 2  i
1883 1 0 , 8 1 4 1 0 ,2 3 3 1904 1 5 ,1 1 4 13 ,686
1 1884 9 , 6 4 0 1 5 ,3 0 2 1905 1 2 ,8 0 4 1 3 ,2 8 7  j
L
1885 7 ,3 3 8 6 , 0 6 4 1906 1 3 ,2 2 2 1 3 ,4 4 4
1886 9 ,0 6 9 6 , 6 7 5 1907 1 3 ,9 2 2 1 4 ,2 6 6  1
1887 10, 1 0 , 4 3 4 1908 1 4 ,8 8 9 13 ,9 7 9
1888 1 2 ,4 1 2 1 0 ,8 2 9 1909 14 ,5 0 1 13 ,0 7 3
1889
}
1 1 0 ,0 6 0 9 ,7 8 8 1910 20 ,381 I S ,206
1911 2 7 ,8 7 5 2 5 ,5 9 0  i
1912 27 ,4 9 3 2 6 ,9 8 9
! 1 1913 2 6 ,5 9 0 26 ,7 3 5
1
» 1914 2 6 ,0 8 8 25 ,137
1
j 1915 3 5 ,0 9 3 3 5 ,2 4 7
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX__ I I I
A nnual v a lu e  in  pounds s t e r l i n g  o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts
f o r e ig n  t r a d e , 1870-1915
j
i Im p o rts E x p o r ts
.  _ _  i
1
J Im p o rts E x p o rts
1870 9 ,9 7 5 8 ,7 0 9 1895 21 ,061 1 8 ,3 7 9  I
1871 10 ,1 6 2 9 ,417 1896 2 1 ,9 6 0 18 ,9 4 7
1872 11 ,4 5 6 11 ,2 9 2 1897 21 ,542 18 ,7 3 8
1673 1 2 ,1 2 0 11 ,302 1898 2 3 ,7 7 7 20 ,3 4 6
1874 1 2 ,1 9 1 1 0 , 940 1899 27 ,605 23 ,2 4 1
1875 11 ,5 3 6 11 ,5 0 3 1900 3 1 ,4 0 9 2 6 ,2 6 2
1876 1 1 ,9 2 3 11 ,023 1901 29 ,745 25 ,545
1877 1 3 ,1 1 9 1 2 ,2 0 4 1902 3 0 ,0 2 3 25 ,751
1878 1 3 ,4 2 0 1 2 ,7 3 9 1903 34 ,1 3 9 2 8 ,4 2 4
1879 13 ,4 1 5 12 ,779 1904 3 4 ,5 7 8 29 ,298
1880 1 3 ,7 8 3 13 ,092 1905 3 3 ,2 2 3 2 8 ,2 9 6
1881 15 ,8 6 2 1 3 ,0 7 4 1906 3 9 ,5 8 6 3 6 ,2 8 4
1882 16 ,291 14 ,7 1 1 1907 40 ,9 0 0 35 ,6 1 9
1883 1 8 ,7 4 8 1 7 ,2 2 0 1908 3 6 ,9 1 3 3 1 ,9 4 5
1884 18 ,677 1 7 ,2 6 0 1909 36 ,5 5 8 3 2 ,8 0 5
1885 1 7 ,8 1 4 16 ,3 3 2 1910 4 2 ,5 2 2 37 ,8 2 2
1886 1 8 ,0 4 3 1 5 ,6 3 2 1911 46 ,437 3 9 ,8 8 7
1887 2 1 ,1 4 0 17 ,791 1912 52 ,5 0 5 43 ,7 6 5
1888 22,029 1 8 ,5 0 7 1913 55 ,937 45 ,3 7 5
1889 21 ,921 18 ,5 1 5 1914 4 5 ,6 6 0 38 ,981
I 890 24 ,5 5 0 21 ,3 2 1 1915 51 ,037 4 7 ,1 2 5
1891 21 ,657 2 0 ,0 5 0
1892 20 ,036 1 9 ,0 7 4
1893 20 ,241 1 8 ,2 9 6
1894 21 ,808 1 8 ,1 1 5 ;
S o u rc e : G0Bo S t a t i s t i c a l  Abs t r a c t  f o r  th e  S e v e ra l
and o th e r  P osse i s s io n s o f  th e  U n ite d  Kingdom 
(l870-l87*8Tp An n u a l C o lo n ia l  Re p o r t  s 
(1 8 7 9 -1 9 1 2 ) 9 S t r a i t s  S e t t le m e n ts  B lue Books
(1913- 1 9 1 5 ) . _ 7 ~
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STATISTICAL appendix IV
Annual values of Straits Settlements silver dollars 
in terms of' sterling and the value of silver in 
London,1870-1915
1
Year
Per ounce 
bar-silver 
in
London
d.
Sterling 
value of 
dollar 
in Straits 
Settlements 
s. d.
Year
Per ounce 
bar-silver 
in
London
d.
. ... 1
Sterling 
value of 
dollar 
in Straits 
Settlements 
s. d.
18671868 
1869
60-9/1660-!-
60-7/16
1892
1893
1894
39f35-9/16
28-15/16
Zf
2/1?
1870 60-9/16 4/5-1 1895 29-13/16
2/2I I1871 60j 4/5 1896 30-13/16
1872 60-5/16 4/6 1897 27-9/16 1/11-15/16
1873 59-3/16 4/4-1 1898 26-15/16 1/11-1/16
1874 58-5/16 4/3 e 1899 27-7/16 1/11-15/16
1875 56-11/16 4/li
4/0-!
1900 28-5/16 2/Of
1876 53b 1901 27-3/16 1/llf
1877 54-13/16 4/0f 1902 24-1/16 i/ai
1878 52 f
5l!
3/11 1903 24f 1/9§
1879 3/9i 1904 26-f 1/10-15/16
1880 52i 3/9t 1905 27-13/16 2/0i1881 5lS , 3/9f 
3/9 §3/8f
1906 30-g- 2/41882 51-13/16 1907 30-3/16 2/4
1883 50-9/16 1908 24 § 2/41884 50-11/16 3/8-J 1909 23-11/16 2/4
1885 48-9/16 3/6-g- 1910 24f 2/41886 45f 3/5# 1911 24-9/16 2/4
1887 44-11/16 3/2I
3/1I
1912 28-1/32 2/4
1888 42^ 1913 27-9/16 2/4
1889 42-11/16 3/l| 1914 25-5/16 2/4
1890
1891
47/-I
45-1/16
3/5i
3/3
1915
'
23-11/16 2/4
Sources: The value of bar-silver 1867-1903 inclusive is the
average quotation, taken from the table "Highest, 
lowest, and average price of bar-silver in London, 
per ounce British standard (0.925), since 1833, 
and the equivalent in United States gold coin of 
an ounce 1,000 fine, taken at the average price",
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found in Gold Standard in International Trade, (1904), 
Appendix G, Statistical Data, p.506.
The value of bar-silver 1904-1915 inclusive is the 
yearly average quotation, taken from "A 
Table Showing the Monthly Fluctuations, in London, 
in the Price of Bar Silver per Oz.Std., from 
January 1833 to December 1923", (prepared by Pixley 
& Avell, Bullion Brokers), found in W.F. Spalding,
Eastern Exchange, Currency and Finance, 4th Edition,London 
1924, p. 330.
Note; In the years which overlap, the difference in 
the value of silver in the two tables is very small.
I have preferred the USA Government statistics as the 
more accurate for the more important period up to 1903*
The average value of the silver dollar in the Straits 
Settlements 1870-1905 is taken from A. Wright and
H. A. Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of 
British Malaya. London 1908, p. 139. The value was 
officially fixed at 2/4 in 1906 at which it has 
remained. The value 1867-1869 was between 4/6 and 4/7« 
There are other figures which are slightly different 
from these given, but the period covered is much 
shorter and I have preferred the more complete table 
of Wright and Cartwright. Other figures can be 
found in
I. Rupert Emerson, Malaysia A Study in Direct and 
I Indirect Rule,p.522. and the period covered is
1888-1906.
2• Straits Settlements Legislative Council Proceedings 
1890 Appendix C, Despatch from Secretary of State 
to Governor Straits Settlements, 13 December 1889? 
SS.411, for the period 1876-1888.
3. The Accounts and Papers, Statistical Tables
Relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions 
of the United Kingdom, converted the trade 
statistics of the Straits Settlements into 
sterling at a certain official rate of exchange 
which was not always the same as the market 
rate. These official values are given in 
Statistical Appendix III.
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STATTST IC AL APPENDIX _ V
In d ex  numbers o f  B r i t i s h  w h o le s a l e  p r i c e s  
1871-1913 and of  s e l e c t e d  comm odit ies
Index  numbers f o r  e ac h  group i n t o  which  t h e
47 a r t i c l e s  have  b e en  c l a s s i f i e d........ t
Group 1 I
j Coal and 
M e ta ls
11_____ _ _1___________
I I
T e x t i l e s  & 
Raw M a te r ia l s
I I I
Pood, D rin k  
& Tobacco
i v  ; 
M ise e l- 
aneous
.
W eigh ted  j 
In d ex
Number f o r  
a l l  47 !
A r t i c l e s
1871 68 o3 146 0 4 1 4 4 .1 1 4 5 .1 1 3 5 .6  I
1872 102 0 9 166 0 5 1 4 7 .3 1 5 1 .5 1 4 5 .2  1
1&73 1 2 8 .3 l6 lo  9 1 5 3 .4 1 5 6 .8 151=9 j
1874 104o8 1 5 1 o l 152 = 5 154=5 1 4 6 .9  j
! 1875 84« 6 1 4 7 .3 1 4 8 .9 140 = 3 140 0 4
1 1876 7 2 .4 137 0 9 1 4 8 .0 1 4 1 .1 137=1 j
1877 6 7 .5 135 0 2 1 5 4 .8 139 = 3 140=4 i
1878 6 2 o8 1 3 1 .4 1144.1 125 = 1 131 = 1
1 1879 5 8 .7 123 = 0 138 o9 1 1 3 .8 125 = 0
! 1880 64o8 1 3 0 .0 140 0 9 1 2 4 .4 1 2 9 .0
1881 6 1 .9 127 0 6 13806 123 = 0 1260O
1882 62 o2 1 2 3 .4 141 oO 123 = 7 127 = 7
I883 6 0 o7 1 1 9 .1 139 0 7 1 2 1 .6 125 = 9
1884 57 = 5 115 0 2 123 = 9 1 1 4 .5 1 1 4 .1
1885 5 4 .6 108 0 9 1 1 5 .4 1 1 1 .4 107 = 0
1886 52 06 99 = 9 109 = 9 1 0 1 .7 1 0 1 .0
1887 53 = 9 102 o7 1060 5 95 = 3 9 8 .8
1888 56 0 6 1010 2 1 1 0 .5 98 oO 1 0 1 .8
1889 62 o7 1 0 5 .1 1 1 0 .4 103 = 1 1 0 3 .4
1 1890 7 4 .9 1 0 5 .4 108 „5 9 9 .4 103 = 3
1891 7 0 o l 1 0 1 .4 1 1 6 .3 95 = 0 1 0 6 .9
1892 6 5 .2 9 5 .6 109 = 9 92 = 5 1 0 1 .1
1893 59 0 0 960 4 108 06 8 9 .3 9 9 .4
1894 60 o 0 8 8 .6 1010 9 8 4 .5 93 = 5
1895 56 0 8 8 4 .3 9 8 .9 8 4 .9 9 0 .7
1896 55o5 92 0 9 93=3 8 6 .5 8 8 .2
1897 5 6 .3 8 6 .8 9 7 .4 86 0 9 9 0 .1  1
1 1898 6 1 .7 80 oO 102 0 2 8 9 .7 9 3 .2
1 1899 7 2 .4 8 2 .9 9 8 .0 91 = 3 9 2 .2  !
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX V ( c o n t in u e d )
I n d e x  numbers f o r  each  group i n t o  which  t h e  
47 a r t i c l e s  have  been  c l a s s i f i e d
t—:Group
1
I
Coal and 
M e ta ls
I I
T e x t i l e s  o f  
Raw M a t e r i a l s
I I I
Food, D r ink  
& Tobacco
IV
M i s c e l ­
an eous
W eigh ted |  
In d ex  
Number fbrj 
a l l  47 
A r t i c l e s  j
i 1900 lOOcO lOOoO lOOoO 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0
1 1901 82 0 2 93 = 3 1 0 0 ,1 9 6 .3 9 6 .7  !
I 1902 7 6 ol 9 2 .3 1 0 1 .4 9 2 .5 9 6 .4  !
1903 7 4 .1 1 0 1 .7 1 0 0 ,6 91=7 9 6 .9
1904 7 0 ,9 112o9 101 ,2 8 8 .3 9 8 ,2
1905 71 = 3 1 0 6 ,7 1 0 1 .2 91 = 1 9 7 .6
1906 780 3 1 2 1 ol lOloO 9 5 .6 1 0 0 .8
1907 8 6 .9 1 2 7 .4 105 = 5 99 = 7 1 0 6 ,0  1
1908 7 8 .5 109 08 107 = 0 9 4 .8 103 = 0
1909 73°C 1 1 2 ,4 1 0 8 ,7 9 6 .5 104=1
1910 7 6 0 6 1 3 6 .2 109 = 2 1 0 4 .3 1 0 8 .8
1911 7 4 .7 1 2 8 .9 1 1 1 ,6 105 = 5 1 0 9 .4
1912 8 4 .9 119 = 6 119 = 9 110 .1 1 1 4 .9
11913 92 0 5 135 = 0 117 = 7 1 0 9 .4 1 1 6 .5
(S o u rc e :  U n i t e d  Kingdom A c co u n ts  and  P a p e r s 9 v o l . 6 l ,  
1914-1916? Board o f  T rade  /  Depa r tm e n t  ojf 
Labou r  S t a t i s t i c s  T  S e v e n t e e n t h  A b s t r a c t  o f  
L abour  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  the  U n i ted  Kingdom, 
Cdo7733> 1915,  S e c t i o n  IV W holesa le  P r i c e s ,
p p . 88- 1 0 1 . )
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX V ( c o n t in u e d )
Index numbers o f  S e l e c t e d  Commodities
--------------
Group Coal Tin Petroleum Hides Rudder R ice Coffee
1871 5 8 .3 9 6 .4 3 1 3 .8 121 ,1 7 6 .9 133-2 9 4 .0
1872 93 0 9 105-2 3 1 0 ,9 1 3 8 .5 8 2 .4 130-7 105-7
1873 124.0 1 0 1 .8 273» 2 4 2 .9 8 1 .5 129-7 131-9
1874 102.8 7 4 .6 2 1 2 .4 1 4 7 .0 75-5 135 -0 15 0 .1
1875 79*3 6 5 .8 1 8 3 .0 1 4 0 .9 7 5 .2 1 1 7 .0 141 .2
1876 65 * 4- 57-3 260 • 6 1 2 6 .7 7 1 .1 1 1 8 .4 139 .7
1877 6O0 8 53 o0 240 .7 125 .1 6 8 .3 137-9 14 4 .2
1878 5606 4 7 .6 1 8 3 .9 1 1 8 .6 64 -4 137 -0 139-1
1879 52« 2 51 .8 1 4 6 .7 I I6 0 6 7 9 .4 132-7 131-3
1880 53 »0 6 7 .6 1 5 4 .9 126 .3 103.5 . 1 2 4 .4 13 2 .5
1881 53-5 7 0 ,1 151-2 1 2 8 .7 96 .3 1 1 2 ,9 115-5
1882 5 4 .4 79o5 1 3 2 ,3 127-5 1 1 1 .4 1 0 4 .3 113-7
1883 55-7 71-3 1 4 1 .3 1 2 8 .7 117-1 107-2 1 0 4 .8
1884 55 06 6 1 .9 1 4 8 .2 129-1 8 4 .0 1 0 6 .4 9 8 .5
1885 53 0 5 6 5 .0 1 4 2 .3 127-5 8 0 .8 1 0 2 ,2 9 5 .2
1886 5 0 .4 7 3 o l 1 3 4 .6 11 9 .8 8 3 .8 9 7 .8 9 7 .6
1887 4 9 .6 84o0 1 2 4 .7 1 1 0 .1 83 .7 9 7 .6 1 2 1 .2
1888 5 0 .1 95-5 1 2 4 .7 1 0 4 .5 8 5 .2 9 7 .5 1 1 2 ,5
1889 6O0 9 7 0 ,7 115-5 10106 8 1 .4 10 6 .8 1 2 4 .5
1890 7 5 .4 7 1 .6 10 4 .8 9 8 .0 9 0 .9 1 1 1 .9 138 .2
1891 7 2 .4 69 ,1 9 4 .3 9 8 .0 8 8 .3 1 1 8 .0 14 1 .2
1892 6 5 .9 7 0 .8 8 6 .2 92 .7 8 0 .5 1 1 6 .2 138 .8
1893 5 9 .1 6 5 .5 7 5 .3 93-5 8 3 .4 1 0 2 .6 1 4 3 .9
1894 63 0 0 5 2 ,7 7 0 ,0 8 7 .9 79-5 9 9 .6 1 4 3 .9
1895 5 5 .8 4 8 ,0 87» 2 8 9 .9 8 0 .9 9 5 .4 1 4 5 .7
1896 5 2 .8 4 5 .3 9 0 ,2 9 2 .3 8 5 .1 9 7 .4 1 4 9 .0
1897 53 0 4 4 6 .0 8 2 ,4 93-1 8 4 .3 10 6 .8 1 4 1 .5
1898 59o3 5 2 ,0 7 8 .2 95-1 93-2 115-3 11 6 .1
1899 6 3 .7 9 2 ,2 8 7 .4 93-1 9 6 .8 113-9 10 0 .9
1900 1 0 0 ,0 1 0 0 ,0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 100 ,0 1 0 0 .0
1901 8 3 .1 9 0 .4 9 1 .8 10 0 ,8 9 1 .8 9 5 .8 10 3 .6
1902 7 3 .8 8 9 .8 8 3 .7 10 4 .5 9 0 .8 8 3 .7 84 .5
1903 7 0 ,1 95-3 8 5 .1 1 0 8 .5 10 1 .9 97-0 8 1 .8
1904 660 7 95o3 8 8 .7 1 0 6 .9 1 1 4 .0 8 7 .2 9 4 .0
1905 6 3 .4 107 .6 8 3 .0 1 1 3 .0 1 1 9 .4 9 0 .3 8 2 .7
1906 6 5 .5 136 .3 8 9 .7 123-1 1 2 0 ,6 9 2 .3 7 8 .8
1907 7 6 .5 13 2 ,1 9 1 .6 1 3 2 .0 119-3 1 0 6 .8 69.O
1908 7 6 .5 10 0 ,9 8 8 ,9 119-0 1 0 7 -0 9 9 .1 8 3 .0
1909 6 7 .8 10 2 ,1 7 8 .4 127-1 1 4 8 . '4 9 6 .2 75-5
1910 7 0 .4 117 0 5 75-3 135-2 2 1 8 .7 9 2 .9 7 3 . 4
1911 6 8 .5 1 4 4 .7 7 1 .5 135-2 14 8 .7 9 8 .8 94 .3
1912 7 6 .1 157 - 9 8 1 .5 1 4 1 .7 1 4 4 .1 1 2 0 .0 1 1 1 .6
1913 8 3 .7 1 5 4 .0 1 0 2 .1 1 6 2 .8 107-3 1Q3.7 103-0
STATISTICAL APPENDIX VI
Annual d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  f o r e i g n
t r a d e  be tw een  th e  J h re ^  p o r t s ,  1870-1915
S in g a p o re Penang Malacca
Im p o rts E x p o r ts Im p o rts E x p o r ts  j Im p o rts E x p o r ts  1
1870 3 5 ,7 0 2 29 ,462 11 ,1 0 2 1 1 ,7 1 4 1 ,0 7 8 629
1871 3 2 ,6 0 0 28 ,492  1 1 4 ,2 6 1 1 4 ,9 8 8 958 834
1872 3 8 ,1 5 7 3 5 ,2 1 2 1 4 ,6 4 9 16 ,8 8 7 1 ,1 0 6 993 I
1873 4 3 ,6 8 8 3 7 ,5 6 8 1 2 ,4 2 9 14 ,8 5 9 919 761
1874 42 ,3 9 1 3 4 ,4 4 7  ; 1 4 ,0 1 7 16 ,5 7 0 961 467
1875 3 8 ,8 8 9 3 6 ,2 9 5 14 ,305 1 7 ,3 1 6 1 ,0 9 4 518
| 1876 4 1 ,7 4 3 3 6 ,4 0 7 1 3 ,5 7 6 14 ,7 6 9 789 697
1877 45 ,0 2 8 3 8 ,4 6 2 1 6 ,7 1 8 1 3 ,1 6 5 873 805
1878 4 3 ,1 9 0 3 7 ,3 7 0 1 9 ,0 5 9 21 ,6 4 7 906 932 j
1879 5 1 ,6 1 4 4 6 ,6 7 6 18 ,5 7 3 20 ,689 1 ,3 6 1 792
1880 5 4 ,6 0 7 51 ,4 2 6 1 7 ,5 0 1 1 7 ,4 2 2 1 ,4 0 3 9 7 7 1
1881 6 4 ,5 8 8 55 ,3 7 2 1 8 ,3 6 6 13 ,5 1 9 1 ,6 4 5 837
1882 6 7 ,4 3 7 5 7 ,8 0 0 21 ,585 2 3 ,3 5 4 1 ,902 956
1883 7 2 ,5 5 3 6 4 ,5 5 4 3 0 ,0 3 7 3 0 ,7 7 9 2 ,053 779
1884 7 3 ,5 9 7 61 ,9 9 2 29 ,1 5 0 3 3 ,0 0 1 1 ,4 9 5 832
■ 1885 70 ,239 5 9 ,0 9 9 3 1 ,1 9 3 3 4 ,5 5 1 1 ,5 8 7 799
1886 7 2 ,6 1 8 5 8 ,2 9 2 3 8 ,3 1 3 3 8 ,1 4 5 1 ,5 4 3 1 ,0 1 0
I 1887 86 ,911 71 ,9 8 1 4 2 ,7 0 7 3 7 ,9 7 8 2 ,1 6 5 949 i
1888 100 ,401 8 4 ,2 6 4 4 5 ,4 0 7 3 8 ,5 6 4 1 ,0 5 0 552 1
; 1889 104 ,918 8 5 ,5 5 5 40,5.15 3 6 ,3 4 1 706 535
1890 105 ,029 9 1 ,6 5 1 4 1 ,7 8 8 3 5 ,8 7 5 480 398 ;
1891 97 ,961 88 ,6 4 8 3 7 ,6 4 5 3 6 ,8 7 4 280 283 j
1892 101 ,852 9 5 ,2 6 3 3 9 ,1 3 4 3 9 ,0 7 4 442 301
1893 119 ,0 1 7 1 0 4 ,5 5 6 4 0 ,7 2 8 3 9 ,7 4 4 404 458 1
1894 1 5 8 ,4 8 4 129 ,778 5 0 ,5 7 5 4 3 ,6 3 4 295 488 ;
1895 150 ,556 1 2 9 ,8 1 8 4 7 ,3 4 9 42 ,6 0 2 314 555 1
1896 151 ,351 1 2 9 ,2 2 6 4 9 ,6 8 0 4 3 ,9 5 0 312 545
: 1897 173 ,176 1 4 6 ,6 4 0 4 6 ,5 2 9 4 4 ,1 4 5 295 582 1
1 1898 191 ,221 1 5 9 ,4 8 5 5 6 ,6 2 3 52 ,3 0 3 266 520
; 1899 216 ,996 1 8 0 ,1 2 6 1 6 6 ,6 8 0 58 ,4 2 6 263 503
; 1900 245 ,500 1 9 9 ,1 5 5 1 68 ,3 2 6 6 2 ,7 9 9 264 663
1901 249 ,100 206 ,320 1 6 0 ,9 9 8 59 ,6 4 3 283 590
1902 273,991 226 ,9 4 6 77 ,1 4 9 7 3 ,7 1 0 343 818
1903 292 ,097 249 ,8 3 3 ! 9 7 ,7 5 3 7 4 ,0 0 3 311 1 ,0 1 1
1904 268 ,5 7 0 234 ,363 ; 9 9 ,5 3 4 7 6 ,9 3 7 725
j
1 ,2 0 8
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STATISTICAL APPEKDIX VI ( c o n t in u e d )  
( $ 0 0 0 )
1 .
S in g ap o re  
Im p o r ts  E x p o r ts
Penang
Im p o r ts  E x p o r ts
M alacca
Im p o r ts  E x p o r ts
1905 243 ,300 203 ,895 88 ,358 77 ,773 575 1 ,2 9 3
1906 247 ,195 2 2 1 s 270 80 ,6 4 0 87 ,955 1 ,473 1 ,781
1907 255 ,999 211 ,137 9 9 ,680 97 ,122 1 ,3 7 5 1 ,2 2 8
1908 225 ,215 183 ,735 89 ,665 87 ,545 1 ,077 1 ,7 4 6
1909 223 ,936 190 ,365 87 ,8 2 4 88 ,406 961 1 ,6 9 9
1910 265 ,628 224 ,038 9 7 ,119 97 ,7 0 4 1 ,1 2 1
1 ,167
1 ,7 2 0
1911 275 ,476 222 ,052 120 ,676 114 ,670 1 ,233
1912 311 ,922 242 ,930 136 ,088 119 ,009 1 ,322 8 ,8 1 9
1913 341 ,966 258,511 14 0 ,1 3 5 121 ,356 2 ,0 5 1 9 ,0 6 3
1914 280 ,430 220 ,836 106 ,740 99 ,156 3 ,4 3 3 11 ,431
1915 32 7 ,1 1 8 291,772 10 6 ,2 3 1 94 ,841 3 ,162 1 6 ,1 0 0
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX VITT
Straits Settlements Foreign Trade, 
in Merchandise and Treasure, 1 8 7 0 -1 9 1 5  ( $ 1 , 0 0 0 )
IMPORTS
SINGAPORE PENANG- j MALACCA.
1
! i
M e r c h a n ­
d i s e
1
T r e a ­
s u r e  i
M e r c h a n ­
d i s e
T r e a ­
s u r e
M e rc h a n ­
d i s e
T r e a -  ! 
s u r e
T o t a l
S t r a i t s
S e t t l e m e n t s
[ 1 8 7 0 : 3 1 , 3 2 7 4 , 3 7 5 ' 1 0 ,1 4 9 953 1 ,0 6 1 17 ! 4 7 ,8 8 2
18751 3 6 , 3 9 3 2 ,4 9 5  j 1 2 ,5 9 7 1 ,7 0 8 1 , 0 9 4 5 4 ,2 8 8
1 8 8 0 4 8 ,7 5 9 5 , 8 4 8 i 1 4 , 9 0 5 2 ,5 9 6 1 ,3 9 7 5 7 3 ,5 1 0
1885 6 5 ,6 5 1 4 , 5 8 8 j 2 7 ,2 9 3 3 , 9 0 0 1 ,5 7 3 1 4 1 0 3 ,0 1 9
18 9 0 9 2 , 7 3 2 1 2 ,2 9 8 ! 3 8 ,1 2 7 3 , 6 6 1 463 17 1 4 7 ,2 9 7
1 8 9 5 1 3 0 ,8 6 6 1 9 , 6 9 0 j 4 3 ,1 8 2 4 ,1 6 6 302 12 1 9 8 ,2 1 7
1 9 0 0 2 2 0 , 0 1 4 2 5 ,4 8 6  j 5 9 ,6 7 3 8 ,6 5 3 247 18 3 1 4 , 0 9 0
1905 2 3 3 ,5 2 0 9 ,7 8 1 1 8 5 ,8 4 9 2 , 5 0 9  426 149 3 3 2 , 2 3 4
19 1 0 2 4 9 ,9 9 7 1 5 ,6 3 1 1 9 4 ,1 2 1 2 ,9 9 7 1 ,1 1 6 5 3 6 3 ,8 6 8
19 1 5 3 2 0 ,0 1 8 7 ,1 0 0 !
f
1 0 2 ,6 3 7 3 > 5 9 4 |  3 ,1 6 2 — 4 3 6 ,5 1 1
EXPORTS
I SINGAPORE PENANG MALACCA
—
;Merchan- 
! dise
-----— ’
Trea­
sure
Merchan­
dise
Trea­
sure
Merchan­
dise
Trea­
sure
Total
Straits
Settlements
I 8 7 0 !  2 4 ,5 2 8 4 , 9 3 4 9 ,0 8 7 2 ,6 2 6 348 281 4 1 , 8 0 5
1875 3 1 , 7 9 4 4 ,5 0 1 1 3 , 4 3 4 3 , 8 8 2 503 16 5 4 ,1 3 0
1 8 8 0 4 4 ,3 1 9 7 ,1 0 8 1 4 ,2 2 6 3 ,1 9 6 418 559 6 9 ,8 2 5
1 8 8 5 5 0 ,2 0 3 8 ,8 9 6 2 8 ,3 7 7 6 ,1 7 5 322 477 9 4 , 4 5 0
1890 7 7 ,0 0 2 1 4 ,6 4 9 3 0 ,3 0 2 5 ,5 7 3 306 92 1 2 7 , 9 2 4
1 8 9 5 1 1 0 , 2 5 4  1 9 ,5 6 4 3 8 , 9 3 5 3 , 6 6 7 519 37 1 7 2 , 9 7 5
190 0 1 7 9 ,.9 2 1 1 9 ,2 3 5 5 9 , 1 6 0 3 , 6 3 9 640 24 2 6 2 ,6 1 7
1905 1 8 9 ,9 2 1 1 3 , 9 7 4 7 4 , 1 3 9 3 , 6 3 4 1 , 1 9 3 1 0 0 2 8 2 ,9 6 1
19 1 0 2 0 9 ,5 3 0 1 4 ,5 0 8 9 5 , 3 6 4 2 ,3 4 0 1 , 7 1 8 2 3 2 3 ,4 6 2
1915 2 8 7 ,4 0 5 4 ,3 6 7 9 3 ,8 1 9 1 , 0 2 2 1 6 ,1 0 0 — 4 0 2 ,7 1 3
| -
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX IX
P e rc e n ta g e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t r a d e  in  m ajo r com m odities 
b e tw een  S in g a p o re  and P en an g 5 1870-1915
TINBA OPTS n , -p,3  p o re  P g o
RICE
S’pore Pg ,
GUTTA PERCHA 
S ’p o re  Pg,
OPIUM 
S’pore Pg,
COTTON 
PIECE GOODS 
S’pore Pg,
1870 6 o l5 73 ,7 0 8 1 ,0 3 1 7 .5 9 92 .3 2 6 ,5 2 7 4 .2 4 2 5 .1 9 8 9 .1 3 10 ,81
1875 6 o l5 71 .18 7 6 .0 4 2 3 .4 9 9 9 .5 6 0 .4 3 75 .91 2 4 .0 9 86 ,38 1 3 .6 2
1880 4o24 7 1 .7 2 72 ,4 1 27 .59 9 3 .3 1 5 .5 0 80 ,18 1 9 .6 6 8 5 .1 9 14 .811885 15-31 69 .7 9 6 5 .2 7 3 4 .7 3 9 7 .1 3 2 .3 8  173.35 2 6 «65 7 6 ,2 0 23 .8 0
1890 29 .13 6 9 o89 6 1 ,9 6 3 8 .0 4 99 .3 3 0 .6 7 1 7 5 .4 8 24 .52 7 8 .1 7 21 .83
1895 310 57 680 43 7 6 .4 3 2 3 .5 5 8 7 .1 5 1 2 ,8 5 7608I 23 .17 7 5 .7 5 24 .251900 1 9 .6 8 80 ,32 83 .9 9 1 6 ,0 0 91 .93 8 .0 5 7 8 .5 6 2 1 .4 4 7 8 .1 3 21 ,87
1905 3 9 .5 5 60 .4 5 7 7 .5 5 2 2 .4 4 8 0 ,3 0 1 9 .7 0 8 4 .6 9  1 5 .3 1 7 7 .5 9 22 ,40
1910 3 0 .7 2 69 .2 8 7 2 .8 9 2 7 .1 0 7 7 .1 0 22 ,83 9 0 ,9 3 9 .0 7 7 6 .5 8 2 3 .3 9
! 1915 7 4 .3 4 25 .6 6  
■ —
80 .3 7 1 9 .6 3 97 .9 6 2 ,31 9 9 .7 5 0 ,2 5 7 2 .8 7 27 .12
: EXPORTS
1870 47 .2 3 52 C (  ( 6 9 .2 3 2 4 .0 , 92 .4 8 7 ,5 2 7 1 .9 7  24 .1 2 8 0 „ 0 8 19o92!
1875 40 089 5 9 . 1 1 j7 1 .3 6 23 .07 9 9 .4 7 0 .5 3 78 .5 1 1 8 .3 5 7 4 .1 1 25.8911880 54« 60 4 5 .4 0 79c54 16 082 94 .3 1 5 .7 5 7 5 .8 2 2 4 .1 4 8 8 ,1 7 11.81!
. 1885 3 3 .1 6 6 6 ,8 4  159.87 3 7 .6 1 9 9 .6 4 0 .3 6 7 5 .2 5 23 .6 5 8 0 .1 8 1 9 .8 01 1890 59 .8 2 4 0 .1 8  5 7 .7 9 4 1 .3 4 99 .78 0 ,2 2 7 2 ,3 2 27 .68 8 3 .5 3 L 6,44
1895 62 0  00 38o00j68o69  3 0 ,7 0 99 .3 9 0 ,6 b 7 0 .4 7 28 .98 7 5 .7 0 24.29!; 1900 56 ,76 4 3 .2 4  j 7 3 .9 5 25 .61 1 00 ,00 - 73 .8 1 26 .19 8 4 .4 4 15.56!
1 1905 48o00 5 2 ,0 0 1 7 7 .2 0 22 ,6 2 98 .6 5 1 .3 5 8 4 .3 6 1 5 .1 5 86 0 15 13.84!. 1910 45 .9 3 5 4 .0 7 1 7 2 .3 0 2 6 .7 9 1 0 0 ,0 0 8 7 .4 5 1 2 ,5 5 7 9 .0 4 20,761
; 1915 
■■■ !■■■ ■■
60 0 00 
_ _
40 ,0 0 ! 7 7 .5 5 2 1 ,9 9 9 9 .8 0 0 , 2 0 1100,00 7 9 .4 0 20.56;
I IMPORTS TIN ORE j
S p o re  Pgo
L870 *
1875 _
1860 — —
1885 — _
1890 LOO 000 -
1895 100. 00 -
1900 96. 73 3 .2 4  1
1905 53« 69 46o31 j
1910 5 2 o 77 4 7 .2 3  1
1915 60 o 45 3 9 .5 5
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX IX ( c o n t i n u e d )
IMPORTS PEPPER RATTANS GAMBIER PISH PARARUBBERS’p o r e Pgc S ’po re Pg° S ’p o r e P g . S’p o r e Pgc S’pore Pg»
1 8 7 0 4 1 . 6 1 5 8 . 3 9 8 6 . 7 3 13o 27 1 0 0 . 0 0 — 9 9 . 4 0 —
1875 4 7 . 2 1 5 2 . 7 9 8 9 . 1 3 1 0 . 8 7 1 0 0 . 0 0 - 8 8 . 3 0 1 0 . 3 8 — -
1 8 8 0 5 8 . 0 1 4 1 . 9 9 8 4 o 0 0 1 5 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 - 8 7 . 9 0 1 1 . 6 7 - —
j 1885 6 0 . 9 2 3 9 . 0 3  9 0 . 7 4 8 . 8 2 1 0 0 . 0 0 — 8 4 . 4 2 1 3 . 8 1 —
18 9 0 6 4 . 5 6 3 5 . 1 4 9 7 . 0 6 2 . 6 8 9 8 . 6 2 - 8 7 . 6 1 1 0 . 4 0 — -
1 8 9 5 6 9 . 4 6 3 0 , 2 9 9 3 . 2 8 6 . 5 9 9 8 . 4 2 0 . 2 6 9 1 . 3 6 7 . 1 8 - —
19 0 0 7 4 . 8 2 2 5 . 1 1 9 6 . 8 1 3 = 08 9 8 . 2 5 0o53 9 0 . 0 0 8 . 8 6 — -
1 1905 8 2 . 7 3 1 7 . 2 6 9 7 . 4 8 2 . 2 3 99° 52 0 . 4 8 9 0 . 6 8 7* 6 6 8 7 . 2 1 1 2 . 7 9
! 1 9 1 0 7 8 . 0 2 2 1 . 9 5 9 7 . 0 6 2 . 7 5 9 8 . 7 8 0 . 9 2 9 0 . 7 4 8 . 1 9 5 1 . 2 4 4 8 . 1 4
J 1915 7 7 . 7 4 2 2 , 2 3 9 6 . 1 8 3 . 4 6 9 2 . 3 1 4 . 9 0 9 1 . 6 9 7 . 1 9 7 6 . 0 5 2 0 . 0 8
[exports
r $
1870 5 2 . 4 7 4 7 . 5 3 8 9 . 2 9 1 0 , 7 1 1 0 0 . 0 0 - 9 6 . 9 4 - -
1 1875 60o02 3 9 . 9 8 8 6 , 8 7 13 0 29 1 0 0 . 0 0 - 71 »72 2 8 . 2 8 - -
1880 6 9 . 9 6 3 0 . 0 4 9 3 . 6 9 6 . 3 1 1 0 0 . 0 0 - 8 8 . 3 8 1 1 . 3 9 - —
1885 5 7 * 4 4  4 2 . 5 6 9 2 . 8 0 7 0 20 1 0 0 . 0 0 - 8 0 . 0 0 1 9 . 8 0 - -
1890 7 0 . 1 0 2 9 . 9 0 9 8 . 5 2 1 . 4 8 9 9 . 8 2 0 . 1 8 8 7 . 2 3 1 2 . 3 4 - -
1895 6 7 . 5 9 3 2 . 4 1 9 8 . 1 3 1 , 8 7 9 9 . 7 8 0 . 2 2 8 9 . 7 3 1 0 . 1 1 -
1900 6 3 o 2 9  3 6 . 7 1 9 8 . 1 3 1 . 6 3 9 9 . 8 9 O o l l 9 4 . 5 3 5 . 1 8 -
j 1905 8 3 . 8 7 1 6 . 1 2 98 0 6 4 1 . 3 2 9 9 . 6 9 0 . 3 1 9 0 . 9 8 8 . 8 3 8 4 o89 1 5 . 1 1
[1 9 1 0 8 1 . 3 4 1 8 . 6 7 97 °79 2 . 0 0 9 9 . 2 2 0 . 6 3 9 0 . 8 0 8 . 0 2 5 4 . 3 7 4 5 . 3 7
! 19151
8 1 , 1 8 1 8 .8 2 !  9 7 , 5 1 2 . 3 5 9 6 0 6 6 3 0 20 9 1 . 4 8 7 . 4 9 1 7 0 . 3 2 1 0 . 1 2
I n  1915  M a l a c c a  e x p o r t e d  1 9 ° 5 6  p e r  c e n t  o f  SS r u b b e r
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX X
Average  im p o r t  and e x p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  m a jo r  com m odi t ies  
i n  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  t r a d e ,  1 8 7 0 - 1 9 1 5
[IMPORT i ^ u t t a P ep p er P e p p e r A re c a -  j
PRICES! T in P e rc h a B lack W hite R a t t a n Gambier Copra Nutr ! P i c u l  i
1 8 7 0 28 0 96 5 9 . 6 2 7 . 9 6 8 c 65 3 . 5 2 3 . 2 0 4 . 9 6
I
1875 22 c 49 3 0 c 3 3 (AV. p r * 1 0 . 4 0 ) 3 . 0 9 5 . 0 5 - 1 . 8 9
1 8 8 0 2 3 . 7 8 4 0 . 4 7 11c 93 l l o l l 4 . 4 0 4 . 2 7 3 . 7 0 3 . 4 1  I
1885 2 6 . 7 2 3 1 . 8 2 1 7 . 8 5 2 7 . 3 3 4 . 3 8 5 . 8 2 3 . 4 1 3 . 2 1
| 1 8 9 0 3 1 . 7 4 5 6 . 4 1 1 3 . 4 9 2 4 . 4 1 5 . 8 2 7 . 8 2 4 . 3 2 3 . 7 4
! 1895 3 4 . 2 5 7 7 . 0 1 9 . 3 6 18 c 03 6 0 60 9 . 0 2 5 . 5 0 3 . 1 1  j
1900 7 2 o71 1 4 4 . 6 0 2 8 . 6 5 4 3 . 2 1 8 . 4 3 8 . 0 7 6 . 3 7 5 . 3 1
1905 80o02 1 2 9 . 4 0 2 5 . 7 5 3 6 . 7 4 8 0 66 9 . 0 4 7 . 6 6 4 . 4 1
19 1 0 7 5 . 5 7 1 1 1 c 5 7 1 4 . 2 8 26 C 19 7 . 1 0 11c 06 1 0 . 0 0 4 . 2 4
1915 7 5 . 1 1 3 3 . 4 7 1 9 . 9 8 3 3 . 4 7 6 , 0 4 1 4 . 3 2 8 c65 5 . 1 2
EXPORT
PRICES
1870 3 0 . 5 6 60 0 29 8 0 56 9 . 4 9 4« 06 3 . 1 1 4 . 9 7 -
! 1875 22 015 2 7 . 3 3 11c 05 - 3 . 8 7 6 . 5 4 - 2 . 2 3
1880 j 2 7 . 6 2 4 0 . 7 7 10c 77 1 6 . 0 3 5 . 7 2 4 . 6 4 4 . 4 8 3 . 5 1
1885 2 8 . 5 5 48 0 41 18 c 82 2 9 . 0 7 6 . 3 2 6 0 06 4 . 1 9 5 . 4 5
1890 3 3 . 6 4 6 4 . 4 3 1 5 . 0 5 2 2 . 5 8 7 . 1 3 7 . 8 3 4 . 7 1 4 . 2 1
! 1895 ■35.35 7 0 o98 9 . 8 9 1 6 . 3 3 7 . 7 2 9 . 5 9 5 . 7 0 3 . 3 2
1 1900 7 5 . 3 1 1 4 7 . 3 8 2 9 . 0 9 4 3 . 7 7 1 0 c 9 0 8 . 5 1 6 , 7 6 6 0 06
! 1905 81c 61 7 9 . 0 9 260 40 3 7 . 2 7 10 c 73 9 . 9 0 7 . 9 0 5 . 3 5
1910 1 7 8 .1 9 8 1 . 7 9 1 4 . 7 0 26 c 04 9 . 0 0 1 1 . 8 2 10 c 46 5 . 3 9
1 1915 j 79°  26 3 1 . 0 2 2 0 c96 3 3 . 7 8 8 . 9 6 1 4 . 1 1 9 . 1 1 6 c 27
* Average  P r i c e
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX X ( c o n t in u e d )
IMPORT C o t to n  P i e c e Goods ■
Pr i c e s Colo- I W H- O 0 Fish. Opium Coal P e t r o -
iTypes u r e d
________________
( B e n a r e s ) leum
( p i e c e s ) ( P i c u l ) Chest Ton Case
1870 ( 1 . 5 5 ) 2 .18 1 .0 2 -  ; 1 .2 3 6 .23 4 9 1 .3 7 8 . 4 4
1875 ( 1 . 7 9 ) - - 1 .5 0 6 .7 7 555 .96 5 .1 3 -
1880 ( 1 - 7 4 ) - - -  I 2 .5 3 7 . 3 4 59 8 .7 7 9-43 -
1 1885 - 1 .6 5 0 .58 1-93  2 .23 6 .5 3 5 6 2 .3 4 9 . 8 9 1 .9 2
1890 - 1 .6 9 1-35 1 . 6 0  1 2 .4 7 6. 80 4 8 5 .2 4 9-21 1 .85
| 1895 - 2 .23 1 .8 5 2 .3 2  j 2 .7 9 6 0 56 747 .37 8 .9 5 2 .11
1 1900 - 2 «77 2 .70 2 .7 9  3 .8 5 7 . 9 4 929-07 11-93 2 .31
! 1905 - 3-35 3-95 3-61  4-09 9-90 989 .86 9 .8 8 2 .01
1910 - 3-10 3-75 3 .5 8  j 3 . 7 7 9 .2 5 1 ,5 9 0 .9 2 8 .9 5 1-95
;1915 — 2 .7 8 3 -13 3 .3 1  j 4 .1 7 1 0 . 5 4  1 , 1 1 9 .0 2 1 0 .5 2 2-53
EXPORT
PRICESL__ _ _
i 1870 ( i 0 23 ) 2o 53
1| CT3
i °01—1 -  ; 2 .0 1 6 . 2 4 475 .62 8 .1 8
1875 1 .8 6 - - -  1 2 .3 1 6 .1 7 566 .60 11 .01 —
1880 ( 1 . 8 8 ) - - -  i 2 .4 2 8 .7 0 593 .96 1 0 .9 4 -
1 1885 - 10 66 0 .59 1 . 9 4  1 2 .4 0 6 .7 2 5 6 3 .2 4 9 .9 0 1 .9 2
I 1890 “ 1 .9 8 1 .7 1 1 .6 0  2 .8 4 7 . 0 4 485 .63 1 0 .8 6 1 .97
1 1895 2 068 1 . 7 4 2 .47  2 . 9 4 6 0 60 74 9 .8 8 12 .01 2 .28
i 1900 - 3 .0 3 2 .12 2-91 4 -11 8 . 5 4 933-29 20 .9 0 2 .15
1905 3 .6 3 2 .70 2 .8 1  4 .3 5 9 .6 3 9 9 4 .6 7 1 1 2 .5 9 2 .11
1910 3 .3 3 2 .68 3-38  4-13 9 .7 6 1 , 5 7 9 . 5 7 I2O.42 2 .17
11915 — 3 0 28 2 o 66 3 .1 9  ; 4 .4 2 1 0 .5 2 989 .83 13 .16 2 0 66
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XI
Value of major commodities in Straits Settlements trade,
1870-1915
□ IMPORTS
jYear 1 Tin Rice Gutta Opium Cottons Pepper
1870 i 4,410 2,510 1,718 4,017 8,486 2,055
1875 4,306 5,080 460 5,682 6,747 4,074
1880 4,830 7,531 1,764 6,515 8,602 2,365
1885 9? 003 8,688 1,431 6,304 9,754 6,682
1890 i1 15,965 17,137 4,169 7,040 11,218 7,397
1895 30,622 19,175 2,544 9,309 9,457 4,492
1900 53,761 25,735 11,799 15,428 14,789 8,269
1905 80,904 31,916 4,235 12,800 16,906 10,348
1910 66,641 39,634 7,366 18,171 14,990 6,487
1915 87,710 57,811 2,313 4,047 13,942 8,946
EXPORTS
1 Yea_r Tin Rice Gutta Opium Cottons Pepper
j 1870 4,719 1,446 2,113 3,172 6,160 2,669
: 1875 4,964 2,903 378 5,248 5,790 4,712
1880 5,880 5,357 1,670 5,869 6,298 3,076
1885 10,708 5,809 2,199 5,758 5,777 6,86l
1890 18,164 11,982 4,892 5,793 6,276 8,391
1895 31,369 16,249 3,125 7,519 7,212 5,232
1900 1 60,816 22,504 15,110 12,351 10,099 9,597
1905 30,821 26,786 4,414 10,567 9,955 9,976
19101 75,421 35,706 9,932 10,631 8,539 8,012
: 1915 91,607 49,442 2,751 768 11,024 9,231{
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XI ( c o n t i n u e  d )
IMPORTS
Y e a r R a t t a n s G a m b ie r F i s h C o p ra S u g a r  T o p i o c a
r  „ .........1870 520 1 ,0 0 5 336 22 330 2
1875 644 2 ,121 684 - 251 -
1880 988 2 ,316 1 ,1 7 4 248 613 68
1885 1 ,3 8 3 3 ,8 0 4 2 ,6 6 4 1 ,372 973 135
1890 2 ,3 1 2 5 ,362 3 ,9 7 9 954 1 ,7 6 6 421
1895 3 ,1 1 0 7 ,1 9 5 5 ,4 0 3 2 ,976 2 ,6 5 7 551
1900 5 ,6 1 3 6 ,0 0 9 6 ,7 5 7 4 ,4 0 0 5 ,4 5 1 440
1905 3 ,8 5 3 5 ,787 9 ,0 1 9 7 ,738 8 ,0 7 2 488
1910 3 ,2 3 6 5 ,323 9 ,5 4 7 1 5 ,2 1 7 6 ,6 4 4 1 , 2Q0
|1915 3 ,0 6 4 1 ,1 4 4 1 0 ,8 9 4 1 1 ,8 2 5 1 1 ,5 7 3 1 ,7 0 9
EXPORTS
Y e a r R a t t a n s Gambi r F i s h C o p ra S u g a r  T o p i o c a
1870 560 1 ,7 8 6 196 39 615 214
1875 632 3 ,8 7 0 580 - 863 369
1880 1 ,712 3 ,6 2 1 1 ,2 8 2 496 1 ,9 3 5 1 ,147
1885 1 ,8 3 3 3 ,8 8 8 1 ,8 9 4 1 ,3 0 4 1 ,8 7 2 1 ,2 4 8
. 1890 2 ,561 6 ,0 2 6 2 ,7 4 0 1 ,4 1 6 2 ,328 2 ,276
1895 3 ,4 7 5 8 ,2 3 3 5 ,1 9 2 3 ,5 1 0 3 ,1 3 7 2 ,716
1900 6 ,782 6 ,6 8 0 6 ,6 7 7 4 ,5 7 4 4 ,4 2 5 4 ,033
1905 4 ,571 6 ,1 2 2 8 , 416 7 ,7 8 2 6 ,445 3 ,5 6 6
1910 3 ,9 7 8 5 ,7 4 8 8 ,4 5 5 1 8 ,4 3 0 4 ,331 3 ,7 7 3
i 19151 4 ,423 1 ,3 1 4 8 ,8 2 5 1 1 ,8 4 8 5 ,9 4 0 3 ,6 5 4
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XI ( c o n t i n u e d )
_
IMPORTS
Y e a r A r e c a n u t Saga C o f f e e P e t r o l e u m R u b i e r C o a l  '
j 1870
i
- 510 417 - 42 535
1-875 150 644 886 — 34 1 ,0 0 -
1880 407 942 609 - 247 1 ,7 0 8
1885 902 840 357 904 302 2 ,8 0 7
1890 615 1 ,0 1 9 820 1 ,6 4 0 309 2 ,9 9 1
1895 1 ,2 7 8 1 ,7 4 9 3 ,3 9 2 2 ,1 4 7 743 4 ,1 9 3
1900 2 ,698 1 ,9 8 4 2 ,2 8 0 4 ,3 6 5 1 ,8 2 0 7 ,9 7 9
1905 2 ,801 1 ,821 1 ,5 5 0 2 ,4 0 5 4 ,615 6 ,3 3 4
1910 3 ,3 1 3 2 ,7 8 9 1 ,1 2 6 2 ,4 8 5 1 6 ,8 2 5 6 ,7 5 2
1915 5 ,041 3 ,3 4 5 1 ,2 2 0 2 ,4 4 8 51 ,1 0 6 7 ,3 2 6
EXPORTS
Y e a r A r e c a n u t Sago C o f f e e P e t r o l e u m R u b i e r C o a l
: 18?0
1
728 390 - 43 9
j 1875 150 898 894 - 139 66
1880 623 1 ,2 8 7 833 - 349 18
1885 1 ,4 6 ?
j
962 265 466 395 32
j 1890 1-s 032 1 ,5 4 5 1 ,3 6 3 902 768 36
1895 1 ,5 5 4 2 ,3 0 4 3 ,4 3 6 1 ,1 0 5 1 ,8 8 7 167
'  1900 3 ,7 7 3 2 ,747 2 ,6 2 3 2 ,575 1 ,6 4 5 108
11305 4 ,347 2 ,7 4 4 1 ,4 4 9 1 ,2 5 0 5 ,6 6 5 76
1910 5 ,6 3 4 4 ,1 7 2 844 1 ,4 5 8 23 ,781 360
: 1915 8 ,0 0 0
L
5 ,0 6 6 1 ,0 0 9 1 ,4 2 4 7 8 ,3 9 8 443
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XI ( o n t i n u e d )
IMPORTS
Y e a r  ! T o h a c c o H id e s S a r o n g s T o t a l T o t a l  SS
1 C o m m o d i t ie s M e r c h a n d i s e
i 8 7 o ;
j
731 532 - 2 8 ,1 7 8 4 2 ,5 3 7
1875 7 6 7 595 - 3 4 ,1 2 6 5 0 , 0 8 4
1 8 8 0  ;
i 1 , 1 4 7 625
762 4 3 ,4 6 2 6 5 ,0 6 1
1 8 8 5 3 , 0 8 1 1 ,3 9 6 778 6 3 ,5 6 2 9 4 ,5 1 6
1 8 9 0  | 2 , 4 3 2 652 1 ,3 5 3 9 0 ,4 5 2 1 3 1 ,3 2 2
1 1 8 95  ! 2 ,5 8 5 1 ,4 9 8 3 , 0 4 2 1 1 8 ,1 1 7 1 7 4 ,3 5 0
19 0 0  ! 4 , 3 8 1 2 ,2 8 1 5 ,6 5 5 1 9 1 ,2 7 2 2 7 9 ,9 3 3
19 0 5  I
j
4 , 5 7 3 2 ,2 0 3 7 , 0 4 8 2 2 5 ,4 1 7 3 1 9 ,7 9 5
1 9 1 0
1 ! 4 , 7 1 5 2 ,8 9 9 6 , 4 0 3 2 4 1 ,7 6 5 3 4 5 , 2 3 5
i  i
1915 5 , 2 1 9 3 , 6 7 6 7 ,9 7 2 2 9 9 ,3 3 1 4 2 5 ,8 1 7
! EXPORTS
1
1 Y e a r T o b a c c o H i d e s S a r o n g s T o t a l T o t a l  SS
C j
C o m m o d it ie  s M e r c h a n d i s e
1870 278 619 - 2 5 ,7 5 0 3 3 ,9 6 3
! 18751 1 , 0 1 5 537
- 3 4 , 0 0 9 4 5 ,7 3 1
1 1 8 8 0
] 1 , 7 1 9 9 2 4 122
4 4 ,2 2 0 5 8 ,9 6 2
j 1885 4 , 3 8 0 2 , 1 7 6 467 5 9 ,7 6 1 7 8 ,9 0 2
i  1890r 646 926 5 2 4 8 0 ,5 8 7 1 0 7 ,6 1 0
1895 1 , 3 0 6 1 ,0 1 5 998 1 1 0 ,7 4 3 1 4 9 ,7 0 8
! 1900
!
1 ,8 5 0 1 ,6 3 9 2 ,3 3 3 1 8 2 ,9 4 1 2 3 9 ,7 2 0
1905 2 ,5 5 9 1 ,4 7 6 2 , 4 8 0 2 0 1 ,4 6 8 2 6 5 ,2 5 3
! 1910 1 3 , 1 5 1 1 ,4 0 0 2 , 1 5 3 2 3 5 ,9 1 0 3 0 6 , 6 1 2
1915 2 ,7 9 2 5 , 7 1 5 4 , 5 9 1 3 0 8 ,2 6 5 3 9 7 , 3 2 4
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX X II
V alue  a n d  r e g i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  S i n g a p o r e ' s  t r a d e  
i n  m a jo r  c o m m o d i t ie s ,  "by v a l u e ,  I 8 7 0 - I 9 1 5
($000)
j1 1
.Imports. _____, E x p o r t s_______ P e r c e n t a g e o f  T o ta l!
{ Year  i 
______ 1 Q u a n t i t y Value Q u a n t i t y Value I m p o r t s E x p o r t s
1 8 7 0 9 , 6 2 1 271 7 4 , 3 6 5 2 , 2 2 9 0 . 8 7 9o09
1 8 7 5 1 2 ,6 8 1 265 9 8 ,5 0 6 2 ,0 3 0 0 , 8 5 6 . 3 8
1 8 8 0 8 , 4 8 1 205 1 1 8 ,5 8 0 3 , 2 1 1 0 , 4 2 7 . 2 4
1 8 8 5 5 2 , 4 7 3 1 , 3 7 8 1 2 7 ,0 7 8 3 , 5 5 1 2 »IO 7 - 0 7
1 8 9 0 1 3 4 ,9 7 2 4 , 1 0 8 3 2 4 , 1 6 4 1 0 ,8 1 2 4 . 4 3 1 4 . 0 4
1 8 9 5 1 9 2 ,3 7 3 6 , 7 7 9 5 5 2 ,6 7 9 1 9 ,4 0 8 5 . 1 8 1 7 . 6 0
1 9 0 0 6 3 ,1 1 2 4 , 6 5 9 4 6 0 ,3 5 7 3 4 ,4 8 8 2 . 1 2 1 9 . 1 7
1905 1 5 6 , 6 4 1 1 2 , 5 8 4 4 8 1 ,6 5 9 3 8 , 8 0 2 5 ,3 8 2 0 .4 3
1 9 1 0 5 9 ,9 9 8 4 , 6 1 0 4 4 8 ,5 2 1 3 4 , 6 3 4 1 . 8 4 1 6 . 5 3
1915 9 0 ,9 9 6 6 ,7 7 7 6 9 8 ,6 3 1 5 4 ,9 7 6 2 .1 8 1 9 .1 3
R e g io n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t i n ,  (%)
Im p o r t s
Year Malaya Siam I n d o n e s i a O th e r s T o t a l
—
1870 8 8 .9 3 8 . 8 5 1 . 4 8 0 . 7 4 100
1875 6 7 . 1 7 2 4 o 2 4 8 .3 2 Oo 22 100
1 8 8 0 40o 29 7 . 8 1 4 3 . 9 0 - 100
1885 9 6 .1 5 3 . 8 5 - - 100
1890 9 6 . 9 5 2o68 0 .3 7 - 1 0 0
1895 90o 53 2 o 27 7 . J L 0 OolO 100
1900 9 0 - 3 0 7 . 8 1 Oo 26 1 . 6 1 100
1905 9 lo 0 7 5 . 0 8 3 . 8 5 - 100
1910 9 3 .1 8 5 o i o 1 . 6 1 O o l l 100
1 9 1 5 6 5 .3 0________ 4o66 2 9 .8 9 0 o l5 100
E x p o r t s
!■— t — -------------1
Year j B r i t a i n USA Europe I n d i a Ja p a n Hongkong O t h e r s T o t a l
1 8 7 0  j 6 . 5 9 5 7 . 7 8 0 - 3 3 3 . 4 5 - 2 2 .6 1 9 . 2 4 100
18 7 5  j 3 7 .1 6 4 1 .5 9 4 . 8 3 0 . 1 0 - 1 2 .1 0 4 - 2 4 100
1880  ! 1 8 .7 8 6 7 . 2 9 1 . 3 3 0 .4 0 - 8 -8 1 3 - 3 9 100
1885 6 3 . 6 7 2 3 - 2 1 7 -0 1 1 . 5 2 - 2 .5 6 2 . 0 3 100
1890 4 8 .8 2 2 9 .4 1 1 9 .4 2 0 . 9 6 0 . 0 1 0 -9 2 0 - 4 6 100
1895 3 7 . 3 4 2 6 . 4 8 3 1 - 5 5 2 016 0 - 7 3 0 .5 3 1 - 2 1 100
I 1900 4 3 . 7 1 3 4 . 1 7 1 8 .1 6 0 - 7 9 1 - 3 0 0 .7 2 1 -1 5 1 0 0
1905 5 2 . 0 4 2 5 - 1 1 16 • 66 0 . 9 0 2 -2 7 0 .6 9 2 - 3 3 1 0 0
1910 46 0 46 3 0 - 3 3 1 8 . 5 4 1 -0 2 1 . 7 8 0 .2 2 1 . 6 5 100
1915 2 0 .0 3 5 5 - 7 3 2 0 . 3 4 0 .6 2 2 - 3 3 0 o l4 0 -8 1 1 0 0
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XII ( c o n t i n u e d )  
S i n g a p o r e Ts t r a d e  i n  t i n - o r e  ( p i c u l s )
Im p o rts E x p o r ts P e rc e n ta g e  of T otal
x ecx r
Q u a n ti ty V alue Q u a n t i ty V alue
‘ “ 1 j
Im p o rts  E x p o r ts
1870 — — — _
1875 - - - - - -
j 1880 - - - - - -
1885 - - - - - -
! 1890 92 ,3 8 7 1 , 8 6 5 4 , 7 0 5 91 2 0 01 0 012
! 1895 3 9 8 ,8 4 2 9 , 1 4 9 1 , 2 4 3 27 7 0 00 Oo 02
! 1900 5 6 5 9633 28 ,501 720 22 12o95 OoOl
j 1905 472 ,4 9 2 2 6 , 3 5 5 - - 1 1 .2 9 -
! 19 5 2 4 ,4 1 3 2 7 ,2 4 5 166 8 1 0 , 9 0
| 1915
Lar
8 7 1 ,7 8 8 47 ,508 115 5 1 4 ,8 5 _  - „ J
R e g ional^ d i ,st r i p u t i o n  _of _ t i n - o r e  (jS)
I m p o r t s
1 Year
L . . . .  _ i
Malaya I n d o n e s i a A u s t r a l i a South
A f r i c a
Siam O t h e r s T o t a l
! 1890 j 99 «95 Oo 05 100
i 1895 ! 9 9 ,8 7 - 0 .1 0 - 0o03 - 100
!1900 j 93 0 25 6 0 06 O 0 6 7 - -
C
\J
0
0
0 100
i 1905 ! 9 1 ,7 4 6„72 1 .5 1 - 0o03 - 100
1910 1 75 «79 1 4 ,2 4 8 018 - 1 .7 7 0o02 100
1915 : 7 7 ,5 8 1 2 ,67 4 .0 7 4 .1 3 O 0 8 O Oo75 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XII ( c o n t i n u e d )
S in g a p o r e * s  t r a d e  i n  r i c e  ( p i c u l s )
Y ear
I m p o r t s E x p o r t s Percentage of Total
Q u a n t i t y Value Q u a n t i t y Value I m p o r t s  E x p o r t s
1870 1 .0 5 3 ,8 3 7 1 ,8 7 5 5 1 1 ,0 1 5 1 ,0 0 1 60OO 4 . 08
1875 2 ,7 4 7 ,2 5 4 3 ,7 4 9 947 ,7 4 8 2 ,0 6 6 1 0 .3 0 6 .5 0
1880 2 ,2 0 4 ,6 5 1 5 ,2 7 6 1 ,5 1 8 ,7 4 1 4 ,242 1 0 .8 2 9*57
1885 2 ,6 2 8 ,9 0 4 5 ,571 1 ,5 1 0 ,4 6 7 3 ,4 6 9 8 ,4 8 6 .9 0
1890 4 ,1 0 6 ,6 3 4 10 ,388 2 ,3 3 7 ,0 1 6 6 ,9 0 0 1 1 .2 0 8 .9 6
1895 5 ,1 3 9 ,5 3 4 14 ,398 3 ,6 5 4 ,6 2 8 1 1 ,1 2 1 l i e  00 1 0 .0 9
1900 5 ,4 0 0 ,2 2 3 21,083 3 ,9 4 4 ,7 9 9 1 6 ,4 2 5 9o58 9*13
1905 5 ,8 1 4 ,8 9 5 24 ,039 4 ,6 1 4 ,8 2 4 20 ,5 7 0 1 0 .2 9 1 0 ,8 3
1910 7 ,1 3 8 ,3 1 2 27 ,3 4 3 6 ,0 4 5 ,5 3 1 25 ,619 1 0 .9 4 1 2 .2 3
1915 b .0 ,1 9 9 ,6 0 3 4 2 ,7 9 8 8 ,5 7 9 ,0 4 9 3 8 ,2 4 0 13*37 13*30
Regi o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r i c e
I m p o r t s
Y ear  j Siam Burma I n d o c h in a  O th e r s T o t a l
j l s T Y l 4 4 .75 1 1 .7 4 1 3 .8 7 2 9 .6 4 100
1875 4 2 .2 4 2 3 .2 8 2 .0 8 3 2 .4 1 100
i 1880 59 • 68 2 6 .2 4 1 .3 2 1 2 .7 6 100
1885 4 8 .6 8 29*04 1 3 .1 8 9*10 100
1 1890 3 9 .67 49*14 l o l l 3 .4 2 100
1895 4 6 .7 7 3 8 .2 1 1 1 .6 4 3 .3 8 100
1900 51*90 3 4 .5 4 1 2 .1 2 1*44 100
1905 71*72 26 .75 0 .2 0 1*33 100
1910 6 4 .53 2 2 .5 7 1 1 .7 4 1 .1 6 100
j 1915 66 .65 6 .0 8 2 6 .3 3 0 .9 4 100
Exp o r_ts
f--1
Year I n d o n e s i a Malaya B r i t i s h Ceylon O t h e r s T o t a l
Borneo
I 1870 3 7 .6 4 25*42 9 .6 4 - 27*30 100
I 1875 6 3 .33 23*13 6 .4 7 - 7*07 100
1880 79*90 1 2 .9 2 4 .0 8 - 3*11 100
j 1885 4 6 .7 5 29*15 3 *66 - 7 0 .4 4 100
1890 4 7 .3 4 3 0 .1 7 8 .1 0 0 .0 1 14*38 100
1895 55*18 3 2 .7 8 5 .0 6 - 6 .9 8 100
1900 5 2 .41 3 6 .2 7 5 .2 4 0 .4 8 5 .6 0 100
1905 4 6 .3 3 4 1 .5 6 8 ol6 0 .0 1 3 .9 4 100
1910 48 0 98 3 3 .2 6 9*44 6 .0 9 4 .2 3 100
i 1915 4 1 .98 3 1 .6 3 2 .2 6 1 4 .8 5 9 .2 8 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XII (continued)
Singapore’s trade in gutta percha (piculs)
---
Year Imports Exports Percentage of Total
Quantity Value Quantity Value Imports Exports
1870 26,432 1,586 33,275 1,954 5,06 7 0 97
1875 15,079 458 13,778 376 1.26 1.181880 40,164 1,646 38,775 1,575 3.38 3o551885 44,5+6 1,390 45,238 2,191 2 012 4 o361890 73,253 4,141 75,795 4,881 4.46 6.34
1895 29,316 2,217 43,752 3,106 1.69 2,80
1900 67,903 9,9H 97,194 14,324 4.50 7,96
1905 15,718 2,013 35,029 2,758 0 0 86 1.451910 22,197 2,229 60,364 4,937 0,89 2.36
1915 24,411 806 47,234 1,464 0o25 0o51
Regional distribution of gutta percha (%)
Imports
Year Indonesia British Borneo Mai aya Others Total
1870 65 0 87 27.44 6069 100
1875 810 86 8 0 96 8.08 1.00 100
1880 81,41 16.59 2.00 - 100
1885 84o89 9.60 5.15 0.36 1001690 87,94 0.22 3o50 0.34 100
1895 85.19 2.68 2.70 9.43 100! 1900 84»6l 11.66 3.23 0.50 100
1905 74.13 11c 08 13 «53 1.26 100! 1910 86.19 8.32 1 «57 3o92 100
i 1915 86.45 8.82 0 ol2 4» 61 100
Exports
Year Britain Europe USA Others Total
1870 91 «70 4« 41 0.36 0.53 100
1375 94.99 2.13 2o 48 0.40 1001880 91.71 6.77 lo52 - 100
1885 89.93 5.89 4.78 - 1001890 77.83 I60 06 5« 27 0.84 100
1895 74.22 22.63 2.61 0.55 1001900 87.39 11.69 0.46 0.46 100
1905 53 «92 30.28 14.57 1.26 100
1910 69.03 25.98 4.53 0.47 100
i 1915 70o30 2.19 27ol3 0.38 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XII (continued) 
Singapore’s trade in Opium (chest1' )
!
Year Imports Exports Itercentage of Tbtal
Quantity Value Quantity Value Imports Exports
1870 5,730 2,983 4,505 2,283 9o52 9 »311875 7,426 4,312 7,041 4,120 11.85 12.961880 8,740 5,223 7,228 4,345 10.71 9.801885 8,250 4,6214. 7,725 4,332 7.04 8.631890 10,896 5,314 8,644 4,189 5o73 5.44
I 1895 9,542 7,150 7,057 5,299 5-46 4.811900 13,457 12,118 9,890 9,116 5.51 5° 07
1905 11,006 10,841 9,079 8,913 4o64 4-69 !i 1910 10,376 16,522 5,939 9,297 8.71 4-44 !
1915 3,690 4,037 747 768 1.26 2.67
Regional distribution of Opium (%)
Imports
Year India Hongkong China Turkey Others Total
1870 88.75 2.40 - 4.29 4.56 100
1875 93o30 0.05 - 3.96 2.69 1001880 97 - 00 1.91 - 1.09 - 1001885 97 o31 I0I7 0o05 1-34 0.13 1001890 92 o92 4» 40 - 1012 10 56 100
1895 96 . 88 3o0i - 0.07 0.04 1001900 94.49 5 »34 0.09 0.02 0.06 1001905 97 o79 2 olO - - 0,11 1001910 97.69 0 e 64 1.51 0.09 0.07 1001 1915 97.65 1 »78 - - 0.57 100
J
Exports
Year Hong- Malaya Indo- Siam China British Indo- Others Total
kong nesia Borneo china
1870 11.93 7.45 49.45 4.62 4o67 1-93 9.29 10.66 1001875 9.42 2.89 59o51 11.10 5-03 1.02 2.97 8,06 1001880 8c72 6o58 53-29 12.22 0.41 1.89 3-77 13-12 100
1885 20o75 11.38 43.90 10.96 5.75 2.10 2.17 2.99 1001890 7.90 16.21 27 0 52 18.19 15.68 2.13 8.6Ö 3 «77 100
1895 20 062 22 o 44 35.85 15-71 1 - 20 1.26 - 2.92 1001900 25.75 21.80 19.28 15.69 7.86 1.91 0.25 7.46 100
1905 14.29 40.39 24.53 10o59 7 - 21 2.26 - 0.73 10c1910 19o88 10 0 20 20 o 95 17.75 23.82 7.40 - 100!
1915 3.26j - -  - 42.58 11.07 43«09;- lod
(Japan 33-33%)
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XII ( c o n t i n u e d )  
S i n g a p o r e ’ s t r a d e  i n  c o t t o n  p i e c e  goods ( p i e c e s )
Y ear I m p o r t s E x p o r t s
Q u a n t i t y Value Q u a n t i t y Value I m p o r t s  E x p o r t s
1870 4 ,3 4 5 ,1 3 3 7 ,5 7 0 2 ,5 8 7 ,1 4 2 4 ,9 3 3 24 .1 6 2 0 o l l
1875 3 ,1 4 0 ,0 3 9 5 ,8 2 8 1 ,8 8 6 ,6 6 0 4 ,291 I60 02 13*50
1880 3 ,9 0 3 ,5 7 4 7 ,3 2 8 2 ,7 8 4 ,8 3 8 5 ,553 15*03 12*53
1885 4 ,0 2 3 ,3 6 4 7 ,4 3 3 2 ,6 8 3 ,9 3 3 4 ,631 11 ,32 9 .2 2
1890 4 j 822 s 072 8 ,7 7 0 2 ,6 2 4 ,1 6 0 5 ,2 4 2 9 .4 5 6 .8 1
1895 3 ,1 8 1 ,7 9 2 7 ,1 6 4 2 ,1 9 8 ,4 4 9 5 ,4 6 0 5 .47 4*95
j 1900 3 ,8 7 4 ,7 5 0 1 1 ,5 5 6 2 ,8 9 1 ,0 8 2 8 ,5 2 8 5*25 4 .7 4
I 1905 3 ,6 5 2 ,1 0 7 1 3 ,1 1 8 2 ,5 5 0 ,8 0 9 8 ,5 7 7 5 .6 2 4 .5 2
1 1910 3 ,4 0 5 ,2 4 6 1 1 ,4 8 0 2 ,2 6 5 ,3 3 3 6 ,7 5 0 4 .5 9 3 .2 2
| 1915 3 ,2 0 2 ,1 8 9 1 0 ,1 5 9 2 ,7 8 7 ,6 8 4 8 ,7 5 3 3 o l7 3 -05
P e r c e n t a g e  
o f  T o t a l
R e g io n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f  c o t t o n  
I m p o r t s
Year B r i t a i n I n d i a T o t a l
Europe
Hongkong
China
J a p a n O th e r s T o t a l
1870 8 4 o62 2 <,76 7*19 4 .1 7 _ 5*03 100
1875 82 0 56 4 .0 9 9 .0 6 0 .6 9 - 3 .6 7 100
1880 9 5 .5 4 2 .7 6 0 o98 0ol3 - 0 .2 7 100
1885 95 .5 8 1 .4 3 2*98 - - 0 .0 1 .100
1890 8 9 .5 9 2 * 95 4*41 1 .9 2 0 .2 5 0 .8 7 100
1895 86 0 62 5 * 68 4*02 1 .1 2 1*79 0 .7 7 100
1900 7 6 .5 2 7 .4 4 60 25 4*18 Oo 21 5 .4 0 100
1905 84° 22 1 ,1 7 11*37 2 o 29 0 .4 4 0 .5 1 100
1910 83*50 1 0 22 60 26 4*00 2*59 2 .4 3 100
1915 760 07 1 .5 9 12 0 08 60 01 2*97 1 * 3 0 100
E x p o r t s
Year j I n d o -  Siam P h i l i p -  
! n e s i a  p i n e s
B r i t i s h  Mala-  Burma 
Borneo ya
In d o -  O th e rs  Total 
c h in a
1870 22 .78 27.69 0 .8 9 5*35 2 .7 8 1 .6 4 26 .19 1 2 .6 8 100
1875 25 .87 24*41 0 .7 2 6 .0 4 3 .4 0 0 .3 0 31 .6 3 7 .6 3 10 0
1880 21 .60 28 .5 8 0 .4 3 1*55 2 .4 3 0 .1 4 3 9 .6 5 5 .6 2 100
1885 17*06 3 3 .3 8 0 .3 2 2 .3 1 2 .3 5 0 .2 2 3 9 .1 4 5*22 100
1890 20 .42 4 0 .1 6 0*55 4*88 1 .8 0 1 .5 1 28 .5 8 4 .1 0 100
1895 37*37 43 .2 7 1 .8 7 5*07 3*44 1 .8 5 2*93 4 .2 0 100
1900 3 4 .2 4  1 9 .8 5 7 .4 9 4 .7 3 3*86 1 .1 2 1 .0 1 27*60 100
|1905 3 0 .8 3 3 8 .7 9 2 .6 1 8 .0 3 1 5 .0 8 1 .7 0 0 .83 2 .1 3 100
! 1910 3 0 .2 5 31 * 46 3 .8 8 1 1 .0 8 2 1 .0 0 0 .2 8 1 .1 8 0 .8 7 100
: 1915 3 8 ,4 3 2 8 .4 5 1*55 7 * 66 1 9 .6 1 - 2 .0 5 2 .2 5 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX X I I  ( c o n t i n u e d ) 
S i n g a p o r e ’ s t r a d e  i n  p e p p e r  ( p i c u l s )
\ Y e a r
I m p o r t s
—
E x p o r t s P e r c e n t a g e o f  T o t a l
i Q u a n t i t y V a l u e Q u a n t i t y V a l u e I m p o r t s E x p o r t s
1870 109,433 854 149,964 1,401 2 0 73 5.71
1875 227,321 1 ,924 279,063 2,828 5*29 8.89
1880 109,333 1,373 187,648 2,152 2 .81 4.85
1885 211,007 4,071 191,424 3,941 6.20 7.86
1890 329 ,551 4,776 343,437 5 ,881 5.15 7 .64
1895 292,426 3,121 306,828 3,537 2.38 3.21
1900 193,177 6,187 185,103 6,074 2.81 3.38
1903 296,718 8,561. 283,935 8,368 3.67 4.41
1 1910 280,115 5,061 365,242 6,516 2.02 3.11
I 1915i . _
271,002 6,956 290,643 7 ,494 2.17 2.61
R e g io n a l d i s t r i b u t i on o f  n e p p e r  ( % )r  — ■i.ic v x j j nBfc3m - - ^ i i ,y i r  <er - <■ —r. wttl jm m * ■ n t » f i  v
Y ear M alaya I n d o n e s i a B r i t i s h  Borneo O th e rs T o ta l
1870 6 2 .6 0 3 4 .0 0 0 .2 0 3o21 100
1875 5 0 .1 3 48 0 83 — 1 .0 4 100
1880 4 9 .1 0 4 7 .9 2 1 .0 9 1 .8 9 100
1885 4 5 .7 0 5 0 .8 4 1 .4 2 2 .0 2 100
1890 6 4 .4 3 27.12- 5 .2 4 3 .2 1 100
1895 6 5 .0 7 2 6 .0 5 7 .1 8 I .7 0 100
I9OO 5 7 .1 8 2 4 .3 8 1 5 .2 5 3 .1 9 100
1905 5 1 .2 0 1 9 .9 6 2 7 .65 1 .1 9 100
1910 2 5 .1 0 4  2 .6 2 3 2 .0 5 0 .2 3 100
1915 9 .9 4 6 0 .5 3 2 0 .9 8 8 .5 5 100
Y e a r E u r o p e B r i t a i n U0 S0 Ao Hong­
k o n g
A u s t r a l i a O t h e r s T o t a l !I
1870 6 .7 9 4 6 .0 0 3 6 .5 7 2 .7 1 0 .4 3 7 -5 0 100
1875 17c 72 4 6 .4 1 2 3 .2 0 4 .3 5 1 .5 9 4 .8 1 100
1880 2 2 .2 1 4 1 .5 0 2 3 .0 6 1 .8 1 3 .6 ? 7 .7 6 100
1885 2 9 .8 4 5 4 .8 2 4 .8 5 1 .7 1 4 .2 9 4 .4 9 100
189 0 3 9 .3 5 3 3 .7 1 I 6 .1 4 2 .1 4 2 .25 6 .4 1 100
1895 3 5 .2 8 2 6 .7 ? 2 3 .8 9 5 .8 5 3 .6 8 4 .5 3 100
1900 3 9 .0 2 2 2 .52 1 8 .0 6 8 .1 6 5 .9 7 6 .2 7 100
II9O5 3 4 .8 3 1 3 .6 4 3 0 .1 8 7 .5 5 3 .8 8 9 .9 2 100
11910 4 2 .5 0 1 8 .9 7 15-90 5 .2 0 3 .7 9 1 3 .6 4 100
! 1915 1 6 .3 1 3 1 .0 4 1 9 .1 2 6 .7 3 5 .1 0 2 1 .7 0 100
STATISTICAL APPENDIX XII (continued)
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S in g a p o re ’ s t r a d e  in  r a t t a n s  ( p i c u l s )
i
! Y ear Im p o rts E x p o rts
P e rc e n ta g e  
o f  T o ta l
Q u a n ti ty V alue Q u a n tity V alue Im p o rts E x p o rts
1870 123 ,319 451 120 ,491 500 1 .4 4 2 c 04
1875 2 0 6 ,2 2 0 574 1 4 5 ,1 5 0 549 1 .5 8 1 .7 3
L880 1 9 1 ,5 5 1 830 283 ,919 1 ,6 0 4 1 .7 0 3 .6 2
1885 2 8 7 ,8 6 1 1 ,2 5 5 2 6 7 ,3 6 8 1 ,7 0 1 1 .9 1 3 .3 9
1890 38 2 ,7 2 7 2 ,2 4 4 3 5 4 ,2 8 8 2 ,5 2 3 2 .4 2 3 .2 8
1895 440 ,602 2 ,9 0 1 441 ,7 5 0 3 ,4 1 0 2 .2 2 3 .0 9
1900 643 ,7 9 0 5 ,4 3 4 6 1 1 ,7 8 6 6 ,6 5 5 2 .4 7 3 .7 0
L905 4 3 3 ,2 0 4 3 ,7 5 6 4 2 1 ,0 7 0 4 ,5 0 9 1 .6 1 2*37
1910 4 3 6 ,3 0 2 3 ,1 4 1 43 2 ,5 1 0 3 ,8 9 0 1 .2 6 1 .8 6
; 191-5 487,1-38 2 ,947 4 8 3 ,4 3 4 4 ,3 1 3 .9 2 1 .5 0
Regional distribution of rattans (%)
Imports
Year Indonesia British Borneo Malaya Others Total
1870 9 7 .1 0 0o92 1 .9 8 100
1875 7 8 .1 9 1 6 .5 5 5 .2 6 - 100
1880 8 9 .5 1 7 .4 5 3 . 0 4 - 100
1885 6 7=62 2 3 .5 2 8 c 69 0 c l7 100
1890 8 1 .2 7 1 4 .8 5 3«7 0 Oc 18 100
1895 86 „34 8 .4 5 5 o l7 0c03 100
1900 8 5 .8 3 7o50 6 .5 9 0 c 18 100
1905 82 o02 1 2 .8 9 4 .7 9 0c30 100
1910 84» 69 IO» 54 4 .3 3 Oo 44 100
! 1915 8 8 .7 5 5 .6 3 5o50 0 .1 2 100
E x n o rts
Y ear E urope USA Hong­kong Britain China India Others Total
1870 2 .9 6 5 0 c75 1 7 .4 8 21 c 06 4 .2 3 1 c30 2 c 22 100
1875 6 .7 3 2 4 .0 8 3 6 .9 5 12c 77 15«. 09 1 .1 4 3o37 100
1880 3 .8 6 4 4 .3 2 2 0 o 07 2 0 .3 4 6 .2 5 lo  77 3 o37 100
1885 1 8 .1 8 1 8 .9 4 I80O6 3 6 .7 0 4 .3 0 i o 4 l 2 .4 1 100
1890 29 0 93 37 0 23 1 5 .5 8 9 o l2 5 d l Oc 86 2 c 17 100
1895 52 019 18 c 85 1 5 .8 9 4 .9 3 4 .5 4 2 0 08 l c 5 2 100
1900 4 3 .3 9 28c 87 I2 c 3 5 7 o 5 l 3o79 2 c 09 2 c 00 100
1905 44c 82 27 »92 1 1 .6 9 5 .8 2 4o21 3o50 2 o04 100
1910 4 5 .2 7 2 3 .0 3 1 2 .4 1 6 .5 7 3 . 4 4 3 0 68 5 0 60 100
1 9 !5 8 .7 7 3 6 .5 9 17 0 09 2 0 .4 1 7 .5 8 4 .8 5 4 .7 1 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XII (continued) 
Singapore’s trade in gamhier (piculs)rYear Imports Exports Percentage of Total
Quantity Value Quantity Value Imports Exports
1870 228,643 1,002 573,083 1,780 3 0 20 7.26
1875 411,895 2,118 591,068 3,864 5.82 12.151880 540,838 2,302 779,964 3,618 4.72 8.16
1885 650,137 3,778 640.144 3,873 5.75 7o711890 678,711 5,288 769,023 6,015 5.70 7.81
1895 784,323 7,081 857,664 8,215 5.41 7.451900 733,589 5,904 784,761 6,672 2.68 3.71
1905 639,052 3,759 617,539 6,103 2.47 3.211910 478,560 5,258 484,016 5,703 2.10 2.72
! 1915 75,458 1,056 91,361 1,270 0.33 0 0 44
Regional distribution of gambier (%)
Exports
Year Malaya Indonesia British Borneo Others Total
1870 66017 32.93 0.90 1001875 60.33 39.67 - 1001880 54.67 41.63 3.70 - 100
1885 51.48 47.12 1.40 - 1001890 58.60 39 0 88 1.52 - 100
1895 74.78 23.42 1.86 0.04 100190 ) 71o70 25 0 20 3.10 - 1001905 74.60 22.95 2°45 - 1001910 79.14 18.50 2. 26 0.10 1001915 58.71 30.90 10 <•39 - 100
Exports
Year Britain USA Europe Indonesia India Others Total
1870 63.01 20.29 6.19 6.75 1.29 2.47 1001875 51.58 10.30 27.75 7c92 0.98 1.47 100I 1880 50.20 20.96 14.99 10.42 2.74 0.69 1001885 47.75 18.20 17° 04 14.61 1.26 1.14 1001890 36.91 17.19 28.93 12.96 2.22 1.79 100
1895 34.35 21.54 28.10 12.06 2.64 1.31 1001900 27.66 25.44 22.08 17.87 4.78 2.17 1001905 16.41 35.00 27.58 12.22 5.45 3.34 1001910 14.99 31.73 35.64 5 0 66 8.14 3.84 100
1 1915 34.70 24.56 17.38 4.18 14.79 4.39 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX X I I  ( c o n t i n u e d )
S in g a p o re ’ s t r a d e  in  f i s h  ( p i c u l s )
Y e a r I m p o r t s E x p o r t s P e r c e n t a g e o f  T o t a l
Q u a n t i t y V a lu e Q u a n t i t y V a l u e I m p o r t s E x p o r t s
1870 5 3 ,5 8 7 64 3 0 ,6 1 0 36 Oo 20 0 .1 5
1875 9 5 .3 0 0 604 5 6 ,0 1 4 416 1 0 66 1 .3 1
1880 1 4 3 ,7 3 1 1 ,0 3 2 1 1 9 ,9 5 6 1 ,1 3 3 2 ,6 7 2 ,5 6
1885 3 3 8 ,2 2 6 2 ,2 4 9 221 ,481 1 ,515 3 .4 3 3 .0 1
1890 5 0 7 ,9 2 3 3 ,4 8 6 327 ,1 2 8 2 ,3 9 0 3 ,7 6 3 .1 0
1895 7 2 3 ,3 2 3 4 ,9 3 6 6 5 0 ,7 2 5 4 ,6 5 9 3 .7 7 4 .2 4
1900 747 ,1 1 6 6 ,0 8 1 727 ,4 8 9 6 ,312 2 .7 6 3 .5 1
1905 7 9 6 ,9 3 7 8 ,1 7 8 7 5 6 ,4 1 6 7 ,6 5 7 3 .5 0 4 .0 3
1910 9 1 7 ,6 5 5 8 ,6 6 3 776 ,887 7 ,6 7 7 3 .4 7 3 066
1915 9 7 1 ,4 6 4 9 ,9 8 9 779 ,8 0 3 8 ,0 7 3 3 .1 2 2 .8 1
Re g io n a l  d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  f i s h  ( % )
p o r t s
Y ear In d o c h in a Siam In d o n e s ia M alaya Hongkong O th e rs T o ta l
1870 4 9 .4 0 1 8 .5 6 5 .6 9 1 .4 8 1 6 .7 7 8 .1 0 100
1875 4 5 .2 0 1 8 .3 1 6 .4 7 1 3 .15 1 .5 3 4 .8 0 100
1880 1 4 .0 5 5 2 .8 1 7 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 5 .2 1 0 .9 3 100
1885 4 1 .0 8 2 3 .76 7 .6 4 1 0 .1 4 1 3 .8 2 3 .5 6 100
1890 2 2 .6 1 40« 00 1 8 .0 5 9 .3 2 8 .0 0 2 0 02 100
1895 3 8 .5 5 3 3 .0 4 1 1 .9 5 8 ,5 1 6 .5 8 1 .3 7 100
1900 4 0 .7 1 2 1 .6 5 1 4 .8 9 1 2 .4 6 8 .2 2 2 .0 7 100
1905 3 9 .9 6 2 4 .2 8 1 4 .5 5 1 1 .4 6 8065 1 .1 0 100
1910 4 0 .1 1 2 9 .0 9 1 1 .3 6 8 .7 2 5 .3 5 5 .3 7 100
1915 4 2 .5 4 2 4 .8 8 I0o93 1 0 .7 7 2 .4 9 8 .3 9 100 ---- - ---
Y e a r I n d o n e s i a Burma Mai ay  a O t h e r s T o t a l
1870 9 1 .4 2 0 .5 8 8 .0 0 100
1875 7 8 .8 2 7 .9 3 - 13o25 100
1880 8 8 .7 1 3 .6 2 0 .7 9 6 .8 8 100
1885 7 2 .8 0 1 5 .6 4 1 .0 5 1 0 .5 1 100
1890 6 8 .9 5 1 6 .1 1 5*73 9 .2 1 100
1895 7 6 .4 6 1 4 .2 3 4 .0 1 5 -30 100
1900 7 6 .0 8 1 3 .9 8 5 .3 2 5o30 100
1905 62 088 2 0 .0 2 9 .1 9 7*91 100
1910 6 9 .6 2 1 4 .0 2 9o00 7 .1 2 100
1915--------- 7 2 .4 6 1 4 .8 9 8 .0 0 4 «»65 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX X I I  ( c o n t i n u e d ) 
S i n g a p o r e ’ s  t r a d e  i n  P a r a
Y e a r
—
I m p o r t s E x p o r t s P e r c e n t a g e o f  T o t a l
Q u a n t i t y  V a l u e Q u a n t i t y V a l u e I m p o r t s E x p o r t s
1905
1910
1915
1 , 4 6 4  573  
1 7 , 4 4 6  7 , 0 4 7  
3 3 6 , 6 4 9  3 8 , 4 4 8
1 , 3 9 3
2 4 , 9 8 7
4 5 4 , 3 5 8
528
9 , 8 3 8
5 4 , 6 4 1
0 . 2 4
2 . 8 2
1 2 . 0 2
0 . 2 8
4 . 7 0
1 9 . 0 0
R e g i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P a r a  r u b b e r  ( % )
Y e a r
M a la y a I n d o n e s i a B r i t i s h
B o r n e o
C e y l o n Siam O t h e r s T o t a l
1905 1 0 0 0 0 0 — _ 1 0 0
1 9 1 0 97 »37 2 . 4 8 0 , 0 6 - 0o07 0 o02 1 0 0
1915 8 6 , 5 4
__
1 0 . 6 9 2 o l9 0 . 3 6 0 . 0 4 0 . 1 8 1 0 0
E x p o r ts
r* —
Y ear B r i t a i n USA. J a p a n  A u s t r ­
a l i a
E u r o p e C anada O t h e r s T o t a l j
1905 87  „30 2 . 4 6 0 . 5 7 0 . 3 8 0 . 1 9 — 9 . 0 9 1 0 0
1 9 1 0 8 4 . 2 2 7o51 1 . 4 7 5 . 1 2 0 . 0 3 - 1 . 6 8 1 0 0
| 1 9 1 5 1 5 . 0 2 7 0 o 09 4 . 6 2 0o55 6 . 9 2 2 . 8 0 — 1 0 0
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX X I I  ( c o n t i n u e d )  
S i n g a p o r e ’ s  t r a d e i n  c o p r a ( p i c u l s )
Y e a r
!
I m p o r t s E x p o r t s P e r c e n t a g e o f  T o t a l
Q u a n t i t y V a l u e Q u a n t i t y V a l u e I m p o r t s E x p o r t s
1870 — — mm
1875 - - - - —
1880 6 6 ,8 8 9 248 110 ,8 1 5 496 0 .51 1 .1 2
1885 3 9 0 ,9 0 9 1 ,3 2 8 286,151 1 ,1 9 5 2 .0 2 2 .3 8
1890 216 .098 936 281 ,987 1 ,3 2 9 1 .0 1 1 .7 3
1895 ■ 508 ,057 2 ,816 5 5 2 ,7 3 4 3 ,1 4 5 2 .1 5 2 .8 5
1900 641 ,0 8 3 4 ,152 543 ,6 5 2 3 ,6 6 0 1 .8 9 2 .0 3
! 1905 8 9 6 ,2 1 2 6 ,893 775 ,432 6 ,0 8 0 2 .9 5 3 .2 0
1910 1 ,2 7 4 ,2 1 9 1 2 ,8 1 7 11 ,319,644 13 ,592 5 .1 3 6 .4 9
1915 i l , 038 ,438 9 ,1 0 5 865 ,3 3 2 7 ,9 5 3 2 .8 5 2 .7 7
Re g i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  co p ra  ( % )
I m p o r t sx f ju  a \j o
Y ear In d o n e s ia  M alaya P h i l i p p in e s  B r i t i s h O th e rs T o ta l
B orneo
1870 — — tmm —
1875 - - - - — —
1880 9 4 .2 0 3 .3 8 1 .2 1 1 .2 1 - 100
1885 8 8 .0 3 3 .5 4 2 .2 6 1 .8 0 4 .3 7 100
1890 8 5 .1 3 I .8 3 6 .5 2 1 .9 2 4 .6 0 100
1895 7 8 .0 5 7 .2 1 7 .6 3 1 .2 1 5 .9 0 100
1900 7 4 .0 4 1 1 .9 4 4 .4 4 1 .5 2 4 .0 5 100
1905 7 9 .4 3 1 4 .3 7 3 .6 8 10 64 0 .8 7 100
i 1910 7 4 .3 9 1 7 .9 2 3 .7 0 0 .7 5 3 .2 4 100
1915 5 8 .2 5 2 8 .97 5 .8 8 1 .2 6 5 .6 4 100
E x p o r ts
Y ear E u r o p e B r i t a i n O t h e r s T o ta l
1870 - - — -
1875 - - - -
1880 7 3 .0 9 2 6 .5 6 0 .3 5 100
1885 82o l8 1 7 .8 2 - 100
1890 7 6 .0 7 2 1 .6 7 2 .2 6 100
1895 9 4 .4 0 5 .4 0 0 0 20 100
1900 9 9 .7 3 - 0 0 27 100
1905 9 7 .1 6 1 .0 2 1 .8 1 100
1910 9 0 .1 8 8 .8 6 0 .9 6 100
1915 8 2 .2 2 1 7 .7 5 0 .0 3 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX X I I  ( c o n t i n u e d )
S i n g a p o r e ’ s t r a d e  i n  c o a l  ( t o n s )
| I m p o r t s E x p o r t s P e r c e n t a g e
!
o f  T o t a l
Q u a n t i t y V a l u e Q u a n t i t y V a l u e I m p o r t s E x p o r t s
1870 6 2 ,8 3 5 531 1 ,0 7 8 9 1 .6 9 0 .0 4
1875 193 ,6 0 7 983 2 ,5 9 9 21 2o70 0 .0 7
1880 1 7 0 ,7 8 0 1 ,6 1 0 738 7 3o30 0o02
1885 3 2 7 ,8 9 0 2 ,7 3 9 1 ,6 4 3 14 4 ,1 7 0 .0 3
1890 3 1 0 ,9 3 4 2 ,8 4 5 2 ,2 8 2 25 3-07 0o03
1895 4 6 0 ,7 2 6 4 ,1 0 5 1 3 ,7 4 2 165 3 o l4 0 ,1 5
1900 66 1 ,5 5 3 7 ,9 1 4 5 ,1 4 6 108 3 .6 0 0 .0 6
1905 5 9 8 ,3 6 1 5 ,9 3 2 6 ,0 7 4 67 2 .5 4 0 .0 4
1910 6 2 1 ,0 6 4 5 ,6 4 7 2 ,1 3 7 20 2 .2 6 0 .0 1
1915 602 ,928 6 ,3 4 6 1 3 ,3 8 6 131 1 .9 8 0 .0 5
R e g i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o a l  (%)
— mrarnm■— ca— M w a m » -  «r^-- —>;nii ww-.b— MMW—
I m p o r t s
1
Y e a r J a p a n B r i t ­
a i n
I n d i a A u s t ­
r a l i a
B r i t ­
i s h
B o r n ­
eo
I n d o ­
c h i n a
I n d o ­
n e s i a
O t h e r s T o t a l
1870 0 .5 6 9 1 .6 7 0 .9 1 1 .5 1 1 . 66 0 .7 5 2 .9 4 100
1875 - 9 6 .6 2 0 .1 4 2 .8 8 - - 0 .1 3 0 .2 3 100
1880 - 9 9 .0 0 0 .9 3 0 .0 7 - - - - 100
1885 0 .5 0 9 1 .0 7 - 7 «37 0 ,8 4 - 0 .2 2 - 100
1890 13o92 6 7 .4 3 1 .6 9  1 5 .3 9 l« 4 4 - 0 .1 3 - 100
1895 3 8 ,5 9 4 0 .0 7 3 .8 2 8 .8 4 7 .3 6 1 .3 2 - - 100
1900 60 0 84 1 9 .2 6 8 .3 2 7 .5 4  1 .3 0 0 .6 4 - 2 .1 0 100
1905 4 4 ,21 1 5 .9 6 24c28 1 0 .1 8 0 .8 3 0 .6 7 3 .8 7 - 100
1910 5 1 .8 6 2 .6 2 2 0 .5 3 1 5 .9 8 0 .1 6 0 .8 0 6 .2 6 1 .7 9 100
1915 6 8 .6 5 0 .1 1 6 .6 6 9o l 2 1 .3 5 1 .2 9 2 .7 6 1 0 .0 6 100
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX . X I I  ( c o n t i n u e d ) 
S i n g a p o r e ’ s t r a d e i n  p e t r o l e u m  ( c a s e s )
i
i Y ear Im p o rts E x p o rts P e rc e n ta g e o f  T o ta l
I Q u a n t i ty V alue Q u a n tity V alue Im p o rts Exp 0 r t  s
A______T
1870 - - ~ - — —
1870 - - - - - -
1880 - - - - — -
1885 3 2 5 ,4 6 8 590 161 ,243 313 0 .9 0 0 .6 2
1890 497 ,9 9 8 934 297,039 580 lo O l 0 .7 5
1895 6 5 7 ,3 4 7 1 ,3 8 6 319 ,152 744 1 .0 6 0 » 67
1900 1 ,3 2 9 ,8 8 3 2,943 9 2 9 ,7 0 0 1 ,9 0 1 1 . 3 4 1 ,0 6
1905 7 H ,5 1 1 1 ,4 3 7 432 ,4 9 0 921 0 0 60 0 .4 8
1910 64 1 ,3 3 7 1 ,3 2 5 3 0 6 ,9 3 4 663 0o53 0*32
1915 5 2 4 ,4 3 0 1 ,3 5 0 333 ,0 2 6 86 3 0 .4 2 0 .3 0
R e g io nal_ _di_sj_ r ib u rio n  oil p e t r o l eum
I m p o r t s
Y ear j In d o n e s ia R u ss ia USA Burma O th e rs T o ta l j
1870  ! — - _ _ —
1875 j - - - - - -
1880 - - - - - -
1885 - - 100 .00 - - 100
1890 - 4 6 .3 2 5 3 .6 8 - - 100
1895 4 1 »20 3 8 .3 1 20 .35 - 0 .1 4 100
1900 74 .1 9 1 1 .7 5 9 .2 7 4 .7 9 - 100
' 1905 56 .1 5 - 3 3 .2 6 1 0 .5 9 - 100
! 1910 6 7 .2 4 - 30 .11 2 .6 5 - 100
I 1915 86 0 82 - 13 .1 8 - - 100
E x p o rts
Y ear Ja p an  In d o - Siam M alaya B r i t i s h Hong- In d o - Others Total
n e s i a B orneo kong C hina
1870 ~  _ _ _
1875 - - - - - - - -
1880 - - - - - — - -
1885 6 3 .8 0 2 2 .5 4 3 ol7 2 .2 2 6 .0 3 - 2 . 2 4 100
1890 -  47 .5 8 21 .21 9 .6 5 9 .3 1 - 4 .3 1 7 . 9 4 100
1895 4 0 .3 2 1 3 .4 4 2 2 .3 2 1 0 .4 8 - 4« 44 9 .0 0 100
1900 3 7 .8 7  1 4 .5 2 1 1 .8 9 6 . 9 4 4 .1 0 3 .1 6 2 «79 1 8 .73 100
1905 2 1 .3 7 26 .4 7 25 .3 8 1 2 .5 9 - 6 . 7 0 7 .4 9 100
1910 -  3 5 .8 9 12 .6 7 44 «49 6 .4 8 - 0 .3 0 0 .1 7 100
1915 1 1 .0 0 6 .0 2 5 8 .48 2 4 .3 2 - - 0 .1 8 100
Y ear
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
190 0
1905
1910
1915
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STATIST I  CAL APPENDIX X I I I
S in g a p o re ’ s im p o r ts  o f t i n ,  1870-1915 
‘ ( # 0 0 0 )
•
Prom f o r e ig n  c o u n t r i e s Prom Penang^ and  M alacca
P i c u l s D o l la r s P ic u l s D o l l a r s
9 ,6 1 9 271 59 ,5 2 8 1 ,7 8 0
1 2 ,6 8 3 265 7 0 ,2 1 0 1 ,6 8 4
8 ,4 8 1 205 104 ,639 2 ,8 1 9
5 2 ,4 7 3 1 ,3 7 8 7 5 ,4 8 6 1 ,4 1 3
1 3 4 ,4 4 0 3 ,5 3 4 1 1 2 ,5 3 8 1 ,7 0 0
1 9 2 ,3 7 3 6 ,7 7 9 8 7 ,0 6 0 3 ,0 3 5
6 3 ,1 1 2 4 ,6 5 9 3 ,1 2 7 149
1 5 6 ,6 4 1 1 2 ,5 8 4 448 38
5 9 ,9 9 8 4 ,6 1 0 474 36
9 0 ,9 9 8 6 ,7 7 7 504 40
S o u rce :  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  Blue Books 
m a in ly  from  Penang
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XIV
P o p u l a t i o n  of t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  
1871-1911
-  — 
R a c e
1871
________________
1881
P e r s o n s M ale
1
F e m a le P e r s o n s M ai e F e m a le
C h in e s e 1 0 4 ,6 1 5 87 ,3 2 7 1 7 ,2 8 8 174 ,3 2 7 143 ,605 3 0 ,7 2 2
M alay s 1 5 9 ,4 5 3 81 ,3 5 6 7 8 ,0 9 7 194 ,0 4 2 9 3 ,6 7 7 9 5 ,3 6 5
I n d i a n s 3 3 ,3 9 0 25 ,526 7 ,8 6 4 41 ,2 6 8 3 1 ,2 6 4 1 0 ,0 0 4
Europeans 2 ,4 2 9 1 ,8 4 8 581 3 ,4 8 3 2 ,8 0 3 680
O th e r s 8 ,2 1 0 4 ,3 7 6 3 ,8 3 4 1 0 ,2 6 4 5 ,3 3 8 4 ,926
TOTAL 3 0 8 ,0 9 7 200 ,433 1 0 7 ,6 6 4 4 2 3 ,3 8 4 281 ,687 1 4 1 ,6 9 7
F l o a t i n g *
R ac e
1891 1901
P e r s o n s M ale F e m a le P e r s o n s M ale F e m a le
C h in e s e
Malays
I n d i a n s
E uropeans
O th e r s
2 2 2 ,9 6 9
2 1 0 ,387
5 2 ,6 3 7
4 ,4 2 2
1 0 ,6 4 4
1 7 9 ,2 3 5
1 0 6 ,3 8 7
3 9 ,5 4 7
3 ,1 6 9
5 ,2 5 2
4 3 ,7 3 4
103 ,8 9 0
1 3 ,0 9 0
1 ,2 5 3
5 ,392
274 ,2 0 7
214 ,538
5 6 ,6 4 5
4 ,4 8 4
13 ,3 7 8
211 ,.513 
107 ,0 5 9
4 1 ,6 8 0
2 ,819
6 ,767
6 2 ,6 9 4
107 ,4 7 9
14 ,9 6 5
1 ,6 6 5
6 , 6 l l
TOTAL 5 0 1 ,0 5 9 3 3 3 ,7 0 0 167 ,359 563 ,252 369 ,838 1 9 3 ,4 1 4
jF l o a t in g 1 1 ,8 4 6 11 ,140 706 1 2 ,5 4 9 12 ,440 109
1911
P e rso n s P a l e s Female
C h in ese
M alays
I n d i a n s
E u ro p ean s
O th e rs
3 6 9 ,843
2 k 0 , 2 0 6
82 ,053
7 ,3 6 8
14 ,547
2 7 2 , 2 1 0
1 2 0 , 6 9 2
6 2 ,3 3 0
5 ,1 7 9
6 ,9 6 3
97 ,633
1 1 9 ,5 1 4
19 ,725
2 ,189
7 ,6 3 4
TOTAL 
F l o a t i n g
71 4 ,0 6 9  4 6 7 ,3 7 4
8 ,0 0 6 7 ,6 7 4
2 4 6 ,6 95
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N o te s :  1 ) fc i n c l u d e d  i n  g e n e r a l  p o p u la t io n , ,
2) From 1871 C ensuses  were h e ld  e v e ry  decade hy
G overnm ent.
3 )  E u r a s i a n s  have b e en  in c lu d e d  u n d e r  O thers*  
(S o u rc e :  B ased  on M a r r i o t t ,  H„ 'P o p u l a t i o n  o f  S t r a i t s
S e t t l e m e n t s  and Malay P e n in s u la  d u r in g  th e  l a s t  
C e n t u r y ' , i n  JSBPAS D ec*1912, No„62, p p „31 -42o )
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX XV
Signatories to the Straits Homeward Goncerence,
31 October 1901
The shipping companies were*
Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
Ocean Steamship Company 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
1 Glen’
'Shire’
1 Ben ’
'Mutual' 
f Shell’
Hamburg-American 
Messageries Maritimes of Prance 
Norddeutscher Lloyd 
Austrian Lloyd 
'Puhhattino?
German-Australian 
Rotterdam Lloyd
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij Nederland 
Compania Transatlantica of Barcelona and Cadiz 
Compagnie Nationale de Navigations Marseilles 
East Asiatic Company of Copenhagen
Russian East Asiatic Steamship Company of St Petersburg 
Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company 
Campagnie des Vapeurs de Charge Francais 
Compagnie Francaise de Navigation des Chargeurs Reunis
The import-export firms or the freight agents were:
Adamson* Gilfillan and Co0 
Arnold Otto Meyer 
Edward Boustead and Co«
(Source: Royal Commission on _Shipping Rings, vol«, ii, 
Cd» 4^9? Appendix xxv, p 0 lll7T~
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HISTORICAL APPENDIX A
A History of Straits Settlements Trade Statistics
During the period 1870-1915 the accuracy of the Straits
Settlements trade returns was questioned on several occasions,
much of the criticism being levelled on the existence of a
large and persistent import surplus,, It was held by some
merchants that the colony's trade could not possibly continue
to show an import surplus year after and they concluded
that it was proof of the inaccuracy of the trade returns«^
At one stage the Colonial government ever considered dis-
2continuing their publication while on another occasion a
■5merchant proposed it o However, better judgement prevailed,,
In 1894 the Singapore Chamber of Commerce expressed its
view that the trade returns were
o o o as correct as could be expected under the 
present system, and undoubtedly in the future . 
would form most valuable records for reference«^
It is fortunate for students of history that records of
imports and exports of the colony were kept, for despite
their shortcomings - no perfect trade statistics exist
lo See ante p, 33 for a discussion of the import surplus 
in the colony’s trade»
2o SCCAR 1890, App«C, Col« Sec« to SCC, 3 February 1890, 
p o 14°
3° SSLCP 1905, 30 October, p« B18» A.Huttenbach proposed 
it because 'it seems a waste to go on printing trade 
statistics which are practically useless« „o'
4« SCCAR 1894» Address of the Chairman at annual general 
meeting, 30 January, 1895? P° 6«
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for any country anyway - they form a most important source 
of information for a study of changes over a period of time 
in the trade of colony»
An outline history of the compilation of these returns 
will permit a letter appreciation of their defects as well 
as their usefulness as research material»
The early statistics
The'first attempt to compile systematic statistical
returns for imports and exports in the British Empire seems
to have heen made in the 1820s when the Annual Blue Boohs
were first published» Colonial governments were instructed
to furnish brief annual figures of the trade of the colonies
by commodities* quantities and value»^ That these early
returns were not very satisfactory is revealed by a Colonial
Office Circular of 22 August i860:
»»» the imperfect returns contained in the 
Blue Books have only been extorted by the most 
urgent injunctions, repeated, year after year, 
and by order sent out to defer payment of 
salaries to officers charged with the preparation 
of the returns until they should have been 
finished» 2
The trade returns of Singapore date from about 1823 tut 
they were not official figures, these dating only from 1833 
when the regulations governing the compilation of trade 
statistics in India were extended to the Straits Settle­
ments» A historian of the period from the founding of 
Singapore to 1869 says: ’the fault of the contemporary
1« RoGcDo Allen and J»E» Ely, International Trade -* 
Statistics» New York 1953, P« 330»"
3« Ibid», quoted, p» 331»
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trade returns is that they were badly and inadequately
compiled »»» neither the bestem nor Asian merchants
cared to give accurate accounts of the value and volume
of their trade»«» / whilej? the British administration
was not particularly keen in compiling very accurate trade
statistics’ He goes on to argue, however, that these
statistics, crude as they are, serve as indispensable
sign-posts to indicate the magnitude and the direction
of growth of Singapore’s trade»
After the transfer in 1867 discussions began between
the newly-established Colonial government and the Singapore
Chamber of Commerce regarding the compilation of the trade
returns» But nothing resulted from these consultations»
It is quite likely that the trade returns until 1886 were
less accurate than those after that date because the
information regarding values of imports and exports was
supplied by ship captains and not by consignees and shippers,
nor was it furnished very regularly» In 1881 there was
an attempt to enforce strictly the provisions of the 1833
2Indian regulations which was, however unsuccessful»
I» Lin Ken Wong, The Trade of Singapore» 1819-1869 
JMBJRAS vole XXXIII Part 4 December 19^07 PP» 5-6»
"(This is the newly-published version of his M.A» 
thesis 'A Study of the Trade of Singapore 1819-1869')»
2» SSLCP 1885» 29 December, pp» B155-6»
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The reforms of 1866°, uniform weights and measures
The accuracy of the trade returns improved considerably
from 1886 as a result of two laws passed that year, the
first providing for the Registration of Imports and 
1Exports and the second for the use of Uniform Weights
2and Measures throughout the Colony„ The need for uniformity 
had been felt for some time and in 1880 a first step was 
taken with the introduction of a bill to fix the capacity 
of a local measure, the chupaho It varied from 32 ounces 
in Singapore to 39°188 in Penang and 37 = 200 in Malacca.» The 
The lack of uniformity enabled some merchants to indulge 
in sharp practices» Some Chinese merchants, for example, 
by the judicious use of varying standards of weights and 
measures, were able to buy coffee from native producers 
and sell it to European merchants at one to one and a half 
dollars below the purchase price! In the language of the 
bazaar, they were described as using the daching penchuri 
(the thieving scale) while the profit they were thus able 
to make was untong daching (the profit made by the scale)»
The Singapore Chamber of Commerce favoured the status quo 
but the Penang Chamber and the government wanted reform» It
1» Ordinance 1 of 1886, 3 February 1886, in Laws of the
Straits Settlements, (Revised Edition), vol, I, 1835-1900, 
London 1920» ~
2» Ordinance VII of 1886, 1 July 1886, same source»
3» SSLCP 1880» 20 May, p»4; 17 August, pp»48-51;
31 August, pp«70-l»
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was finally agreed that the question of weights and measures 
he tackled as a whole and not piece-meal and a committee 
was set up to investigate and make recommendations. It, 
however, failed to submit a report hut the government 
pressed on alone and in 1883 passed a hill fixing the capacity 
of the gantang as the equivalent of the Imperial gallon and 
that of the chirp ah. was the Imperial quart (40 ounces)
In 1885 a committee comprising representatives of the 
government and the Chamber of Commerce found that there 
was ’much confusion and irregularity’ in the system of weights
pused. The following year a hill came before the Council
which, by incorporating the reform of 1883? introduced the
yard, the Imperial pound and the Imperial gallon as the
standard units of length, weight and capacity in the colony.
These units were to he used in all dealings in the colony,
hut it was conceded that some native weights were ’so
generally used that it would he impossible to abolish them,
such as the picul and the kati* and their use was therefore
allowed. The picul was fixed at 133i pounds. The chupah.
defined in 1883? was also allowed. This hill was passed
3without opposition. Subsequently the Chinese measures of
1. Ordinance XI of 1883° See SSLCP 1883? 4 June, pp.37-8;
20 August, p„71; and 26 October, p.143«
2. SSLCP 1886, App.25, ’Report of the Committee on Weights 
and Measures’, p. C335°
3. Ordinance VII of 1886, see also SSLCP 1886, 31 May, 
pp. B27”8; 28 June, pp. 40-3; 15 July, p. B89»
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length - the chhek (l4i inches) and the chhun (1-19/40 
inches) - were also allowed»^
Thus by 1886 the units of weights and measures in the 
three settlements were rendered uniform and clearly defined., 
and the recording of quantities of commodities imported and 
exported became less haphazard and more systemmatic and 
accurate»
Registration of imports and exports
On 4 December 1882 a Colonial Circular asked for 
information on the manner of ascertaining the value of imports 
and exports» The Governor of the Straits Settlements replied 
that as a rule imports were valued at the port of entry and 
included cost, insurance, freight and all other charges»
In some cases a certain percentage of declared value was 
also added and in others the actual value of the articles 
excluding freight and shipping charges was taken to be the 
value of imports» Exports were valued as they lay on board 
ship at the port of shipment and included shipping charges 
but, in nearly all cases, excluded freight and insurance 
charges» The Governor said that the values of imports and 
exports were recorded as declared by importers and exporters 
and were not calculated by government officials, who, 
however, from their personal knowledge and experience, 
exercised a check on inaccuracies in these declarations»
1«» SSLCP 1910 f 19 august, p.B86; 2 September, p.BlOO;
9 September, p.3104; 16 September, p.BlOB.
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Ke said, however, that in future the market prices as 
produced by the Singapore and Penang Chambers of Commerce 
would he used to calculate ehe values of imports and exports»" 
But this decision was soon reversed»
In early 1886, under the provisions of the Ordinance 
for the Registration of Imports and Exports, the procedure 
for the declaration of imports and exports was clearly 
prescribed. The ’ descript ion, quantity or weight and value 
of goods’ were to be filled in on specially printed forms 
and submitted by importers and exporters» Masters of vessels 
could not deliver or accept cargo until they had received 
written notification from the Registrar of Imports and 
Exports that these requirements had been met» The agents 
or owners of vessels were also required to submit within 
ten days the manifests of inward and outward cargo» Captains 
of .junks?tongkangs and prahus had to report to the Registrar 
to make verbal declarations;if they failed to do so no port 
clearance was issued to them» The luggage of ships’ pass­
engers not exceeding $250 v/as exempted from the provisions
2of this ordinance»
As a result of these new regulations, declared the 
Registrar of Imports and Exports in 1887s ’the present 
Returns are better compiled than in former years’»
1«, Gov» SS to Sec» of State, SS 449? 1 November 1883«
2» SSLCP 1886, App»4? P« C9 - l60
3c SSAR 1887» p»66»
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The Singapore Chamber of Commerce conceded that there 
was some improvement hut expressed the hope that a better 
qualified person would he appointed on the retirement of 
the then i n c u m b e n t T h e  new Registrar, Alexander Stuart, 
in his Annual Reports for 1889 and 1890, said that the in­
accuracy in the returns was the fault of the merchants who 
submitted the declarations from which his department compiled 
the trade returns. He complained of lack of experienced 
personnel as the result of clerks being frequently transferred
abouto He pointed out that in a free port it was unlikely
2that very highly accurate statistics could be obtained
In 1890 the Colonial Secretary asked the Chamber 
whether the government should discontinue the publication 
of the trade returns to which the Chamber replied that it 
’ would very strongly deprecate the retrograde step of 
ceasing to collect and publish these Returns’-^ . Both the 
Singapore and Penang Chambers promised to give every assis­
tance to the Registrar, The Department was reorganized 
and the government then expressed the opinion that the returns 
were ’more accurately and more intelligently compiled’^
1. SCCAR 1887, pc5,
2, SSAR 1889c Pc 121o
3° SCCAR 1890c ApPoC, Colo Sec, to SCC, 3 February 1890,
Pol4 and SCC to Col, Sec, 3 April 1890, p 015<> Enclosed 
was a Memorandum by the Commit, tee of the Chamber of 
Commerce on the Import and Export Returns of 1888,
pp,15-18,
4* SSLCP 1890, App,l4s Address of the Officer Administrating 
the Government, 2 October 1890, p 0 C73°
The Registrar in his Report for 1891 stated that there was
increased European cooperation and declared that the returns
for Singapore were as accurate as could he hoped for«^
Praise . for the Straits Settlements
A Colonial Office Circular of 5 December 1891 enclosed
the results of the enquiry into the compilation of colonial
trade statistics begun nine years previously« The Report
said that ’great differences were found to exist,'not only
in regard to the principles on which valuations were based,
but also in the methods employed for securing correctness
in the results’. It pointed out that the free ports of
Gibraltar and Hongkong had no trade returns while the returns
of Malta were highly inaccurate due to the reluctance of
merchants to give information« It went on:
We may point out that although the ports of the 
Straits Settlements are free ports, the local 
authorities are able to compile returns of their 
imports and exports«2
Comment was made on the theory held in some colonies that
o«oto b& flourishing £ a colonyJ must have a 
preponderance of exports over imports, and if 
the unassisted figures did not show this they 
were duly rectified by the Customs«3
It is most likely that the unassisted statistics of the
colony were as correct as was possible under the circumstances,
although due allowance must be made for the omissions
1 « p080o
2. & 3° ’Report of a Committee appointed to enquire into 
the Compilation of Import and Export Statistics in 
the Colonies’ Colonies General, Miscellaneous No«83? 
October 1891, Enclosed in CO Circular 5 December 1891°
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described in Chapter II'.-1- 
The changes of 1894
The colonial government, in consultation with the
Singapore Chamber of Commerce, examined the proposals which
wore made in- this Report and implemented them with slight
changes. The government and Chamber agreed that imports
were to Tbe valued at the port of entry at invoice value
less trade discounts but including freight and insurance
charges, but they decided to include landing and commission
charges which the Report had suggested should be excluded.
They agreed with the Report *s suggestion that exports be valued
at the port of shipment and should include the value of
packages. The values taken were to be those declared but
the Registrar of Imports and Exports was to make checks
against market reports and by consulting the Chambers of
Commerce. The colony, however, was not prepared to use
2Imperial standrds.
The colony adopted the propos ed classification of commo­
dities under four major heads and from 1894 the trade returns 
were presented in this new fashion:
I Live animals, Pood, Drink and Narcotics
II Raw materials - (a) Textile
(b) Metal
(c) Other
III Manufactured articles - (a) Textile
(b) Metal
(c) Other
IV Coin and Bullion
1. See ante, pp.34“5°
2. See Report of 1891 and Gov. SS to Sec. of State, No.101 
13 April 1893o
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I n  1894 th e  R e g i s t r a r  o f  I m p o r t s  and  E x p o r t s  r e b u t t e d  c r i t ­
i c i s m s  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  h i s  d e p a r tm e n t  and  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  
t r a d e  r e t u r n s  were a c c u r a t e  and u s e f u l  t o  one p o s s e s s i n g  
'a p r o p e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  f i g u r e s ' .  He a d m i t t e d ,  however ,  
t h a t  t h e  i n t e r - s e t t l e m e n t  s t a t i s t i c s  were p r o b a b l y  i n a c c u r a t e  
due to m i s t a k e s  such a s  d o u b l e - c o u n t i n g  and t h a t  t h e  v a lu e  
of  the  t r a n s s h i p m e n t  t r a d e  c o u ld  no t  be  o b ta in ed » ^ -
In  1902 S t u a r t  e x p l a i n e d  how th e  s t a t i s t i c s  were 
co m p i led  t o  th e  Commission e n q u i r i n g  i n t o  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  
o f  the  S t r a i t s  Homeward Conference® E x p o r t s  were s u b s t a n ­
t i a l l y  c o r r e c t  a s  t h e  m a n i f e s t s  o f  v e s s e l s  s e r v e d  a s  a check 
on th e  d e c l a r a t i o n s  of  m erchan ts»  As a f u r t h e r  check  f o r  
a c c u r a c y  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n s  from which he com pi led  t h e  t r a d e  
r e t u r n s  were t r a n s m i t t e d  to  the  Chamber of  Commerce d a i l y  
f o r  i t s  p e r u s a l  and to  be made p u b l i c  so t h a t  any e r r o r s  and 
i n a c c u r a c i e s  c o u l d  b e  im m e d ia te ly  r e c t i f i e d »  The v a l u e s  
of  i m p o r t s  of some m a n u f a c tu r e d  goods from Europe an d  4hose
of  some e x p o r t s ,  f o r  which no q u a n t i t y  d a t a  were a v a i l a b l e ,  
v/ere u n a v o id a b ly  l e s s  a c c u r a t e  a s  i t  was more d i f f i c u l t  to  
make checks  f o r  a c c u ra c y »  T h i s ,  he d e c l a r e d ,  r e s  a l s o  t h e  
c a se  w i th  th e  s t a t i s t i c s  of B r i t a i n »  R e g ard in g  t h e  v a lu e  o f  
t r a n s s h i p m e n t  t r a d e  S t u a r t  s a i d  he c o u ld  no t  o b t a i n  r e l i a b l e
1 . SSAR 1 8 9 4 » p »2 5 9 »
The p r e s e n t  s t u d y  o n ly  d e a l s  w i th  the  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  o f  
th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  and e x c lu d e s  th e  i n t e r - s e t t l e m e n t  trade 
which  i s  a d m i t t e d l y  i n a c c u r a t e ,  and t r a n s s h i p m e n t  t r a d e ,  
f o r  which no p r o p e r  s t a t i s t i c s  e x i s t »  Also  e x c l u d e d  a r e  
th e  v a l u e s  of  i m p o r t s  and e x p o r t s  o f  Labuan,  C h r i s tm a s  
and  Cocos I s l a n d -  which  from 1908 v/ere c o m p i led  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  t h o s e  of  th e c o lo n y »
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statistics: very often the shippers were not aware of the
contents of the cases they forwarded and attempts to obtain
the required information could be misconstrued as inter-
1ference with trade»
In 19035 during the enquiry into the currency of the 
colonys several merchants and bankers made severe attacks 
on the accuracy of the trade returns, basing their arguments
pchiefly on the existence of the large import surplus» The
chairman of the committee, however,was of the opinion that,
* whatever their value in detail»»»generally speaking»»»
the trade returnsi=J7 give a correct view of the relative
3trade with different places’»
In 1907 a Colonial Office Circular transmitted a 
resolution adopted at the Colonial Conference held in London 
that year:
XIV» Uniformity in Trade Statistics» That it 
is desirable so far as circumstances permit, 
to secure greater uniformity in the Trade 
Statistics of the'Empire, and that the Note 
prepared on this subject by the Imperial Govern­
ment be commended to the consideration of the 
various Governments represented at this
Conference» 4
1» SSLCP 1902» App»40, ’Report of the Commission on the 
Eastern Shipping or Straits Homeward Conference as 
affecting the Trade of the Colony’, Minutes and Appendices» 
Evidence by A. Stuart, pp» 364-9o
I q2• °traits Settlements Currency Committee» Minutes of
Evidence and Appendices» Cd*» 1585 1903, PP° 18-23, 39-40, 
44-5 and App»6, pp»72-3° See also ante p»33»
3 o Ibid», p. 20»
4c CO Circular, 29 October 1907°
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The colony agreed to do this and pointed out that the 
trade returns were already as closely patterned after those 
of the Mother Country as was possible, due allowances being 
made for the ’nature of the trade’ and the ’circumstances 
of our ports’o The Registrar said, however, that it was 
not possible to carry out the suggestion contained in the 
Note that exports of domestic produce and re-exports be 
separated as there was little domestic produce and it was 
also difficult to trade exports back to their origin1
There was no other major attack on the trade returns 
except constant complaints that they were always late in 
appearing, with the result that ’their practical value to
2the mercantile community is, to a large extent nullified1.
The_ proposals of 1915-14
In 1913 a committee was set up, comprising representatives 
from the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States 
governments and the Singapore and Selangor Chambers of Commerce, 
to ’enquire into the System of Registration of Imports and 
Exports in the Colony and the Federated Malay States and the 
desirability of amending it'.3 This committee interviewed
lo SCCAR 1907. AppoL, Memorandum on 'Note on the Trade
Statistics of the Self-Governing Colonies’ (Serial No»
XXX, pages 521-525 of Papers laid before the Colonial 
Conference 1907) by Alexander Stuart, Registrar of 
Imports and Exports, 5 December 1907? pp.85-7«» The 
Chamber agreed with his views, SCC to Col. Sec. 1 6  
December 1907? p.SSo
2e SCCAR 19130 AppoD, SCC to Col. Sec. 29 October 1913? ppo39-40o
3° Selangor CCAR 1913/14. App.O, pp„57-870
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Alexander Stuart, "by now Registrar for 23 years, and 
W.P. Hume, Commissioner of Trade and Customs in the PMS 
since 1907° Both these men agreed with the suggestion of 
the committee that it was an advantage to publish joint 
statistics for the colony and the Federated Malay States 
under one central authority located in Singapore» The 
committee was of the opinion that though the statistics, 
as they stood, could 'lead to incorrect deductions’, they 
were nonetheless
•oein the main accurate, and the method of 
ascertaining them is, under the present 
conditions, and with the present staff, 
difficult to improve upon0l
The war intervened and these proposals were shelved»
In 1922, on the recommendations of a joint committee,
were published the consolidated trade statistics of the
’Malayan Registration Area’, which included the Straits
Settlements (comprising the three settlements, Labuan,
Christmas Island and Cocos Islands) the Federated and the
Unfederated Malay States» As a result of the recommendations
of another committee in 1927? the separate trade returns
pof the Straits Settlements were discontinued from 1928»
1• Ibid., p «57•
2° SS Trade Commission Report 1955/4s vo1»IV, App»175> 
p,453-4° The regulations relating to these changes 
were Ordinance 183 (Statistics) of 1921 and Import 
andSxport Rules Gazette Notification 107 of 1929°
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Thus after almost a century the trade returns of the 
Straits Settlements were discontinued« They had short­
comings but deliberate attempts were made to remove sources 
of error and it can be said in conclusion that they form a 
most useful and essential source of materials for a study 
of Straits Settlements trade«
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HISTORICAL APPENDIX B
An Outline History of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce
Early mercantile co-operation
The Singapore Chamber of Commerce was established in 1837 
but before this date there were many instances of mercantile 
co-operation. One of the earliest on record is the•presenta­
tion of an Address at the departure of Raffles in June 1823*
In his reply Raffles uttered those words which subsequently 
became the creed of the port.^ In 1830 the merchants of the 
port again gathered together to welcome the visiting Governor- 
General of India and elected a small deputation to wait on 
him with complaints about the infringement by the administration
of the freedom of the port and about the absence of a local 
2currency. The following year merchants petitioned Parliament
3for a Court of Justice, and a recorder was appointed in 1834.
In 1833-36 these merchants strongly resisted attempts by the 
Indian government to impose dues on the trade and shipping of
4the port.
The merchants of Singapore also co-operated for the 
regulation of trade. In 1835 there was a series of failures
1. See ante, pp.52-3«
2. 100 Years of Singapore, vol.II, p.30.
3. Ibid., p.32.
4. See Wong, 'Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869’, pp.258-60. 
and Mills, British Malaya, 1824-18679 p. 266.
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in the bazaar due to speculation and over-trading by Chinese . 
merchants who operated on credit received from their European 
counterparts. It was deciaed at a meeting of merchants the 
length of credit be shortened and payment strictly enforced.'*' 
Though the new arrangement was claimed to operate success­
fully this is doubtful in view of the regular requests to 
2enforce them. The problem of collecting from some defaulting
3Chinese merchants was a perennial problem.
Formation of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce
The Singapore Chamber of Commerce was established on 
8 February 1837 for the purpose of'watching over the commer­
cial interests of the settlement'.^ The factors leading to 
its establishment are not very clear as most of the Chambers 
records are no longer extant. But it seems to be a logical 
development from ad hoc action to a more formal arrangement 
It is possible that the Chamber came into existence at 
the end of a period of bad trade - the imports and exports 
of Singapore exceeded £4m in 1829 but fell below $3m in 
1836. It was in this period that merchants met to draw up 
rules governing the granting of credit.^ A historian,
1. Wong, 'Trade of Singapore, 1819-18691 23456> pp.227-8.
2. On 23 November 1852, 22 May 1858, 13 June 1864.
3. See Registration of Partnership Bill, pp.96-101.
4. See Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the 
British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, vol.II, 
p•291•
5. The Chamber has only the Annual Reports from 1887 to 
the present day. The volume for 1889 is, however, 
missing.
6. See ante, p.329. This view is put forward in 100 Years 
of Singapore, vol. II, p.33 and is apparently accepted
by the Chamber today which quotes it in SCCAR 1957« pp.8-9*
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Dr Ian Nish has pointed out that, in the short period between
the ending of the East India Company’s China monopoly in 1833
and the outbreak of the first Anglo-Chinese War in 1840, a series
of Chambers öf Commerce wors established between India and China - the
Bengal Chamber in March 1834? ‘the Bombay and Madras in
September 1936? the Singapore in February 1837? the Canton in
1838 or earlier and the Ceylon Chamber in March 1839• The
other Chambers in the East came much later and at widely
1dispersed dates» Dr Nish poses the question whether it was 
coincidence or design that led British merchants to set 
up these bodies between 1834 and 1839° While present know­
ledge prevents it being answered adequately there is some
evidence that merchants were not unaware of the advantages
2of co-operation,,
On its formation the Singapore Chamber comprised both 
European and Asian merchants, the first committee including
1» The Shanghai Chamber was established in 1851? the Hong­
kong in 1861, the Yokohama in 1864 and the Karachi Chamber 
in i860»
2» I» Nish, ’British Mercentile Co-operation in the India- 
China Trade from the End of the East India Company’s 
Trading Monopoly’, JSEAH, vol»III, No»2, September 1962»
It is possible that some light will be thrown on 
the subject and on merchant organizations and activities 
generally when the records of the Penang Chamber are 
opened for study» The Penang Chamber claims to have been 
’in existence in the year 1795? nine years after the 
island of Penang was founded by France Light, and we 
claim to be the oldest body of merchants in Malaya« Old 
records show that in 1787 and 1788 the mercantile body was 
a solid body in their relations with the authorities, i«e» 
the East India Company'» (From a short manuscript on 
the Penang Chamber prepared by its secretary 1961« The 
records of this Chamber, I am told, go back to 18/0 and 
negotiations are going on between the Chamber andthe 
Malayan government with regard to their preservation 
and use by researchers)»
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one Arab and two Chinese»1 It was felt that this ’liberality
of sentiment’ in opening the Chamber to non-Europeans was
proof of a ’good and honourable feeling, which will no doubt
2be reciprocated and tend to the best results’» But in 
i860 there was only one Chinese firm in the Chamber's roll, 
all other Asian firms having left» Song Ong Siang, the 
chronicler of things Chinese, says ’Apparently after that 
date the Chamber closed its doors to the Chinese’» The 
Chamber itself thinks that the ’withdrawal of other races’ 
was due to their desire to have their own Chambers.^ This 
is rather unlikely in view of the fact that the Chinese 
Chamber was only founded in 1906» It is possible that in 
about i860 there were differences of opinion between European 
and Chinese merchants» There is some evidence to support 
this view: in i860 the Singapore Chamber memorialized the 
government on ’the necessity of passing an Act for the 
Registration of all partnerships and changes of Partners 
in firms trading in the Straits Settlements’» Y/hen nothing 
was done, in 1864 it resolved ’That the Chinese or other 
dealers in the bazaar be invited to enter their chops and 
the names of the various partners trading thereunder in a
I» Loh, ’Singapore Agency Houses, 1819-1869’, p»52»
2» Newbold, vol.II, p°394o
3» Song, 100 Years of the Chinese in Singapore» p»ll4»
4» From short manuscript prepared by the Secretary 1961.
3 ° 100 Years of Singapore, vol»II, p»41°
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r e g i s t e r  t o  "be k e p t  "by t h e  Chamber and t h a t  any changes  he  
communicated* But n e i t h e r  C h inese  nor  o t h e r  t r a d e r s  i n  
t h e  b a z a a r  a c c e p t e d  t h i s  i n v i t a t i o n « ,
The growth  of  t h e  Chamber
I t  i s  n o t  known how many f i r m s  were members o f  t h e  Chamber
i n  1837 h u t  i n  1862 t h e r e  were 30 f i r m s . 2 I n  1887,  t h e  f i r s t
y e a r  f o r  which  th e  Chamber’ s Annual R e p o r t s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e 9
the  membership  h a d  f a l l e n  to  25,  which i n  1890 i n c r e a s e d  to
28« Prom 1895 th e  number o f  members b egan  to  i n c r e a s e  more
r a p i d l y ,  due p r o b a b l y  t o  th e  boom t h a t  to o k  p l a c e  a f t e r  t h a t
d a t e 0 T here  were 37 members i n  1895, 44 i n  1 8 9 6 , 47 •
i n  1897,  and more t h a n  50 members a t  t h e  t u r n  o f  the
c e n t u r y .  I n  1905 and 1910 t h e r e  were 56 members b u t  t h e
number jumped t o  74 i n  1915«
A l th o u g h  t h e  government  o f  the  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  was
a n x io u s  t h a t  t h e  m e r c a n t i l e  community be w e l l  r e p r e s e n t e d
i n  th e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l ,  t h e  m e r c h a n t s  o f  t h e  c o lo n y
seemed l e s s  t h a n  e n t h u s i a s t i c ,  an  a t t i t u d e  t h a t  drew the
f o l l o w i n g  c a u s t i c  comment from th e  G o v e rn o r ,  S i r  H a r r y  Ordt
. oot he  r u l i n g  i d e a  i s  t h a t  a m erc h an t  comes h e r e  
to  r e a l i z e  a f o r t u n e  or  a competency a s  q u i c k l y  
a s  p o s s i b l e  and t h e n  t o  r e t u r n  home, t h a t  any 
t im e  no t  d i r e c t e d  t o  t h i s  o b j e c t  i s  v /a s ted « » . To 
such  an e x t e n t  does  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n o t  
a s s i s t i n g  i n  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p r e v a i l  t h a t  one
1.  100 Y e a rs  o f  S i n g a p o r e « v o l . I I ,  p . 4 l °
2 e I b i d « , p «35 o
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of the largest houses in the Straits Settlements,
Messrs Boustead and Company, are admitted to 
have laid it down as a rule that no member of the 
firm should hold any public office«,,I am compelled 
tc give up the idea of finding any person except 
a Chinese gentleman«1
Thus in 1869 the first Chinese member of the Council was
appointed« He was Hoo Ah Kay, more popularly known as
Whampoa« According to Song Ong Siang he was ’almost as
2much an Englishman as he is a Chinaman’« After Whampoa 
there was usually a Chinese member in the Council, who was, 
to quote one of them, ’the mouthpiece of the Chinese’«^
It is possible that the reluctance of merchants to 
assist in the administration was the result of Ord’s personal 
lack of popularity with them« In any event by 1887 the 
situation had changed very considerably« The Singapore 
Chamber was allowed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
the right to elect one of its members to the Legislative 
Council;^ John Finlayson of Boustead & Co« on being so 
elected declared that it was 1 the highest distinction which 
a businessman in Singapore can well receive’«
1« Quoted in Loh, p«56 (Gov«SS to Sec. of State 26 April 1869) 
Ord did not get on well with the European merchants«
For more on the relationship between them see ante,
P p o  5 8 - 6 0 c
2« Song, p.157«
3° SSLCP 1906. 12 January, pp« B2 -18, Tan Jiak Kim 
speaking against a bill for the registration of 
partnerships.
4» SCCAR 1887« App.C, A/Col. Sec to SCC, 17 November 1887? 
conveying the news. The previlege was later also 
granted to the Penang Chamber.
5° SFP, 2 December I887.
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He was the only candidate and subsequent nominees of the 
Chamber to the Council were also ’unanimously’ elected« The 
Singapore Chamber’s right to nominate an unofficial member 
continued until 1 February 1955 when it was abolished under 
the Rendel Constitution.^*
Prior to 1907 there was a Singapore Exchange separate 
from the Chamber although the two bodies shared the same 
offices and clerical staff. There was a certain degree of 
duplication in the functions of the two bodies and in 1907 
they decided to amalgamate. Since the Chamber was the 
stronger body (financially) and more active it, in fact, 
absorbed the other. From that year to the name of the Chamber 
was added the words ’and Exchange'. The rules of the en­
larged body did not change, but to the first stated objective 
of the Chamber of watching over the commercial interests of 
the settlement was added: ’to iDromote or oppose any legis­
lation or other measures affecting the Trade or Commerce of 
the Settlement’.
Of greater significance was the establishment of a 
Rubber Association in 1911^  It has since developed into
1. SCCAR 1957, p.9°
2° SCCAR 1906„ Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the 
SCC, 19 November 1906, pp.23-7« Minutes of a General Meeting 
of theSCC, 4 December 1906, p.28. Minutes of a Joint 
General Meeting of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
and Exchange, 4 December 1906, pp.30-2.
3® See ante, pp.72-3
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an important body in its own right and the location of the 
Chamber and the Association in Denmark House today can he 
paralleled by the ’co-existence’ of the Chamber and the 
Exchange in days gone by0 
The Chamber and its contacts
At its inauguration the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
adopted 23 sets of regulations1 The first described its 
objects:
That the Singapore Chamber of Commerce is formed 
for the protection of the general interests of the 
trade of the Settlement, for the collecting and 
classifying of mercantile information, for 
establishing a Court of Arbitration, to adjust 
commercial differences which may be referred to 
it, and for communicating with the public authorities 
on all subjects affecting the common good»
A later clause enjoined
That all other commercial associations, together 
with the houses of business at places where no 
associations are established, be invited to 
correspond with and communicate information to 
the Chambero
In the course of carrying out its objects the Singapore 
Chamber made frequent recourse to other mercantile associa­
tions and co-operative efforts with such bodies were not un­
common«,
The Penang Chamber was the one closest to it and they 
often acted together although their views differed on some
1. See Newbold, vol. II, pp0391-8o
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occasions» The Hongkong ^ens?al Chamber of Commerce, which
was formed in 1861, co-operated with the Singapore body on
2currency matters» The Singapore Chamber was quick to point 
out to similar ties between the two colonies when it suited 
its purpose;
Our conditions of trade resemble those of your port 
more closely than others» • »3
when it did not suit its convenience the Chamber was equally quick 
to point out that
o o o the circumstances in the two Colonies differ 
'widely »4
The Singapore Chamber at various times, when the need arose, 
communicated with Chambers in India, Indochina and Indonesia»
Its principal contacts, however, were with merchant 
bodies in England» There were close business connexions 
because many of the European firms in Singapore were branches 
of British firms or held agencies for British companies; the 
British merchants of Singapore also eventually returned 
to England to take up senior appointments at head-offices 
there and together they formed a body of men highly knowledgeabie 
in Straits Settlements (especially mercantile) matters who
1. Such as in the case of the Registration of Partnerships» 
The Penang Chamber was consistently in favour but the 
Singapore Chamber vacillated and its opposition prevented 
the bill from passing» See History of the Movement, for 
Registration of Partnerships in the Straits Settlements, 
published by the Penang Chamber of Commerce, Penang 1916»
2» See p.18.
3° SCCAR 1905» App»K, p»44 SCC to HKGCC, 10 November 1905,
during exchange of letters on Registration of Partnerships 
Bill.
4- SCCAR 1697» App»L , p»l62, SCC to Col.Sec, 14 June 1897* 
rebutting the use of the Hongkong precedent in the 
Registration of Trade Marks Ordinance.
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were always ready to support the cause of the colony„
Before 1867 one of the Bodies that the Singapore Chamber 
kept in touch with the London East India and China Associa­
tion, a body started in I836, whose function was to coordinate 
the activities of various British Chambers of Commerce at 
places 'within the limits of the East India Company’s Charter 
andwhich served as the agency through which they made their
petitions to the British government«^ A similar organisation
2was established in Liverpool in 1839°
The Straits Settlements more frequently relied on the 
old Straits hands and their friends to do this, and the 
transfer in I867 from the India office to the Colonial office 
was achieved largely by their unremitting l a b o u r I n  1868 
these men formed the Straits Settlements Association in 
London with the object
eooto guard against any legislation that might 
prejudicially affect the interests of the Straits 
Settlements and, in particular that might be 
calculated to check or interfere with their 
commercial prosperity as ports of trade,to use 
means to prevent unnecessary expenditure by the 
local government and otherwise to watch over the 
general interests of the Settlements.4
This Association was a powerful pressure group in the British
1. Nish, p. 74°
2o Ibid., po84°
3° See Chiang, ’Malaya in Parliament 1857-1896’, chapter I, 
’The Transfer’«
4° Ooi,?’The First Colonial Governor, Sir Harry Ord, I867- 
1873 ? App.A, ppoi-iio
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Parliament and could and did ’petition, persuade, pester
and threaten’ the Secretary of State for the Colonies»1
Branches of the Association were started in Singapore and
Penang in the same year and the Association and Chamber
often worked very cloely on matters which affected the public 
2interest»
The four British Chambers of Commerce with which the
Singapore Chamber had most contact were those of Glasglow,
3Liverpool, Manchester and London» The reason was obvious 
- these cities had close economic ties with the Straits 
Settlements, since between them they exported cotton piece 
goods and other manufactured goods and supplied much of the 
steamship tonnage for the trade with the East» This fact 
was not lost on the Singapore Chamber which bluntly pointed 
out, when urging the Manchester Chamber to make fresh re­
presentatives to the British government to secure the removal 
of the Indochinese tariffs, that the trade of the colony, 
’largely associated as it is with that of the United Kingdom’ 
would derive immense benefit»^- The Glasgow Chamber, which
I» Parkinson, A History of Malaya, British Intervention 
in Malaya, 113^7^1877, pi’25» '
2» Such as in the income tax controversy, see pp»59-63»
3» See p»35 footnote 2» These were the cities which 
opposed the East India Company’s monopoly of trade»
4° SCCAR 1695, App»1, p»55°
Arthur Redford’s two volume history of the Chamber, 
Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, (vol»I 1794-1858, 
pub. 1934 and vol.II 1850-1939? pub. 1958) however, makes 
virtually no reference to the Straits Settlements 
or Singapore»
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was founded by Royal Charter in 1783» claimed that it was
largely representative of the Mercantile and 
Trading Firms and Houses hy whom, or through 
whose influence, the British possessions of 
Singapore and other Colonies in the Straits 
of Malacca were originated»!
The London Chamber, founded only in 1881, seemed to show the
greatest interest in colonial trade» In December 1884 it
established an East India and China Trade Section which was
to be ’directly representative of the trading, commercial
and shipping interests in the East Indies, Burma, the Straits
Settlements, Hongkong, the Indochinese Peninsula, Japan
2and China generally’» In 1898 this Section was sub-divided 
into three sub-committees to deal with (a) India, Ceylon 
and Burma, (b) China and Japan and (c) Straits Settlements 
and East I n d i e s I n  1913 this special section was abolished 
and was replaced by a Far Eastern Section which dealt with 
trade interests in China, Japan and Malaya
It was the London Chamber which initiated and organized 
the periodical Congresses of Chambers of Commerce of the 
Empire, the first of which was held in 1886 and coincided 
with the Colonial and Indian Exhibition held in South 
Kensington that year»^ It v/as then proposed to hold such
l o  Excerpt from the Minute Books of the Glasgow Chamber 
of Commerce and Manufacturers 1885°
2 c Excerpt from LCCAR. 1885»
3° Excerpt from LCCAR 1898»
4° Excerpt from LCCAR 1915°
5» SCCAR 1891c AppoC, p.14, LCC to SCC 7 May 1891, 
proposing a second Congress»
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Congresses periodically so as to 'consolidate and extend 
the commercial relations which already exist between the 
Mother Country and her various Colonies and Possessions’
The second was held in 1892 and was timed to coincide with 
the opening of the Imperial Institute« The Singapore Chamber 
sent representatives to these Congresses, to London in 1896, 
1900 and 1906 but not to Montreal in 1903 and Sydney in 
1909»
The Singapore Chamber certainly achieved its objective
of keeping in touch with other mercentile bodies and it did
not fail to expound and to extol the virtues of free trade.^
But it was evident that by the end of the nineteenth century
the revival of protectionist ideas was making headway in
3some parts of the Empire. The actual usefulness of these 
Congresses to Singapore was probably slight. The Chamber's 
representatives were unable to introduce for discussion a 
subject which was extremely vexing at the time - that of the 
Indochinese tariffs.^ The Congress v/as concerned with broad
1. Ibid., p.7»
2. As in the 1892 Congress. SCCAR 1892. App.C. pp.76-7° 
Report of the Chamber's representative (William Adamson) 
to SCC, 5 July 1892.
3. As in Canada. SCCAR 1896. App.K, pp.6l-3, Report of 
Chamber’s representatives, William Adamson and Charles 
Stringer, to SCC, 17 June 1896.
4«- Ibid., 61-3 and SCCAR 1900. App.B, p. 319» Report of 
the Chamber’s representatives, William Adamson and 
JoM. Allinson, to SCC, 8 August 1900.
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principles such as colonial tariff policies and not in
individual issues. It was also concerned with getting as
many Chambers as possible to participate« The Singapore
1Chamber pointed out that Penang was omitted which seems
to suggest that the later Chamber was not very significant»
The Singapore Chamber, with some pique, also drew attention
to the ignorance of the London body:
I may point out, however, that neither Singapore 
nor Penang are in China but form together with 
Malacca the Colony of the Straits- Settlements0 2
The ^ achievements of the Chamber
The Annual Reports of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce
present much valuable information and the Chamber could
truthfully claim that the first of its objects of collecting
3and classifying mercantile information was achieved» The 
Chamber also assisted the government to improve the govern­
ment to improve the accuracy of the colony’s trade returns.^ 
The Chamber was seldom asked to act as a Court of 
Arbitration in trade disputes» In the period 1887-1915 there 
was not a single case» The Chamber was, however, asked by 
European firms to persuade the Pepper and Gambier Society to 
improve the quality of these exports from Johore»^
1. & 2« SC CAR 190,5, App.G, p»30» SCC to LCC, 5 June 1905-
3» See ante, p«>70 for the published information of the 
Chamber»
4» See Historical Appendix A»
5» See ante, p»91«
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The Singapore Chamber was successful in persuading the
colonial government to rescind an order preventing men-of-
war from entering the inner harbour0 It argued that the
coaling business of the port would be adversely affectedo^
The Colonial Government took up the matter with the Imperial
Government and in 1890 these vessels were allowed to proceed
2directly into the inner haroour of Singapore0
The Chamber was partially successful in its campaign
against the sudden increase in the military contribution
3demanded from the colony in 1889° After failing to secure 
redress for several years, all but one of the unofficials
in the Legislative Council, including the Chamber’s nominee,
4 3resigned, an action which the Chamber thoroughly approved.^
The Chamber refused to nominate another person to fill the 
vacancy:
That whilst not relinquishing its privilege to 
nominate a Representative in the Legislative Council, 
the Chamber under the present circumstances, is 
unable to find an eligible person willing to be 
nominated for the vacancy06
1. SCCAR 1890 c App.A p.38, SCC to Cole Sec., 4 June I89O0 
2o Ibid», p»43>Col.Sec® to SCC 21 November l890o 
3° See ante, p .460 
4= Song, p„283,
5° SCCAR I8jj5. App. L, p<,79c
6. Ibid., p„80, SCC to Col.Sec. 25 January 1895°
The Imperial Government subsequently devised a compromise 
acceptable to the colony, and the unofficial then resumed 
their seats«^
The Singapore Chamber was in the forefront of the move-
2ment for currency reform in the colony» It proposed reforms
to bring about fixity of the exchange rate in 1893, 1897 and 
31902o It was a vigorous and effective opponent of income 
tax legislation^ and prevented the passage of a bill to 
register business partnerships«^ The Chamber’s efforts tog
remove the tariffs of Indochina, however, proved futile«
The Singapore Chamber, it was noted earlier, was entirely 
a European body in the period 1870-1915° The Chinese merchants 
were aware that the Chamber's interests and their own did 
not always coincide« Thus during the inquiry into the 
colony's currency in 1893 the Chinese member of the committee 
asked for two other Chinese representatives because 
he was sure that the Chinese view would be different from 
that of the majority of Europeans „7 His request was granted«
1» Song, p«283«
2. See Historical Appendix C«
3o See ante, pp«253-4°
4» See ante, pp»58-63«
5» See ante, pp»96-101.
6» See ante, pp»156-9°
7° SSLCP 1893» App»28, pp»C269~71°
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The d i v e r g e n c e  of  i n t e r e s t s  i s  a l s o  w e l l  i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  th e  i s s u e  o f  R e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  Trade  Marks* In  1896 th e  
C h in ese  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l  c a l l e d  on th e  c o l o n i a l  government 
to  e n a b le  anyone t o  r e g i s t e r  h i s  t r a d e  mark and to  p ro d u ce  
t h e  c e r t i f i c a t e  o f  r e g i s t r a t i o n  a s  p r ima f a c i e  p r o o f  o f  
h i s  c l a i m  t o  i t .  T h is  was n e c e s s i t a t e d  by th e  i n c r e a s e  i n  
th e  c o u n t e r f e i t i n g  o f  C h inese  t r a d e  marks,, and i t  was f e l t  
t h a t  l e g i s l a t i o n s  such  as  e x i s t e d  i n  Hongkong, would a s s i s t  
i n  e l i m i n a t i n g  i t « ^  R e g i s t r a t i o n  had  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  by a 
judge i n  S i n g a p o r e :  th e  M e rch an d ise  Marks O r d in a n c e ,  which 
was p a s s e d  i n  S i n g a p o r e ,  p l a c e d  th e  c o lo n y  i n  th e  same 
f o o t i n g  a s  B r i t a i n ,  and i n  t h e  l o g i c  o f  e v e n t s  t h e  r e g i s t ­
r a t i o n  of  t r a d e  marks sh o u ld  have  f o l l o w e d ,  b u t  i t  d i d  n o t ,
The a c t u a l  e f f e c t  o f  p a s s i n g  one s t a t u t e  w i t h o u t  
w i t h o u t  p a s s i n g  t h e  o t h e r  h a s  been  to  i n t r o d u c e  a 
sys tem  o f  p r o c e d u r e  which must a c t  v e r y  u n f a i r l y  
a g a i n s t  any p e r s o n  c h a r g e d  w i t h  t r a d e  mark o f f e n c e s *  
The onus of  p r o v i n g  h i s  in n o c e n c e  i s  t h u s  thrown 
on the  p e r s o n  who i s  c h a r g e d  w i t h  h a v in g  i n  h i s  
p o s s e s s i o n  a f o r g e d  t r a d e  mark,  w h i le  a t  t h e  same 
t im e  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  which i s  a f f o r d e d  him by th e  
R e g i s t r a t i o n  Act i n  E n g la n d  i s  w i t h h e l d  from him*2
The S in g a p o re  Chamber to o k  t h e  v iew  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  law
a f f o r d e d  E u r opean i m p o r t e r s  s u f f i c i e n t  p r o t e c t i o n  i n  t h e
1 .  SCCAR 1 8 9 6 . App.L.  p*74,  Col*Sec to  SCC 9 O c to b e r  1896 .
2o R e p o r t e d  i n  Volume V o f  S t r  a i t  s Sekt l j 3_men t  s La w Repor t s  
p / 4.80 Judgement  of  C our t  o f  Appeal  i n  c a s e  of  Regina 
Vs* Khoo Beng Choo* Quoted by Tan Ngan Pan i n  
SCCAR 1 8 9 7 . AppeL P 0I 5 6 , Col*Sec t o  SCC, 11 March 1897? 
E m ig tn .  1927/97? E n c l o s u r e  -  Tan Ngan Pan t o  P r o t e c t o r  
of  Chinese*
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c o lo n y  and d e c l a r e d  t h a t  th e  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  t r a d e  marks 
would i n e v i t a b l y  l e a d  t o  g e n e r a l  r e g i s t r a t i o n  w i t h  th e  r e s u l t  
t h a t  E u r o p e a n  i m p o r t e r s  would he  s u b j e c t e d  t o  ’ i n c o n v e n ie n c e  
and e x p e n s e ,  w i th o u t  a s  t h e y  c o n s i d e r ,  any a d e q u a te  
c o m p e n s a t i o n ’ o1
The Chamber was no t  c o n v in c e d  even th o u g h  i t s  e n q q u i r i e s
t h e  Hongkong Chamber b r o u g h t  th e  r e p l y  t h a t  t h e  lav/ t h e r e
was ’ on t h e  whole b e n e f i c i a l  to  t r a d e  and n e i t h e r  c o s t l y
2
nor  i n c o n v e n i e n t ' o The S in g a p o re  Chamber t h e n  a s s e r t e d  
t h a t  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  th e  two p o r t s  d i f f e r e d  w id e ly  and 
t h a t  ’what  i n  t h i s  m a t t e r  a p p e a r s  to  s u i t  Hongkong would 
be d e c i d e d l y  i n a p p l i c a b l e  to  t h i s  C o lo n y ’ 0 I t  was q u i t e  
f i r m  i n  i t s  o p p o s i t i o n  and the  c o l o n i a l  government  d e c i d e d  
t o  d ro p  t h e  m a t t e r » ^
Concl u s i o n *-
I t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  t h e  S in g ap o re  Chamber of  Commerce 
had  a v e r y  im p o r t a n t  r o l e  to  p l a y  i n  t h e  t r a d e  o f  S in g ap o re  
i n  th e  p e r i o d  1870 - 1 9 1 5 ° I t  was c o n s u l t e d  by th e  g o v e rn ­
ment on m a t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  to  t r a d e  and i t  was a v i g i l a n t  and 
e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e c t o r  o f  t r a d i n g  i n t e r e s t S o  Very o f t e n ,  a s  
d e m o n s t r a t e d  most  c l e a r l y  i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  f i x i t y  o f  exchange,-
1» SCCAR 1 8 9 6 o AppoL,  p 075* SCC to  ColoSec» 11 J a n u a r y  1897* 
(emphasis m in e ) .
2 e SCCAE 1 8 9 7 , AppoL, p p . l 6 0 - l  HKGCC to  SCC, 8 May 1897«
3o I b i d o ,  p p .1 6 2 -3  SCC t o  C o l • S e c » 14 June 1897*
See a l s o  a n t e ,  p 0 337.
4» I b i d . ,  pc 1 6 3 , Colo Sec. t o  SCC 14 August  1897* M isc .5 8 2 4 /9 7 .  
c Very t e n t a t i v e 0
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i t  even  l e d  and  moulded p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  and i n f l u e n c e d  th e  
governm ent  to  l o o k  c l o s e l y  i n t o  t h e  r e f o r m s  i t  su gges tedo  
I n  e x t e r n a l  m a t t e r s  su ch  a s  t h e  I n d o c h i n e s e  t a r i f f  
p ro b lem  t h e  Chamber was i n e f f e c t u a l ,  a s  were a l s o  th e  
c o l o n i a l  and i m p e r i a l  g o v e rn m e n t„ I t s  g r e a t e s t  i n f l u e n c e  
was i n  l o c a l  m a t t e r s  and i t s  b e s t  p e r f o r m a n c e s  were on t h e  
l o c a l  s t a g e  o f  S in g a p o re  t r a d e 0
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HISTORICAL appendix g
A History of Currency Reforms in the Straits Settlements,
1869-1906
Introduction
Studies on the currency problems of the Straits Settlements 
and the Malay Peninsula fall into two broad categories. The 
first concerns the trials and tribulations of a silver currency 
fluctuating and depreciating in relation to gold and discusses 
the measures by which fixity of the exchange rate was brought 
about and maintained.^  The second category focuses attention 
on the operations of the Colonial Exchange Standard which
pwas established in the Straits Settlements in 1906.
What has been overlooked is a history of currency reforms 
in the Straits Settlements prior to the establishment of the 
Colonial Exchange Standard. The history of currency in the
colony has been described as ’a tale of confusion and chaos
• • 3arising out of adherence to the silver standard’.
1. Eor example, E.W. Kemmerer, Modern Currency Reforms, A 
History and Discussion of Recent Reforms in India, Porto 
Rico, Philippine Islands, Straits Settlements and Mexico, 
New York 1916; C.A. Conant, A History of Modern Banks of 
Issue, 6th Edition, New York 1927 and J.O. Anthonisz, 
Currency Reforms in the Straits Settlements, London
no date.
2. Eor example, Sir Sidney Caine, ’Monetary Systems of the 
Colonies: Malaya’, in T.H. Silcock (Editor), Readings in 
Malayan Economics, Singapore 1961; H.A. Shannon, 
'Evolution of the Colonial Exchange Standard’ in Inter­
national Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol.I 1950-1, and 
'The Modern Colonial Exchange Standard’, IMP Staff 
Papers, vol.II 1951-2, Washington D.C.; Ida Greaves, 
Colonial Monetary Conditions, HMSO 1953 and P.H.H. King, 
Money in British East Asia, HMSO 1957.
3. W.E. Spalding, Eastern Exchange, Currency and Finance,
4th Edition, London 1924, p.162.
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But closer examination reveals that this lo not a ooimcot view; 
there can be perceived both progress and•continuity in the 
currency reforms undertaken between 1867 and 1906, and the 
principal features of these reforms are still the main features 
of the Malayan currency system of today. These are: the use 
of the dollar as the unit of money; the security of the 
currency issue which results from its being backed by 100 
to 110 per cent reserves in the first instance and ultimately 
by the entire revenues of the state; and the fixity of the 
exchange rate in terms of sterling first fixed in 1906 at 
2s.4d. and which has never changed.
The unit of money - the dollar
The dollar was officially recognized as the unit of money 
in 1867 when the Straits Settlements became a Crown Colony. 
Prior to this date the official unit was the Indian rupee 
although it was a coin which did not circulate in these ports 
despite several attempts by the Indian administration to 
introduce it for the sake of uniformity throughout its poss­
essions. The coins in current use were Spanish and Mexican 
dollars which were accepted in Southeast and Bast Asia. The 
attempts to force the rupee into circulation were unsuccess­
ful, alienated Straits sympathies for the Indian administration 
and led inexorably to the demand for separation from India.^
1. For an account see l.A. Mills, British Malaya 1824-1867, 
-JIIBPAS, vol.III, Pt.II 1925, pp.267-70, and Correspondence 
respecting the Transfer of the Control of the Straits 
Settlements from the India Office to the Colonial 
Department, Cmd.3672 1866, pp'.'17-18.
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The reiDeal of all legislation relating to currency and the
proclamation of the dollar as the colony’s unit of money was
one of the first acts of the newly-created Legislative Council.'*"
ITearly a quarter of a century later some merchants in
the Straits Settlements agitated for the resurrection of the
rupee. In 1693? as the result of a request by the Singapore
Chamber of Commerce, a committee of 12 was set up by the
into
colonial government to enquire/and report on the problems posed
by the depreciation and fluctuation of the exchange rate of the
silver dollar in terms of gold. Six members who favoured
fixity of exchange held the view that it could be most easily
achieved by adopting as the colony's currency the Indian
rupee which had been fixed at ls.4d. in 1893- This proposal
was strongly opposed by the other six members who argued that
the depreciating currency was to the advantage of the colony
2and they wanted the status quo.' In view of the indecision of 
the committee the government took no action regarding fixity. 
However, the ghost of the rupee in the Straits Settlements 
was laid for good.
The security of Straits Settlements currency
The security of Straits Settlements paper money in the 
twentieth century is due almost directly to the scarcity of
1. See F. Pridmore, Coins and Coinages of the Straits
Settlements and British Malaya, 1786 to 1951, Memoirs 
of the Raffles Museum Ho.2, June 1955, Apj.XX, Act IV 
of 1867, ppc119-20.
2. SSLCP 1893 9 App.28.
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metallic money in the nineteenth century. Until the turn of 
the century there were no dollars which were specific to the 
colony which, like the rest of Southeast Asia and most of 
East Asia, depended on Spanish and Mexican silver dollars. 
/""The most widely-circulated coins in history and probably 
the closest to a truly international currency a total of over 
2,000 million coins were struck between 1537 and 1821 and a 
further 1,500 million from 1821 to 1903j_7^ ‘ ln the nineteenth 
century many of the dollars exported from Mexico and other 
South American states were transported to London and sold at 
bullion value, frequently to cotton piece goods exporters who
2 -nshipped them to China and the Straits Settlements. But 
txnere was still a scarcity of silver dollars in the East due 
possibly to the practice of hoarding precious metals in India 
and China; in 1886 the Mexican dollar in the Straits Settle­
ments commanded a premium of four and a half per cent over
3its bullion value.
1. See R. Chalmers, A History of Currency in the British
C ...Monies, London 1893? App.A, and A. Piatt Andrew, ’The 
Mexican Dollar', App.P(2) of The Cold Standard in 
International Trade, Washington Government Printing 
Office, 1904? p.468.
2. SSLCP 1887 9 App.16, p.222, Chartered Bank of India, 
Australia and China, London office to Singapore branch; 
also p.227? Deputy Master of the Mint to the Treasury,
28 November 1874.
3« Ibid., p.213, Gov.SS to Sec. of State, 22 December
1886, Enclosure No.l - SCC to Col.Sec., 19 October 1886.
The scarcity of dollars in Asia led to a number of
imitations of the Spanish and Mexican dollars. The Japanese
struck 165 million ’yen' or Japanese trade dollars between
1871 and 1897, of which more than 110 million were exported.1 2345
The United States produced for export 36 million American
2trade dollars between 1872 and 1878, while the french issued 
70 million Saigon dollars (piastre de commerce) between 1885 
and 1903. " All these coins closely followed and were some­
times exact replicas of the Mexican in terms of size, weight 
and silver content and circulated alongside the older 
established coins, which were, however, valued slightly 
higher.
British merchants in the East had long called for a 
British silver dollar. In 1830 a deputation of merchants in 
Singapore complained to the visiting Governor-General of 
India about the absence of a local currency.^ In 1856 and 
again in 1358 a Company dollar was mooted. In 1863 merchants 
and bankers in Hongkong and Singapore made fresh representa­
tions which resulted in the establishment of a Mint in 
5Hongkong.
A total of two million British trade dollars
1. Andrew, pp.484-5.
2. Ibid., p.476.
3. Ibid., p.484.
4. Makepeace, Brooke and Braddell, 100 Years of Singapore, 
vol.il, p.31.
5. Chalmers, p.375«
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(commonly known as Hongkong dollars) were struck between 
1866 and 1868 and then the Mint was closed, the authorities 
having been discouraged by the high cost of minting and the 
fact that the coins passed at a discount. The equipment was 
sold to the Japanese government which went on to produce the 
successful yen. Despite repeated representations in 1872,
1876, 1878 and 1886, the British government refused to sanction 
the striking of another British trade dollar.
The complaints of straits merchants that there was a 
scarcity of silver dollars were not without foundation. The 
recorded values of treasure imports and exports, which con­
sisted very largely of silver dollars, show an excess of 
$46m of exports over imports in the period from 1870 to 1885* 
There were import surpluses in the years 1881 and 1836-1888 
inclusive but there was again an export surplus of almost 
$>19m in the period 1889-1393» Thus, in the period 1370 to 
1893 there was a net export surplus of $54m.^ This is probably 
a low figure because Chinese workers returning to China after 
several years’ sojourn in the colony or in the Malay Peninsula
frequently took out more dollars than they brought in, both
2these movements being unrecorded.
In 1893 the International Monetary Conference held in 
Brussels with the aim of rehabilitating silver failed; the
1« Imports were $239m and exports $293m. (SSBB)
2. The luggage of ships’ passengers which did not exceed 
$200 was not recorded for purposes of compiling the 
statistics of imports and exports. See ante, p.320.
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British government in India and the government of the United
States closed their Mints to the free coinage of silver,
causing a sharp fall in the value of the metal in terms of
gold.1 234 There was also a decline in the supply of Mexican
dollars in London and San Francisco. These events led to
renewed agitation by the Chambers of Commerce of Hongkong
2and Singapore for a British trade dollar. The Secretary of
State for the Colonies consented and arrangements were made
for the Indian Mints to coin at least $5m per annum for the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and the Hongkong
3and Shanghai Bank. A proposal for the provision of coining 
facilities in London to supply coins to the banks in the colony 
whenever they were required had been made as early as in 1872 
but had been rejected.4 The new British trade dollar was to
1. See D.U. Leavens, Silver Money, Indiana 1939, Cowles 
Commission for Research in Economics, Monograph No.4, 
chapter VII, ’International Monetary Conferences’, pp.45- 
54- There were International Monetary Conferences in 
1867, 1872 and 1881. In 1867, of the 20 countries re­
presented, 19 favoured international gold monometallism.
The later conferences were attempts to restore effective 
pi-metallism which ceased from 1873 when the stable gold- 
silver ratio of long standing began to fluctuate.
2. SCCAR 1894, App.B, The Hongkong Chamber proposed it and 
solicited Singapore support, HKGCC to SCC, 24 January 1894, 
p.20. The banks in Singapore were enthusiastic and the 
Chamber duly wrote to inform the government,
The Chamber at a special general meeting later adopted 
a motion in favour of a British trade dollar by 17 votes 
for to 8 against.
3. Ibid., Sec. of State to G-ov.SS, 27 October 1894, pp.28-9.
4. SSLCP 1874, App. 28, p.CXXV Oriental Banicing Corporation 
to Col.Sec., 14 May 1872.
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circulate concurrently with other dollars and was not to he
sole legal tender as was proposed in 1886, when the Chartered
Bank of India, Australia and China had opposed it vigorously«1
The new dollars arrived in 1895 and thee was no room
for further complaints of scarcity,. Between 1894 and 1902
there was a net import surplus of treasure amounting to 
2over |69nio In the period 1903-1906, however, there was an 
export surplus of $28mO hut this was prohahly due to the 
currency reforms undertaken in these years«
During the discussions about the striking of a British 
trade dollar the British Treasury in 1878-1879 and again in 
1887 suggested that an alternative means of solving the 
problem of scarcity was for the government to issue paper 
money* ^  A resolution favouring this proposal on the grounds 
that it would he a great ’convenience’ to the local popula­
tion was passed in the legislative Council in 1881«^ The 
three commercial hanks that enjoyed the right of note issue 
opposed a Government Note Issue, claiming that it amounted
1* SSLCF 1887, Appo l6, pp.221-4? Chartered Bank of India, 
Australia and China, London office to Singapore branch, 
with copy to the Governor of the colony, who transmitted 
it to the Secretary of State, in his despatch 8363 
21 February I887? p«220*
2. Imports were $291m and exports f'222m (3SBB) *
3° Imports were |l29m and exports '157m (SSBB).
4- SSLCP 1887* App»l6, po2l6, Sec« of State to Gov„SS,
SS264 20 November 1879? Enclosure No«2, Gov0SS to Sec, 
of State, SS413?22 December 1886» Also, pp.223-4? CO 
to Treasury, 8 March 1887; Treasury to CC, 4 May 1887? 
Enclosures in»Sec. of State to GovoSS, S3124 24 June 1887°
5° SSLCPI881, 8 Novembe, pp.78-82, by eight votes to four«,
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to a slur on private bank-noteso^ The Secretary of State 
also rejected the note issue on the grounds that circumstances 
in the colony did not necessitate a government note issueo 
In May 1884 the Oriental Bank failed in Ceylon and 
Singaporeo In Ceylon,, where it was the only note-issuing 
hank,, the government was forced, in the public interest, to 
guarantee the notes of the hank« In Singapore the other two 
note-issuing hanks, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia 
and China and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank cashed the notes 
of the Oriental Bank and prevented a run on their own banks« 
The following year a resolution was passed in the 
Legislative Council calling for a Government Note Issue which 
would meet the public demand for ’perfect security*. The 
preamble read:
That the issue of the paper currency required by 
the Colony is a function which the Government 
should assume or control o'
Gone was the argument of ’convenience*«
The first instance of government assumption of the
note issue occurred in 1847 when the Chartered Bank of
Mauritius failed» It was the first of the Chartered Banks
and began operations in 1837? its charter providing for
I, Ibido, view of banker in Council» 
2« SSLCP 1885, 9 April, pp.B19-27*
double liability wltile its notes were not legal tender 
In 1849 a Government Note Issue replaced the bank issue» 
Popular opinion forced the government to continue with it 
v/hen it wished to abandon the project in 1864° It was 
therefore re-established with a Board of Currency Commissio­
ners to issue notes and to administer the redemption of notes 
in current coin„ For this purpose a minimum specie reserve 
of one-third and a maximum of one half of the note issue 
was held with the remainder of the reserves being held in 
the form of Imperial or island debentures which were to be
realized to compensate any fall below the specified minimum
2specie reserveo
In 1884? under similar circumstances? the government
of Ceylon was forced to guarantee bank-notes of the Oriental
Bank» According to a contemporary authority on currency
matters? Robert Chalmers:
It was at once recognized that this decision 
admitted the principle of ultimate state 
liability for private Issues? and that? after 
the Ceylon precedent ? the arguments for such 
issues had become untenable»3
This isa view shared by Ida Greaves^ although H0A0 Shannon 
places the date of recognition at 1847°^ The Secretary
lo AoSoJe Easter, The Impe)rial Banks, London 1929? P»3 1
2 o Chalmers, p0367°
3* Ibido, Po365°
4» Greaves, p080
5» Shannon, ’Evolution of 
PPo344-6 o
the Colonial Exchange Standard’
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of State himself admitted that the British government's policy 
had changed after the Ceylon incident hut declared that he 
would only approve a state issue if no strong private hanks 
operated, hut this was not the case in the Straits Settle­
ments; furthermore, there was insufficient public interest 
In 1893 the Governor of the colony again raised the 
question» There was a scarcity of silver dollars during the 
Chinese New Year celebrations and the private hanks had 
issued to their limit» He proposed a Government Note Issue, 
which was to he fully secure, to circulate concurrently with
0the private issue» The Secretary of State was favourably 
disposed-^ and the Singapore and Penang Chambers of Commerce 
were enthusiastic, although the latter was against one- 
dollar notes»^ The Secretary of State then sanctioned the 
proposed issue of notes of five, ten, 50? 100 and 500 dollars, 
and forwarded the British Honduras Currency Note Ordinance 
of 1894 which was to he the basis for Straits Settlements 
legislation»^ This came as a shock to the colony which had
1» SSLCP JL888, App»3? Sec» of State to Gov» SS, SS70 
27 October 1886, p»C9.
2. SSLCP 1896» App»50, p.C357? Gov» SS to Sec» of State,
No*»56 3 March 1893»
3« SSLCP 1895» Appol6, p.C39? Sec» of State to Gov»SS,
SS No Ö 52 ”12 February 1895»
4« Ibid», PCC to Col»Sec» 22 April» 23 April, 1895? 
ppo40-1; SCC to Colo Sec 0, 23 May 1895? p.C44.
5» SSLCP 1896, App.50, PoC359? Sec» of State to Gov»SS,
SS 290, 24 September 1895»
assumed, that its legislation would he based on that of Ceylon,, 
which in turn vras based on that of Mauritius which provided 
for a specie (or coin) reserve of one-third to one-half of 
the note issue with the rest of the reserves in the form 
of approved securities,,
The British Honduras Ordinance,^ according to the Secretary
of State, resulted from consultations between the Colonial
Office and the Treasury and
...was not originally drafted with special 
reference to the circumstances of the British 
Honduras but was intended to be a model Ordinance 
including those provisions which, in the opinion 
of the highest financial advisors of Her Majesty’s 
Government, should be embodied in the law of any 
Colony proposing to establish a Government Note
Issue.3
It provided for a Board of Currency Commissioners to manage 
the note issue which was legal tender and redeemable in 
current coin.
The greatest emphasis was placed on the security of the 
notes. They were backed by a Note Guarantee Fund which 
comprised a coin portion initially fixed at two-thirds 
of the note issue but which could be reduced to one-half by 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and an investment 
portion which was to be one-third but which could be increased
1° SSLCP 1895. App.l6, pp„42-3° This was stated in Col.Sec. 
to SCC, 3 May 1.895« J.O. Anthonisz, one-time Colonial 
Treasurer who subsequently wrote a book states erroneously 
that legislation was based on that of Ceylon, p.7.
2» SSLCP 1897. App.4? printed.
3« SSLCP 1896«, App.50, p 0C362, Sec. of State to Gov.SS,
SS202 22 May 1896.
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to one-half of the note issue.» These provisions differed 
from those of the Mauritius and Ceylon ordinances only in 
the proportions of the coin and investment reserves»
An Innovation was the Depreciation Fund» From the 
income gained from investments after administrative expenses 
had "been deducted, a sum equal to one per cent of the purchase 
price of the ecurities was to he paid periodically into a 
Depreciation Fund» '.’/hen this Fund equalled ten per cent of 
the purchase price of the investments the one per cent pay­
ment was discontinued and the income from investments was 
paid into the general revenues of the colony» In the event 
of the market value of the investments, including the 
Depreciation Fund, falling "below the purchase price, a sum 
equal to the deficiency was to he transferred from the 
general revenues of the colony to the Note Guarantee Fund«
Thus the Government Note Issue was hacked to the extent of 
100-110 per cent of its token value in the first instance 
and hy the entire revenues of the colony ultimately»
Instead of welcoming the security so carefully provided, 
the Straits Settlements protested against the ’stringent 
provisions’ and asked to he allowed to hold one-half specie 
reserves as in the case of Ceylon and Mauritius» It was 
feared that the Government Note Issue would otherwise he
seriously crippled in competition with the less securely 
hacked private hank n o t e s T h e  Secretary of State, however,
1» Ibid», Gov» SS to Sec» of State, SS502 19 December 1895? 
Enclosing Deport of the Committee of the Executive Council 
on ths Draft Currency Note Bill for the Straits Settlement, 
dated 14 December 1895? pp»360-2»
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laid down:
The first condition of a state issue should he 
the absolute certainty that the notes can he 
cashed on presentation, and the question of any 
profit to he made hy the Government out of the 
note issue is an entirely secondary consideration.
He refused also to allow the Governor to pledge the revenues 
of the Malay States against the paper currency which also 
circulated there, and only in 1938 did they share the res­
ponsibilities and the profits«.
The Straits Settlements Currency Mote Bill was read 
the first time on 3 December 1896. It was strongly opposed 
hy the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, supporting the banks, 
which feared the eventual loss of their privilege of note
pissueo There v/as also a heated dispute over government
refusal to guarantee the encashment of government notes at
Penang in addition to S i n g a p o r e D e s p i t e  its being passed
by a government majority on 2 September 1897^ it did not
come into operation because of the continued opposition
from the banks and the case v/as taken up with the Colonial
5Officeo Gariy in 1899 it v/as re-issued with minor changes
r
and passed«, Prank King correctly points out that this ordin­
ance v/as the basis of further currency reforms in the Straits
1. Ibid«,, Sec« of State to Gov« SS, SS202 22 May 1896, p.C362«
2« & 3„ SSLCF 1896o 3 December, p. B327? Also SCCAR 1896, 
AppoÖ, SCC to Col« Sec« 30 January 1897, p«,83o
4* SSLCF 1897« 2 September, p«B98«
5° SSLCF 1896« App«49j P°533-6, Chartered Bank by India, 
Australia and China to CO, 18 October, 26 October 1897®
6« SSLCF_189J9, 28 February, Ordinance IV of 1899« The bill
came up on 17 January, p«B6; 31 January, p«B9;
14 February, pp«B13-17; 26 February, p«B2Ö«
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Settlements o ^
The first government notes arrived in 1899 and quickly
won popular success» One-dollar notes were not introduced
until 1905o So successful was the colony's management of
the paper issue that in 1909 the Colonial Office lowered the
coin portion of its reserves to* not one-half as prescribed,,
2hut to one-third»
The fixity of exchange
In 1893 a member of the 12-men committee of enquiry into
the currency problems of the Straits Settlements pointed
out:
The Government controls neither the metallic 
nor the paper currency of the Colony03
He declared that a local Straits Settlements dollar was
’a condition precedent’ to a change to a gold standard
currency if it was desiredo The committee had been set up
at the request of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce which had
discussed the colony’s currency problems and called for
enquiry into the means of ’securing greater fixity of
exchange’o^ This committee was equally divided on the
question of fixity of exchange or otherwise, and agreement
was found only in the call for a British trade dollar, which
was approved in 1895« Opinion in the Malay States,
1« King, po9«
2. SSLCP 1909, Appo29? p.C84, Sec, of State to Gov.SS, 
SSNOol93 12 August 1909«
3° SSL CP 18953« App028, poC320, ’Report of the Committee, . . ' 
Sub-appoC, Memorandum addressed to the SCC by the Hon, 
G.So Murray, (a banker by profession), 22 July 1893»
4« Ibid,, poC256, A/Colo Sec. to SCC, 24 July 1893? conveying 
government^consent to the Chamber’s proposal. See also 
ante, p,350.
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incidentally, was just as divided»"*"
In 1897? when Japan changed to the gold standard* the 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce by a narrow majority of 17 to
p14 votes again called for fixity of the exchange rate» The 
government, however, decided to take no action in view of 
the enquiry then being conducted into the effects of the 
change in Indian c u r r e n c y I n  1902, however, the government 
and Chamber agreed that an overseas export should be 
consulted^ and Sir David Barbour who had served on the Indian 
Currency Committee was invited to be chairman of a committee 
of enquiry in o Straits Settlements currency which comprised 
representatives of the Colonial Office, the Treasury and the 
Straits Settlements Association in London» The committee 
took evidence in London and produced a 14-paged report which 
advocated the graduated conversion to a gold standard
5currency» The Report was adopted by the Straits Settlements 
1o Ibid», p » C257»
2° SCCAR 1 8 9 7 » ’Report by the sub-committee of the Chamber’, 
9 November 1897? PP=23-106» See also SSLCP 1 8 9 8 » App»34? 
SCC to Col»Sec» 4 February 1898, pp»C4l3-4°
3° SSLCP 1902, App»45? GoVoSS to Sec» of State? SS67 
9 March 1898, p»C467°
4« SCCAR 1902» App»G, SCC to ColoSeco, p»52 9 June 1902
and SCC to CoIoSec», 5 July 1902, p»55* For a discussion 
of possible causes that led to this change, see ante?
PP» 2 5 9 -6 1 o
5° Straits Settlements 
1903; Report, Cd»
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L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  and* e x c e p t  f o r  one a l t -e  r a t io n ,^ *  was 
im p lem en ted  i n  f u l l »
The B arbour  P l a n  c a l l e d  f o r  th e  s t r i k i n g  o f  a S t r a i t s  
S e t t l e m e n t s  d o l l a r  s p e c i f i c  to  th e  co lo n y  which was s i m i l a r  
to  t h e  Mexican  and o t h e r  s i l v e r  d o l l a r s *  When an a d e q u a te  
su p p ly  o f  S t r a i t s  d o l l a r s  was a v a i l a b l e  th e  o l d e r  d o l l a r s  
v/ere t o  he d e m o n e t i z e d ,  and the  e x p o r t  o f  the  new d o l l a r s  and 
th e  im p o r t  o f  o l d e r  d o l l a r s  were to  he p r o h i b i t e d *  As t r a d e  
expanded  h u t  n o t  t h e  s u p p ly  o f  t h e  new S t r a i t s  d o l l a r s ,
i t  was e n v i s a g e d  t h a t  t h i s  ' c u r r e n c y  s t a r v a t i o n '  would b r i n g  
abou t  t h e  d e s i r e d  b r e a k  w i t h  s i l v e r  and c au se  t h e  new S t r a i t s  
d o l l a r  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  i n  t e r m s  o f  g o ld ,  and  th e  exchange r a t e  
was t o  b e  f i x e d  a t  a c o n v e n i e n t  p o i n t*  S u p p l i e s  of  new d o l l a r s  
(which v/ere t o  be t o k e n  i n  v a lu e  i n s t e a d  o f  i n t r i n s i c )  v/ere 
t o  be i s s u e d  by th e  government  i n  exchange  f o r  g o ld  a t  t h e  
d e c l a r e d  r a t e *  T h is  was t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  system u se d  i n  
I n d i a  and t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  a s  w e l l ,  a l t h o u g h  i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
t h e  r a t e  o f  exchange was im m e d ia te ly  f i x e d .  The o p e r a t i o n  
in  th e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  was a d m i t t e d l y  slow bu t  i t  was 
recommended on t h e  g rounds  t h a t  i t  was ' p e r f e c t l y  s a f e ' *
The S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  (C o in ag e )  O rde r  o f  1903^ c a r r i e d  
out  t h e  recom m endat ions  o f  t h e  Barbour  Repor t*  For  the  
f i r s t  t ime i n  i t s  h i s t o r y  d o l l a r s  s p e c i f i c  to  t h e  S t r a i t s  
S e t t l e m e n t s  were s t r u c k  -  t h e  s p e c i e  r e s e r v e  o f  t h e  Note
1 .  See p* 366.
2. See P r id m o re ,  App.XXV, p*129<>
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G u a r a n te e  Fund b e i n g  s e n t  to  t h e  Bombay M ints  to  be r e ­
c o in e d  i n t o  t h e  new d o l l a r s »  The p a p e r  i s s u e  o f  t h e  co lony  
was d e c l a r e d  l e g a l  t e n d e r  i n  th e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  s t a g e s  o f  
t h e  change t o  t h e  g o ld  s t a n d a r d ,  a s t e p  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e j e c t e d  
by t h e  Barbour  Committee» Thus t h e  e a r l i e r  r e f o r m s  o f  th e  
Colony f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  an u r g e n t  c u r r e n c y  
p ro b lem  i n  th e  t w e n t i e t h  c en tu ry »
I n  J a n u a r y  1906 th e  exchange r a t e  of  th e  new S t r a i t s  
S e t t l e m e n t s  d o l l a r  was p eg g ed  a t  2 s »4h» which was i t s  c u r r e n t  
m a rk e t  v a lu e  and i t  h a s  b een  m a i n t a i n e d  t h e r e  o v e r  s ince»  
There  were a n x io u s  y e a r s  when s i l v e r  r o s e  i n  v a lu e  and d i d  
n o t  f a l l  a s  t h e  B arbour  Committee e x p e c t e d  bu t  the  s i t u a t i o n  
was sav ed  by r e d u c i n g  the  s i l v e r  c o n te n t  o f  the  l e g a l l y  
token S t r a i t s  d o l l a r s »
By 1906 t h e r e f o r e ,  the  main f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  Malayan 
c u r r e n c y  sys tem  h ad  ap pea red»  The d o l l a r  had  lo n g  been  
e s t a b l i s h e d  as  th e  u n i t  o f  money» A b s o lu t e  s e c u r i t y  o f  th e  
c o l o n y ’ s c u r r e n c y  was g u a r a n t e e d  by t h e  sys tem  o f  r e s e r v e s  
u s e d  f i r s t  f o r  the  government  n o t e  i s s u e  and  l a t e r  f o r  t h e  
new c u r r e n c y  sy s te m ,  u n d e r  which th e  su p p ly  o f  money was 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  go v e rn ed  by th e  payment o f  g o ld  t o  t h e  Crown 
Agents  in  London and t h e  i s s u e  of n o t e s  by t h e  C urrency  
Commissioners  i n  th e  colony» T h is  h a s  s i m i l a r i t i e s  w i th  
t h e  1895 a r r a n g e m e n t  which th e  banks  c o u ld  t a k e  b u l l i o n  
to  th e  I n d i a n  M ints  and r e c e i v e  i n  r e t u r n  B r i t i s h  t r a d e  
d o l l a r s »  There  was, l a s t l y ,  f i x i t y  of exchange  o f  th e
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S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  d o l l a r  i n  te rm s  of  s t e r l i n g ;  a l t h o u g h  
t h e  c u r r e n c y  of  the  co lo n y  was t h e o r e t i c a l l y  a go ld  exchange 
s t a n d a r d  i t  i s  more a c c u r a t e l y  a c o l o n i a l  exchange s ta n d ard , ,  
Prom 1906 u n t i l  t o d a y  no m ajor  changes  have  t o k e n  p l a c e  
i n  t h e  b a s i c  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h i s  system» Only more t e r r i t o r i e s  
-  t h e  f e d e r a t e d  and u n f e d e r a t e d  Malay s t a t e s  and th e  B r i t i s h  
p o s s e s s i o n s  in  Borneo were a c c e p t e d  a s  p a r t n e r s  o f  t h e  co lo n y  
i n  t h i s  sy s te m .
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